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University History Series

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND ITS CONSTITUENCIES 1983-1995

Volume II

On the Campuses: Chancellors, Faculty, Student

Interviews with:

Theodore L. Hullar
Clark Kerr
Julius R. Krevans, M.D.
Pedro Noguera
Glenn T. Seaborg
Neil J. Smelser
Martin Trow
Charles E. Young

With an Introduction by
John Douglass

Interviews Conducted by
Germaine LaBerge
and Ann Lage
in 1997-1999

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND ITS CONSTITUENCIES, 1983-1995

Volume II: *On the Campuses: Chancellors, Faculty, Student*, 2002, xvii, 332 pp.

Former chancellors, members of the Academic Council, and a student leader reflect on shared governance within the University of California; relationships between the campuses and the Office of the President; budget planning for existing and new campuses; the interplay between the state government, the UC administration, and the regents.

Interviews with THEODORE L. HULLAR, chancellor, Davis and Riverside; CLARK KERR, UC president emeritus; JULIUS R. KREVANS, M.D., chancellor, UCSF; PEDRO NOGUERA, ASUC president, 1985-1986; GLENN T. SEABORG, chancellor emeritus, Berkeley; NEIL J. SMELSER, faculty representative, Board of Regents, 1985-1987; MARTIN TROW, faculty representative, Board of Regents, 1990-1992; CHARLES E. YOUNG, chancellor emeritus, UCLA, 1969-1997.

Introduction by John Douglass, senior research fellow, Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley.

Interviews conducted by Germaine LaBerge and Ann Lage in 1997-1999 for the Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

A chorus line of chancellors, gathered for a Regents meeting, July 1989. Left to right: Jack Peltason, Irvine; Barbara Uehling, Santa Barbara; Ted Hullar, Davis; Chuck Young, Los Angeles; President Gardner; Mike Heyman, Berkeley; Julie Krevans, San Francisco; Dick Atkinson, San Diego; Robert Stevens, Santa Cruz; Rosemary Schraer, Riverside.

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Volume I
The Office of the President

Stephen A. Arditti	Director of State Governmental Relations, 1984-Present
William B. Baker	Vice President, Budget & University Relations, 1983-1996
Ronald W. Brady	Senior Vice President, Administration, 1983-1993
William R. Frazer	Senior Vice President, Academic Affairs, 1981-1991
Cornelius L. Hopper, M.D.	Vice President, Health Affairs, 1979-1999

Volume II
On the Campuses: Chancellors, Faculty, Student

Theodore L. Hullar	Chancellor at UC Riverside, 1985-1987, UC Davis, 1987-1993
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Julius R. Krevans	Chancellor at UC San Francisco, 1982-1993
Pedro Noguera	Professor of Education, Student Leader during the Anti-Apartheid Campaign
Glenn T. Seaborg	Chancellor, UC Berkeley, 1958-1961
Neil J. Smelser	University Professor, Faculty Representative to the Board of Regents, 1985-1987
Martin Trow	Professor of Public Policy, Faculty Representative to the Board of Regents, 1990-1992
Charles E. Young	Chancellor at UCLA, 1969-1997

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Regents and State Government Officials

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Richard G. Heggie	President of the UC Alumni Associations, Regent Ex Officio, 1988-1989
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Howard H. Leach	Regent of the University, 1990-2001
Steven A. Merksamer	Chief of Staff to Governor George Deukmejian
Dean A. Watkins	Regent of the University, 1969-1996
Harold M. Williams	Regent of the University, 1982-1994

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INTRODUCTION by John Aubrey Douglass

Observing the Rhythms of a Major University

The stories that unfold within these oral histories are conditioned by the peculiarities of the University of California. This great university is so much more than one or two major campuses. It is more than just Berkeley, or simply UCLA, or San Diego. The University of California is the largest land-grant university in the nation, a multicampus system of unique size, quality, and influence on society. Collectively, the university is a promise to the people of California. It serves the education and research needs of a dynamic and growing California—a state like no other in its demographic mix and economic prowess. Keeping up with the diverse needs of California has proven a significant challenge. Yet this institution also services a larger worldwide community. California gains considerable strength by the university's attraction of talent and its ability to garner global collaborations.

Most importantly for our purposes here, the university is also an academic enterprise with arguably the greatest level of autonomy of any public university in the nation--a distinction that provides a vital context for reading these oral histories. Simply stated, the University of California's status as a "public trust" in the state constitution means that lawmakers do not enjoy direct authority in directing its management. Only a handful of public universities have a similar status. To some measurable degree, this unusual level of autonomy has historically buffered the University of California from the political winds and temporal fashions pushed on other public universities. Indeed, this was the stated intention of those that crafted the historic amendment to the state constitution in 1879.

On the occasion of California's second constitutional convention, a delegate and Berkeley alumnus forcefully argued that without a legal separation from the legislature and the governor the university would be "adrift upon the boisterous sea of politics, sure to wreck to pieces on the rocks of partisan life and party contention." Another champion of the university, not only a delegate but a regent as well, claimed that without the amendment the university would be a "plaything" of politics. "As long as it is made subject to legislative caprice," he concluded, "so long as it can be made subject to the beck of politicians; so long as it can be made to subserve sectarian or political designs, it will never flourish." Their arguments accompanied by the deft use of parliamentary procedure won the day at the convention. Californians proceeded to approve the amendment as part of a new state constitution.

Yet the university is obviously not a wholly pragmatic organism insulated from the outside world. Its operation and history is full of politics, often heavily influenced by the demands of government and a larger public. But this plays out in ways that are somewhat different from other major universities. For example, the battle over affirmative action that marked the end of President Jack Peltason's tenure was part of a national debate. The ultimate decision, however, was that of the university's Board of Regents. Its deliberations alone resulted in a formal policy to end racial preferences in admissions, hiring, and contracting. In virtually any other state, the decision and rhetorical battle would have occurred within the halls of a state legislature. The only other recourse, a state constitutional amendment, would trump any action by a legislature or a governing body like the regents, in California or any other state. But in this instance, the University of California was dragged

into a harsh political battle precisely because of its legal authority, and because of the symbolism and momentum its decision could lend to the eventual passage of a constitutional amendment.

Arguably, such instances are not the norm. Arguably, they are not always bad. Such moments are evidence of the centrality of this institution in the lives of Californians. What is clear is how important this high level of autonomy has been for the university. It would not exist in the form it is today without this status. The university's organization and mission would have been unrecognizably altered.

This semi-autonomous legal condition also elevates the role of the Board of Regents and the leadership of the institution, its president, the chancellors, and academic leaders. It has historically fueled the building of a distinct academic culture. Autonomy offered the opportunity for university leaders to make major policy choices, including the creation of the nation's first multi-campus university, and the decision to be one of the most selective public universities in the nation in undergraduate admissions. It has influenced the university's internal organization, notably the notion of nine campuses with similar values, the same general mission and desire for excellence, unified admissions policies, and general equality in resource allocations. Unlike most multi-campus systems, each chancellor has, within the sphere of a dynamic set of campuses, an officially equal role in guiding the actions of the university president and the board of governors. Autonomy has also provided the conditions for creating a powerful faculty role in governance and management. The Academic Senate has a decipherable and a unique level of authority to help manage the university enterprise.

In a way that only personal observation can reflect, we are given in these pages an extremely informative glimpse into the world of this unique university, by a unique group of higher education leaders, working on the problems that belong to a distinct period of history. The subtleties of managing and guiding a large university system are readily exposed. The relative role of the president, the chancellors, the Board of Regents, and others are described within the context of real policy issues and problems.

Martin Trow, Clark Kerr, and others have in years past talked of the private and public lives of research universities. This dichotomy has special relevance to those in positions of leadership at the University of California. The private life of an institution is dynamic but relatively insular. In many ways, the work of faculty and the daily activities of students and administrative staff operate within a natural order, seemingly separate from the consternation of the outside world. Their lives beat with a regularity that attests to their focus on the task at hand: to gain new knowledge, to create, maintain and meet the requirements of a structured education, and to socialize and enjoy the fruits of a vibrant university environment. There is a sense of focused purpose that seems essential to our more traditional notions of the purpose of the academy. It is a place for learning and reflection, an important environment for young women and men making the transition from home to work, from youth to adulthood. And while there are many experiences within this realm--the life of the undergraduate major in engineering, the transfer student from an urban community college, the graduate student in history, the faculty member in physics, and the academic advisor or librarian--there remains a sense of a shared experience and shared values.

The public life comprises interaction with that outside world. For the University of California, the range of interactions and the responsibility to a larger public are substantial. The stakeholders continue to grow as the importance of higher education for socio-economic mobility and economic

prosperity multiply. The public life includes the interface of the university with lawmakers in the regular grind of budget hearings, and with economic interests who depend on the university's research prowess and its production of a talented labor pool. It includes the vocal concerns of a larger public worried over the impact of enrollment growth on their community, or potential changes in admissions requirements--essentially, the entrance gate to the private life of a great university system such as the University of California.

This dichotomy often comes under attack and shows signs of redefinition and erosion. Within the academy itself, faculty are redefining the notion of the academic community by creating alliances and close interaction with colleagues in other institutions, other nations, or in the corporate world. But even more important for this story, one sees in the history of places like the University of Michigan, San Francisco State, UC Berkeley, or UC Santa Barbara, spectacular instances of their vulnerability. The Free Speech Movement, civil rights, and the consternation over the Vietnam War provided a powerful and sequential mix where the private life seemingly dissipated in the cloud of closed campuses, occupied buildings, and roving bands of students confronting and being confronted by police. The pronounced problem with the university was, in no small measure, precisely its isolation. In the heat of an extended moment that shook the university, it appeared that the academic life would never be the same.

But the dichotomy did, in some form, return. One sees in the historical record a resurrection to an altered yet consistent rhythm, where the private and public once again settle into their respective havens. The histories exposed in these oral histories show these rhythms, offering the voices of the university's top echelons of leadership during the presidencies of David Gardner and Jack Peltason. Here one experiences moments of equilibrium, of a general peace between the internal and external worlds, and a sense of shared purpose, a relative tranquility within academia. There are also moments, indeed periods, of tumultuous dissent. There are clashes over budget cuts, over divestment in South Africa, affirmative action, retirement packages, between campuses, and between strong personalities.

These two realities, the private and public lives of an institution, are repeatedly alluded to as two presidents of the university, six chancellors, several vice presidents, academic senate leaders, regents, a governor and lawmakers, and those engaged in the never ending difficulties of university relations, recall their experiences during the 1980s and early 1990s. There are patterns of success and failures that relate to the designs and initiatives of individuals and groups. But there are also contextual problems that oftentimes engulf and transcend the talents of figures such as Presidents Gardner and Peltason, chancellors such as Charles Young, Mike Heyman, Chang-Lin Tien, Richard Atkinson, and others.

In short, periods of improving resources from the state, and to a lesser degree from the federal government, generally offer an environment of good feelings and opportunities for innovation. Periods of declining resources offer a whole different dynamics. Add to this another and correlated factor: the predilections of a university's governing board. Notes one of our observers, "There are only two major problems in higher education when dealing with any major campus or major system: resources and the quality of the board. That's all there is." When there are sufficient resources "to feed the enterprise," he continues, "nobody is very upset about anything, unless you have a board that's very obstreperous or becomes quite politicized or whatever." Another participant offers a similar observation: "A pot of Gold followed by hardship and back up again and down again." The swings influence the general morale and cohesion of the chancellors and the board. Similarly, he explains, "the faculty's mood would swing absolutely with these cycles. They would forget everything when it was good, and they would get mad when it was bad."

In 1983, David Gardner seized upon an improving economy and the sympathies of a new governor to help reverse a long period of declining state investment in the University of California. With this financial foundation forcefully pursued, he then demonstrated a startling ability to manage the Board of Regents while creating a sense of shared purpose among the chancellors—a group that included a number of very strong personalities. There were to be cracks in the armor, including the unwelcomed (by the president at least) but successful venture by lawmakers to alter the investment patterns in the university's retirement system and endowments. The first major public consternation over admissions since the early 1970s also erupted by the late 1980s. This time it concerned largely the removal of Asian-Americans from designation as an "underrepresented" group, which meant at that time favorable treatment in the admissions process, at the increasingly competitive campuses such as Berkeley. But the general pattern was of order and progress for most of Gardner's tenure, and even grand visions—notably a carefully crafted process to set enrollment targets for existing campuses and to then initiate the planning of new campuses. This effort was crucial for the eventual approval for a tenth university campus at Merced.

The period of equilibrium began showing signs of erosion by the late 1980s and completely dissipated by the early 1990s. By the time Jack Peltason entered the presidency in 1993, the realities of a major recession, one of the worst since the economic downturn of the Great Depression, meant huge cuts to all of public higher education and California's already beleaguered schools. The university faced an approximately 25 percent cut over a four-year period in its state budget—the virtual sole source of funding for faculty positions. Once again, the university's autonomy would prove critical. Autonomy meant that UC had the legal authority to create its own retirement system. Other public university retirement systems are part and parcel of state-operated retirement programs, or in a few cases part of a larger private consortium. UC had gathered, thankfully, a large surplus during the previous period of relative economic prosperity during the late 1980s. An early retirement program for faculty and staff modeled on corporate strategies offered a means to soften the staggering loss of state funding, and essentially saved UC from the perils of major cuts to academic programs. The California State University system, for example, had no such option.

Despite the mitigation offered by not one, but a total of three early retirement programs—each offered in succession as the annual budget cuts accumulated—the financial problems remained severe. President Peltason was caught in a period of decline, and the direct and tangential strains of these circumstances on the university are clearly documented in these interviews. President Gardner's departure had also corresponded with controversy regarding compensation for himself and the chancellors that, in the midst of a severe recession, generated public criticism of the university.

Added to this was a Board of Regents that had begun, in some form, a process of rebellion against the careful management of David Gardner and more specifically the presidency. The composition of its members had also changed. It had included a balance of liberal and conservative members in the early 1980s who, under Gardner's influence and in better economic times, had a good working relationship. A succession of more conservative appointees altered this balance. The new mix would eventually lend itself to a new dynamic. One regent in particular desired to interject a larger political agenda—namely affirmative action—into the board and the university's deliberations. And he cleverly did so. A significant feature of his actions was to question the very credibility of not only the president, but also the administrative leadership of the university. The times had changed.

All of these factors brought a sort of implosion to the morale and management of the university, another instance of the melding of the private and public life that shocks the university. Even the most effective leader of the university, of a campus, is at times swimming against a great tide. Peltason and other subsequent university leaders would have their share of victories, but there was little time for thinking ahead. There was no talk of new campuses. The early and mid-1990s was a period of reacting, coping, modest reorganization, and recovery.

Were this and similar periods of strong outside influences on the university good or bad? By 2000, was the university stronger or weaker for such trials? Whatever your answer, such moments in which the private and the public congeal and combust are a reality. There is some marginal evidence that their length and depth are intensifying. The reasons for their pervasiveness are multiple. The university has an expanding number of stakeholders and constituents, including a growing and demographically diverse population that seeks entrance to the university. Industry and government desire greater university involvement in promoting economic development. State and local lawmakers want performance goals and greater accountability. There are stresses and strains of decreasing funding by the state for enrollment growth, and the difficulties of physical expansion in an era of significantly expanded environmental laws. Perhaps at the most basic level, the increasing importance of higher education, both real and perceived, in turn generates greater public concern and scrutiny.

Yet we have witnessed a return to a relatively healthy balance between the private and the public life—correlated not incidentally with an improved economy. The duration of this more healthy balance is an open question. Another set of budgetary problems loom on the horizon as of this writing.

In digesting these histories, one is clearly struck that there are also private and public lives for the individuals attempting to guide a vast and complex public university. One sees the rhythms of their work and actions. Our interviewees speak frankly and offer examples of both their pragmatism and miscalculations, their character strengths and flaws. There are candid observations regarding their colleagues. Gratefully, one reads sympathetic recollections of the actions and motives of even their harshest critics. Time seems to heal wounds, but there is also evidence of a remarkable level of collegiality. Most importantly, one gains insight into the complexity of working in an organization that is highly decentralized. The private work of the president, chancellors, and those who work with them is, in large part, devoted to managing the institution and protecting it from the vacillating demands of the outside world. They seek to create the conditions that allow the private life to flourish under a semi-invisible hand. Time and time again, much of their effort is focused on gaining resources, reacting to lawmaker and public demands, circumventing intrusive, sometimes ultraistic proposals, or considering ways to absorb financial blows.

Ambitions, character flaws, sad circumstances, all add to the difficulties of managing such a large public university. This is a private life that remains largely hidden. They operate much of the time within a cadre of administrators and faculty leaders, and confer in an environment that few in the university itself really know much about. Yet it is pivotal to the health of the university.

From the perspective of institutional memory, and for understanding the history of this university, important and interesting questions are answered in these oral histories. This ranges from major policy and administrative decisions to simply gaining a greater understanding of organizational behavior and the nature of leadership. Why was Jack Peltason chosen as president? What were the true circumstances behind the Board of Regents' decision to end University of California endowment and

retirement stock investments in South Africa; or to effectively rescind their own long-standing policies on affirmative action—two actions that came against the recommendation of university presidents? Why would Governor Deukmejian offer to resurrect the previously long decline in the budget of the university in the period of one year? Was it with fervent conviction or ambivalence that the university's leadership renewed federal contracts for UC's management of three national laboratories? How did the chancellors of two academically and politically powerful campuses view each other?

We may not learn all in these recollections, but we gain significant insight. There also is corroboration offered in a process that includes so many voices independently telling their stories. And while there is a private life, of deals struck, strategies attempted, and personal interactions that require confidentiality, one sees that most decision-making involved a very open process of consultation. In part, this is because of the nature of this public university. Decision making on most major issues almost always includes an elaborate, oftentimes exasperating process of discussion and meetings that reflect a culture of collaboration and balances of authority.

The University of California is not like a private corporation. It is not like any other agency of state government, such as the Department of Transportation. Major decisions are subject to the engagement of large number of actors and groups that share responsibility in areas such as admissions, academic personnel policies, and student aid. In the vast majority of cases, the deliberations are substantial. Few directives are issued from on high. This means that the power of persuasion and personal interaction is vital. To a great extent, a president or a chancellor must think hard about the integrity of an action. In part, this is because she or he will need to defend not only a decision or voiced desire, but the path used to arrive at it.

Actors in the university must also carefully sustain their reputation for reasoned decision making, as it will likely influence their power of persuasion in confronting the next problem or in promoting new initiatives. Not all succeed in navigating these waters. One also finds that specific personalities, such as those of a chancellor, fit or do not fit the temperament of their campus, or the management styles of different presidents and vice presidents. The chemistry of personalities is significant.

With these interviews, one gains a greater sense of the challenges of leading the University of California and its various campuses. It is a difficult job—a calling if you will. One also sees that our actors in the time period covered here are not, to hark back to a clamor of another period of the university presidency, simply part of a mindless "machine." They are not simply seeking the path of tradition or accommodation—although they are sometimes forced into such compromises. Presidents, chancellors, lawmakers, and others engaged in guiding this university are only human. Here they freely attest to this simple observation.

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Berkeley, California
March 2002

PROJECT HISTORY by Ann Lage

The oral history interviews collected in *The University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995*, provide a range of perspectives on the governance of the statewide university system and its response to societal and political forces during the presidencies of David P. Gardner and Jack W. Peltason. The twenty-four interviewees include senior administrators in the Office of the President, chancellors and faculty from five campuses, seven regents, and three state government officers.

The need for such a project became apparent in the course of conducting an oral history with David Gardner.[1] As he examined the issues, challenges, and accomplishments of his nine years as president (1983-1992), he emphasized the importance of his relationships with regents, the governor and legislature, chancellors, and the Academic Council, as well as the contributions of his senior staff. We discussed the benefits of documenting the university during his presidency more broadly and had several conversations about potential interviewees. In 1996, the Regional Oral History Office (ROHO) submitted a proposal to President Richard Atkinson and received funding to conduct focused oral histories on the Office of the President and its diverse constituencies during the Gardner presidency.

During the early Gardner years the university benefitted from a strong state economy, negotiating with the new Deukmejian administration in Sacramento for an enhanced university budget after years of decline. Funding was available for new academic programs and increased faculty salaries. Analyzing long-range enrollment trends, the president's office adjusted enrollment targets on existing campuses and undertook planning for three new campuses. Controversial issues arose, such as divestment in South Africa, national laboratory management, and affirmative action policies. In the final years of the Gardner presidency, declining state budgets set a new tone, a creative retirement incentive program helped ameliorate declining university budgets, and the compensation packages for senior university officials came under attack. These trends and issues, as well as reflections on managerial and governance themes, were examined by our interviewees in this project.

A year after the project was underway, we embarked on an oral history with Jack Peltason[2] and extended the scope of this project to include his three-year term as president, from 1992 to1995. These were difficult years in which the university dealt with the worst state budget

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[1]David Pierpont Gardner, "A Life in Higher Education: Fifteenth President of the University of California, 1983-1992," conducted 1995-1996, Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, 1997.

[2] Jack W. Peltason, "Political Scientist and Leader in Higher Education, 1947-1995: Sixteenth President of the University of California, Chancellor at UC Irvine and the University of Illinois," conducted 1998, Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, 2001.

since the Great Depression and the Board of Regents voted, against the advice of the president, chancellors, and academic senates, to end affirmative action in admissions and hiring. The regents selected a site for a tenth campus, and the president's office negotiated a four-year budget pact with Governor Wilson. These and other issues from the Peltason presidency were covered in many of the project interviews; we regret that budget and time constraints prevented us from broadening the scope of our earliest interviews or adding other interviewees who were central to the Peltason years only.

Narrators

Narrators included six key senior administrators in the Gardner presidency, most of whom continued into or through the Peltason years. Collected in Volume I: *The Office of the President*, interviews with vice presidents William Baker, Ronald Brady, William Frazer, and Cornelius Hopper, and Director of State Government Relations Stephen Arditti provide insights into the budget process, university relations, interaction with gubernatorial staff and the legislature, national lab management, employee benefit programs, academic planning, the knotty problems of administering health affairs, the UCOP's relations with regents, faculty, and campus officials, and managerial styles in the office of the president.[3]

For Volume II: *On the Campuses*, chancellors from UCLA, Riverside, Davis, and UCSF were interviewed on their relations with the Office of the President and the functioning of the Council of Chancellors. Professors Neil Smelser and Martin Trow were interviewed as faculty members prominent in university goverance circles for years; both served as faculty representative to the Board of Regents during this time period, and both are sociologists whose fields of study include higher education. Professor Pedro Noguera, a student leader in the anti-apartheid demonstrations and ASUC president at Berkeley during David Gardner's presidency, added a unique student's perspective. Former Berkeley chancellors, Clark Kerr and Glenn Seaborg, who had served as mentors to David Gardner, also gave short interviews for the project. These perspectives from the campuses will be supplemented by oral histories with Berkeley chancellors Heyman and Tien, now in process, by the oral history with UCSC Chancellor Karl Pister,[4] and by President Peltason's oral history, which documents his eight years as chancellor at Irvine.

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[3] Larry Hershman, director of the budget in the president's office, has sealed his oral history until he retires from the university. A fuller account of their years in the UCOP can be expected in full oral histories in process at ROHO with Vice President William Baker and Cornelius Hopper.

[4] "Karl S. Pister: UCSC Chancellorship, 1991-1996," Regional History Project, University of California, Santa Cruz, 2000. Oral histories with I. Michael Heyman and Chang-Lin Tien, in process, ROHO. A lengthy oral memoir of Chancellor Charles Young will soon be available from UCLA's Oral History Program.

A major theme in the Gardner and Peltason oral histories is the relationship of the Office of the President with the Board of Regents and with state government. In Volume III, interviews with seven regents discuss the functioning and culture of the board, major issues addressed, and working relationships with the presidents and senior administrators. Dean Watkins, electrical engineer and businessman from Palo Alto, was first appointed to the board in 1969 by Governor Ronald Reagan. Harold William, a Jerry Brown appointee in 1982, was president of the Getty Trust in Los Angeles. Three Deukmejian appointees among the narrators are Roy Brophy, joining the regents in 1986 after serving on governing boards of California community colleges and the state university system; Meredith Khachigian, a community volunteer from San Clemente and wife of a Deukmejian political consultant, appointed in 1987 after service on the Master Plan Commission; and Howard Leach, businessman from San Francisco, appointed to the board in 1990 because of his background in agriculture. We also interviewed two alumni association representatives, Walter Hoadley and Richard Heggie, who held ex officio positions on the board in these years.

Interviews with three representatives of state government are also included in Volume III. Former Governor George Deukmejian and his chief of staff Steve Merksamer recall the forging of the governor's commitment to restore adequate state funding to the university in 1983, regental appointments, and issues of concern such as divestment in South Africa. Assemblyman Robert Campbell comments as a legislator who had purse-string power as chairman of the Ways and Means subcommittee for education from 1882-1995. Other oral histories completed or in process at ROHO and other oral history programs will help round out the picture on the Board of Regents and from Sacramento.[5]

Oral History as Research Method

Oral history provides unique and irreplaceable sources for historical study. It preserves the reflections and perspectives of those who have participated in historical events, documenting with firsthand accounts how events happened, how decisions were made, and the behind-the-scenes interplay that underlies the public face of an institutional policy. Beyond documenting what happened and how, the words of participants reveal the personal and social contexts and the institutional and political constraints which profoundly shape events but are most often not apparent in the written record. Furthermore, they provide a record of how people remember and understand their past, often an indication of personal values and cultural meanings.

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[5]Oral histories are in process with former state assemblyman Tom Bates, who represented the Berkeley district for most of these years, and now State Senator John Vasconcellos, for many years chair of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. Former State Senator Nicholas Petris, who chaired the budget subcommittee on education, reflects on his relationship with the university in a memoir completed in 1996. Researchers should also check the California State Archives State Government Oral History Program for related interviews.

Oral history once was avoided by traditional scholars. It is messy. As a reader of these three volumes will note, different participants may remember events quite differently. They provide multiple explanations for why things happened and assign different weights to the significance of particular actions. But it is that very quality of messiness that many researchers value, for oral history accounts--particularly a series of oral histories on the same topic--restore the complexity and subjectivity of the lived experience to the historical narrative and challenge a "one-truth" approach to historical writing.

By making connections between individuals' personal backgrounds and cultural frameworks and their course of action in the professional or public arena, oral histories put a personal face on history. As the rubric of the sixties, "the personal is political," becomes more widely accepted in the scholarly world, oral history takes its place alongside traditional written records as source material for historical study.

The methodology as practiced by the Regional Oral History Office begins with trained interviewers with a background in the field of inquiry and a grounding in relevant research materials. Germaine LaBerge, Ann Lage, and Suzanne Riess have conducted interviews for ROHO's University History Series for many years; Carole Hicke conducts interviews on California state government. Research for the Gardner and Peltason interviews provided the basis for planning this project. We read published interviews and articles, newspaper accounts, and minutes of Board of Regents' meetings, and consulted with colleagues of the presidents, including some who became interviewees for this project. The Gardner and Peltason oral histories were themselves rich resources for themes and topics to be explored from the diverse perspectives of our narrators in this series, as was the oral history with President Emeritus David Saxon, conducted by the UCLA Oral History Program. As narrators were selected, interviewers focused their research on pertinent topics and provided their interviewees with a preliminary outline of topics to be covered.

Interviews most often took place on the narrators' homeground, in their homes or offices. They varied in length from one to six hours. Twenty-four interviews, more than sixty hours, were recorded from March 1997 to May 1999. Tapes were transcribed verbatim and lightly edited for accuracy of transcription and clarity. During their review of the transcripts, narrators were asked to clarify some passages and give additional information when needed. Most narrators made only minor changes to their words; a few made more substantive revisions. Interview histories precede each oral history, giving further information about the interviewing and editing process. Final preparation of the oral histories included entering narrators' modifications, preparing indexes, the gathering of photographs and other supporting materials, printing and binding. In time and with narrators' permission, many oral histories will be mounted on the ROHO website for greater accessibility by researchers.

The resulting three volumes of twenty-three interviews are not a complete story, by any means, but along with the oral histories of Presidents Gardner and Peltason and other university and state government leaders, they will be an important component of any effort to understand the history and governance of the university in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

We thank John Douglass, senior research fellow at the Center for Studies in Higher Education at Berkeley, for his illuminating introduction to the volumes. We also want to thank President Atkinson and Vice President C. Judson King for their understanding of the importance of documenting the history of the University of California and their support for university history projects, including this one.

The Regional Oral History Office, a division of the Bancroft Library, was established in 1954 to augment through tape-recorded memoirs the Library's materials on the history of California and the West. One of its major areas of investigation has been the history of the University of California; a listing of oral history interviews in the University History Series follows the appendix in each volume. Copies of all interviews are available for research use in The Bancroft Library and in the UCLA Department of Special Collections. Tapes of the interview sessions are available for listening in The Bancroft Library, which also houses the archival records of the Office of the President. The Regional Oral History Office is under the direction of Richard Cándida Smith, Director, and the administrative direction of Charles B. Faulhaber, James D. Hart Director of The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Ann Lage, Project Coordinator
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
March 2002

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

University History Series

The University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995

Theodore L. Hullar

Chancellor at UC Riverside, 1985-1987, UC Davis, 1987-1993

An Interview Conducted by
Germaine La Berge
in 1997

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Since 1954 the Regional Oral History Office has been interviewing leading participants in or well-placed witnesses to major events in the development of northern California, the West, and the nation. Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through tape-recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. The tape recording is transcribed, lightly edited for continuity and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewee. The corrected manuscript is indexed, bound with photographs and illustrative materials, and placed in The Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, and in other research collections for scholarly use. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account, offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is reflective, partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable.

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It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows:

Theodore L. Hullar, "Chancellor at UC Riverside, 1985-1987, UC Davis, 1987-1993," an oral history conducted in 1997 by Germaine La Berge in *The University of California Office of the President and Its Constitutencies, 1983-1995, Volume II: On the Campuses: Chancellors, Faculty, Student*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 2002.

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INTERVIEW HISTORY--Theodore L. Hullar

Theodore L. Hullar served as chancellor at two campuses of the University of California--Riverside (1985-1988) and Davis (1988-1992). He therefore has a unique perspective on the presidency of the university during the latter part of the twentieth century.

Described by some as "a personable whirlwind," Dr. Hullar took time out of a series of meetings in San Francisco to meet with the interviewer at a Fisherman's Wharf motel coffee shop on December 2, 1997. Articulate and focused, he reflected on the character of the two different campuses and on the nature of the university--for three hours.

UC Riverside Chancellor Tomas Rivera hired Ted Hullar away from Cornell University where he was both professor of natural resources and Director of the Agricultural Experiment Station in 1984. When Tomas Rivera died unexpectedly, Dr. Hullar honored his promise to him and moved to Riverside serving under acting chancellor Dan Aldrich. UC President David Gardner asked Hullar to move into that position in 1985.

In the interview which follows, he exudes excitement about the Riverside campus--both how he found it and how it grew during his tenure there. When David Gardner asked him to move to Davis in 1988, Dr. Hullar was reluctant to leave Riverside, as Riverside was reluctant to lose him. But move he did, to promote further growth and change at UC Davis also.

Dr. Hullar covers topics specific to the campuses in this oral history but also reflects on the university as a whole--from Council of Chancellors' meetings, to relations with the Office of the President, to hard decisions made when the 1990's economy took a nosedive. Theodore Hullar is a man who wrestles with issues in order to improve situations; his reflections are substantive, well thought out and valuable for future researchers in the field of higher education.

The three tapes were transcribed at the Regional Oral History Office (ROHO) and lightly edited for clarity. Dr. Hullar looked carefully at the transcript for several months before returning it with minor changes. Back at Cornell as Director of the Center for the Environment, he spent time on the phone with the interviewer refining the wording. The interview was then final typed and indexed at ROHO.

Germaine LaBerge, Interviewer/Editor
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
May 2000

Regional Oral History Office
Room 486 The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please write clearly. Use black ink.)

Your full name Theodore Lee Hullar

Date of birth 19 March 1935 Birthplace Prescott, WI

Father's full name Melvin Lee Hullar

Occupation Postal service worker Birthplace Forest Lake, MN

Mother's full name Edna Chrystalia Nelson (Hullar)

Occupation Homemaker/teacher Birthplace Afton, MN

Your spouse Joan Judith Miller (Hullar)

Occupation Librarian/teacher Birthplace Chicago, IL

Your children Theodore William Hullar; b. 9 Feb 66
Timothy Everett Hullar; b. 6 June 68

Where did you grow up? Hastings, MN (0-6); Minneapolis, MN (6-28)

Present community Ithaca, NY 14850

Education K-12, Minneapolis, MN, Roosevelt H.S. (10-12 grade).
B.S., Univ of Minnesota, 1957. PhD. (Biochemistry), Univ of Minnesota, 1963

Occupation(s) Professor (1964-74). Public administrator (1974-79).
Professor (1979-present). Chancellor (1985-1994)

Areas of expertise Chemistry. Biochemistry. Environmental science.
Public policy and administration. Environmental management

Other interests or activities Hiking, walking, canoeing, travel, woodworking.
music, reading, public affairs

Organizations in which you are active Environmental, social

INTERVIEW WITH THEODORE L. HULLAR

I ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 1984-1994

[Date of Interview: December 2, 1997] ##[1]

Personal Background

Hullar: I'm troubled by this interview, by this discussion, because I always tend to look at what can be better, not be a publicist for what is good. One of the concerns I have for this discussion is that I may well give too much attention to what could have been better.

LaBerge: Well, you could add a little personal statement about that.

Hullar: It's not a very felicitous characteristic, only focusing on what could be better because people take it as criticism and I don't mean it that way. I am a change agent. I think as a change agent because I always believed--. Well, it's one of the Eastern religions who believe no matter how good, or what the quality is of a work of art, you must deliberately make a mistake, because nothing can be perfect. Only God is perfect. Therefore, in any work of great creation in the service of your God, you cannot be perfect.

So, I always do believe that there is opportunity for improvements. I think, actually, everybody does because that's what animates us as human beings. It's how we're different from other sentient creatures.

LaBerge: Okay, we like to start with a little personal background, so tell me when and where you were born and a little bit about your education.

Hullar: Sure. I was born on March 19, 1935, in a small town in Wisconsin, because that was where the hospital was. I grew up in Hastings, Minnesota, which is now a suburb of the Twin Cities, it's about twenty-five miles away. At six, I moved to Minneapolis and did all my schooling there. I went to the University of Minnesota and got both of my degrees there.

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[1]## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcript.

LaBerge: Your degrees are in?

Hullar: The bachelor's degree is in what would now be called applied biochemistry, and the graduate degree, Ph.D., in biochemistry.

LaBerge: Do you mind telling me the year?

Hullar: No, 1963 for the Ph.D., and '57 for the B.S. In '63 and '64, I was at the State University of New York at Buffalo on an NSF [National Science Foundation] postdoc for a fellowship in medicinal chemistry, and then I was invited to stay there and I was appointed to the faculty in 1964. I was on the faculty of medicinal chemistry until 1974 at which time I took a one-year leave of absence to serve as the charter commissioner for the Erie County Department of Environmental Quality. They were just forming a department, they wanted an active environmentalist and scientist, preferably with a Ph.D. I fit those requirements. After serving in that position for just one year, I then became a deputy commissioner for programs and research in the New York State's Department of Environmental Conservation.

In March of '79, I joined Cornell University, where I served first as associate director of the Agricultural Experiment Station, and then as director, and also as professor of natural resources. I was at Cornell from '79 to '84.

UC Riverside, Executive Vice Chancellor

Hullar: It was in 1984 that I was selected to be the executive vice chancellor at UC Riverside [University of California at Riverside].

LaBerge: How did that come about?

Hullar: Well, it came about because a senior person on the agricultural side of the university administration, knew me and my work and said, "Ted, they've not seen anybody like you in this search. I think they should because they've only seen," and then he named a set of disciplines. I don't now remember what those were.

LaBerge: Who was this?

Hullar: This was Lowell Lewis, a good personal and professional friend back then and remains so today. He said, "They've not seen anybody like you with the kind of agriculture and environmental background that you bring. They've seen people more out of the normal arts and sciences mode." I said, "Well, I'm not really interested in moving." He encouraged me to be interested. I said, "Well, okay. I'll be happy to be interviewed," or something like that. As you might say, the rest is history, because the interviews went very well.

[Chancellor] Tomás Rivera selected me. I immediately, upon his offer, said yes in my heart, and in a few days I said yes verbally to him. Tomás, to me, is one of the most interesting persons I've ever met. Unfortunately, he died in May of 1984 of a massive cardiac failure, unexpected. He had been under a great deal of pressure, and in that sense, it could have been the pressure that really caused his very untimely death. He and I were the same year in age, separated only by about nine months. He was a migrant farm worker in Minnesota when I was working on my uncle's farm, so we probably worked in the fields on the same hot days only separated by seventy-five to one hundred miles and time. He was a poet, as you know, and had a great love for the campus, and a very gentle person but with deep personal values so it would have been a lot of fun working with him. Well, that wasn't to be.

Chancellor at Riverside

Hullar: Dan Aldrich was leaving as chancellor at UC Irvine [University of California at Irvine] and [President] David Gardner asked Dan to be acting chancellor at UC Riverside. They then had a search and I was selected to be chancellor. I was chancellor at Riverside for two years, and then David Gardner asked me to consider being a candidate for the chancellorship at UC Davis [University of California at Davis].

Again, I was reluctant because we were having, frankly, a very good time at Riverside. It was very enjoyable, very stimulating, very positive; we were getting a lot of things done, things that the campus wanted to do, that I think others wanted us to do, certainly the people in the community were very, very enthusiastic at this point, and my wife and I were enjoying ourselves very much in that very positive environment. David called, and I said, "If you want that to be a consideration, to move to Davis, I'll talk to the committee if that's what you'd like." He said, "That's what I would like," and I did and I was selected and that's how I came to Davis.

LaBerge: Just in that, because we want to talk about David Gardner's leadership and the way he works with people, did you have a choice about it?

Hullar: I think I did. It was an interesting conversation with David because the phone rang and it was during an event at the chancellor's residence, a social event, and he gave me a sense of what he wanted to talk about and even then I think I said two things. Number one, "David, I think I better call you back, because I'm at this event, and it's going to take more time I think than just a few minutes." Then, I said, "Are you sure you want to do this," or words to that effect. He allowed then as to how, yes, he was sure he wanted to invite me to consider this at least as a possibility; he didn't offer anything because there was a normal process, of course.

So, I said, "Well, okay, I'll call you back." So I did and we talked some more and I said I did not think it was a good idea and for the reasons I just gave that--. Let me expand on that. The Riverside campus, in a sense, has been the runt of the litter to use an agricultural

term; it's not a positive term. I think, actually, that probably describes the way Riverside may have felt about itself and the way others may have felt about it. I didn't feel that at all. I felt this was a campus that had a great deal of potential. It clearly had a great deal of quality, far more quality than I think either the campus people or the outside world was giving it credit for.

Building on Riverside's Strengths

Hullar: It was almost an ideal situation given the demographic changes [such as] population increases, and the ethnic and racial profiles of the state. It had this aspiring faculty who really wanted to be something different than they were. They really wanted to grab a hold of the situations and turn them in such a way that the future in all respects looked positive. They had been through, of course, the smog episode where the mayor said Riverside is the smog capitol of the U.S. That was meant by the mayor to be positive and, of course, it turned out to be one of the most damaging statements ever made, I think, by a public official. That attitude affected the entire community and it affected the campus, but again I say, without, in my judgment, justification as regards to quality and the capacity of the campus to aspire and achieve.

Well, what we did in two years, that first year as executive vice chancellor and my second year there as chancellor, we turned around just about everything that was necessary. The enrollment started increasing, we introduced new senior staff to the campus, we set about hiring additional faculty commensurate with the enrollment increases. The community attitudes changed from whatever they were before I got there, and I don't know what they were, to very, very positive. There was a real bullish attitude about the campus.

LaBerge: How did you do that?

Hullar: By listening very carefully to people, by being, in a sense, very strong in what I personally felt about the campus. It's what I just described and I would say that to anybody who would listen. I didn't do it high on a soap box and "I'm here to tell you about the world of tomorrow." I didn't do that. I just did it through actions and, frankly, through a lot of kinetic energy, by working with people, by working long hours, by engaging people, by caring about them, by listening to them, by trying to do whatever possible to help individuals and groups of persons achieve their aspirations.

Personnel and Community Relations

Hullar: I did it also by some pretty clear thinking of what we needed to do regarding staff. There were some persons in positions who were not functioning as well as they might, and I

would have rather sober-sided conversations and we made some personnel changes. We brought new people in. We created at least two, if not three or more, positions that were crucial to the future of the campus.

LaBerge: What were they?

Hullar: One was the vice chancellor for university relations and development, and another was an assistant vice chancellor for enrollment management. Those were new positions, both were critically needed by the campus because enrollment, or lack of enrollment, was one of the chief problems of the campus and therefore one of the chief challenges.

I also did it by working closely with persons in the community, civic leaders, and again, it was by paying attention to what they said, caring about what they said, responding to them, being available, participating in the events out in the community, speaking to whatever group asked, being very responsive to their interests and linking the University of California at Riverside to the community and vice versa, in a sense, being a partnership-making mechanism. A number of the ideas that we created there are now being fulfilled, much of the development on University Avenue leading to that campus was conceived of when we were there.

I remember coming into a Christmas party with an idea about one aspect of the Route 60-University area. I said, "Let's just think of it this way, let's assume the land is vacant, what could we put on it?" Well, they never thought that way before. The land became vacant and now there's a great deal being put on it. I think I could sketch out right now what the plan is because it's very similar to the one we created mainly in words, not with a lot of design contracts, but mainly with words.

It was that kind of activity with the community, we did the same thing on campus. We were instrumental in making sure that the U.S. Department of Agriculture and its agricultural research service thought positively about shifting the USDA salinity laboratory from the west side of Riverside to the east side of Riverside and to put it right on the Riverside campus. We did the arrangements on campus to do that and worked closely with the congressional delegation, mainly George Brown to that end, and also with the USDA officials, so it was taking advantage of those opportunities.

Combining Roles of Professor and Administrator

LaBerge: How did you know how to do this when you had been a professor?

Hullar: I've always been interested in administration. Let me put it differently, when I look back on my life, it's clear I've always been interested in administration. I have gravitated to situations where there was something to be done, and I'm very willing to engage ideas and to engage people in what would seem to be a positive and common enterprise, and that dates back to my high school years.

LaBerge: Were you student body president and things like that?

Hullar: No, I wasn't student body president. I probably pushed too hard to be student body president. [laughter] I'm not one of these people who like positions because one likes to be in a position. That's just not part of my motivation, that probably puts me in about the third standard deviation from the norm. But I'm in these positions because I really have an interest in life being better, the world being better, an activity or project succeeding, an idea being implemented, there being a new way of doing things, whatever it might be of that genre.

LaBerge: What in high school did you do sort of in that vein?

Hullar: I was very active in Boy Scouting, and I was the leader of one of the regional honor organizations. I probably did more of it, actually, in the university where I was organizing all kinds of activities regarding social services council, I was president of that. There was a student religious council, I was president of that. During the time of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, we organized, this is in Minneapolis now, a clothing drive and I was responsible for that and responsible for getting everything sorted out. I just tend to gravitate to those situations, and I just carried that on when I joined the faculty at SUNY [State University of New York] Buffalo.

LaBerge: So, this came naturally to you?

Hullar: Yes, I think it did. Lots of people want to be in these positions, they plot their course to be in these positions, they do everything that's necessary. They know how to hold their hands and hold their face, and tailor themselves. They think a lot about what to say, and what not to say, and when to say it, or when not to say. I just don't think about those things, maybe my record shows it too. [laughter] What you see is what you get with me.

LaBerge: When you came to Riverside, did you also have a position on the faculty?

Hullar: Yes, as a professor of biochemistry. The position was 110 percent chancellor and 0 percent professor; it was an absolutely full-time job.

Interaction with President David Gardner

LaBerge: What kind of support or interaction did you have with the president when you were at Riverside? Let's just concentrate on that.

Hullar: It was of several different kinds, I'm not going to get all of this out the first time, I think, because there's a lot to it. I think, first of all, you asked earlier about David Gardner, you asked if David Gardner gave me a choice in moving to Davis, the answer is yes. I could have said no and I think he would have respected that. I didn't say no.

Davis is an intriguing campus, and it has been one of the significant campuses regarding agriculture and environment, so there was a lot of fit between me [and it]. Also, I'm very much interested in the engineering and the physical sciences and also, particularly, in the social sciences and humanities. I really am interested in those, I read a lot in those areas, I participate in arts events, although I'm not a performing artist of any kind, at least not anymore. I used to be as a little kid but not now. Davis was a full campus in that respect, approximately 18,000 or 19,000 students, and there was a strong belief, on the Davis campus, that what it needed to do was to get going again.

It was broadly, broadly stated that it was too languid, too passive, not fast enough afoot, and that changes addressing all those matters needed to be made. This was all really quite new to me, I just absorbed these kinds of views as they would be stated to me. I remember once being, this is when I was at Cornell, I was in a conference in Washington, D.C. and a person from that campus said, "Well, this campus needs somebody like you." I don't think that was meant as any disrespect to the then chancellor, Jim Meyer, who just said, "Where the world is and where we are, are not coincident, and we need to get more to where the world is."

My first interaction with David Gardner was at the time of Tomás' death. He called me and told me about it. I had heard it from the executive vice chancellor, Carl[ton] Bovell. David was very straightforward, he said, "You're coming in as executive vice chancellor. Do you think you can do it? Do you still want to come?" I said, "I think I can do it and certainly I'll come, I made a commitment." Many people were surprised that I did go. I said there was no choice, I had made the commitment to Tomás, and I will fulfill that commitment irrespective of what it may mean to me personally. If it worked out in terms of success on both sides, fine; if it didn't [work out], well, then that was a commitment I had made and I would take those consequences.

LaBerge: Could you go back to Cornell, did you have that option?

Hullar: No, I did not have that--. Well, excuse me, I think I did have that option but it was never discussed. It was never discussed when I was there, it was never discussed during that time. Then the question came of who was going to be acting chancellor, and here's where I saw David's personality, and his firmness, or his resolve in action.

I got a call that I should call him and I was actually on my way to Riverside too, I had a meeting with folks, and he and I connected and he was very clear. He said, "You maybe can do the job of acting chancellor, but you've never been on this campus, you've never been in UC, I think it best if we take another course," and I agreed with him. He told me who the person would be, Dan Aldrich, and I said, "I would be more than eager to work with Dan." I thought we could work well together. He was very clear, in that case, that there really was only one option, this was not a discussion matter. I appreciated that directness.

Dan came in as acting chancellor, I came in as the executive vice chancellor; we did have a good year. David was very direct and clear about his intentions in that instance.

Campus Visits of the Vice Presidents

LaBerge: Then when you became chancellor and had to deal with budget officers, Council of Chancellors, regents' meetings, all of that, what were your first impressions?

Hullar: I can remember two. I don't know the sequence of these, but I think the sequence goes like this. UC central administration at that time had a system of campus visits. The campus visits were where the senior vice president for administration, Ron Brady, the senior vice president for academic affairs, Bill Frazer, the vice president for university relations, Bill Baker, and others of their staff would come to a campus.

The campus would normally make a presentation regarding budget, and program, and other things on an agenda that would have been previously provided by the president's office. We really worked very hard at this. We had it in the Citrus Experiment Station, that building that's an architectural gem, I think it might be fairly called, but it was at that point unused because people had moved out, vacated it so they could move to other buildings. We had it there and it was a good meeting.

At lunch time, Bill Frazer and Bill Baker said, "Hullar, we've got to sit down with you and talk to you," and they did, me at the end of the table, them on either side of me basically closing me in so I couldn't get away. And we had a heart-to-heart talk about the campus. They were genuinely interested in knowing who I was, what some of my thoughts were, genuinely interested in telling me what the principles and policies were by the way the president's office acts on various matters, and offering me advice as to what I should be doing on the campus, and offering very much to help.

I will never forget that meeting, it was very generous on the part of both of them. I don't believe Ron Brady was a part of that group, the small lunchtime group, but he and I had identical conversations at about the same time, shortly following that. There was, of course, an orientation to the president's office where you'd go be in the president's office for approximately one day for maybe six or seven hours and at that time we had a good conversation.

David Gardner's Support

Hullar: I would say this about David and the way he at least treated me as a chancellor. He never specifically specified goals or specific objectives. It was basically, "Here's the position, I have confidence in you. I'd like you to take it, go and do good things." That is both a good principle and I believe not so good a principle.

It would have been helpful to me, I think--. First of all, I appreciated the confidence. Secondly, I appreciated the opportunity to focus on the things that seemed important, from a campus perspective and from my own perspective, to do that, in a sense, unhindered by

the observations of persons who were several hundred miles away and who didn't know the campus as intimately as those persons.

On the other hand, working in that kind of unstructured environment has its liabilities. You're never quite sure how you're measuring up to an outside view, and outside views are always important. You're never quite sure if you're touching on all the most important things.

In particular, on maybe a more personal basis, you're never quite sure of what the report card is, because report cards in academia are written by many people. There are those who love you and believe everything you do is just wonderful. There are those who feel exactly the opposite. Well, those are two opposite kinds of report cards, neither of which is very objective.

The way of evaluating is then you get a mass of input, but you don't necessarily get that mass of input from all the people who are in the best position to evaluate what you've done and the effectiveness of it. It leaves the president, I think, in a bad situation with respect to evaluation, whether it be formal evaluation after a period of years or informal evaluations, because there are no sets of parameters that a person can use, aside from the parameters that may have been internally set by the person or by the parameters set by others who are observers. I would think it would be a bit better to be managerially more specific.

LaBerge: And that went both at Davis and at Riverside?

Hullar: Yes, it was actually much more so at Davis because I received no statements as to what should be done at Davis. Probably, the most significant characterization of the goal at Davis was by a senior officer of the central administration who put it this way, he said, "Ted Hullar, you're the alarm clock at Davis." I said, "Well, what does that mean?" He said, "You're waking the place up." That's a direct quote.

LaBerge: Right, who said that?

Hullar: That was Bill Baker. He actually said it at various times.

LaBerge: I can hear him saying it.

Hullar: Yes, yes. I believe that David also felt that; he was not happy with the energy, the drive, the persona of the campus. It was just too flat, too taking things for granted. Of course, at that time that I was appointed, that was broadly felt on the Davis campus as well.

Riverside's Reaction to Move to Davis

LaBerge: Well, what was the reaction at Riverside when you were leaving?

Hullar: Oh, they were devastated. I would not say that if I didn't know that to be the fact. There was one person--. Well, let me back up and give you a bit more of this. I was told by Janet Young that I was to keep this completely confidential, not to talk to anybody. I will never forget this conversation.

LaBerge: Who is Janet Young?

Hullar: Janet Young was the assistant to the president. When I'm given an instruction like that, I obey it, provided it's not amoral or unethical and this was neither. I was a little bit puzzled because I could tell my wife and maybe our two boys, but not anybody on the campus, so I didn't. Well, the selection of chancellors was announced during March of 1987 at UCLA [University of California at Los Angeles]. A very short time prior to the announcement, the Riverside campus got a call that I was going to be announced as the chancellor at Davis and Rosemary Schraer at Riverside. She was the executive vice chancellor whom I had selected and recruited to the campus.

LaBerge: From?

Hullar: From Penn[sylvania] State University, where she had been a senior member of that administration for some time. She was a distinguished biologist and a big-hearted, strong person. So, I obeyed the instructions, shall we say, and didn't tell anybody so there was absolutely no preparation. It was announced at about noon and I came to Riverside and the office staff, with whom I was very close and they with me, and they were just dumbfounded by this. Although, my administrative assistant, Joyce Smitheran, thought that something was up but she did not know what it was.

Well, one person whom I recruited to the campus, it was the assistant vice chancellor for enrollment management, he told me later that he spent until three a.m. that next morning walking the campus from shock.

LaBerge: Who was this?

Hullar: Fred Zuker, shocked, disconsolate, dismayed, wondering what the future held, how could this be, all of those kinds of emotions. It was not good. In retrospect, I wish that statement would have never been made, I wish I would have had the sense to say, "I don't think that's right, let's talk about this, and if necessary, let's talk to the president." I didn't say any of that. As I said, I just absorbed the request and acted on it. I think there was probably surprise at Davis also, but I'm not sure of that.

LaBerge: Now, was Chancellor Meyer already retiring? Did he know that?

Hullar: Yes, he was retiring on the job first.

Selection Process for Chancellors

LaBerge: So, that was known. Usually, in the selection of chancellors, aren't the faculty consulted?

Hullar: Yes, they are. It goes something along the following lines. There is a committee established, and there are faculty on that committee. The committee functions in total confidentiality. Nothing is to be said by the committee as regards who the candidates are, or to give any characteristics of candidates in terms of what their specialties are, where they're from, or their sex, or their age, or anything about their background.

Normally, committee members will give only modest information about the course of the search, like we're at point A or point B, and quite often are even reluctant to do that. So, there are faculty representatives on that committee, those faculty keep their own counsel. They talk with each other I would expect but they do not talk outside. There are no meetings on campus in any kind of public way with candidates. It's a process conducted in complete confidentiality.

LaBerge: Does the Academic Senate feel like they should have a voice? In that situation, how do they feel about this?

Hullar: I think you have to ask the leadership of various of the senates around the system as to how they feel, but the faculty persons on the committee are selected by the Committee on Committees, which is an intimate part of each of the campus senates. In a very real way, those senates have been consulted and have been involved. It has been my sense that the faculty persons who serve on these committees are some of the most respected on the campus, at least in terms of them understanding the breadth of the campus, understanding its needs, and who have sound judgment about matters.

LaBerge: Well, the story you just told is exactly the kind of thing that is not anywhere in the written record, just how that came about and how it was announced. I mean, I think there is a little bit--.

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Hullar: As we review the transcript, we may want to explore that more. To me, the process is fascinating. It's fascinating in the comprehensiveness of the search committee. It's fascinating in the way that the committee had a lot of opportunity to take initiative but also interesting in the way David Gardner was clearly in charge. Well, "in charge" is maybe not the right word, was clearly the leader of the committee but yet making it possible for people on the committee to say, and I think feel, what they wished.

I remember the interview for the Davis position. It was held in a motel in the Bay Area, and it was the largest room, a square, a table set up and people were really quite a distance from each other so it was not an intimate setting. I was surprised even with that sort of structural characteristic of the meeting and really how freely, and informally, and interactively the members talked among themselves. I think there was a collegial

atmosphere among all people on the committee, or at least all who I had any occasion to observe during that session.

In retrospect, it's also clear that David Gardner absorbed everything that was being said, and probably everything that he could perceive as being thought. He absorbed all of that, integrated it into whatever internal criteria system he had and then made his own decision.

LaBerge: Is that the way it worked, everyone had their say, but he was the decision maker?

Hullar: I believe that's the way it is; since I never participated in one of those myself where I was a member of the committee, I can't say for certain. The appearance I have of both the Riverside search and the Davis search was that's the way it worked. He was, to a large degree, silent during these discussions. The committee kept going and I would assume that each of them, in a sense, has certain ideas and themes that they wanted to explore by way of questions, or comments, or inquiry, and he let that happen. It was a free flow among the people with David being, I think, very alert to both sound and nuance going on with the committee.

II THE COUNCIL OF CHANCELLORS

Impressions from the First Meeting Attended

LaBerge: Well, let's move to another kind of meeting, and that's the Council of Chancellors. How did those work, and was there a difference when you were the Riverside chancellor versus the Davis?

Hullar: Yes.

LaBerge: That's too many questions at once. [laughter]

Hullar: Let's just take the second one. Yes, there was a difference when I was a Davis chancellor rather than the Riverside chancellor. I'd had two years of experience in the chancellorship and working with the president and the fellow chancellors in that setting. Davis is a very different campus. It was seen as more of a peer of the larger campuses, whereas Riverside, I think, was not seen as much as a peer. Now, I think it was seen as more of a peer after my two years there because we got a lot of things going and I think people recognized that.

LaBerge: So, is there a different weight in the votes, if there is a vote?

Hullar: David never took votes. [laughter] We'll talk about discussion and decision making maybe as part of this interview, because it was very interesting to observe, to the extent one spoke, to participate in. I will never forget my, I think, first chancellor's meeting. It was held at Blake House, in a second floor conference room converted from a bedroom, and it's the northwest room on the second floor and it's the longest room. David sat at the end of the table nearest the door. Chancellors arrayed themselves along the sides. Chuck Young and Mike Heyman sat at the table on the window side and then Julie Krevans always sat at the right hand--.

LaBerge: Right hand of the president? [laughter]

Hullar: I don't mean it that way. He sat along a side of the table on the inside wall, he sat in a position nearest the president. Yes, that's right. Ron Brady, and Bill Frazer, and Bill Baker arrayed themselves along the side. Well, one day--.

LaBerge: And the other chancellors anywhere?

Hullar: Jim Meyer always sat at the end, the far end, usually at the end of the table looking directly at the president, I always remembered that. Okay, I remember the following so distinctly. This is my first meeting, or maybe my second, and I'm still learning and this is a very illustrious group of people, you know, you see as extraordinarily distinguished in so many respects. We have some of the nation's top higher educational leaders sitting in that room.

I don't know what David said, but I remember David starting to talk, at which point one or the other, of either Chuck Young or Mike Heyman, got up and started talking. Okay, now that's an interruption. We're taught from childhood to not interrupt, right? Okay, so David is more or less continuing whatever it is he's saying and one of these tall chancellors in their normal speaking voice, which is a strong commanding voice, starts talking, and then the other starts talking. I'm looking at this saying, I don't quite understand this. They then started talking with each other and then they turned their back on the president. I thought, well, all very interesting, I didn't know what to make of it but it was really quite unforgettable.

What I learned in subsequent work with both Chuck Young and Mike Heyman was that there was absolutely no disrespect in this, it was collegial, it was comradely, they were simply speaking their mind in the way they've always spoken their mind. David being the strong, quiet, measured leader, just sat there and spoke and continued on in the businesslike way in which he had started. Each of them was the same person but it just sort of all came together in this sort of unusual mixing of the waters, shall we say. It was an interesting experience.

Use of Declarative Sentences at Meetings

Hullar: It turns out that there was a lot of that in the Council of Chancellors. One of the chancellors, the current president [Richard Atkinson] would be silent for much of these meetings. When Dick Atkinson was chancellor at UC San Diego, he would sometimes sit for virtually a whole meeting without speaking. Then at some point, and I could never predict when these points were, he would make an observation like, "This is a good idea," or, "We should," or, "That's not a good idea," or speak in an evaluative way or observational way about something, and again, just declarative. I think if there's one characteristic of those meetings of the Council of Chancellors is that people spoke in declarative sentences, declamatory sentences maybe.

On the one hand, I appreciated the directness. On the other hand, I truly do believe that a substantial amount of value was lost, or a substantial amount of content was never uncovered because there was not a conversation, there was not a discussion in the best sense. There were these declarative statements. It's sort of like a mortar salvo conversation, one packed parcel gets sent across and it lands, but you're so far away or so distant in psychological terms here that you can't really see what effect it had, or observe in any intimate way what effect it had. Then another one comes in from another angle so I would call that mortar salvo.

LaBerge: Is that a scientific term I might know?

Hullar: No, no. You know mortar is in warfare. It's just one I've taken on as an analogy for a certain kind of meetings. I do believe there was more of that than was optimally valuable because I do think a great deal of content that could have been brought to bear was not disclosed. This is not an evaluative comment, these are just matters of style. There are some people who function this way, and others of us who don't. I, myself, am much more of a discussion-oriented person. Admittedly, I'm talking all the time during this interview--.

LaBerge: But you're supposed to be. [laughter]

Hullar: I'm supposed to be. I really like to ask questions, and that's my style. My style didn't always fit with the style that was sometimes the most extant in the meetings of chancellors.

LaBerge: Were there discussions between meetings where some of that would have taken place?

Hullar: More. There was more discussion of the kind we're talking about between meetings or at the breaks. Not everybody engaged in it. Sometimes people would just banter about small things unrelated to--I shouldn't say small--but banter about things unrelated to the business. Two chancellors might conduct their intercampus business about hiring of one person and promoting of another, or how two programs could interact, whatever it might be. The meetings themselves were, and this is to repeat myself, were not fully discussional.

Ted Hullar's Style

LaBerge: How did you interact with that group?

Hullar: I was actually quite quiet. First of all, that's my style in these groups. I actually am that way most of the time. I like to observe, think, think about things before speaking, I like to discuss. I don't believe that either I or most anybody else, in the course of a conversation, gets the words just right with the first saying to present exactly what they feel, that is even if they know exactly what they feel. I think the best that some of us do is maybe 60 to 70

percent on target. I suppose persons will always be promoted to higher levels if they are perceived of as always being 90 to 100 percent on target. I don't think most of us are.

I think, particularly when the topics come up among ten or more really very strong-willed people, each with different views, and if you listen carefully, you're going to hear things that you may not have ever heard before, or be stimulated into thinking about things you've never thought of before and think about them in new ways, because of the discussion. The life of the academy is to absorb that and think about what it means, and that has always been what I've tried to do.

There is an old phrase, an old story in one of Peter Drucker's management books. It goes something like this: that Alfred P. Sloan, when he was chairman, the CEO of General Motors, gathered his senior colleagues around and they discussed something at length and they came to a decision. He said, "Thank you gentlemen for the decision. Tomorrow, we will meet again to see if we wish to really make that decision."

The VERIP Decisions

Hullar: I think there is something to be said for that, particularly in managing the affairs of the academy where most of us do come to this with a professorial mind, which means we're curious, we want to dig down, we want to see ramifications, we want to be reflective. That approach was sometimes taken in the Council of Chancellors particularly when there were difficult issues like admissions policies or the VERIPs. Those decisions were normally not made all in one meeting. The topic would be raised, it would be presented, there would be various comments made, and quite often the result of that would be the president saying, "Well, we'll go back and do some more work and we'll bring forward a more specific proposal," or words to that effect. That was certainly true with the VERIPs which were probably one of the most extensive sets of decisions that were made by the president advised by the chancellors during the time I was the chancellor on both campuses.

LaBerge: Why don't we talk about that? We're talking about '88, '89 maybe.

Hullar: It starts at the very beginning. I don't know what the years are. I've never kept a chronology of these years of encouraged retirements, or the incentivized approach to retirement. I think there were three of them. These are impressions now and they may not have all the facts right. These are impressions. I think that the first time it arose is when one of the chancellors said, well, it was Ron Brady who said, "Look, if we're going to save money, we've got to go where the money is." That was pretty straightforward. That's a Willie Sutton-like comment, "Why do you rob banks? Because that's where the money is."

Well, if you're going to save money, you go where the money is. Ron said that. You could just feel a quiet in the meeting. He said, "That's faculty and senior staff," because

that's where the salaries are, 80 to 90 percent of the university's budget is the salaries. You go for the high salaries, those are the professors and senior administrators. Well, even though professors had been retiring at approximately the average age of sixty-two, or the low sixties at least, it was not at all clear they would do that in the future because these were risky times. It's evident by our budget going down. Why would we expect faculty to retire when the budget is going down and their economic future is uncertain? It's counterintuitive when you think about it, but that was never stated at the meetings, at least never that I heard. I listened very carefully.

So, that means you somehow have to incentivize people to think seriously about retirement, and again, I don't remember even what the terms were of these three voluntary incentivized retirement programs but that was a long discussion. Some of the chancellors, not all of us, but some of the chancellors were talking intensely, and intensively, and protractively about this, saying, "We have to do this. Bring forth the plan, Mr. President and Mr. Vice Presidents, so that we can really consider this," and gradually that was brought forward.

The Second and Third Offers

Hullar: Then, it was all very interesting. Whatever history is written about David Gardner's years, it should be a chapter, I think, on these voluntary early retirements because then it became clear that if the "take"--put that in quotes--on these early retirements wasn't sufficient one would have to go back. Well, it's just self-evident that you have to increase the benefits. Problem number one, slippery log number one over rushing stream. You are going to increase the benefits now for the second group? Well, how does that affect the first group?

I think it's fair to say, based on the record, that problem, and I do believe it was then and still remains a problem, that problem, I don't believe was fully recognized, or if it was, it was never articulated. There's not a clear sense, I think, in the record that it was accommodated to. The record here results from a couple of Davis faculty suing the university because they took actions of a certain kind and those actions caused them to be dis-benefited, if I can use that term, and the persons here are Don McNary and Elmer Learn. The case isn't exactly to the point I'm making, but it illustrates it.

So, you had this problem of the early ones taking the retirement then having to increase the benefits progressively. I don't know how to evaluate this. One could say it suggests it was not a long-term plan or they hadn't thought it through. I don't know if that's fair or not. I don't think I had those views. I'm not sure others had those views. But it was clear that this was going to be a more difficult problem, this whole voluntary early retirement was going to be a more difficult problem. So, that's one aspect of the problem.

Encouraging Some and Discouraging Others on the Faculty

Hullar: The second aspect is, well, some of our very best faculty are going to take this because they know they can be hired on--. UCLA faculty are going across town to USC and Berkeley faculty are going across the Bay to Stanford. How much of that occurred, I don't know, I'm sure it's in the record or could be found out. But as a university, we don't want to lose those people. So, then came the challenge of how to encourage people to take retirement but at the same time encourage them to stay affiliated.

Complicating that was the view by some chancellors, "but we simply have to get inadequate performers to retire, out of the system, because they're clogging things up." These are direct quotes that I've heard. "They're standing in the way of recruiting younger faculty, they're not helping attitudes inside the campus or departments, so we've got to make sure that those kinds of persons are really encouraged to leave."

At the same time, high performers, you want to really encourage to stay. So there was an inherent schizophrenia and there was a lot of time spent at chancellors' meetings. I think, in part, it got resolved well but it was not expeditious. I think it could have been resolved, in retrospect, much better particularly if it had been cleanly focused upon first one and then the other and really examine the ramifications and come out with very clear policies for the university. Or, if the university was not going to have policies that applied universitywide, then it should be each campus's responsibility.

The University as Confederation

Hullar: My sense, even then, was that if it was going to be each campus's responsibility, it ought, in a sense, be a template of considerations that should be gone through because the university is both--. This is another topic now, this is the topic of the university as confederation. The university is both nine distinctly autonomous, free standing, major universities with virtually all the perquisites of that; it's also a confederation. David Gardner as a president, I believe, wrestled with that issue a great deal, never in an avowedly discreet discussion topic, but as a fabric or a framework regarding autonomy and confederation that I expect was in his mind during so many of these discussions.

On the one hand, the chancellor is responsible; on the other hand, David being conscious of the impacts of the individual actions of the entire university nonetheless wanted to know. Well, he's a very strong-willed person, and when strong-willed persons want to know, it quickly mutates into, "I want to be involved," or "I want to tell you," or, "I want to control you." If any of us have been parents, we know how that can work. So, there's an inherent tension there. It's one thing I think that David dealt with steadily, and largely silently.

LaBerge: For instance, when the decision was made to do the VERIPs, then how do you deal with that?

Hullar: A decision was made to do a VERIP.

LaBerge: Okay, to do a VERIP.

Hullar: They came incrementally and only when the second or third came along did they begin to be seen in relationship to each other. I thought at the time, I believe now, that we should have always contemplated the possibility of there being more than one so that whatever one did on the first one, a second one would be completely consistent with it. There would be no contradictions of spirit or results and it would be all part of a seamless fabric.

[tape interruption]

Campus Morale

Hullar: Many of my observations about the VERIPs are based on what I thought at the time, and in particular, my reflections in subsequent months and years about what actually happened and what I thought at the time and what I observed at the time. I think a theme of what I've just been saying about the VERIPs is seeing each of the VERIPs as an isolated activity--we have to save money, or we need to trim our faculty--not seen in terms of all of the impacts. I won't take the time here to amplify what all of those impacts are but impacts on campus morale, impacts on those who retired just the year before without a VERIP, and there were a number of those and they weren't very happy.

LaBerge: And you'd hear about it.

Hullar: Oh, you bet, you'd hear about it in various ways. It always rebounded to the dis-benefit of the president, the regents, and the chancellors if the person speaking about it chose to go that far. The second VERIP I don't remember being seen in any organized way in terms of the first and certainly the third wasn't because the third was far more attractive than either of the previous two.

They were not seen fully in terms of keeping quality, they were not seen in terms of encouraging those who you didn't wish--. I'm saying this in a negative way and I don't mean to, I have to use better wording here because I don't mean to be negative. There are persons of us who when we reach a certain age, or a certain place in our profession, we cease being as creative in that realm as we previously had been.

If those persons are not going to be creative in other ways then you want to ask the question, "Well, are they the same quality in a contributing nature in their professorships now at this stage in their career as they were previously?" The University of California tries always to be on the leading edge so those persons were seen as some who, if we

could fit them into a better situation for the university, we would all be better off. Sometimes, that would even be encouraging them to retire and seek employment elsewhere or to be retained on a part-time basis. I don't believe that subject of the encouraged leave-taking was dealt with as fully as possible.

My own view was that every one of these faculty persons, irrespective of what anybody may feel about them, was valued highly at the time they were hired. They were very likely valued highly during a substantial portion of their career. These are not insignificant, inconsequential people; they have been colleagues. They are persons of value and they are persons who have their own self-respect. We ought to have thought about all of these encouraged leave-takings more in those psychological ways than we did. It was very much of a business relationship and I think we would have all been better off if we had seen it more in terms of personal relationships.

Implementation on the Davis Campus

LaBerge: When you went back to your campus, how did you go about implementing the VERIPs?

Hullar: I talked about it with the senior administrative staff, the executive vice chancellor, academic vice chancellor, and deans, and again decentralized. In retrospect I think that was inadequate, maybe even inappropriate. I think in my own case I wish that I had much more of a collective discussion. I wish people on the campus frankly engaged more.

There was not nearly as much serious attention to this by deans on the Davis campus. There was high variation among the deans. The deans on the Davis campus felt that they were dukes in their own right and they did not need to pay any attention to King John. After all, they had already signed the Magna Carta, so they were entirely on their own, thank you. So, on our campus there was a lot of variation.

There were some deans who were very creative and those persons who they wished to retain they worked very hard to retain on a half-time or up to half-time basis. Others who were not fully performing their professorial duties as normally determined at that point in their career were sometimes almost just given the back of the hand, very uncomradely, very uncollegially. So, there was a lot of variation. I don't think that variation is helpful, I think that's destructive, particularly in this case here.

But you know, we can critique this whole process a lot but we don't do any of this very well across the nation. I mean the reduction in force of thousands upon thousands of people in large corporations, that's not a happy business. As a nation, we don't do this very well. The VERIPs did result in substantial savings to the university. The second value it had was it demonstrated or began to demonstrate to the state policy system that the university could adopt strong business practices in its operations.

LaBerge: Do you mean the Department of Finance or legislature?

Hullar: Yes, newspapers, thought leaders. I mean if most of the private sector in California was doing this, or was forced to do this because of economics, why wasn't the university? Well, the university was. So, I think there was a very substantial, public relationship, not relations, but public relationship value to this.

LaBerge: What other measures were you encouraged to take on campus?

Hullar: That's, I think, an interesting point. I cannot be definitive on this. Ron Brady is the person that you must interview about this. The VERIPs were where the big money was because that's the people, and, of course, then those were extended not just to the faculty but to the staff, as you know. What I'm saying about faculty one could also say about staff, generally the comments are the same.

The university found it hard, and I still think--.

Need for Cost-cutting Measures

Hullar: The university then, I believe, found it difficult to believe it could conduct its essential activities in a more cost-effective way. Inherent in all this was a belief that we're doing things very well; we cannot reduce costs. Some of us, frankly, didn't believe that in the slightest, but the whole culture of the university was that we're doing things either well or optimally; it's not possible to do them better. Now, in the private sector, there is never that culture. You're always encouraged to be cost-cutting, profits increasing, always working to increase the difference between gross revenues and costs. The university really doesn't look at that very much so we were not encouraged to do very much more.

Let me give an example. There is another university, the University of Washington, that has only approximately two-thirds of the state dollars per faculty member, per student, that the University of California does. The University of Washington and UCLA are approximately the same in size. Leave to others to make evaluative judgments about those two campuses, but there are some facts that are obvious.

The University of Washington is without any doubt, one of the most distinguished research universities in the country and [one of] the most distinguished public universities. They have a broad program; they appeal to a broad sector of students. They take them in from all sectors of society. They have a strong arts program, and of course a very strong athletics program, the whole thing. They are getting two-thirds of the dollars from the state of Washington as is the University of California, yet in terms of quality, the University of Washington and UCLA are in the same quality level. It's hard to distinguish between the two, that one is not as good as the other, but with only two-thirds of the state dollars.

What is the University of Washington doing that's different? They are doing something that's different, because they are substituting two-thirds of the money for a full amount of

money and they are coming out with a quality institution. We don't look at that kind of bench marking very much in the University of California. I don't know why, I can make guesses at it, but I don't think those are appropriate.

The University Budget Process

LaBerge: What about student fees and coming to that decision?

Hullar: Let's talk about that. The larger issue here is the issue of university budgeting and how it is or is not made. I'm not an expert on this. I have a series of impressions, some of which reflect what others have observed and some reflect my own.

We think a lot about the input side, like the money coming in, requesting more money from the governor and believing--. We believe that we have to have a certain amount of money, and it's based on last year's budget, and if we're going to increase students by a certain amount, we need a proportional increase in state funds. If the legislature does not provide that money, then we have to raise student fees.

Well, there is another way to manage that, that is you either get other sources of revenue to fund parts of your operation, like increasing your federal extra-mural grant support, which is a strategy that the University of Washington has definitely used and, of course, universities like MIT, and Caltech, and Harvard, and Yale, and Stanford also use that. Or, you again go where the money is, where they're, in a sense, forced to pay and that's with the students.

So, as you know, the student fees went up by these rather large percentages each year. They went up, not because of a plan that they should go up, or not because of a belief that it was good educational policy or good personal finance policy, but because the state legislature did not provide the money. There was far more attention given to increasing student fees than to determining how to reduce costs inside the University of California or to eliminate programs or activities or dramatically reduce programs or activities that may not have been central, leaving the definition of central aside for a moment. It was a very simple way of doing budgeting, very incremental. It's not zero-based.

It was founded on the view that we have two sources of funds other than research grants and contracts: one is the legislature; the second is students. I guess the third source of funds would have been to economize on operations, reduce costs incrementally. The fourth source was to go through the VERIPs. The criticism made by persons who really understand financing then and may still be made, for all I know, that the university simply is not engaged in what you would call modern budgeting or modern resource acquisition strategy because the sources being looked at were too limited.

LaBerge: Was any of this suggested at the meetings?

Hullar: No, it wasn't. It relates to, again, this sort of declarative or declamatory way of engaging topics. It was wrestled with but always within these sort of narrow boxes that were set up by the budget side of the university. The budget side of the university was not actually a budget side but it was a funds acquisition side and that's the Larry Hershman operation. He has a title with budget in it, but his chief responsibilities are to present a politically acceptable budget approach to the state of California, then to work on the political side, discussion, lobbying, relationships, et cetera, to try to be sure as much of that is accepted as possible. But it doesn't get into the insides of the university and both are important.

The major criticism made by a few persons I talked with at length about this and whose judgment I really do respect are the university failed to do that, or at least failed to do it in any significant way.

Allocation of Funds on Campus

LaBerge: When your campus was given a much lower budget because the funds weren't there, what did you do about that?

Hullar: We allocated the funds out as best as we could, largely on a formulaic basis. "Here are the funds, folks. Do the best you can with them." There was at least one officer on the campus who saw what was happening and who undertook to do a systems analysis of the whole sphere of operation and realized that millions of dollars could be saved and they were.

LaBerge: Who was this?

Hullar: It was Daryl Ralls. That then freed up a lot of monies for the campus to allocate in other ways.

LaBerge: Well, you did this sort of on your own in your own campus, not knowing maybe what another campus was doing?

Hullar: Correct. Well, not knowing is maybe not correct. Not knowing maybe in great detail, but there was a lot of crosstalk among officers, like Daryl being responsible for facilities would have generally known and sometimes specifically known what other campuses were doing by way of economizing in that area.

Cooperation Among Chancellors

LaBerge: What about the relationships among the chancellors? Would you say it was cooperative, or competitive?

Hullar: It was cooperative even when there was intense competition. That was most evident when one campus would be working, frankly, very hard to hire faculty from another campus so there would be sparks and the chancellors would sometimes have pretty pointed conversations with each other, not negative but just pointed. But that did not preclude at all those chancellors working collaboratively with each other.

I think one of the truly amazing features of the University of California is the way the chancellors do work together or at least did when I was a chancellor. David Gardner, by his personality and his comments, very substantially encouraged that and helped that. There was not any spirit of invidious competition.

There were some situations where a couple of chancellors really did, though, get into it. They were really sharp and it was almost at the personal level. I noticed that all of us would work to repair whatever negativism there may have been there and we were generally successful. David Gardner was very supportive of that.

III SENIOR STAFF AND VARIOUS ISSUES

Senior Vice President Ron Brady

Hullar: I should make a few comments about Ron Brady, he's on your list.

LaBerge: Yes.

Hullar: He's on your list for specific reasons I expect. Ron is the person who designed virtually every way the university ultimately used to save money. He is a genius, administrative and financial genius. He has extraordinary ability to identify talented persons and to engage them in meaningful work.

Ron, among all the chancellors and the president and the other officers, was the one person who not only could think as an academic, because he was one--and he chose at a relatively early stage to go into the administration side--he could think as a venture capitalist, and as a banker, and as an investment banker, even while he was understanding what the academy was.

Because he is extraordinarily bright, had lots of experience, and had this financial and business and administrative view, he could see through problems or issues in a way that was penetrating, and much faster, and much more decisive in terms of which options made sense. He could do that faster than anybody else, faster and better than anybody else. Being a person with those characteristics, he also believed that he had come to good solutions and he stated them very bluntly and very clearly. He would have a logic for them which was compelling.

That is certainly evident, I think, in the relationship between David Gardner and Ron Brady. They were very close. Ron was very supportive of David. David was the president and Ron was the senior vice president and Ron knows very well what the difference in those two positions is. He never ever did anything to abridge that relationship and he deserves a great deal of professional credit for that. Because Ron was so quick, and so penetrating, and could present a case so compellingly, those persons who may not have had those qualities could get reasonably upset. Cold, unfeeling, distant,

abrupt, brusque, insensitive, those are some of the negatives. I don't think that applies at all, I think those are just dead wrong. He just saw things with real clarity.

Now, if you disagreed with him, you knew what you were disagreeing with because they were clear. The logic would be laid out and you could address those points. You could have a discussion about them. There was a crystallinity to it all, which I found very helpful. My sense is that the university never did capitalize on his abilities.

One has to be clear about something else. It was the chancellors that decided that VERIPs were a good thing. Ron Brady presented that as an option. Those VERIPs were discussed over, I don't know, three and four months. Ron was always a servant. In every thing I saw, he was always a servant of the general directions being established by the president and the chancellors.

Ron didn't create these out of whole cloth and he certainly didn't force them on the university. He made clear what the financial consequences would be, right down to what he expected the take rate would be for different age cohorts, fifty to fifty-five, et cetera, and if you altered some of the features what the take rates might be. It was a very professional piece of work.

Relationship with Regents and Chancellors

LaBerge: What about his relationship with the regents?

Hullar: Ron's?

LaBerge: Ron's.

Hullar: It was very strong and very positive. The regents could have trouble with everybody in the university, including the president. If they couldn't get through to the president or "make" the president understand, they would call Ron; there would be long conversations. Complex, difficult, negotiations, like let's say, regarding hospitals, or medical centers, Ron was on the phone all the time to the regents. The strongest regents were those who had the most respect for Ron.

LaBerge: Who would you put in that category?

Hullar: Frank Clark, Harold Williams, Roy Brophy.

He [Ron Brady] and David had a very good relationship in this way also, to the extent I know the details, that if there were a difficult vote coming up on a topic, let's say having to do with medical centers, Ron would be very much on the phone like a chief of staff would be, or a president of a major corporation, or even of the U.S.

LaBerge: Did you see him as sort of filling that position as a chief of staff?

Hullar: To the extent there was a chief of staff function, Ron did it, but there really was not a chief of staff function in the Office of the President. David was really quite solitary, I believe, in the way he managed matters. He would speak with one person and then another person. There was not a person who functioned across the senior vice presidents and the vice presidents and some of the chancellors, either in a groupwise or in a interdigitating kind of way. Ron did it to a certain extent but he was not charged to do it. The extent to which he did it was based upon the issue to be dealt with at the time.

LaBerge: What about his relationship with the chancellors? Did the other chancellors, you think, feel the same way you did?

Hullar: Yes, they do. In fact, I think some chancellors might even put it much more strongly. Ron was the go-to person. If you wanted to discuss something in-depth, if you really had a problem, if you wanted to get a penetrating analysis of it, if you wanted to test out the sensibility of an idea that you were thinking of, he was a good confidante. Yes, he was a confidante, certainly, but he was a good analyst that way.

LaBerge: Did you feel he had too strong an influence on the president?

Hullar: No, I don't believe he did. I believe Ron in virtually all the things he did during David Gardner's presidency, he did either at David's direct request or because he believed them to be very much along the lines of what David wanted. That certainly is true with respect to executive compensation, various executive compensation packages. Those weren't Ron Brady's creations. Those were creations developed by staff working with him but being responsive to the president and the chancellors.

LaBerge: Why don't we talk about that?

Hullar: Why don't you flip that off? Let me just collect my thoughts.

LaBerge: Okay. [tape interruption]

Hullar: To a very large degree, Ron focused as the senior official responsible for carrying out the general policy directions of the president and the chancellors. That's true with VERIPs, that's true with executive compensation, true with how to manage the facilities, programs of the university. Sure, I'm sure Ron had his own views but I frankly never could determine what those personal views may have been because he was always being responsive.

What he would do would be to serve up options, and he would argue forcefully for one option that contrasted another depending upon the financial objectives. Did one want to just have staff and faculty depart the university so there would be maximum savings? Did one want to have a system where depart, yes, take retirement, but then come back? Those would be two different kinds of options.

Technology Transfer

Hullar: The one area where I think Ron very much, though, focused on his own was in the realm of technology transfer, and that was with the office of technology transfer. This was within his scope of responsibility and he took personal interest in this. He hired Carl Wooten. He developed the idea of this Delta Corporation. He did it with the aid of staff discussions, I'm sure, and also with the aid of some consultants. Then, he presented those first to David, that was at the very end of David's service as president, and then to Jack [Peltason].

Because of Ron's strength of personality, and his acumen, those, in a sense, sailed through. I think it's fair to say they sailed through without the kind of critical analysis from a broad range of expertise that they deserved. I felt that at the time; I certainly felt it once I personally got into it and I certainly feel it now. Of all the chancellors, I was probably the one most personally oriented toward, or most naturally oriented toward those kinds of things.

I talked quite a bit with Ron, but Ron had this idea and he saw there were ways to have it make sense and ways to have it implemented and he was really very persuasive in presenting it. I thought then, I still think, it was too fast, that it deserved more analysis, but that's not a criticism of Ron. If anything, it's a commentary on, again, the way in which big topics were dealt with, not necessarily with as much depth and to examine the nuances. I think if that had been done, and I don't know on whose watch this would have been, but again I think if that had been done, the university would not have received as much criticism of its technology transfer program and of the office of technology transfer as it ultimately did.

Again, we're dealing with individuals to be sure, but we're dealing with a culture of the university. Each of us are within that culture and part of the culture is that one doesn't change the university culture very fast.

David Gardner's Severance Package

Hullar: We raised the subject of executive compensation, or I believe that Ron was acting within the general framework of policies and intent established by the president and the chancellors. As we know, the end of that was the David Gardner severance package. It's a very difficult subject. I think, I'm not sure about this--. Well, excuse me, I'm sure about one thing. There is a general belief that David Gardner's severance package was uniquely different from anybody else's.

LaBerge: Yes, right.

Hullar: Now, whether it's a fact or not is something that can easily be determined. There was a broad view that it was uniquely designed for David Gardner. That view was not received positively, that caused a, I don't want to say, separating or fracturing, that's too strong, but that caused an irritation, an unsettling.

LaBerge: Do you mean among the chancellors?

Hullar: Chancellors.

LaBerge: We know what it caused in the public world.

Hullar: In the public. But it caused it among the chancellors, it caused it among other senior officers at the university, like vice presidents and staffs. You could just feel it. Each of these persons is very respectful of others, so that very little would be said openly, but you could just feel it. I'm not sure David ever understood this.

I'm not sure that anybody ever brought it to him. To the extent people inside of the Kaiser Center didn't bring it to him, I think that's unfortunate. I think some people should have. A statement would have been, "David, I don't necessarily know what all the facts are, but here's what people are feeling," and then, the person should have said, "And here's what I think should be done about how people are feeling." I don't know that was ever done, in that sense, I don't believe David was served as well as he might have been. If persons did do that, I don't know but it's possible they might have, but this was unsettling.

LaBerge: The chancellors didn't?

Hullar: None that I know of that did this. Now they may have, I just don't know. There's no reason, these kinds of things are very private, but that was a difficult time and I feel badly for David that this occurred. I feel very badly for the university. It was not a good time.

Regents' Meetings, 1992

LaBerge: What about at the regents' meetings, were you present at both [March 20, 1992, and April 20, 1992]?

Hullar: Yes, I was. Well, they were very unusual regents' meetings because of, again I don't know all the details, but I do know some of them. The meeting where the package was finally decided upon was one where David Gardner made his presentation. I'm not sure if Ron was in that meeting or not. Quite often the two of them would be there together with nobody else but then the regents met alone and that was a very unsettling time.[2]

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[2]Personnel matters are discussed at closed sessions.

David was visibly concerned. He was not his normal demeanor; he was probably curious and wondering and maybe unsettled by the length of time it took. You could just feel the tension outside that meeting room and that was held at the alumni center, James West Alumni Center at UCLA [March 20, 1992].

LaBerge: This was the so-called secret meeting, possibly, and then later there was a more public meeting where it was ratified?

Hullar: Correct. It had to be ratified in a public meeting [April 20, 1992].

LaBerge: Yes, and he asked for it to be spoken about in public.

Death of Libby Gardner

Hullar: One of the factors that were, and this is not necessarily chronological or even logical order here, but one of the things that occurred, of course, was Libby's illness and then death. Here's a series of observations. One observation is that regents and chancellors and others felt very, very badly and registered that to David. He and Libby were close, there's no question about that.

David, very much to his credit, would speak so positively and warmly, and generously, flatteringly, about Libby and toward Libby in private conversations. The regard was just very, very palpable, it was very strong. So when her death occurred, we all felt for David.

We really did. I remember after the memorial service--it wasn't a funeral service--at the Mormon Temple in Oakland, there was something of a receiving line. I remember one of the chancellors, it was Chuck Young, grabbing ahold of David and just clutching him. I mean, I said, "Are they ever going to let loose of each other?" It was a very, very strong and touching thing to observe. David and Chuck had a strong and positive relationship.

But then something happened and that is that David spoke a lot about his agony. How could he continue? "My life is not the same, it will never be the same." It was like a Mozartian recapitulation in one form after another, one variation after another. There were a number of senior persons who said, "Enough is enough, he has gone too far. This isn't helping, this is hurting."

I think that became part of this compensation issue. David began losing regard among a number of key people, regard that he had from them before and lost because of this. What they would say, I think, was unseemly, all this focusing on his personal agonies and personal travail caused by the tragic death of his wife, not that those feelings were inappropriate, but to have them on such public display. Under the surface of these comments was the view that this was as an excuse or a reason for behavior. You just had the feeling that it didn't redound well.

Again, I don't know if anybody ever talked to David about that. I don't know what others believed, but it was not clear to a lot of us as to whether or not David had any persons with whom he would have that kind of close and confidential relationship.

LaBerge: Other than his wife.

Hullar: Other than his wife. Probably the closest would have been Julie Krevans. Julie was very close to David, certainly during Libby's illness. Julie was basically called in as almost a personal physician, certainly a personal consulting physician. These are just my impressions, you know, my small lens of a very complex topic. If it's thought that this kind of thing is helpful in understanding David Gardner's time as president, particularly his last year, I certainly wouldn't want to discuss this with many others. David is an intensely private person, intensely.

LaBerge: That's why that would be so unusual for him to bring this up.

Hullar: That's right, but being so private--.

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LaBerge: Okay.

Hullar: David being so private, you can't rely on observations or words that he has spoken entirely because you really have to use as sources of data, the observations of other people as well.

LaBerge: Right, that's why we're interviewing people like you.

Public Relations of the University

Hullar: Right, right. The executive compensation issue, the one we've been talking about, I think, was a very sad time for the university. There is no question that if you look at peer relationships, the president of the University of California is not paid nearly the same and the chancellors aren't, and the vice chancellors aren't, right on down the line. Now, they're still paid a lot more than faculty. And given the democratic nature of governance in UC, the faculty would feel this difference much more strongly and express it much more strongly in UC than elsewhere. Therefore, it became a bigger issue.

But in terms of the merits of the case, if you look at peer comparisons and believe that you have to be competitive, the executive compensation was not overblown. It also came up at a very bad time, particularly, for me on the Davis campus. The Davis campus was one of the most democratic, in the way we're using it, of all the campuses. We were suffering budget cuts at the same time the executive compensation program was being established. That's probably a good definition of bad timing, right?

LaBerge: Right, and student fees were going up.

Hullar: And student fees were going up, that's right. The executive compensation program should have been established. Faculty, generally in these kinds of discussions, do not note that the university was also being really quite energetic in doing comparison evaluations of faculty salaries in UC compared to our eight peer institutions and faculty salaries were going up also; that's usually forgotten.

What is also forgotten is, or not paid too much attention to, is that in terms of dollars that students pay, UC was a very good bargain. It couldn't say that once the fees went up for the second, or third, or fourth year in a row because it became much more again in the midpoint of peer institutions. But, at the beginning of that, they were very much on the low side of that.

So, one needs to present a whole picture of that and that whole picture, frankly, was never presented. The university was, like in some of these other matters, in a sense, isolated. It created its own universe, and operated within that universe without presenting itself as fully, and I think, as appropriately to the outside world as it might have.

LaBerge: Well, in the interest of time, should we jump to another topic?

Hullar: Sure.

Admissions and Affirmative Action

LaBerge: How about admissions and affirmative action?

Hullar: It's very hard to talk about that now because of all that's going on. What's going on now bears no relationship to what went on then.

LaBerge: Well, that's one of the things that we wonder because we're going to also be interviewing Jack Peltason on his presidency. Were there roots of Proposition 209 that you could see?

Hullar: Oh, boy, why don't you shut that off for a minute? [tape interruption] Were there roots of Proposition 209 back then that could even be seen? I think the answer is no, and yes. I think all of us believed that we were not bringing into our campuses a sufficient number of Chicano, Latino, Hispanic, Native American, and of African American [students].

Let me put it more personally. I just believe that there were a lot more persons from those ethnic and racial groups in the state than we were proportionately getting into admissions as students. Therefore, more had to be done. There were barriers of whatever kind, and we had to work in lots of different ways to lower those barriers. In that respect, I don't think any of us contemplated Prop. 209.

I have never viewed that [affirmative action] effort--and it was intense on all of our campuses--I never viewed that effort as an effort in preferences, and I still don't view it as an effort in preferences. I think that much of the public rhetoric, and the actions of the regents, and the actions of the courts are misguided. We have always in our universities where there is selective admission, recruited a class to meet certain educational objectives, a diversity of talents, and capabilities, and backgrounds, and experiences. We've always done that.

We've never gone from the top SAT or GPA and filled our class that way. We've never done that. We've never done it because we said, you know, persons from small towns in this state have interesting experiences; persons with abilities, be it music, or leadership, or art, or athletics, we've always reached to get those. And it's to provide for the educational and social diversity because people involved in athletics, and in music, and in art, and leadership of various kinds are providing a great deal to the social environment that's on our campuses.

So, it's just reasonable that you go to persons who have different cultural backgrounds as well. The most obvious form of cultural backgrounds are those from different ethnic groups and different racial groups. They have different life experiences; they've had different economic experiences; they have different family histories. They have different ways of thinking because of, take Chinese, the reverence they give to ancestors in contrast to those of us who are Anglo. So, it makes sense to bring those in.

There has never been a defense of this, of affirmative action, in educational terms. There wasn't during David Gardner's term and there was not during Jack Peltason's term. There were some attempts I'm told by senior staff to make the educational case, but I'm also told that educational case was not accepted as appropriate for being, shall we say, on the public agenda. It was not accepted by at least the attorneys involved, and maybe others. So, in that respect, at least for me back in the times way back--. Well, I've been involved in this since the late sixties and right on through.

LaBerge: You mean because of the campuses you've been on, is that what you mean?

Hullar: Yes, well, I just personally believed in it. My first experience was working with a black community in Buffalo, New York. They lived in the ghetto, they were not a part of the university, and I said this doesn't make sense. There have to be young men and women down there who are just as smart as those on the campus. Why aren't there some of them here? Well, I always believed that.

So, I always believed there was an educational reason. Therefore, I did not then see there was any problem with the preferences. I have always been aware that there has been a problem with preferences and certainly always been aware that there has been a problem with quotas.

What I think we should have been smart enough to see, and we weren't, was that we were involved in quotas. It's most evident in the hiring of minorities and women-owned firms; there was a literal quota for that, 15 percent or something like that. Those of us

who were aware of it, and I was one of those, could justify it because in the construction industry and in parts of the contracting industry, contracts were very much going to white-owned, white-managed, male-owned, male-managed firms. There were just a whole set of practices that had been built up. So, you had a self-reinforcing system.

Women starting their own businesses, who may have been under-capitalized and under-staffed but competent--and minority-owned firms were in the same category--they were, in a sense, excluded by a system that was very well-functioning. So, there was a social phenomenon. I believe you can argue the case was outright discrimination, not due to people's desires but due to a system that was locked in to the way that part of our world, contracting and the facilities of construction parts of our world, functioned.

Since there was systematized discrimination, if you can use that term, it seemed to me to make sense you had to have something systematic to begin to reverse it, to increase capacity of those firms. That's not also been stated either I believe. Again, I think it's too bad. I think the University of California could have done that. We should have been more sensitive to this matter of quotas and addressed it and created an educational argument, pertaining to the education of students, and an anti-discrimination argument where the results were to systematically discriminate.

LaBerge: Were there ever any discussions at regents' meetings when you were there?

Hullar: Maybe at the very end.

LaBerge: But it didn't come up as a big issue?

Regents' Role and the Gardner Team

Hullar: No, no. There is a topic we've not talked about that might be worthwhile to talk about and that is the nature of the regents themselves.

LaBerge: Yes.

Hullar: Because that relates to David Gardner. David Gardner likely had just two or three things that he steadfastly focused on. One was securing a budget for the university. Another was the idea of campus autonomy and university confederation. A third was ensuring that the flow of business from the administration to the regents was conducted in an expeditious, timely, responsive manner. On this last of the three points, a criticism of David was that he never left anything for the regents to discuss.

There was so much staff work, and done so well, the papers were prepared, the discussions with individual regents prior to difficult topics coming up was so extensive that the regents never discussed anything. I think that's probably a fair analysis, but I don't

think it's a criticism of David Gardner as a president. I think it was highly effective for a long period of time.

These were busy people; captains of industries, like Dean Watkins; strong persons such as Roy Brophy; long-time regents such as Frank Clark. This was congenial to them. As I said, they were busy, they were strong-willed, they would respond to arguments, they didn't need a lot of discussion. Again, toward the end of David's time, it was evident that the regents were bridling under this, they didn't like it. They never said so, but you could sense a frustration starting small and then getting bigger. Then, you could sense and hear irritation.

LaBerge: With him personally?

Hullar: I think it devolved to that. Again, I think one has to look at David as a person. David is smart, he is determined, he is unusually focused. A lot of us are focused, but he is very focused. He doesn't complicate his public life with a long and broad and complex agenda. He is focused on just a few things, and that's all to the positive. It can also get in the way, once there start to be cracks for whatever reason, it can get in the way of dealing with what may be causing those cracks, and I can't be too much more specific than that.

In a factual way, I can speak impressionisticly about it. Some of these cracks were developing because there began to be these newspaper reports about high executive salaries, and the high student fees, and the rate of increase of student fees, and the fact that all the university wants is more money.

Then, of course, there was also the criticism, subtle and quiet, but you know the state is in economic trouble and what is the university doing for that. The university never did respond in a sufficiently proactive and ramified and deep enough way. I put a period where I shouldn't have. It didn't respond in a ramified, deep enough, and broad enough way to help the state think through and meet its economic development or financial stability needs.

Styles of Different Presidents

LaBerge: Well, one of the questions we had was whether he was a president for the good times and we needed somebody like Jack Peltason for when the times were bad.

Hullar: Let me speak to that. It may well be. You've raised, I think, a very interesting and equally difficult question. It may well be that David Gardner's style of approach was more suited for the good times. This, again, is not meant as any criticism; some people are turnaroud agents.

LaBerge: Right, and he brought the good times. He had that relationship with Deukmejian.

Hullar: Right, he had that relationship and he came in and he got major promises from Governor Deukmejian and that was all fine. David's strengths may be more on the--. Good times is not a phrase, I guess, I want to use.

LaBerge: No, I didn't really mean to use it. [laughter]

Hullar: It's a phrase that you've heard?

LaBerge: Yes.

Hullar: Yes, I've heard it too. David is a very strong executive manager, very strong as a CEO, and a chairman of the board kind of person. But as a colleague of mine pointed out, those are not the same as change agent. What was being asked of the university, in many, many different ways was, "Mrs. and Mr. University, please change. The state is changing economically, financially, demographically. Won't you please change too?" The university was seen as not being responsive to those urgings, as quietly as it may have been said, those urgings of the state.

What Jack Peltason did wasn't anything except to follow David and not undertake any initiatives. He didn't undertake any. He achieved that budget compact, but that's not much of an achievement in a practical way because it lasts only as long as one governor or one legislature. We just know that. That's the way those things are.

LaBerge: You served under Jack Peltason for a year or two, is that right?

Hullar: I was the chancellor while he was president, yes. I also worked a bit in the president's office on these matters of economic development. Jack did not have an agenda for specific achievements so far as either I or anyone else, I think, could detect. His agenda was, so far as people could detect, was to not further exacerbate difficult situations and to simply be calm. By doing that, one could then reduce some of this ferment that had been created, or just let it dissipate, and I think that did happen.

You can compare what Jack Peltason did, in that regard, to what the president [David Gardner] did, on these various items we've been talking about, and also to what Dick Atkinson did. Dick created a major new program for economic development, for example. Or, let me say it differently, for engaging the university in a more intimate and partnership way with the business and industry sector of California.

Outreach Programs at Davis and Riverside

LaBerge: Back to admissions, how was that effected on your own campus?

Hullar: We worked very hard to increase admissions of African Americans and Chicano/Latino--we did it in a variety of ways.

LaBerge: We're talking about Davis?

Hullar: We're talking about Davis, yes. I started all of this at Riverside, though, so in that sense it covers both. We worked very, very hard at outreach. I'm amused at this recent emphasis on outreach, I almost feel insulted because we were doing so much of it. I do believe that people ought to give credit to what has gone on in the past. We had a very strong program in outreach. I personally participated in it, as did other senior officers, speaking, and working with people, and all over the state, being engaged with those groups, both on and off campus.

We worked very hard to identify qualified students and made sure that they really knew that the Davis campus wanted them. We had a series of spring activities, Picnic Day being the most famous of them, I guess. There were also some other festivals, one put on by the Chicano/Latino community, another by Native Americans, and the Asian-American communities. I said, "Let's just create the spring festivals, not have it just be Picnic Day and some others. Let them all have their own place of prominence." And that had a strong and positive effect.

LaBerge: When you were at Riverside and you were trying to get more students--I mean this is kind of going back but it's a little bit about admissions--how did you do that?

Hullar: The same way.

LaBerge: Students who did not get into maybe their first or second choice?

Hullar: We would actively recruit them. Some students only knew about UCLA and Berkeley, now that's really surprising. You almost want to say, if that's all they know about, are they university material in the first place? You take what's given to you, right? At Riverside, we actually got a list of students who were not accepted at UCLA, that being the closet campus. We would look at the list, we'd make some determinations of which of these were UC eligible, who we thought were appropriate for the Riverside campus and then we would actively recruit them. We sent them letters, that's pretty aggressive.

LaBerge: That's right. [laughter]

Hullar: I don't like the word aggressive. That's taking a lot of initiative. This is nothing new. I'm basically bemused by this. Let me make a comment. I'm not sure it fits here, but we talked about the regents, this collegiality and comity that existed among the regents was very evident for a number of years. It is now changed very substantially, it's very different now. We talked a little bit about some of this during David Gardner's time. Ward Connerly has been central to this. We talked about how David would present, let's say, a budget or present another proposal and there would be some polite discussion, some discussion, polite. Sometimes probing in depth, sometimes not, but then there would be approval.

I remember a regents' meeting in Riverside, it was in March, and the budget was being presented. The budget presented fees, and fee increases for students. It was the first

meeting Ward Connerly was at. All the regents approved except for Ward. He didn't even pay much attention to the presentation. He basically said, "I disapprove, this is wrong." He gave a micro-speech about it. It was clear that, even then, he was not going to fit the style that had been created up to that point.

LaBerge: He wasn't a regent when David Gardner was still there, was he?[3]

Hullar: I believe he was. I remember that meeting very distinctly, at Riverside. I thought to myself, whoops, something has changed now. He spoke out vigorously in opposition to the president's budget proposal, that had not been done before. He spoke out vigorously without really understanding it, that was also clear. Not that he could have understood it, because it's a very complicated thing.

UC's Budget Presentation

Hullar: There is something else that should be said, it's the style of the way these budgets were created and in particular relation to student fees. We've talked about the relationship between the president of the university and the governor, first George Deukmejian and then Pete Wilson, were very positive and very strong. Each of those governors had a great deal of respect for David. I believe that he respected them. He certainly respected their position and the responsibilities they had and he always spoke of them in respectful tones.

The university had an interesting way of presenting its budget. It would determine what the parameters were for the governor's office and the, what was it the division of the budget? Is that what it's called? Or, Department of Finance?

LaBerge: Department of Finance.

Hullar: Department of Finance, determine what those parameters were. The university would always make its budget within those parameters. As I mentioned earlier, it didn't do zero-based budgeting, but it did incremental budgeting, like if we're going to bring in more students, we're going to need more money or if costs have gone up by certain inflation factors, 2 percent, or 3, or 5, or whatever it might be, we need more money. So, we've been given a budget target by the state, and if the university needs more money, that difference needs to come from student fees. The university would present the student fees at the same time.

I remembered talking at length with Larry Hershman about how backwards that was, not that it was inappropriate to mention what the student fees would be, but it's the legislature that passes the budget and being so strongly as a part of the governor's budget, could have negative impacts on the legislature. Well, reasonable people can disagree on

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[3]Ward Connerly was appointed to the Board of Regents in 1993.

that strategy. I've had people tell me why that was the right strategy, because you have to start out with a good place in the governor's budget.

What it did do was present the fee issue to the state long before the legislature ever got to the point of considering this. The alternative strategy would have been to say we need this much money. There are several options: either the state provides more money, or we get more money from the students, or we make even further economies, but here is the impact of that. There was not a scenario approach or an options approach.

I believe the university has now gone to that options approach. It's just a set of observations that really comes back to the budget. It reflects this sort of very direct approach of the incremental budgeting within the constraints set by the governor.

[tape interruption]

Oakland Headquarters

LaBerge: We were going to talk about the Oakland headquarters and what your observations and reactions were.

Hullar: Well, I think it's an interesting situation the university was put in. The university clearly needed to either renovate University Hall and add to it, or build a new building in the city of Berkeley, or it needed to find headquarters elsewhere. I learned from a very authoritative account that the university kept coming back to the city of Berkeley, and the city of Berkeley kept saying, "No." Ron Brady did--his business was always to work on different approaches. He had already been looking at other possibilities since it seemed that the city of Berkeley was going to continue to say no. And one day the other possibilities seemed to make a lot of sense.

So the university told the city of Berkeley that no, they weren't going to do this any more. At which point the city of Berkeley completely reversed itself, but of course at this point the university had already chosen something else. So I feel badly for the city of Berkeley. I think they made a huge mistake. I think it's probably not in the best interests of the university to have moved out of at least a reasonably close association with a campus. And the Berkeley campus was the obvious one to stay in close association with, but frankly the university had no other choice.

The consideration of the Kaiser Center was dealt with in a very businesslike way. Different options were considered. Ron Brady presented the materials and it was a business transaction. There was an underlying point to it all, and that was to bring all of the central administration staff into one facility. I found that then a compelling argument. And I found in my workings with the central administration, both as a chancellor and then subsequently, that that made an enormous amount of sense because just by taking an elevator and walking down a corridor, you could get to THE person for a personal

conversation. What's so curious now about what the university is doing is that they're going to disassemble the all-under-one-roof concept. And I have never understood what the logic for that is.

LaBerge: What about the perception in the public, that some have commented on, that it was more--

Hullar: Ostentatious?

LaBerge: Yes.

Hullar: Oh, I think it probably is too ostentatious for some people's tastes, probably more so in some areas than it needed to be, but what there is about the building is a complete parity on all floors.

LaBerge: Right.

Hullar: Again, the principle of democratization, or egalitarianism, if you like to use that word, in an elitist organization, which is what universities are, is interesting. Again, I think that's fueled in part by the economic stresses that we were under. We've not heard much about that recently because the economic context is now so much more positive.

Planning for Growth in the University ##

LaBerge: What about the search for a tenth campus?

Hullar: This was done in an orderly fashion. There were projections made of how many students there would be for additional spaces in UC. Back of the envelope calculations initially made as to whether the current campuses could handle them. An assumption made for planning purposes that no, they couldn't and that began, then, a set of more specific planning activities for the campus. David Gardner was personally involved in this. He basically led the discussions in a pretty active way.

Each of the campuses had to make presentations as to what they felt their size should be. We all did that and we presented a report, and so on. David Gardner then assembled all that and put it in his briefcase and took a trip from the West Coast to the East Coast and back again. When he came back, he had his plan laid out. The plan was for starting with Berkeley and UCLA campuses to be at the same size they were at that point. UCSF was set aside because it's a specialized campus. Then, Davis, Irvine, and San Diego would be 25,000, with 20 percent graduate students. Santa Barbara would be 18,000. Santa Cruz would be 15,000 and Riverside would be, was it 10 or 15? I can't remember.

At which point, various of the chancellors started lobbying their specific cases. I didn't think 25,000 was right for the Davis campus because it has the land, it was already at 18 or 19. It was a highly specialized campus because of the agriculture and environment, and

the arts and sciences, and engineering side of the campus very much needed to develop just to have the right academic mix, academic proportions on the campus.

Santa Barbara didn't like being at 15, or was it 18? They argued for more. David agreed by adding in additional graduate students, which in a sense was unfair to other campuses because that meant they had a higher proportion of graduate students. Of course, the Riverside people didn't like it at all--I was then at Davis--they didn't like it at all because they felt that they had also the land and the public demand to grow to at least 20 or 25. I think they were just upward a little bit; people can get the details on this.

David didn't move very much from his initial suggestions. It all resulted in the need for three campuses opening in successive years of 8,000 apiece. Some people have accused David of doing this so that he could be seen as a builder of campuses. That may or may not be true. I don't know, I never felt that. The plan laid out was sensible. I thought it was unusually ambitious. On the other hand, without an ambitious plan, you're not likely to move ahead. So, I thought the plan was appropriately ambitious. We now know what has happened: three have devolved into one. It has taken much longer.

LaBerge: And the demographics changed too.

Hullar: And the demographics have changed, that's right. Also, the finances have changed in that it's not at all clear that the legislature is going to continue to support the current campuses and build a new campus. I think we always felt that that might be the case, but I think it's now seen that it might even more be the case. There is some caution developing there.

LaBerge: What about at Davis? What reaction did you get from your community?

Hullar: We got two reactions. I think some of the faculty believed that yes, we should grow, particularly in the arts, sciences, and the philosophy and the humanities sides. On the other hand, for whatever reasons, and this is a complicated topic, for whatever reasons, a number of outspoken, or a number of persons on the campus, mainly faculty, did not believe that the growth was the right thing, growth for growth's sake. I must say that I did not handle that as well as I might have.

I believed then, and I believe now, that the way for the Davis campus to increase its quality and increase the strength, and by that I mean breadth and depth of a number of departments, was through additional FTEs [full time equivalents]. It's easier to do all these things if the pie is growing in size, rather than the pie is sliced into more pieces. It's easier to develop if you're adding to, rather than taking away from; that's particularly true on the Davis campus, which is unusually egalitarian in its sense of self-governance on these kinds of issues. So, I did believe that growth was good for the campus and I still do.

It was met with mixed reviews. I was a very high profile chancellor on the campus and for those people who didn't like it, I made, therefore, a perfect target to vent their frustrations. My visibility, generally, made a perfect target. [laughter] At Riverside, it was a good thing, but at Davis, it wasn't. But that's a different story.

LaBerge: We could do a whole interview on that.

Hullar: I think what David initiated and the way he initiated it for the new campuses was very much in the right direction. He asked Ron Brady, as sort of his special assistant for big projects--if I can put it that way, or for big issues--to be in charge of that. Ron dealt with the planning for these campuses in a very businesslike way. He used a number of consulting firms and it was all done according to an orderly schedule.

I think people should feel impressed with what was done, by way of getting things organized. There are some criticisms, maybe they didn't look at all the factors enough, maybe it went too fast. But, one is always going to have those kinds of criticisms. Overall, I think it was well done.

We talked about Ron. I think Ron is really an unsung hero of the university. If people will think objectively about what he did and the roles he had, and the fact that he was serving within the general policy framework of the university presidents. As I've said now, I think, for the third time. [laughter] So, we'll only say that once when it gets typed up.

Relationship with State and Community Colleges

Hullar: You also raised the question of the state college system. I don't have many comments on that except to say that there were frustrations with the leadership of the CSU system when Ann Reynolds was the chancellor of that system. People felt much better when Barry Munitz came in. I think it's because of the styles of the two. Ann is an energetic person, she is solitary, she doesn't communicate as easily with others as Barry does. I view Ann as a good friend, as a good professional friend, but I think that's the way people view her.

The situation with respect to the community colleges was actually different. A number of key persons in the central administration really saw the community colleges in an adversarial way. They did not believe that the leadership was nearly as much a team player in communication with the University of California senior leadership as it might be.

On the other side of the community college picture, though, is that UC looked very positively upon relationships with the community colleges. We saw this whole business of two and two; the first two years at a community college then [two] at the university. There are many pitfalls and difficulties in that.

The Davis campus was the first one--and this occurred when Jim Meyer was chancellor--the Davis campus was the first one to engage in very strong meaningful articulation relationships with community colleges. These were actual contractual relationships, and that eventually became a model for the rest of the university.

San Diego took a slightly different approach. They said, "Our job is not to teach remedial courses." This was when Dick Atkinson was chancellor there and they said they're not going to do that; the community colleges are going to do that.

I tried to get that established at Davis and never could. I'm not even sure now that it's established. It was somehow felt by the Davis faculty that they must do the remedial education because only they can assure quality, and have this cultural aspect of it being a university experience. Well, there is probably some truth to the cultural aspect of it, but again, one has to look at how to best allocate resources.

The Superconducting Supercollider

LaBerge: Were you involved in the superconducting supercollider?

Hullar: I was involved in that intensively, actually. It occurred at the time of my transition from Riverside to Davis and then shortly after that. This was not a project, I think, that the president of the university engaged himself very much. That was mainly Bill Frazer.

Notwithstanding the strong focus that Bill gave to it, I think it's viewed now as something of an administrative disaster, the way the application was prepared. There was a frenetic scurrying at the proverbial last minute, the last couple of weeks, to get the proposal done. It was viewed by persons in Washington as not nearly the quality it should have been. And, of course, the scramble to get state funding almost bordered on the comic. It is not a high point for the university. I expect that if it had been in California, I expect we now would have a superconducting supercollider in the U.S., also because the physics community in California is so extraordinarily strong.

So, California lost a lot. However, it's not at all clear California could ever have got that because there was so much political support for that from the state of Texas. Jim Wright was still the speaker of the house. Phil Gramm was the senator, and the state of Texas put a half a billion dollars, at least that much I think, out front of that in terms of funding, whether it be for capital improvements or other such things.

We've talked about technology transfer. I think David recognized it was valuable. There was not a perception that he placed a lot of attention on it. That was within the purview of Ron Brady, and we talked about what Ron did.

Decision to Leave Davis as Chancellor

LaBerge: I have two more questions. One is, did you decide to step down when David Gardner decided to step down?

Hullar: That occurred in the following way. I created both a lot of positive feelings and also lots of anxieties on the campus because of my own style of moving ahead and wanting to get things done. There were some people who just thought that was great, and other people who thought it just wasn't the way things were done at Davis. So, there were mixed views of me as a chancellor.

LaBerge: By faculty or by--?

Hullar: By faculty, yes, and I knew that. I knew that from just about the day I stepped onto campus. Jack Peltason and I had conversations about all this. After one of those conversations I said to myself, "I'm just not going to do this [be chancellor] anymore." It just really relates to Jack's style and mine. He was not going to be supportive of me in the face of criticism of me.

Jack was the kind of person who wants no controversy. No action is action. He was not going to be supportive of anything that would make waves. So, I said to myself, "This is not the kind of situation I wish to continue with."

David Gardner and I would have had a very different conversation. I would have said, "David, I want to come to your office. I want to have a discussion. Here's what's going on, here's what people were saying, here's what we've done. So really, the choice is yours, you tell me. Don't put that back on me. You've got to tell me." Just like you ask me about coming to Davis--well, you can't have that kind of conversation with Jack.

LaBerge: What would have happened, do you think? Would you have been supported by David Gardner?

Hullar: I don't know. We have not talked about this, but David is also an acutely political person and he would see any actions any place in relation to the whole. I think David would have been supportive, actually. I thought quite a bit about that. I think he would have been supportive, but we would have had to have an understanding because I knew at Davis that I was doing things that were very controversial. In fact, frankly, I'm surprised that stronger controversies didn't arise earlier and more deeply. They arose on ephemeral things.

Because I could see the institutional apparatus not functioning as well as it might, I basically stepped into operational situations at various times. The word "commandeered" is not appropriate. I mean I did step in, but commandeering was not done and would have been an inappropriate action. In handling that, I believe I could have done things more felicitously.

[Page 44A is under seal until 2025]

Hullar: I think David would have handled it [matters] very differently, and we would have come to terms with what he expected of me, and I would have had him deal it out on the Davis campus because I was simply not going to sit still any longer for being sniped at.

[Page 45A is under seal until 2025]

LaBerge: Did you resign?

Hullar: No, I told Jack I was going to leave. I was not asked to resign, and I was not fired. People have interpreted my departure as being fired, but I wasn't at all. Jack Peltason said directly, "Ted, it's up to you." And I said, "Thank you." So, I said [to myself] that I just can't work under these circumstances. The circumstances were I just simply did not know the degree of support that Jack was going to provide. I assumed that it would be fickle and I don't work under that. I don't think anybody works under ambiguous circumstances. Relationships can tolerate a reasonable amount of ambiguity but not constant ambiguity.

Finding More Bay Area Space for the University

LaBerge: Did you stay on as a professor?

Hullar: I stayed on as a professor. This comes back to Ron Brady's one-year sabbatical leave; that was not inappropriate. Traditionally, this is done with faculty, and it's normally done with chancellors. I talked to Jack and secured a one-year study leave. I did that partly in Washington, D.C., where my office was in the UC offices and then partly in Davis. I came back after one year and sat in my faculty chair. Well, I didn't either; that's not quite right. I came back after one year and started working on an economic development-related initiative regarding the Alameda Naval Air Station.

We could have a small amount of discussion on that. That I believed then was a really good idea and I believe now is a really good idea, but it shows the ambiguity of the university towards these kinds of things. The university simply was not going to put any emotional, intellectual, psychological, physical, financial capital into that. As one person said, two things, "No money and no bad publicity." Those were my instructions. Well, with that kind of support, you wonder. There was no money and the university didn't get any bad publicity. After three months, I disengaged the university from a bad, awkward situation. Nothing was happening and we're going to rely on the university to continue spending money, so we just said no. So, this is an untold story.

What's interesting is that I really laid it out to the president, Jack Peltason, to the chancellor, Chang-Lin Tien, and to the director, Chuck Shank. I said, "Listen, we've got a great opportunity. It's going to take a hefty amount of resources and commitment by presidents, and chancellors, and directors, and regents. I think if we really put our thinking caps on this can be a winner."

In addition, it's a big piece of land. If there's one characteristic that UC Berkeley and Lawrence Berkeley Lab have is that they don't have enough land for their programs. So, they have to figure out where they're going to create an ancillary campus. They needed to figure it out then and they're going to need to figure it out in the future.

There are two obvious places. One is northward into the Richmond area, the USDA laboratory in Albany on Buchanan Street and the Richmond Field station, et cetera. But Richmond with its sort of negative reputation as a social place, and whatever the stigmas are attached to all that, that's likely not going to be the spot. See, the other spot is south. Every building [at Berkeley] is full. You can't put any more there, so where do you go? The Oakland army depot, those lands out there on the railroad tracks and so on, or someplace else. The other place is farther south of Oakland, like south of the city, there is a lot of land in there, warehouse land, or on to the Alameda Naval Air Station.

The difficulty of that, of course, is it is five miles or more from the Berkeley campus. That's a long way. But you could have off-loaded large activities, lots of activities down there. My personal view is that the university will rue the day when it didn't capture a couple hundred acres at the Alameda Naval Air Station and create a campus. Of course, it has been very hard--. I mean, by analogy though, we can look at UCSF and its need for a second campus and just reflect on how tortured and difficult such a self-evident [decision] has been.

There were three sensible approaches: take options on all kinds of property at Parnassus, which is probably the most sensible; secondly, create a major development around San Francisco General [Hospital]; or third, go to this forty-acre site in the Mission Bay project. They chose the easiest of those three, the Mission Bay. Given the time spent and the presumed difficulties, that was probably the wisest choice. It took them a very long time to come to what I think can be regarded as an almost self-evident decision. If it took them that long, when they had the obvious need, it's not unreasonable that the university is not responding too positively to the Alameda--. It's too bad.

LaBerge: Right. At Davis, you had hospital issues too.

Hullar: Yes, we did. Davis has a very strong-willed and financially astute hospital [and clinic] director, Frank Loge, he is certainly not an academic like Bill Kerr is. He's not academically oriented like Bill Kerr is at UCSF, but he's a very strong-willed manager. He makes, managerially, a lot of the right moves. Quite often, they are the right decisions. He is financially very astute.

We did, though, save that center from a lot of difficulties because I got personally involved in the master planning for the campus and now it has the capacity to develop a major medical complex. Prior to my getting involved, it would have used up all the building space and only been able to meet about a third of the space needs that they had.

On the Davis campus, we also had a lot of space to grow in because of the large acreage of agricultural lands around the campus. Besides that, I purchased 1,574 acres of land almost virtually adjacent to the campus to add to the already extensive holdings. So, the Davis campus holdings within just three miles were over 5,500 acres; that's almost ten square miles.

LaBerge: Someday, someone will be thanking you.

Hullar: Oh, there is absolutely no question about that. "Of all the things Hullar did, this was the most important," I think that's what they'll say. I've had people tell me that. But you know, you just have to move ahead and do the right things. I think David Gardner was a very effective president of the university. Was he perfect? No, none of us are. Can we learn? Of course. You don't learn much from your successes. You learn from your lack of successes, or less than full successes. It's fascinating.

David Gardner's Contributions

LaBerge: Would you want to give one statement of what David Gardner's contributions to the university were?

Hullar: David Gardner's contributions to the university were significant. I think they were positive, significant, and will carry the university a long way. And, they were significant in a number of respects, establishing very strong and positive working relationships with the board [of Regents], being mindful of the matters of autonomy and confederation. I think he was appropriately focused on the budgetary side of the university. I think he took decisive action in identifying certain steps that could relate to that, relate to the financial situation.

Were there more things that could have been done? Of course. But, each of us has only so much time, and there's only so much capacity of an institution. If David had stayed as president, I think we would have had continued attention to one or more additional campuses. I think David would very much have turned himself to matters of academic quality. What we've not talked about here is what might have been if he had stayed. I'll probably add more to that, but just let it be.

LaBerge: Okay, I'm just going to thank you very much.

Hullar: You're very welcome.

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The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

University History Series

The University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995

Clark Kerr

President Emeritus, and Berkeley Chancellor, 1952-1958

An Interview Conducted by
Germaine La Berge
in 1999

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Clark Kerr, circa 1960.

Photo by Gabriel Moulin Studio.

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INTERVIEW HISTORY--Clark Kerr

UC President Emeritus Clark Kerr met David Gardner when the latter was a graduate student on the Berkeley campus. As an Alumni Association employee later, Gardner organized tours around the state and accompanied the chancellor/president on many of these visits to alumni groups and Rotary clubs. Kerr watched Gardner's career unfold from vice chancellorship at UC Santa Barbara, to systemwide vice presidency, and on to the presidency of the University of Utah. Through it all, Clark Kerr became a mentor to David Gardner. Because of that mentorship, Dr. Kerr was interviewed for the Gardner Era Oral History Project.

One tape was recorded at Clark Kerr's office at the Institute of Industrial Relations on Channing Way in Berkeley on January 22, 1999. Dr. Kerr spoke with ease about the aforementioned career of David Gardner. He has a unique vantage point as a former professor, chancellor, and president of the university. When asked about his reaction to the appointment of David Gardner as president, Kerr said:

"I thought it was excellent...I had very high regard for David. I had seen something of him at the University of Utah. He had me give the commencement speech there one year when he was president of that university, and you could see the high regard with which he was held by the Utah community. So I thought he was an excellent appointment for the university. And he turned out to be one of the most important presidents in university history."

High praise indeed from another important president, one who fashioned the Master Plan for Higher Education (1960) which Gardner had the opportunity to implement.

The tape was transcribed and lightly edited at the Regional Oral History Office (ROHO). Dr. Kerr made very few changes with his characteristic green-blue pen. The transcript was final typed and indexed at ROHO.

Germaine LaBerge, Interviewer/Editor
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
January 2000

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please write clearly. Use black ink.)

Your full name Clark Kerr

Date of birth May 17, 1911 Birthplace Stony Creek, PA

Father's full name Samuel William Kerr

Occupation teacher-farmer Birthplace Perry County, PA

Mother's full name Caroline Clark Kerr

Occupation milliner Birthplace Beaumont, Luzern County,

Your spouse Catherine Spaulding Kerr

Occupation environmentalist Birthplace Los Angeles, CA

Your children Clark Edgar Kerr, Alexander William Kerr, Caroline Mary Kerr Gage

Where did you grow up? southeastern Pennsylvania

Present community El Cerrito/Berkeley, California

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INTERVIEW WITH CLARK KERR

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNANCE UNDER DAVID GARDNER

[Interview 1: January 22, 1999] ##[1]

First Acquaintance with Gardner

LaBerge: Why don't we start with when you first met David Gardner, your first recollections.

Kerr: I met him when he was a graduate student here at Berkeley. I wouldn't know when because he was in the Center for Studies in Higher Education under T. R. McConnell. There were a number of graduate students around. I went over and met most of them. He was one of them, so I saw him first of all in a student context. He was then doing his book on the oath controversy,[2] which became his Ph.D. thesis and an excellent book it is.

Then I next came in connection with him--he began doing some work with the California Alumni Association. In those days, the president of the university, beginning with Robert Gordon Sproul, went around the state on an annual tour, meeting with alumni groups, meeting with Rotary clubs, meeting with the boards of editors of leading papers, like the Sacramento Bee. David organized those on behalf of the Alumni Association, and he went with me on some of those tours, so I got to know him in that connection.

Then subsequently, I knew of his work, although I wasn't directly involved with it, in Santa Barbara. Then, when he became vice president of the university in charge of external--I don't know what it was called--university extension. It had a broader title than that.[3] I did see something of that. And then, as his career moved on, why, he would often consult me on--he had lots of job offers. He was a bright, energetic, very competent young person, and he had various job offers coming his way, and he'd ask me--usually

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[1]## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcript.

[2]David P. Gardner, The California Oath Controversy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967)

[3]Vice President of Extended Academic and Public Service Programs.

he'd just call me up, and we'd have long phone conversations--was this a good move, or wasn't it.

Mostly, I thought he was better off what he was doing now than moving around too much. I didn't think he--several times, why, I would tell him I thought he needed to stay for a while, whatever the job was [that] he had at the time, and not look like he was hopping from one job to another and couldn't be counted on in the long run.

And then, of course, he became president of the university.

LaBerge: Right. Now, did you have any part in that selection? Do people call you to be on those committees, or just ask your advice?

Kerr: No, not in connection with--I know on the recent ones here at Berkeley, why, I have been consulted with the faculty committees--for example, Chancellor [Robert] Berdahl. And I was consulted by the board, asking me to meet with their selection committee, both the [Jack] Peltason and the Richard Atkinson appointments. But I don't remember--I was then traveling around the country a lot when David came in. I don't remember having been consulted, either by a faculty committee or by the Board of Regents, in his appointment.

LaBerge: Do you remember what your reaction was when he was appointed?

Kerr: I thought it was excellent. I thought it was very good. I had a very high regard for David. I had seen something of him at the University of Utah. He had me give the commencement speech there one year when he was president of that university, and you could see the high regard with which he was held by the Utah community. So I thought he was an excellent appointment for the university. And he turned out to be one of the most important presidents in university history.

Two Issues Facing the New President

Financial Support from the State

Kerr: He came along when there were two big issues that had to be confronted. One was this decline in university support under [Governor] Ronald Reagan and [Governor] Jerry Brown. As I point out in that foreword that I wrote to his oral history, the support for the university had gone down by 32 percent--which is just an enormous amount--had gone down 32 percent at a time the cost of living was rising, so that the real reduction--when you put together the cost of inflation and the reduction, it was more than 32 percent. He came at a time when that had to be reversed or we were really on our way, way downhill.

In one year he succeeded, against the advice of a lot more cautious people, in making up for the 32 percent reduction.

LaBerge: How do you think he did that?

Kerr: It was easy to see that that's what the university needed. Now the question is why would a new president, in his first year out, decide to overcome a 32 percent deficit that had been accumulated? Suppose he failed? [It would have been] an enormous black mark on his record to have tried it and failed. You'd say, "He was stupid for trying, [for having] initiated this process to begin with."

He had to succeed, and he did succeed. As I say, I wasn't involved at that time, but David prepares for things very, very carefully. I'm sure he prepared his case with enormous care. Also, he's a very persuasive person. So the combination of careful preparation and being persuasive, and having a governor [George Deukmejian] who first of all had some surpluses to work with, because the so-called recessions or depressions of the 1970s were by that time over with, and he also had a favorable inclination toward education. The combination of having a better economic situation and a governor who was basically friendly toward education and David's own talents--he made up in one year the deficits that accumulated over sixteen prior years.

That was an enormous contribution because, as I point out in my foreword, if we'd hit the early 1990s with 32 percent still to make up, and then falling behind another 14 percent, the university would have been really ruined, so that it was absolutely crucial to have a president with the courage and the ability--the courage to present a program and then the ability to carry it forward that overcame the deficits of sixteen years.

State of the Presidency: Robert Gordon Sproul

Kerr: The second issue which was important in history was the state of the presidency itself. The university had, up through Robert Gordon Sproul, had been run really as a one-man administration. Sproul had a staff of a thousand people working on the paperwork of the university and making decisions that he would then review and sign. Hardly anything could happen without going through Sproul's mechanism.

For example, when I was head of the Institute of Industrial Relations, I needed a file cabinet for this new institute, so I had to apply to Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the university, to get this file cabinet. [laughter] Every six weeks--which was the normal length of time before he got around to anything, because he was so busy--I had a phone call from him. He said, "Where are you going to put your file cabinet in your office?" As a matter of fact, I didn't know. I wanted to get it and then see where it fit. I said, "I don't really know, but I'll find a place. I want to see where it fits the best, and I'll let you know where I put it if I get it." He finally approved it. But he got that far into detail.

As I tell in the memoirs that I'm writing, on another case--I had to go down to Los Angeles on some university business and somehow got delayed and got to the Oakland airport after all public transportation had stopped, and I had to get home. I had a class at

eight o'clock the next morning. So I took a taxi for six dollars to my home. I applied to the president's office to see if I could get my six dollars back. Six weeks later, I get a note from him, saying that he thinks it's a reasonable request and he's approving it. But that's how much detail the president got into.

State of the Presidency: Clark Kerr

LaBerge: And you changed all that.

Kerr: I changed that, yes. In the course of it, I dropped my staff from the thousand people he had had to two hundred fifty, which I might say is an enormous thing to do. I turned them over to the campuses. They didn't lose their jobs, but they were turned over to the campuses. A lot of them were unhappy because they had been in the statewide administration and were making decisions on behalf of the president. Now they were sent down to the provinces, you know. It was a disturbing time, but I did decentralize the university just enormously.

During the time that I was president--I had taken the place of--from being administered by one man, this whole big university--which, of course, was growing in size very much at that time, more than doubling--and I had decentralized it into a federation of campuses, where we had a lot of shared governance, lots of decisions made by the campus level--some having to be reviewed at the statewide level and by the regents but essentially turned it over to the campuses to run on a daily basis.

Then, in Los Angeles, our chancellor down there, who had come from a system in Kansas--there was no president of the Kansas system. There were six institutions: University of Kansas, Kansas State, some city college, and I guess a community college or two--all reported--and it was a pretty small system, none of them were big institutions--all reported directly to the Board of Regents. He was accustomed, as head of the University of Kansas, to going directly to the board and not through a president.

LaBerge: Who was this?

Kerr: Franklin Murphy. He lobbied with what was then called the Forbes Committee, set up by the regents, that was looking at the organization of the university. He lobbied through what he called a confederation system, under which each campus would set up separate governance. You had to take a constitutional amendment to do this. But instead of having one united university that would be at that point nine campuses, each established as a separate entity.

The difference between a federation and a confederation is that in a confederation, the central body does only those things which are delegated by the individual parts of it. I opposed this. The Board of Regents agreed with me unanimously on it. There are a lot of reasons for my opposition. One was if nine campuses went separately to the legislature,

they'd be fighting each other instead of going with a unified budget, and there would be a tendency for them to make their alliances. Davis might tie up with UCLA and fight Berkeley, and it would break down into factional fighting.

Also, if we were a confederation rather than a single institution, we would be facing the CSU, the California State Universities, which were organized together and probably would stay organized. They, after all, had twenty-two campuses scattered around the state, which means a lot of political support, and we were then going to be a divided group.

Likewise, we did some things in common--like, I had set up a library system with these buses going back and forth to the central libraries, and everybody having a unified catalog of what the university had in the total system. The Study Abroad programs were set up together. Look at what would happen to those programs. Anyway, there was this idea of a confederation that got defeated.

State of the Presidency: David Saxon

Kerr: David Saxon, when he became president, came from UCLA, and UCLA had had this big battle against--but you're quite familiar with it over all the years--hating Berkeley and hated Berkeley's dominance. He came in unpersuaded that there should be a single University of California. When David talked with me when he first came in about breaking up the university, he abandoned this idea, but he did initially favor the confederation idea.

When he was leaving office, the day before he left, he called me down to University Hall and said he'd like to talk with me, and so I went down. He had a little story to tell me about how he had changed his opinion about the university, that he had come in thinking the university should be split into component parts, and he wanted to say that he had abandoned that idea, and he thought it would lead to just endless controversy among the different segments, and battles, and would be very destructive.

Second, he said he had come in with what was a standard UCLA point of view that the statewide administration was incompetent and that he shouldn't, didn't trust anybody in the statewide administration. As he got to know the staff, he had come to the conclusion that they were a lot of devoted and competent people there.

Third, he said that he had come to realize that he hadn't when he first entered office thought that this was the university of the people of California and that he should have done more, in going out to the people and talking with them about the university. That would be like these presidential tours that Sproul took and I took and which he had abandoned.

And then fourth, he said that he wished he had spent more time talking with some of the old hands, like Harry Wellman and me about what the university was about when he first came in.

Anyway, it was sort of, almost a confessional to a father confessor about how he viewed this period. But anyway, he had abandoned this idea, the Murphy idea of a confederation. However, he still had this attitude that the campuses could do more than they had done, that the presidency was sort of a suspect position.

LaBerge: We're still talking about David Saxon?

Kerr: Yes, David Saxon. David had done various things which reduced the power of the president. For example, there had been an All-University Faculty Conference that Sproul had started and I continued, which I had found very helpful. He discontinued that. These presidential conferences were very important, to get the representatives of the total faculty to talk about where the university should go. He discontinued the Cal Club, which was an organization of student leaders of the several campuses, in which we talked about student concerns and what should be done. Both of those had been unifying forces that Sproul had started.

Also, I had set up a Council of Chancellors, which I consulted on major things going before the board. But that Council of Chancellors began treating itself as though it was not an advisory group to the president but as though it were a constitutional agency, like the Board of Regents--could make decisions. It began meeting without the president in attendance, taking action on its own.

While the presidency was continued under David Saxon--and he decided that the university should continue as a single unity--he still, however, did reduce the influence of the presidency quite considerably.

State of the Presidency: David Gardner

Kerr: And so when David Gardner came in, he decided, I think very importantly, to restore the position of the president to what it had been, not under Sproul but what it had been under me when I decentralized it. So he made--aside from keeping things running--he made two historic contributions. One was to work out a viable support program from the State of California. The second was to get some unity back to the university and some greater influence on the part of the president. That's how I saw his presidency, confronting those two grave problems--and very successfully.

LaBerge: Would he have noticed this from afar, at the University of Utah--known that the presidency had lost some of its effectiveness? Or did he talk to you--I know that he had these lunches that he talked about with you and Harry Wellman and Elmo Morgan.

Kerr: Yes, he talked with me some. But he knew the Sproul presidency, too. I think he must have felt that you couldn't go back to the Sproul presidency, everything done by one man. But he did want the university to be held together. I think it was just sort of the logic of the situation. You had to have a strong president to hold the nine campuses together, keep them from fighting each other, and to go to Sacramento with enough power to get the budgets you wanted. Anyway, as far as I know, quite on his own--I don't know of any regental pressure on it--decided to restore the power and influence of the president and the Board of Regents.

Then you're probably going to ask about his leaving the presidency.

Interaction with the Board of Regents

LaBerge: I will, but before that--because I know we won't forget that--how do you think he interacted with the Board of Regents?

Kerr: I think he did extremely well with the Board of Regents. I've got to qualify that a little bit, something I didn't see at the time but became conscious of later. As I said before, he was a very careful planner, and so anything he went to the board with, he got all his information in line and was very confident in his judgments, so he prepared excellent agendas.

He also, on controversial matters, spent a lot of time talking with regents in advance so he knew what problems there were going to be and how he might answer them, et cetera. So it was careful preparation and then very careful consultation put together. But he got along very well with the board. Now, the board, however--once he was no longer president--began complaining that they had turned into a rubber stamp and all they were doing was giving their approval to what the president proposed, which was correct, and not having enough influence on their own.

I had no sense of that at the time he was president, but I knew that that came up afterward. I know it was an issue when I was asked to advise on his replacement, that they talked with me about. The board wanted to be sure that they could have something to do, really to do. Whether there was any of that while he was president, I don't know, but I never heard of anything about it until afterward.

LaBerge: Were you in the practice or are you ever--to go to regents' meetings?

Kerr: No. I've never been to a regents' meeting since the day I was fired. [laughter]

LaBerge: You probably never want to set foot there.

Kerr: I never wanted to go there. But I did go to these committee meetings when they were selecting both Peltason and Atkinson.

Qualities Sought in a University President

LaBerge: In a general way, what kinds of qualities were the board and you, then, too, looking for in a president? And does it depend on the situation?

Kerr: Well, it depends on the situation, but you don't know what the situation is going to be.

LaBerge: That's true.

Kerr: I mean, after all, when I was selected as president, nobody knew that Reagan was going to become governor and would I get along well with Governor Reagan.

LaBerge: Even you pointing that out, it's very important, isn't it, who the governor is and how that relationship works?

Kerr: I got along very well with [Earl] Warren, although I was chancellor only briefly while he was governor. And Goodie [Goodwin] Knight, who followed him, and very well with Pat [Edmund G., Sr.] Brown. I didn't get along--he didn't get along with me--a better way of putting it--when it came to Ronald Reagan.

As I saw the situation when I was made president, the regents wanted at that particular moment in time somebody who was forward-looking because they were facing the tidal wave of students. We were facing building three new campuses. We were facing the need for getting the Master Plan [of Higher Education]. And I had shown that I was forward-looking as the chancellor of Berkeley because I developed a very well-regarded academic plan, well regarded by the regents, and a very well-regarded physical development plan here. They wanted somebody who was oriented toward the future, which I was. They had seen me.

ROTC and UCLA Chancellor Ray Allen

Kerr: They also wanted somebody that would tell them what he really thought. I had gone through--Ray [Raymond B.] Allen, the chancellor at UCLA, was the man who was slated to be the next president when the chancellorships were established. He and I took different approaches. From what the regents told me and what I saw, he had a tendency to guess what the regents really wanted and then give them that. They had seen me stand up to them and argue for positions that they didn't like, but do so politely and reasonably.

LaBerge: Is this the loyalty oath mainly?

Kerr: It happened during the loyalty oath, but I wasn't chancellor then. I was a faculty member. But there were other issues that came along likewise. I guess--well, some of them were always worried that I was too liberal for them. Regents [Edwin W.] Pauley and [John E.]

Canaday, who were the two remaining members from the oath controversy, were the two people who led to my dismissal on behalf of Ronald Reagan. So there must have been something left over of this concern that I was too liberal. But I did face them on a number of things.

There was a period when the federal government said that nobody could take ROTC, which was really a federal program, if it belonged to any organization of what was then called the attorney general's list, which was a very long list of suspicious organizations, most of them not Communist. Since all male students who were citizens had to take compulsory ROTC, this meant if they couldn't take compulsory ROTC, they couldn't be students. That was a really hot issue in those days. It was still the [Senator Joseph] McCarthy period. I took the position before the Board of Regents that we would not enforce this, that the federal government could not control our admissions and retention policy, that this was within the autonomy of the Board of Regents.

It was a very nasty--Sproul never took a position on it. He said it was an issue for the chancellors. When a meeting came up on the issue, which was held in Santa Barbara, before the issue came up, Ray Allen disappeared. He just went back to Los Angeles. Sproul decided it was not a presidential issue--although it was, obviously. He said it was a chancellors' issue. I was left there, without the president supporting me, with Allen having disappeared. Allen, I might say, on that day lost his presidency of the university, that he wouldn't stand up and take a position, and I would.

When I got through, the regents complimented me on my presentation, my willingness to tell them what I thought was best for the university. Allen, while trying to cater to them, lost their respect. Anyway, that was one illustration. I think they felt that I would tell them what I thought was good for the university and not what I thought was catering to their--that they were getting an honest opinion. I think that was the general view.

Search for Gardner's Replacement

LaBerge: So when they were looking for a replacement for David Gardner, they weren't necessarily looking for the same kind of person?

Kerr: No. Well, they didn't consult me on David Gardner. They consulted me on Peltason and Atkinson. And then--

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Kerr: Both times I was taking the position you needed a strong president to govern this huge enterprise, and both times they would jump me and say, "We don't want too strong a president." This was in reference to David Gardner. There were also issues--[UCLA Chancellor Charles] Chuck Young, who was a possibility on both occasions, had had disagreements with his wife, which are well known and troublesome to some people. And

[UC San Diego Chancellor Richard] Dick Atkinson had this famous case of having promised to help some lady acquaintance have a baby. The regents were taking both things quite seriously.

I said in both cases I didn't think that would impair their conduct as president. It might be distasteful for other reasons, but would not impair their conduct as president. At both times, I gave them names of people outside the university to look at, as well as just internal people. I thought they should make a nationwide search.

So what do regents look for? They aren't looking so much at what problems the president might confront, because they don't know, but they're looking at the problems which they've had most recently. When somebody gets to buy a house [and] they didn't have any closets in their old house, that's the first thing they look at: are there sufficient closets? [laughter]

I guess when you look for a second wife, which I never have, you want to know whether the lady is a good dish washer if the prior was not. At any rate, they're more concerned with [what] the recent problems have been than about the future.

Charles Hitch

Kerr: I might say that [Charles] Charlie Hitch followed me and then Saxon. Charlie--I'm sure they were looking at somebody that they thought could get along with Governor Reagan. Charlie had come out of the defense department, had been comptroller general at the defense department when I brought him to the university. He had been able to get along with all those generals, you know, and I'm sure they had some thought, well, if he got along with all those generals fighting each other, fighting the Secretary of Defense, that he ought to be able to get along with Ronald Reagan.

Charlie was a much more cautious person than I had been and I would have been and was needed at that time. He was also extremely competent. He could handle budgets very well. So I don't know. When you say, "What do the regents think?" there were then twenty-four of them. What are there? Twenty-six now?

LaBerge: Yes.

Kerr: And you have twenty-six different answers, depending on which regent you're looking at. It's hard to say what do the regents think.

Salary Issue

LaBerge: Would you like to comment on David Gardner's resignation and retirement?

Kerr: David was, of course, in Asia at the time--I think specifically Hong Kong. The day he came back from Hong Kong, he asked me if I'd go down to see him, which I did. The president's office was then in Oakland. What I said was a general proposition, that I thought the president's salary should be based on academic grounds, which meant in relationship to faculty salaries. See, the people who had recommended the salary were looking at comparable jobs in business and things of that sort. They had a survey made. That was a very difficult and very complex job. In fact, I think there are very few jobs in business which are anywhere near as complex as being the head of a big university, and having to deal with medical schools and rebellious students and prima donna faculty members, with all the knowledge known to mankind, and so forth. It's just fantastically complicated.

I could see why they would want to look at what was paid for big jobs in industry, but I thought it was more important for the president to be looked upon as a member of the academic profession and not be too far out of line with what faculty members got. In fact, when I was president, the regents had several times wanted to raise my salary, and I said I didn't want it. I had in mind two things. One, I didn't think it was wise for the president to receive more than the governor of the state. I just thought that might cause some trouble with the governor or the people in Sacramento.

Now, let me say they also said if I was going to keep myself below the governor, then I ought to get the retirement plan the governor had, and I said no, I wanted to get the retirement plan the faculty members had. So the highest salary I received for being head of this big university was $45,000. The governor then, I guess, got something like $47,000. And I kept to the faculty--I mean, I'm saying this as a matter of principle and also the action which I followed, that it was better to think of it as an academic position rather than as a business position.

I thought David ought to thank the regents for their consideration but that he ought to say he'd rather be at a somewhat lower level. Now, let me say, he got advice from the chancellors, all of whom knew if the president's salary went up, their salaries would go up. He also got advice from the other vice presidents. They knew the same thing, including [Senior Vice President] Ron Brady. You know, Ron Brady did very well out of this transaction. The whole new policy did very well by him. I don't think I said so, but I certainly thought, that he was getting prejudiced advice from people who would personally benefit from the advice that they were giving.

Well, David said that the regents had voted this. They had this survey made, and they had voted this, that it would be a slap in the face to say he wouldn't accept their decision. He wasn't prepared to take that action. He also argued to me, which was absolutely true, that the job of the president was at least comparable to that of people in big industries. In fact, I think at that time the University of California had more employees than any single

corporation in the state, including PG&E and so forth, except for the State of California, which is the biggest single employer.

So anyway, I thought he ought to thank the regents and regret that he felt it was not wise to get that far out of line with faculty salaries.

LaBerge: Right now we're just talking about the salary, not about the benefits package.

Kerr: Well, I was talking really about the salary. I don't know much about the benefit part. I knew about the salary policy. Faculty salaries were being held level at that point. And tuition was going up. I thought it would cause bad relations--as it did--with students and with faculty members, to have the president going up so much when they were being held stable or their tuitions were going in a negative direction for the students.

Anyway, David thanked me for my advice and decided to go along with what the regents had done. I personally thought--rightly or wrongly--and I say rightly or wrongly because I don't know about the situation to really come to a clear decision--that Ron Brady, who was the one who had made the proposal to the board and who had himself benefitted very much--he was as clear or clearer a beneficiary than David Gardner was--had persuaded David to stay with the settlement, which he, Ron Brady, had recommended to the board, which benefitted him so much. I held Ron Brady more responsible than I did David Gardner, and I still do. I say rightly or wrongly because I don't know enough about the inner workings to reach a clear decision or competent decision about that.

But I do think that David would have been better off within the university if he had followed the academic policy rather than the business policy. Now, I proposed that the new library be named after David. I was the one who made that proposal, went to the chancellor, and saw the thing through to a successful conclusion. But by this time, it was, I guess, eight years--seven or eight years after he had left. There was still resentment within the faculty that David would accept a salary increase of that magnitude while their salaries were being held even, as the cost of living was rising.

So it was really deeply felt within the faculty. Now, that problem was solved by the Chancellor [Chang-Lin] Tien making the decision to go ahead with--although there was some hesitancy on the faculty side. Now, I argued that first of all, they shouldn't hold David responsible for what had happened; it was more Ron Brady and the regents who were responsible. But also, you had to look at a person's total record. You couldn't look at just one thing that you didn't like. I thought that David's record in totality was a superb one, that he did great service to the university, which was important in the short run and also in the long run, and that he deserved to be honored with the biggest building we'd had for many years and the most important one on campus, the addition to it. Anyway, it went through. But I just say this to indicate what damage was done in faculty opinion.

Then I've been among others who have tried to persuade David to come back to the university, and that is in the process of happening. And said to him, "Welcome home." I put it--the "welcome home" thing, which he has reminded me of recently in a telephone

conversation--that he felt for a while that he wasn't welcome in his old home, and so I put it "welcome home"--and he *will* be welcomed home when he comes back.

LaBerge: Now, I may have missed something, but I didn't realize he was coming back.

Kerr: No, that will be announced soon.

LaBerge: Okay, all right. So this is a little preview.

Kerr: He's coming back to the university on kind of a leave of absence from the Hewlett Foundation, to accept initially a--Hewlett is going to be paying him a year's kind of sabbatical. He will be associated with the School of Public Policy and the Center for the Study of Higher Education, and then later take on responsibility for the Center for Higher Education, for which he is the best qualified man in the United States to do that. So that's about what I know about David Gardner.

LaBerge: Any of these other issues--

Kerr: I glanced down your list.

Systemwide Administration Move Out of Berkeley

LaBerge: How about the move to Oakland? Did you have any comments?

Kerr: Yes, I had a problem with that. Not the move to Oakland, but the move to the Kaiser Center. They are two separate things. When I was president, I was very conscious of this resentment of UCLA. They blamed everything on Berkeley. It wasn't Berkeley. "Berkeley" was their phrase for the statewide administration.

LaBerge: Yes.

Kerr: They were also saying "Berkeley did this" or "Berkeley did that" and Berkeley had nothing to do with it. I was chancellor at Berkeley, and to have people say "Berkeley did this" and "Berkeley did that"--it was the statewide administration.

Wayne Thompson was then the city manager in Oakland, a very successful one and later was manager of the Dayton-Hudson big chain out of Minneapolis--now retired in Oakland. He had some locations. I forget the name of--there was an old estate somewhere in Oakland that we looked at, a big house and a big garden around it. We would have had to have an office building somewhere, for the staff, although I cut the staff by three-quarters. But anyway, for the president's office to be there in Oakland.

I had also, I might say, raised with the regents the possibility of moving into Santa Barbara.

LaBerge: Oh. This is when *you* were president.

Kerr: This is when I was president. We discussed that informally. Santa Barbara has airplane service, and it's sort of halfway between--not halfway, but partly north as well as south, so that was considered. So I was thinking of moving it out of Berkeley. The one place I thought it should never go was Sacramento because [it would be] too close for access by the State Department of Finance, et cetera. So I didn't object to Oakland.

I'm not sure--there was some talk by the regents--because they didn't see quite where to put it--of building a building somewhere near the San Francisco airport. They thought it would be more convenient to get to San Francisco, even from L.A., than it would be to get to Santa Barbara because there are many more flights. And so there was some talk about the San Francisco airport, and then Oakland, and then also Santa Barbara.

I did doubt the wisdom of going to the Kaiser building, which is so--well--some of the people who moved there say, "We're going to the University of Chevron." You've heard that phrase.

LaBerge: [laughter] Yes.

Kerr: The University of Chevron. The offices were pretty magnificent. It was a convenient location, of course, right near the BART system and being right on Lake Merritt and good parking facilities and so forth. But I didn't quite like the corporate atmosphere of the whole building and the fancy nature of some of the offices. So I had some resistance to the idea of the Kaiser building, but not to Oakland. I think the move away from Berkeley was a desirable one.

New Campuses and Various Issues

LaBerge: Do you want to glance down the list?

Kerr: Yes. [Short pause as he reads]

Well, Affirmative Action and Admissions. That's a long, long story. I don't know anything about that in connection with David Gardner. I know the situation more recently.

Regents' role. That's kind of a big general one. We've really talked about legislative dealings. Shall I say I think he did a good job of appointing chancellors? And got along well with them.

Divestment from South Africa. I spent some time in South Africa and appeared there in what was called the chancellor's lecture at the two big universities, Capetown and Witswatersrand, attacking apartheid, which I saw a fair amount of. But at the same time, I didn't quite like the idea that investment policy was being determined by political issues,

which was David's--so I was unhappy with the South African situation at that time. But I was also unhappy with the general principle that you made investment decisions on political grounds. I thought investment decisions should be made where you got the maximum money. So if I had to vote on that, I don't know how I would have voted. I would have been conflicted, obviously.

Faculty Relations and Salary. Well, I've mentioned that. Salaries. Why, he restored them to parity, which was part of my first point about what he had done for the university, restoring the financial situation.

Federal Government Relations. I don't know anything about his relations with the federal government. I would just say excellent.

Same way with Legislators.

National Labs, I don't know.

Oakland Headquarters, we talked about.

Planning for New Campuses. I think David came along and thought that, looking far in advance--we needed three new ones, I think he was talking about. In 1958, when I came in, we were then looking forty years ahead. I had a forty-year plan about 1960, which--

LaBerge: It's hard to believe it's--

Kerr: Actually, it said that with three new campuses we'd be able to take care of ourselves through the year 2000, which is going to be just about right, and that we'd need some new campuses after that. In fact, I even talked with the regents. We had so much trouble finding decent sites that size that the regents were inclined to think we might get some property now for the period after 2000--they did look at some different sites. One site that Regent Carter was particularly interested in was somewhere in the Ventura-Los Angeles county line. He thought the population was going to go that way. We never got to look at that, but we did look at some property in Marin County, and we did look at some property in the Valley, and we did look at taking over one of the military bases in San Francisco.

So anyway, he came along. If you're going to look forty years ahead from the time he was in, that would take you to 2030 or something like that. We're probably going to need by that time maybe three new campuses. So I think that he was quite right in starting to plan for these new campuses, at least in terms of getting land for them because land was getting more expensive and almost impossible to find.

In all of the southern California area, we only found one decent and available site, and that was Irvine. We had several alternatives for what became Santa Cruz. So I think he was quite right in planning for them. I know he was very disappointed when it looked like that wasn't going to happen because one of the big things he could have done would have been get three new campuses, particularly get land for them. And that didn't happen. I know that disappointed him quite a lot.

Regents' Officers, I don't know about relationships there.

We talked about the next one, Smelser Report, which I thought was excellent. I don't know what David thought about it. I presume he favored it, too.

Relationships with the state colleges, I don't know. I worked out the Master Plan with them. I think he probably supported the Master Plan's continuation.

LaBerge: I was going to ask you, how did you think he did carry it through?

Kerr: As far as I know, he was all in favor of continuation of the Master Plan.

Senior Staff--

LaBerge: Other than Ron Brady?

Kerr: I have my doubts about Ron Brady, on many grounds, including the ones I mentioned. But I have a feeling that David too much accepted the staff that he inherited, rather than creating his own staff. I know I talked with him one time specifically about Ron Brady. I thought he ought to replace him, on other grounds than the ones we talked about now. He said, "He's the only person in the senior staff that I can rely on to get things done." Now, that's kind of a sad comment to make. I did feel that rather than accept the people he had inherited from David Saxon that he should have been more aggressive in choosing his own people. I did not think it was a strong staff, and I think he would have been better off if he had one of his own choosing.

Master Plan for Higher Education. As far as I know, he was all for it--still all for it.

Connection between Loyalty Oath Controversy and the Free Speech Movement

Kerr: Connection between the Loyalty Oath and the Free Speech Movement. Well--

LaBerge: I put that down because he, in his oral history, said, "You should ask Clark Kerr that."

Kerr: I think there was a pretty close connection there. Roger Heyns once said to me when he was chancellor at Berkeley--he said, "Every time I trace back any of our current problems"--which was during the student troubles--"I end up at the oath controversy." I think that he was right about that. The oath controversy developed an antagonism between faculty and regents which had never existed before to the same extent. The regents were suspicious of the faculty; and the faculty, suspicious of the regents. I'd have to go into a lot of the history of what happened during the FSM movement to say why that was so important, including the Heyman Report in the fall of 1964--which said the students could try to disrupt a university meeting at Berkeley, could burst into Sproul Hall and drive the clerks out of the windows of the second floor and [Dean of Students] Katherine Towle out

of her office and so forth--and not get a single word of reprimand from the faculty. So there was this background of regents and faculty antagonism.

And then the faculty formed this Committee of 200, which was resurrected during the FSM period, called the same thing, Faculty of 200. In both cases, there were about two hundred faculty members, and so they all got to know each other. Aside from that, the loyalty oath, first of all, politicized a lot of faculty people and radicalized them. It was a terrible controversy. And also kind of became the place to be for politically active young faculty members. They thought that's a place that's really a dynamic, interesting place. I'd like to be there. And there are some--in the memoir I'm working on now, I quote one faculty member who said he came here specifically because of that. I'm sure there were many of them who came because it was an active place.

But then, also, it radicalized some faculty members, politicized them, and brought some new faculty, which tended to be more on the left liberal side. But aside from that, those who were on both sides of the faculty--and there were at least two sides, if not many more--got to know each other. As soon as a problem came along, they had their phone list of people they could call, and there were ready-made coalitions already in existence. So anyway, there was a connection.

Assessment

LaBerge: Any other comments, like an assessment of David Gardner's presidency? You've probably been saying it all along.

Kerr: I think he did two enormous things, as I said before, to advance the University of California, and he made--or he accepted one serious mistake--and that his two greatest contributions overwhelmed the one mistake. Also I'd say that people's contributions ought to be looked at in their totality, as we're facing currently in the United States, I might say. People's contributions ought to be looked at in their totality and that evaluation should not be based upon any one factor or any one development without looking at the total history.

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University History Series

The University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995

Julius R. Krevans

Chancellor at UC San Francisco, 1982-1993

An Interview Conducted by
Germaine La Berge
in 1997

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Julius R. Krevans, M.D., 1995.

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INTERVIEW HISTORY--Julius R. Krevans

Dr. Julius Krevans came from the Johns Hopkins University Medical School to serve as Dean of the School of Medicine at UCSF in 1971. In 1982, then President David Saxon asked him to take on the chancellorship. Dr. Krevans remained in that position until 1993. The interview which follows focuses on the years of David Gardner's presidency which coincide with the years Chancellor Krevans headed the UCSF campus.

One interview was held at Chancellor Emeritus Krevans' office on the UCSF campus on November 12, 1997. He spoke easily and with candor about the Council of Chancellors' meetings--the relationships among the nine campus heads and the president.

"I think one of David's great skills was...treating the Council of Chancellors as the executive board of the University of California and making each of us feel that we had a hand in what happened in the whole university--not just on our campus. You can't do that artificially. He did it with great skill and judgment."

Dr. Krevans also discussed the specialized issues facing the medical schools, UCSF in particular--admissions and growth of physical plant, among others. He emphasized the importance of good relationships with various groups--senior administration, Regents, legislators, alumni, neighbors, faculty.

Two tapes were transcribed at the Regional Oral History Office (ROHO) and sent to Dr. Krevans for approval. He reviewed the transcript carefully, added some key facts, and made minor changes. The transcript was corrected and indexed at ROHO. We are grateful that Chancellor Emeritus Krevans found time in his research schedule to add his thoughtful reflections for this project.

Germaine LaBerge, Senior Editor/Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
January 2000

Regional Oral History Office
Room 486 The Bancroft Library

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please write clearly. Use black ink.)

Your full name Julius RICHARD KREVANS

Date of birth May 1, 1924 Birthplace N.Y.C., N.Y.

Father's full name SOL KREVANS

Occupation Actor, Merchant Birthplace UKRAINE

Mother's full name Anyuta Makovetsky KREVANS

Occupation Feldscher Birthplace Ukraine

Your spouse Patricia A. KREVANS

Occupation Housewife Birthplace McKeesport, Pa.

Your children Nita, Julius R Jr, Rachel, Sarah, Nora

Where did you grow up? New York City

Present community San Francisco Calif

Education B.S. N.Y.U.

M.D N.Y.U.

Occupation(s) Physician, Academic Medicine, Academic Administrator

Areas of expertise Internal Medicine, Hematology, Academic Administration, Health Policy, Biotechnology

Other interests or activities - family, golf, sailing, Bread baking

Organizations in which you are active Corporate Boards, Exploratorium, Commonwealth Club, Foundations

INTERVIEW WITH JULIUS R. KREVANS

I BACKGROUND

[Interview 1: November 12, 1997] ##[1]
[University of California at San Francisco]

Education: New York University, B.A. and M.D., 1946

LaBerge: We'd like to really start from the beginning, so why don't you tell me about when and where you were born and a little bit of your background.

Krevans: I was born in New York City in 1924. I grew up in New York City and went to public school. I ended up in a school called Stuyvesant High School, which is and was a so-called elite science high school.

LaBerge: So you had that interest early on?

Krevans: Yes. And then I went to NYU [New York University] as an undergraduate at a campus called University Heights, which doesn't exist anymore--now it's only downtown--and then to NYU Medical School. I graduated in April of 1946, a few months before my twenty-second birthday.

LaBerge: From medical school?

Krevans: Yes. It was wartime, plus the public school system in New York City at that time would advance you at the rate at which you learned, so people skipped whole grades. I went from kindergarten directly into second grade. That knocked off a year, and in junior high school I knocked off a year, so I finished high school when I was fifteen. The rest just goes on. I took a little bit of post-medical school training, but I was in the army, as we all were. I was in medical school during World War II. I took an internship and some pathology training and then was sent by the army to the Philippines where I was stationed for a year.

---

[1]## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcript.

LaBerge: Is this after the war or during the war?

Krevans: After the war. And then I came back and was stationed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. That's where I began to get a real interest in academic medicine. I was put in charge of the hematology unit even though I didn't know anything about it--which was typical of the army. I had the opportunity to use consultants.

Johns Hopkins Faculty, 1953-1971; UCSF, Dean of School of Medicine, 1971-1982

Krevans: I had very good consultants, one of whom was from Johns Hopkins, who offered me a position in his laboratory when I finished my army time at Walter Reed. I went to Johns Hopkins in July of 1950, took my training there and then joined the faculty in 1953. I remained at Johns Hopkins as a faculty member until 1971.

LaBerge: Were you doing private practice too?

Krevans: I did practice, but as a member of the faculty full time.

LaBerge: And this is in internal medicine?

Krevans: Internal medicine and hematology. My CV [curriculum vitae] will have all of the various training things.

And then in January of 1971 I came to California as dean of the School of Medicine at UCSF [University of California at San Francisco].

LaBerge: How did that come about? Were you looking to come out here or were they looking for you?

Krevans: They were looking for me. Then in July of 1982 I became chancellor of the campus. At that time David Saxon was president.

LaBerge: Did he also hire you for--I guess the president doesn't hire the dean of medicine; the chancellor does.

Krevans: Philip Lee was chancellor when I was appointed dean. And then in 1991 I was supposed to step down as chancellor, and David [Gardner] asked me to stay on, and I said I won't stay on unless the regents ask me to stay on, which they did. The rule was you left when you reached age sixty-seven. For breaking a rule, I wanted it regental. So the regents asked me to stay on for an additional two years, and I stayed until July '93. Then in July '93 I became emeritus, took a sabbatical, and then came back and have been working for the UCSF Medical Center ever since. That's what my job is now: working for the hospital.

David Saxon as University President

LaBerge: Why don't we start with David Saxon, since you worked under him?

Krevans: Until David [Gardner] came.

LaBerge: Yes. What kind of a manager or president was he? Just so that we can compare and contrast.

Krevans: Very different. I had known David Saxon before I became chancellor, and I got to know him a lot better when he offered me the position. David was a true scholar in his own right. He was a physicist, which says something very deep about a person. He was very academic, and passionately believed in the university, and as you know from his record, he had very strong personal feelings of integrity. The loyalty oath, et cetera.[1] He was a difficult president in some ways to work with, because he had very fixed opinions. I don't know how he would put it, but he did not have an easy constructive relationship in general with the chancellors. I know he and my predecessor did not get along.

LaBerge: Your predecessor was Francis Sooy?

Krevans: Yes. He [Saxon] and Chuck Young of course were very close. David had been Chuck Young's provost at UCLA, and then became his boss as the president. There was a tension there, but there was a tension in the whole chancellors' [council business]. I only had that for a relatively short time--a little over a year. But it was not harmonious. So he was quite different in style. He had a much shorter fuse than Gardner. But I not only admired him and respected him, I liked him. We lived in Berkeley at the time I was dean, and I had gotten to know him. He and his wife came over to dinner a couple of times at our house, just the four of us. I enjoyed it. It was different.

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[1]David Saxon refused to take the loyalty oath while he was on the faculty at UCLA and was therefore dismissed by the Board of Regents on August 25, 1950.

II CHANCELLOR, UCSF, 1982-1993

David Gardner and the Council of Chancellors

LaBerge: We'll want to talk more about the Council of Chancellors anyway. Maybe we can just launch into that. How did that change when David Gardner became president?

Krevans: I think David was skillful. When you use the word "skillful" some people use it in the pejorative sense, and I don't use that in the pejorative sense at all. David was skillful in the very best sense of that word, in dealing with a group--nine people, each of whom is in his or her own right already a very credentialed and creditable person, and each of those people responsible for what happened to an important entity of the University of California. It's a very difficult job, the presidency. I'm sure you've heard that from David. In some ways you're president of nothing; in other ways you're president of one of the most important institutions in the world. How to create a University of California without mucking around with the very important principle of keeping responsibility and authority in the same place.

When I became chancellor of this campus, in large part the success of this campus depended on what happened here in San Francisco--not what happened in the president's office. It was very easy for the president's office to deteriorate into a regulatory commission. I think one of David's great skills was understanding the danger of that, and therefore treating the Council of Chancellors as the executive board of the University of California and making each of us feel that we had a hand in what happened in the whole university--not just on our campus. You can't do that artificially. He did it with great skill and judgment.

When something came up which principally affected undergraduate education, for example--we don't do undergraduate education--but he didn't cut me out of the discussions. If something came up in medical education, he didn't cut [Chancellor Ira Michael] Mike Heyman out of the discussion because Berkeley doesn't do anything in the medical area. Now it isn't that there weren't clashes and differences of opinion; there were plenty of those. But I would say if you looked at the sum, he handled the Council of Chancellors, its relationship with the president's office, its role in the whole university,

with great skill, great judgment, and great success, and much better than--I had witnessed it second-hand with Dr. Sooy's experience--and my one year which preceded David's coming.

[tape interruption]

Krevans: There were a lot of details about the council. A number of them are in your questions here that are not starred. But there isn't a single thing in here that didn't come to the Council of Chancellors. Everything.

LaBerge: Which ones do you think are most important to talk about?

Krevans: They all are.

LaBerge: Should we start at the top, then?

Affirmative Action in Admissions

Krevans: Let's start at the top with affirmative action in admissions. And we're now talking about David Gardner. I don't know what David believes in his heart of hearts. I don't. I know that he was meticulous in following the policy which was established and never in any way by indirection or lack of action interfering with what was the established policy of affirmative action by the regents. He empowered [Senior Vice President William] Bill Frazer in a very substantial way to take the lead in regental presentations on this subject. He appointed very good committees to deal with some of the sticky issues. He didn't seize opportunities to undercut it--there were plenty of those--the flak that poor Mike went through on the Berkeley campus with the accusations of keeping out the Chinese. That was a golden opportunity if the president's office wanted to undercut affirmative action.

On the other hand, he didn't trumpet it as the single most important thing the university had to do. All that was openly discussed at the Council of Chancellors' meeting. I think, as I look through this, that was the interesting thing that leaped out at me and reminded me of how skillful David was in basically increasing the firepower of the university by having a consensus.

There are almost no examples in which a chancellor went off on his or her own, because most of the chancellors had their own usable direct routes to important legislators, to important people in corporations, to the power structure, and could have--had they chosen to--been very formidable foes of the president. We didn't do it.

LaBerge: You think it's because of him.

Krevans: I think in part it was because of the process he set up and the clarity of the way in which he ran the Council of Chancellors. He ran it. He sat in the chair, and when an issue would

come up, before he would express his opinion, he would make sure there was plenty of time for everyone else to express their opinion. Then there would be the back and forth, and sometimes they were strong--but it was a civil group. And then he would bring it to closure. It's one of the reasons I admire him very much.

You've done a lot of these interviews; you've probably got a better picture of the way universities work than most people. I think one of the most grievous sins in the university is avoiding difficult decisions. People will distort the avoidance of a difficult decision and call it, "We're studying it carefully." [chuckles] They'll try to study it away rather than face it, and David wasn't like that. David would try to come to closure even when it was clear that there were disadvantages of choosing one over another. It was very helpful. I think that added to the collective feeling among us as chancellors that what we were doing meant something, because we actually saw the position the university adopted--you didn't always have your way. They made mistakes when they didn't listen to me. [laughter] But they listened, and the eventual decision, with some grumbling, was made by all of us.

So you looked at affirmative action in admissions. That was one where I think there was a perception that since he was a Mormon he didn't really believe in equality, particularly of black Americans, but there was absolutely zero evidence that that was true.

LaBerge: You would discuss the universitywide admission process?

Krevans: Yes.

LaBerge: What about your personal campus?

Krevans: You come now to another interesting dynamic. Have you been to card games? We all came with our cards fairly close to our chests, because the president's office--despite David's hard work--is a place where the ethos is to tell you what's wrong with what you're doing.

LaBerge: That's how you would feel.

Krevans: That's the truth. It's very human. The program is on the campus, something goes wrong, the legislature eats up the president, [chuckles] or the regents eat up the president. So the presidential office develops a very defensive mentality and set of processes. Every time something goes wrong they build a new set of processes to prevent anything from going wrong again. When you consider the university is pushing into its second century, all those things never go away. So you've got an accretion of interminable checks, and you have people who are anonymous and faceless who get some kind of proposal and it disappears. Back come all the reasons why you can't do that. What you want is how to do it. So the chancellors in turn get the feeling, "For God's sake, if we don't bring stuff up, then those trolls won't tell us what's wrong."

Then the other issue that you have to deal with in terms of the Council of Chancellors is while we're all one university, every campus is different: a different environment in which it functions, a different self-image, different forces which determine its success and

failure. This campus [UCSF] is the most different of all. Of course, it has no undergraduates, it has almost marginal support from the state. One of the things I used to resent--who the hell were these people telling me what to do when they were giving me 15 percent of my budget, and I was getting 85 percent on my own? Why should they tell me what to do? [laughs] But I could answer that question myself. They had the right to tell me what to do because I was part of the University of California.

So it was not a simple relationship. And then you had giant campuses like Berkeley and UCLA, each in its own rights one of the great universities of the world, being harnessed with seven other campuses--not with us, we were always different.

LaBerge: You were kind of a separate--

Krevans: We had a much easier time. How do you put into one team of horses UC Santa Cruz, UC Riverside, and UC Berkeley? Issues would come up which--you couldn't treat them equally. There had to be an understanding, and it's a lot easier to do it as an abstraction of "primus inter pares"--first among equals--which Berkeley was. I used to remind Mike that our budget was bigger than his. [laughter]

Chancellors' Relationships with Vice Presidents

LaBerge: So when you got down to your individual campuses, after for instance you discussed the admissions policy of the university, when it came down to UCSF's admissions policy--

Krevans: That would be discussed more among the five chancellors with medical schools, because again--and this is not the way it ought to be, maybe, but the way it is--if you look at health professions, everybody says all health professions are equal, each school has a dean, but the reality is people will pay attention to what happens in the medical school and then everything else is sort of fitted in. So the campuses which had medical schools and medical centers had a commonality of purpose, and the vice president for health affairs was the convener, not the executive. That was again a tension that had to be dealt with, a generic tension.

LaBerge: This is Cornelius Hopper?

Krevans: The vice presidents and chancellors. Here comes an issue, let's stay on the medical campuses. But you don't have to use that. Con [Cornelius] Hopper was vice president for health affairs. But I would have turned blue in the face and had smoke coming out of the top of my head if anyone had implied that our medical school or our dental school or our medical center reported to Hopper. Con and I are good friends. The schools report to the chancellor. The chancellor reports to the president.

LaBerge: The same thing with the other vice presidents?

Krevans: Absolutely. Every once in a while there would be a real issue, and a few times there were strong words between not me and David, but between other chancellors and David, when the vice presidents took on--using the lexicon of management--line authority instead of staff authority. While that sounds picayune and petty, it isn't. For people who had my job or Mike Heyman's job or [Berkeley Chancellor] Chang-Lin's [Tien] or Chuck Young's, for them to be able to carry out that responsibility, they had to have the authority. That authority is regental; I don't think anyone ever forgot that.

LaBerge: Because you're approved and appointed by the regents.

Krevans: And we carried the delegation of the regents' authority from the president. It's not direct; we don't bypass the president. And that's the way that the wording actually is: "By the authority vested in me by the Regents of the University of California," we give degrees out.

LaBerge: Whereas the vice presidents are not approved by the regents?

Krevans: Sure, they are.

LaBerge: But they're not appointed or--

Krevans: It's a matter of operational effectiveness. You could do it the other way, as they do on campuses: the chancellor will appoint a provost and say to the provost, "You are in charge of all of science." But the authority is to the chancellor, and that provost reports to the chancellor. Now we don't do that here on this campus. The deans report directly to the chancellor. We have vice chancellors, but they are staff, not line.

Now let me just step back so that I don't mislead you. For most of the work--this day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month work--we dealt with the vice presidents or sometimes below that level. But the authority was president to the chancellor. And that made it easier to deal with the vice presidents because they knew that the chancellor reported to the president and not to them. So it was a working relationship. It also worked the other way: the few times I remember getting mad enough to put a stop to it, I did not like anyone from the president's office dealing directly with anyone on my campus unless I knew about it.

LaBerge: I take it that it happened.

Krevans: It happened.

LaBerge: Do you want to give me any examples?

Krevans: It happened all the time. All the admissions officers get together, and then the academic affairs office starts having direct relationships with our admissions officers without letting the chancellor know. That's unacceptable because then all of a sudden you've got a wholly different management mechanism, and it doesn't work. At least it didn't work here. The other chancellors felt the same way.

LaBerge: Because it's something you're responsible for.

Krevans: Absolutely.

Medical Schools Admissions

LaBerge: Let's go to your group of medical school chancellors. Would you meet regularly outside the Council of the Chancellors?

Krevans: When major issues came up we did. When we were having problems with what's called the compensation plan, by which faculty of clinical departments had their total income made up in part of state money and in part of money that they earned in the practice of medicine. That's a very sticky issue. There, we did want to have a single plan that everybody accepted. Every campus had a different plan. That took almost three years. Each campus said, "This is the way it's working; why change it?" We would meet on those issues. Sometimes there were medical center issues, hospital issues, and we would meet about that. And a summary of what we felt would come up at the Council of Chancellors. That kind of stuff.

LaBerge: What about admissions? Is that something you would discuss?

Krevans: No, that was never--our admissions are so different--

LaBerge: Than anybody else's?

Krevans: Than anybody else's. And different for the different schools.

UCSF School of Medicine

LaBerge: Okay, the medical school here.

Krevans: It gets 6,000 applicants and admits 140 students. Our concern, frankly, is not what happens at Davis but what happens at Harvard or Stanford.

LaBerge: Those are your comparative institutions.

Krevans: That's where our reputation is. Johns Hopkins. We're not worried about what happens at Davis and Irvine. There were issues also about the graduate program, which is very frustrating to us. We have a very small graduate program but very highly rated. The university systemwide budget separates the health science budget from the general campus budget, [chuckles] and our graduate program was always lumped into the health science

budget. It used to drive me crazy. We coped with it. And our numbers were so small that it was very hard to get the university to pay attention to it. Periodically something would be published on graduate education, and they would just leave San Francisco out and only have information from the other eight campuses, and I would go through the ceiling. [chuckles] David would say, "Calm down, calm down. We'll fix it." [laughter]

By and large, until the very end--and I think you'll find this when you talk to the other chancellors--it was a very collegial relationship both collectively and individually. David and I became close because his wife was a graduate of our school, and therefore an alum. And when he was courting her she was a student here. Then when she became ill, I was involved in helping select medical care, et cetera, for them, and we became quite close.

LaBerge: He mentions in his oral history how supportive you were particularly at that time.

Krevans: It was a very rough time. There was one area of friction which--I don't know whether David mentioned it or not, but it's real. It's probably less real now. With the president's office across the street from the Berkeley campus as it used to be, and the prestige that is put on the shoulders of the Berkeley chancellor--it was hard to know who was the head of the university from the public perception. I think there was some tension there. I think it became less once the president's office moved to Oakland.

Oakland and Southern California Headquarters of President

LaBerge: Were the chancellors in on that decision to move?

Krevans: We discussed it, yes. I think the principal architects of that move were David and maybe [Senior Vice President] Ron Brady and David--I don't know in what order.

And there were some other differences of opinion: a number of us, and I was one, were concerned that the presidency was getting too corporate. The symbol was the southern California headquarters. You walked in there, and you were walking into the offices of a corporation. To some extent that was even true in the Kaiser building--less, but still. A number of us felt that things had to be done to oppose that perception, because that was not good for the university. All those issues would get discussed.

LaBerge: How do you think he fostered that kind of openness? It's sort of like with kids: you can't make children be friends. He couldn't make you--

Krevans: No. He didn't become friends with all the chancellors--some. I've thought about it. I think the way he conducted the Council of Chancellors was the instrument that made that possible. It wasn't just a perception that he was listening; he was listening. As the discussions went forward, it was clear he was being influenced by the discussion, that he wasn't just going through a ritual. Once you get by that, if you yourself are at all perceptive, you realize that you're part of something that's genuine, not made up. I think

that was the principal reason it worked. He didn't gather you together to tell you what to do; he gathered us together to figure out what we should do. It sounds like slogans, but it wasn't; it was much more than a slogan.

David Gardner and Regents' Meetings

LaBerge: Since we brought up the regents, tell me about the regents' meetings, how David Gardner handled them, and what your input to the regents' meetings were.

Krevans: There were a number of issues. Let's just take the regents' meetings. It depends on what period of David's presidency you're talking about. Early on he could do no wrong; he was the darling of the regents.

LaBerge: He set that in motion in some way?

Krevans: They just liked him from the start. The role of the chancellors at the regents' meetings has always been awkward. You know how the regents' meetings worked--there were three basic formats: there's the regents' meeting, at which everybody is present, including the public; then there are things called closed meetings, from which the public is excluded when you talk about personnel matters, legal issues, contracts, and which chancellors stay; and there are the regents-only meetings, where everybody has to leave except the regents. Every time that happened egomaniacs like me would walk out the room and say, "How the hell can they hold a meeting? There is no university except what's in San Francisco and Berkeley and Los Angeles." So there was tension. [laughter] You just sat around all day long. Regents' meetings are like all other corporate meetings: they tend to skip over the important stuff and spend the time on easy stuff. It's in the Parkinson's book. *Parkinson's Law*--you know that book?[1]

LaBerge: Yes.

Krevans: It describes a corporate meeting in which they approve a $2 billion atomic energy plant in fifteen minutes and spend the rest of the day on the design of a $35,000 garage. Regents' meetings are like that in some cases. They will go whizzing by some major issues and then spend hours on what used to be called the Architecture and Design Committee, while they argued about the pitch of the roof on the new dorm in Santa Cruz. [chuckles] You sit around or march around or mull around trying to figure out what you're doing there for a day and a half, first for the committee meetings and then for the brief Friday morning session.

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[1]C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law, and Other Studies in Administration (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

I thought David conducted himself as president of the university with great skill. He would, despite all of the discussion and bouts, et cetera, which had gone before, once a position was decided upon, he would be absolutely a tireless advocate of the position that we had taken. An example: we had the Mt. Zion [Hospital] merger here. We spent a year, with him basically putting me on the rack in discussions.

LaBerge: Like at the Council of Chancellors?

Krevans: And then one-on-one, and with my bringing my colleagues over--Ron Brady and all of the budget people coming, arguing back and forth. When the decision was made--okay, it's the right thing to do--David was a formidable advocate to the regents, who also had doubts about it. He was very good at that, and he's very articulate. His summing up after a complex discussion--not just of the prepared material, but of what had happened during the regents' discussion--was done with great skill. He was a very effective speaker in his own way. Not a showy speaker, but a very effective speaker, and that's important, because that's a big table. So I thought that went well. It turned sour when the issues turned sour--particularly the retirement issue. Then it got very unhappy.

Retirement Controversy

LaBerge: Do you want to talk about that issue now?

Krevans: Sure. What do you want to know about it?

LaBerge: What was your take on it?

Krevans: He didn't do anything wrong. Whether the regents had done something wrong or something inappropriate or something careless is one story, but David was only being given what he had been told he would get. Whether they should have told him he was going to get that, that's another story. A lot of it was exaggerated, because a lot of it was his own money--money that he had put in that was then due him. There were a couple of things perhaps that he might have stepped back and said, "Oh, this isn't worth it." But he was embittered by that time. It's very easy to make someone look greedy. There was something in this morning's paper on the president--not the CEO--of Levi Strauss, about Tom Tusher, a friend of mine, getting a hundred million dollars. It sounds like they gave him a hundred million dollars. But that's not true. What they gave him were a lot of options at a time when the stock was worth three dollars and something, and it's now worth 200. [laughs] So every option they gave him is worth $190. That accretion in value took place.

We don't have stock options, but we had certain things promised us, and I got some of that too, but mine never achieved the notoriety of David's. These deferred payments, I don't know whose idea that was--probably Ron's, because Ron was the most creative administrator I've ever met. Absolutely incredible man. You should be interviewing him.

He's wonderful. He has horns, and you can smell the brimstone; he is the devil. But he's a wonderful devil. [laughter]

The university was doing very well. There was a lot of political turmoil going on. The chancellors were running probably 70 percent behind comparable people in other universities in pay. There was money available to increase their pay, but politically it was considered dangerous. So they came up with the deferred payments. We each got it, and next year you got another deferred one. Well, by the time you left, a fair amount of that money had accumulated--it was a big package. It sounded like he got it all at once, but he didn't.

LaBerge: Accruing--

Krevans: Over the years. This is separate from the retirement. Now deferred payments are again a perfectly acceptable, valid way of compensation, but it was painted as a secret. And it wasn't; it was voted on and written up in the paper at the time it happened, but nobody paid any attention to it. I think the erosion of the relationship between David and the regents--not all the regents; remember, they voted, including Willie Brown, for David. It was probably an accumulation of things: the "regal" presidency, the divestment issue, the excessive benefits and retirement--all of those things kind of compounding. A few regents who took advantage of it were acting out like adolescents. For all of the looking back at that unpleasant time, every regents' meeting is now worse than any of the ones we've ever had then. [laughter] Talk to [President] Dick [Richard] Atkinson about regents' meetings.

LaBerge: Do you still go?

Krevans: No. I haven't been to a single regents' meeting since 1993. I would go if they invited me for some specific reason, but there's no reason I should. When you've had this kind of job, what you don't miss is fascinating to me; not to you--

LaBerge: No, it is fascinating to me.

Krevans: One of the things I underestimated was the pleasure of not being responsible for what other people do, because I had twenty-two years of it as dean and then chancellor. Suddenly I'm only responsible for what I do. On the other side, it would be a lie if I didn't admit that I miss when I would make a casual remark someone would always say, "That's interesting." [laughter] When you're chancellor or president people say, "That's interesting." [laughter]

President's Relationship with Governor and Legislature

Krevans: Again, I think you can't separate the relationship with the regents from the other external relationship, and that's with the legislature and the governor. One would have to say, however David did it, that his development of the relationship with [Governor George]

Deukmejian was one of the most important positive things that happened to the University of California. It turned around that faculty salary issue in a very, very important way. It did it dramatically and quickly, and it had a wonderful, wonderful effect--not just the dollars, that's fine. But it just turned the morale around, literally overnight, when it happened. [Director of State Governmental Relations] Steve Arditti, I'm sure, could tell you a little more about that. And [Director of the Budget Lawrence] Larry [Hershman]. I think that was David who did that, by meeting and discussing directly with the governor. He got along less well with the legislature. Most of them were Democrats: no matter how he combed his hair he never looked like a Democrat. [laughter] But he got on okay with Willie Brown.

LaBerge: Yes, isn't that interesting?

Krevans: I don't know if he ever told you when you interviewed him about his breakfast with Willie.

LaBerge: I'm not the one who interviewed him, and I don't have every word of that at my fingertips, so tell me.

Krevans: They did not get off to a good start when he first became president. David was worried about that. He said, "Do you know him?" I said, "Yes, I know him well." He said, "I'd like to get to speak to him personally so that he understands where I come from." I was chancellor, and I had a nice house on top of that hill [pointing], and one morning Willie and David came up--my wife had gone out and gotten some croissants, and we sat around all morning, the three of us, drinking coffee and having buns, for over three hours. Afterwards--you know, they didn't go out and play pool together, but they had a much better understanding of each other. I think it helped both the university and the legislature. It was an interesting event. Major, important issues are not always decided by battles in armor and that kind of thing, they're often decided by having coffee. [chuckles]

LaBerge: Right. And just understanding people. I guess that's one of the other things I heard--how often he would just pick up the phone and really keep in contact with people.

Faculty and Alumni Relations

Krevans: Let me just pick out some other things you might--. [looking at outline] Faculty relations. That was one of the sore points. Faculty and alumni relations. You can lump those together. David, like anybody in that job, wanted to retain the relationship between the president and the faculty and the alumni, and as I reminded him, and as did a number of my colleague chancellors, "You don't have any faculty." [laughter] "You don't have alumni. Berkeley has alumni. UCSF has alumni. The president's office has no alumni." There was tension in that, because he did try.

LaBerge: And how would he try? By going to the Academic Senate meetings?

Krevans: He did that at first, and then he stopped doing that because the enormous burden of that job is unbelievable. But he did that at first, the first couple of years. He would go around and spend some time on each campus. Basically, he tried to do it through the senate and the Academic Council.

LaBerge: Which is for the whole university.

Krevans: And not always considered a powerful force for good by the chancellors. [laughter]

LaBerge: Are you invited to those meetings or not?

Krevans: No. Basically they were the vice president's--they were Frazer's meetings.

LaBerge: Is there some kind of tension because he was not a faculty member?

Krevans: I don't think so. It's because there is no total faculty constituency. The Academic Council's not artificial; there has to be the deliberative faculty body that looks at academic issues that override everything--definitional issues. But the academic programs are different--there is no academic program in English or in biochemistry at the universitywide level. There's a biochemistry program in San Diego and there's one here and there's one in Berkeley, and they're run by faculty of each campus; they're not run by administration. Just because faculty get together in Oakland, they don't set up a biochemistry program. So the Academic Council is looking at policy issues that affect the whole academic environment. It just makes anyone who's got responsibility for what actually happens on campus nervous because they can come to some conclusion, and they're a very powerful body, as they should be.

Remember, there are two faculty representatives that sit with the regents. They are given great respect by the regents--perhaps more than they deserve. Not more than they deserve as individuals, but they are by no means representative of the faculty. And depending upon whose rear ends are in those two chairs, you sometimes have spectacular representation, you sometimes have okay representation, and you sometimes have very negative representation. I'm not going to give you examples [laughs].

LaBerge: What about UCSF and your own Academic Senate?

Krevans: It's like I suspect it is on most campuses. The role of the senate varies a lot from campus to campus. On this campus it varies also with the chancellor. I was never quite successful at making the senate feel it was of great importance; it's not on all issues. The senate is of critical importance as an insurance policy because it has a lot of power, which can be extremely important under certain circumstances. When there are huge policy issues which affect the integrity of the university, the regents delegate directly to the faculty, and not through the president and the chancellor, the authority to make academic decisions, admissions decisions, et cetera. Very important. These are genuine academic issues. Over the years the faculty have also collectively kind of redefined what's important for academic issues--to include everything: parking--.

LaBerge: That's big at Berkeley too. [laughs]

Krevans: But it is on every campus. How can you effectively carry out your scholarly work if you can't park your car? So this line as to where the faculty management authority should be is what's a problem, and it varies from campus to campus. Here there is very little problem: the faculty senate basically deals with policy issues and gets very involved when they're very important. I mean, the faculty role on this Stanford merger thing is very powerful and very important. On the Mission Bay campus which is about to be undertaken, we had a two-hour session of the faculty yesterday just on that. Seventy people showed up. We have 1,000 faculty. The administration of the campus is giving the faculty a major and appropriate role.

The point that--when I say they're very important, it's on this kind of issue. The fact that only a relatively small number showed up is not the important thing; the important thing is that Chancellor [Haile] Debas felt it was critical that there be faculty involvement. And the committee, which has recommendations for how the academic entry into that new campus should evolve was entirely made up of some of the leadership faculty--not the deans, but the leadership faculty of the campus.

Neighborhood Impact and Laurel Heights

LaBerge: What about when you were having--maybe this was the Mt. Zion merger--wasn't there a whole neighborhood outcry?

Krevans: Ah, yes. That was a minor one. The big ones were Laurel Heights, and the building of the hospital back in the seventies. Those two were major ones. It was terrible. Berkeley has the same thing--more with animal rights in Berkeley than with environmental people. And we won all the lawsuits but we lost--it cost a fortune. Eventually it's worked out, but it sapped millions--

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LaBerge: Okay, we were talking about the Laurel Heights expansion.

Krevans: We acquired Laurel Heights--again, this was a beautiful example of David's leadership, because we had to move quickly, and it was over Christmas, and we did it under the chairman's authority. That was in '85, early '86. We then went through the EIR [Environmental Impact Report] process and were sued. Instead of starting renovations in '87, we didn't really get started until last year [1996]. We've had the use of some of the building, and meanwhile we were paying--we didn't get any money from the state for that.

We eventually won all the law cases. We had to revise our EIR based on the [California] supreme court upholding one little piece of the appeals court. We won in the superior court. We got a terrible decision from the appeals court. The supreme court

reversed the appeals court on all but one issue. But the way it works, if they uphold any one, you have to do the whole thing all over again, which we did at enormous cost. By the time we finished, we could have gone ahead with our original plan (which had been worked out by the faculty of the School of Pharmacy) to basically make that a bioscience center for the School of Pharmacy. That was one of the issues in the court, whether we knew that in advance--which we didn't. But the regulations are different now. The cost of renovations has changed. It would now be impossible financially to do it. So it's going to become a Behavioral and Social Science Center. It'll be wonderful.

Officers of the Regents

Krevans: On those issues, the president's office was enormously supportive. But it brings up another issue down here: the regents office's general counsel, which I'm sure you've talked about.

LaBerge: Was it Don Reidhaar then?

Krevans: Yes.

LaBerge: Okay. I haven't talked about it with too many people.

Krevans: It's a very critical issue. The way things were--and I think still are--the general counsel reports to the regents, and the president doesn't have a lawyer. And the campuses don't have a lawyer, because we are basically under the umbrella of the general counsel's office. It's gotten better, but it was a very frustrating phenomenon. You get a major issue that comes up on the campus and if somebody in Don's office decided it wasn't important it could sit on their desks for weeks. There was nothing we could do about it, because I couldn't call David Saxon or David Gardner--he had no authority over these people. What a lot of us thought, and what I think David G. actually proposed, is to have the office split in some way. For university business, the general counsel would be an officer of the president; and for regental oversight the general counsel would report to the regents. But the regents didn't want to give it up. So they made some kind of compromise. I think the situation is still the same.

The Secretary of the Regents is a different story. That's not a problem. The Secretary of the Regents basically works for the regents, should work for the regents, and works in liaison with the president's office in working out the meetings--it's a non-problem.

The treasurer is a big problem. A lot of that is much better than it was before. The way it was before, the treasurer--like the general counsel--reported to the regents. So when you had any kind of financial transaction on a campus, you dealt with the treasurer and not with the president. The president had no authority. Again, what was proposed--and I don't know how far that's gone; I think they've gone some distance--is to draw the line on university business--acquisition, loans for buildings, et cetera--the treasurer is a president's

officer. For investments the treasurer is a regents' officer. But I don't know how that stands now. But you can see the tension it created.

LaBerge: Yes. Can you give me an example of, for instance, a financial transaction?

Krevans: Buying Laurel Heights. The treasurer helped us with it, and David helped us with it. But had the treasurer chosen not to, and David thought Yes, there was nothing he could have done about it. He had to persuade the treasurer. Actually, the treasurer thought it was a very good deal. In that role, at least from my perception, the treasurer should be a presidential officer, because it's the president who's responsible for what happens in the university--not the treasurer.

Chancellors' Connections with Regents and Legislators

LaBerge: Now did you have your own relationships with individual regents?

Krevans: Yes.

LaBerge: And how does that work?

Krevans: Carefully. [laughter] No, you really have to be careful.

LaBerge: Does someone in the beginning tell you all this? Or you just kind of learn it?

Krevans: You sort of learn it and you're sort of told. But common sense and decency really tell you what to do. When a regent would come to me about something, and if it was something personal, I have no problem with that. When the regent would come to me about something about the university, it was absolutely critical that David be informed about that. If a regent would come to me, as they did--and I'm sure they did with other chancellors--"I'm worried about what David Gardner is doing." My response is, "Have you talked with him about it? Would you like me to talk with him about it?" Because the last thing in the world I wanted was to develop a confidential relationship about something that had to do with the president's office. It's very destructive.

Conversely, when we wanted something, it was very important sometimes for us to go to the regents in advance. We never did it without letting the president know. It's particularly true for the local--if you will--regents. There were some regents who were very close to Chuck Young because of southern California. There were some regents who were very close to Berkeley. We probably did medical care for most of the regents, so they became very close to us.

You can take advantage of that if it's done properly, but you can't have end runs around the president--the same thing is true of legislators. I have very straight and easy access to not just Mr. [Willie] Brown but to a number of other legislators. And it was useful to

Larry Hershman in the annual budget, and [Vice President William] Bill Baker, and they would use me, and they would use Mike [Heyman], because Mike had very strong relationships with some of the legislators. And Chuck did in southern California. But it had to be coordinated. You couldn't have campuses advocating budgetary decisions on a campus basis without coordinating with the whole university. Some people went out of line--not all.

LaBerge: Any of these times, if you want to give me examples, feel free.

Krevans: Well, on the budgetary issues, one of the things we did was to try to find an advocate who was not directly benefitting, so that for example, on hospital issues, when some of the university hospitals--at San Diego and at Irvine and also at Davis--were in terrible financial trouble, they wanted a special line item in the budget to help those hospitals out, in the university budget. Rather than have [Irvine Chancellor] Jack Peltason or [San Diego Chancellor] Atkinson go to the budget hearings, I went and spoke to the general issue of how critical it was to have a viable university hospital, with the reasoning that it would be much more effective since I wasn't asking for money for UCSF. So that's how it worked. I had some personal reservations, but on balance it was good for the university, and so you do it.

LaBerge: What about on your special issues? Would someone else go advocate for you?

Krevans: The president's office, usually. We had a much easier time because everyone thought of us as an exception.

LaBerge: And also kind of like a star in the--

Krevans: Well, we also brought a lot of benefit.

LaBerge: Yes.

Krevans: A lot of kudos, and particularly for Ed Carter, who was a regent early in my time as chancellor, used to regularly criticize the university for its failure to have preeminent professional schools. He was really interested in business schools. He didn't like the idea that when people talked about the best business schools, they talked about Wharton and Tuck and Harvard and Stanford and didn't mention any UC school until after they took a breath. And then he turned to me and said, "Except your school, Julie." [laughter]

So you're right: we kind of were a free ride on some of the reputation issues. We were first in NIH [National Institutes of Health] funding and preeminent in biomedical sciences, and the biotechnology industry spawning out of this place, et cetera.

Divestment, 1986, and Proposition 209, 1996

LaBerge: How about divestment? You brought that up as being one of the--

Krevans: Well, it was one of the issues which was a very turbulent issue. It had all the drama because of television and the helmeted police and all that stuff--all very high theater. And it was an important issue. David was opposed to divestment, as I think the majority of the regents were opposed to it.

LaBerge: How about the chancellors?

Krevans: They were split. I think probably if you took a vote among the chancellors they would have said, "Oh, let's get rid of this issue; it's not worth it. It's hurting the university so much. Let's divest." On principle, I think the chancellors probably would have voted, divestment's a mistake because engagement was a better policy. I don't know which was right. But at the regents' meeting, and that one happened to take place in Santa Cruz, the word came down at the last minute that the governor had changed his mind. The governor's supporters among the regents voted for divestment.

David, of course who was a regent as well as president, voted against it, because he thought it was the wrong strategy. He really believed engagement was a better strategy than divestment. It wasn't because he supported apartheid. It was because he felt engagement was a better strategy. And he voted against it even though he knew the governor was asking everyone to vote for it.

LaBerge: Do you think that affected later regent relations?

Krevans: No. I don't think that at all. I think actually it increased their respect for him, because I think had they voted without the governor pushing them, they would have voted against it.

LaBerge: On another issue I forgot to ask you when we were talking about affirmative action, could you see then any roots of Proposition 209, looking back on it?

Krevans: Not during the time David was president. The only issue that came up--and it was a big issue--is one you should talk to Mike Heyman about, and that was the accusation that Berkeley and Los Angeles--but mostly Berkeley--were taking extraordinary steps to keep Chinese out in order to have respectable numbers of black and Hispanic Americans, that they were cooking the books. That was the first suggestion that this was truly an issue. That quieted down. Actually, Berkeley changed its procedures and it had to do with how much weight you gave to the English language score. If you weighted it up, you keep Chinese out. But it's more complicated than that. Mike would know all the details. But it was a big issue.

LaBerge: Brought up by the regents or--

Krevans: No, it came from outside, and it was brought up by a collection of very distinguished Berkeley graduates, including a judge.

LaBerge: If David Gardner had been president when 209 came up, do you think that that would have, first of all, passed in the regents' meeting?

Krevans: I have no idea. The regents have changed so much. It's hard to know. He didn't overlap with Ward Connerly at all. So I just don't know. By that time, the regents had changed the way they worked. I don't know what's happened since, but it's not good. I don't think it's good for the university. They are behaving much less like trustees and much more like a legislative panel with different agendas. Regents are trustees. They own the university directly for the people, not for the governor. But it's hard to envision that if you sit at a regents' meeting.

Technology Transfer, Patents, Overhead Income

LaBerge: What about any specific UCSF issues?

Krevans: The technology transfer--and that was an unhappy sequence of events which is still going on. It's illustrative of the tension between the University of California as an entity and the several campuses. It has a number of different details. Let's take the one which always leaps out first: money. Patent income. When I became chancellor there was a system in place; it was a universitywide patent office. And there still is. It received all the patent income for the whole university, took off its expenses, and half of the patent income went to the inventor, the faculty member who had done the research. The other half went to the university, and nothing came back to the campus. Nothing. Zero. And there was nothing left, because they spent so much money, and all the expenses were done centrally and were paid for by patent income off the top. Expenses were formidable. It's a big expensive office because it's expensive to prosecute a patent.

If you looked at patent income, basically 90-something percent of it came from two campuses, and 80-some percent came from this one. It was this campus and the strawberry patent at Davis that were the only things that were bringing in any money to speak of. So we pushed very hard to change the system--started under David and completed under Peltason.

David started the first part of the change, and I would give Dick Atkinson and Chuck a lot of credit, because they had nothing to gain immediately. We put in place--and it had to be phased in; it took four or five years--that each campus paid for its own patent prosecution. That of course put some brakes on the amount of money the patent office spent. Very quickly, campuses had negative balances--they were spending more on patent prosecution [it was still being done centrally]--than they were bringing in. Campuses like Santa Barbara weren't bringing anything in and were spending a lot of money.

That brought up the whole issue of what's the most effective way to do technology transfer? This was something that Ron Brady was very interested in. Again, there was tension between the campuses and the president's office; Ron envisioned a central technology transfer program supported by investments from the campuses with distribution of yield to the campuses. The faculty were worried about it. I thought it was basically a very good idea. I don't know what's happened since '93. The third issue was similar in that it did not deal so much with technology transfer but with private funds and overhead from the federally-sponsored research. We used to get nothing.

LaBerge: You meaning nothing back from--? And you were the ones who--

Krevans: We were generating it!

LaBerge: Were you the 80 percent?

Krevans: Not 80 percent, but a lot. [chuckles] That's gotten very much better. And David also started that. To have some of the distribution of overhead money on federal grants go back to the campus of origin rather than all of it be given to the president's office as discretionary money. That was very well done.

There was another issue on which I failed, but now they've finally moved on it. There was something called the Opportunity Fund. The Opportunity Fund is made up of the indirect costs on private grants from foundations, et cetera. The president kept all of that money as his discretionary funds. I tried in vain to make David understand that if he could split that with the campus, that his share would go up, because as soon as we started getting money back we would see to it that more of the private foundations put in overhead for us. Because that was very marginal--some foundations do, some foundations don't. Since we raised the money, we have a lot more to say about whether or not they'll put in overhead. I understand from our accounting people here that we now do get some of that money. That started under Peltason. So there were issues that separated us, but they were all handled with civility and good will, I think. David much of the time made good decisions, and sometimes he didn't listen to me. [laughter] That was an important one.

Cal-PIRG

Krevans: David had a big vision. The Keck Telescope is a very good one. No pun intended. That would never have happened without him. There were a lot of reservations on the part of the chancellors. I think if we had voted on that one it would have gone down--among the chancellors. But he saw that as an important thing for an institution like the University of California to do, and I think he was right, even though I thought it was an awful lot of money. Cal-PIRG [California Public Interest Research Group]--

LaBerge: Does that affect UCSF? Do the students here have that--

Krevans: They don't pay much attention to it.

LaBerge: But is it on their tuition? I didn't know if it was just undergrad?

Krevans: No, it's everybody. I think David was 100 percent right on this issue. Chancellors backed him on this issue, which was very important, because since he was a Mormon he was thought to be a right-winger, and to have "left-wingers" like Chuck and Mike agreeing with him was very important. Ralph Nader was very bitter on this one. I have no idea to what extent the Cal-PIRG issue revisited itself in some of the legislature's harassment of the university--because the legislature got very much involved. We had Bill Baker going crazy with the legislature telling him, "You guys are going to pay for this." But we didn't budge on that. And you know what the issue was: the negative versus positive checkoff.

LaBerge: Yes.

Krevans: We felt that we were correct. Actually, if a company that's trying to sell you something does that, it's against the law. If you get something from a company which says, "We're going to spend this money unless you check off 'No'," they go to jail. And here we want to impose that on the students. That was a tough issue. That's the kind of issue we would spend a lot of time in the Council of Chancellors, because it involved judgment on how punitive the backlash was going to be. We all had our own antennae which reached into the legislature.

LaBerge: Who were your antennae in the legislature?

Krevans: Mr. Brown, Senator Mello, Quentin Kopp, John Burton, Milton Marks--all our local people. And then for a while we had one of our clinical faculty, the ophthalmologist from Marin County, who was in the legislature [William Filante, M.D.]. These people had nice easy interaction with us, and we with them, and they would call. Also, the--

##

Krevans: --Senator [Alfred] Alquist, John Garamendi. There were a lot of people who interacted with us for one reason or another not exclusively--John was an alum of Berkeley.

LaBerge: But it cut across party lines, too.

Krevans: Yes. Although in San Francisco there are not many Republicans. I think there are three. [laughter] I mean, three registered Republicans. [laughter] Anything else on this [points to list] you want to talk about?

Faculty Home Loans

LaBerge: Do you have anything more to comment on Ron Brady? Maybe the amount of power he had.

Krevans: Ron Brady had an enormous amount of power, but not by delegation or by fiat. He had it because he was so good at what he did. I'll give you an example. We periodically go through in the Bay Area a time when housing prices are normal; it doesn't last very long, and then you've got this kind of thing [gestures]--we're back on that slope. That was a huge problem when we were recruiting, particularly young faculty. People say, "Why should you worry about faculty? You have to worry about everybody." But that's not true. Most of our staff positions are recruited locally. Most, not all. Faculty are recruited nationally and sometimes even internationally. So you have a different issue. You recruit somebody who's been a star at Washington University in St. Louis at that time, and they come out and see that the estate with horses that they were able to afford won't buy them a run-down Victorian. It's a big problem. Nobody ever could figure out what to do about it. Ron Brady figured out what to do about it. We have a wonderful faculty home-loan program. It costs us nothing. Do you know how it works?

LaBerge: I know a little, but why don't you explain it?

Krevans: They use the float. There's so much money going in and out of the university all the time that they have a money market pool. So Ron said, "That's such a huge amount of money. We can take a very small percentage of that and loan it to the faculty at the same interest rates that we get on that fund. Therefore we're not reducing the income to the university. Put on a tiny extra charge for the administration of the program, and within a certain number of years the amount of money coming back from payments will be enough to make it sustaining." And that's exactly what's happening. This is the kind of thing Brady could do.

He was a problem solver. He wasn't the kind of person who said, "We can't do this for the following reason." He would ask a lot of questions: Do we want to do this? Is this really important? Is this what you really want? Et cetera. Once that was settled, his next set of questions was, Okay, given the constraints, how can we do it? That's why he had a lot of power. Not because David turned that side of the business over to him.

Some of the regents didn't like him. I think he never came across to the regents as they would like to have him come across. Most of them were successful financially in their own right, and at least it was their perception--this is an opinion, not fact--that he was not as respectful of their great talents as he should have been. You can ask others. That was my perception. But there's no question there was no great love for Ron Brady. Some of them liked him very much; collectively, he was not popular with the regents, even at the time David still was. I thought he was great because he solved problems.

LaBerge: And you obviously saw the results in the faculty that you were able to recruit.

Krevans: It was great to have the faculty home-loan program. And there were many other issues--financing issues, et cetera. He was very good. Working with the treasurer's office, which had to be done--he couldn't order the treasurer to do something, but Ron was able to move things quickly. He's up there in the state of Washington now, apparently very happy.

LaBerge: As far as David Gardner and the chancellors, did you feel he delegated a lot of authority to you?

Krevans: I think so. I don't know if he delegated it to me. It really isn't quite that clean.

LaBerge: Not quite the right word?

Krevans: He had it all, and he never gave it away. Because whatever authority we have as chancellors comes from the regents through the president, and therefore he retains it all. Anybody can appeal any decision the chancellor makes to the president. So delegation is the wrong word, I think. I think the right word is he recognized that in order for us to discharge our responsibility, we had to have our authority upheld. We didn't get a lot of letters saying--we did get a few--"You are delegated this authority." But that was mechanical. The reality is that he respected our decisions and didn't encourage going around them. That was much more important than a series of letters from the president saying, "You are allowed to spend up to this amount or that amount of money." We had some of those, but they're not that important.

Jack Peltason as President

LaBerge: Any change when Jack Peltason became president?

Krevans: A little bit. Jack had a little different style. Jack seemed, in the short time we overlapped as chancellor and president to be much more concerned about how people will perceive the university than David was. Less willing to take the hard decision, even though people criticized you for it. But Jack's a person of great stature and integrity. I think the regents were not looking for another controversial person, [chuckles] given the bruised condition of the regents after David's departure, because of tremendous criticism of the regents.

LaBerge: What was it like to have one of your former chancellors and colleagues become president? Or for him--did he have a different perception, do you think, of the chancellors because of his experience?

Krevans: I don't think so. We went through this on this campus when I was dean of the School of Medicine. Phil Lee was chancellor for a very short time, and then he and the regents decided it was the wrong fit. He stepped down, and the person who was chairman of our ear, nose, and throat department--Frank Sooy--was made chancellor. And actually Charlie Hitch called me up and said, "Julie, how would you feel if we appointed Frank Sooy chancellor?" And I said, "Charlie, what would you do if I said I'll resign?" He said, "Oh,

my God." I said, "No, no." [laughter] So he was my chancellor. When he stepped down and I became chancellor, he went back on the faculty. I don't think that's a big deal with most people who get to these jobs.

LaBerge: I read somewhere--I can't say where--that maybe you were being considered to be president?

Krevans: Not that I know of. Would I have accepted? Of course. [laughter]

LaBerge: Maybe it was someone else's speculation.

Krevans: Maybe. I don't know. I don't think so. I think they could have considered someone like me at a happier time--leaving me out of it now--someone who didn't have automatic warm credentials with faculty, with undergraduate programs, et cetera, which Jack did. They had just come through this very unpleasant set of circumstances, and they needed instant credibility. Jack provided that, and I think the real choices they were looking at--if I were to guess; I wasn't on any committee--were Chuck [Young] and Dick [Atkinson].

I think the reason--again, I have no inside information--they chose Jack is both Chuck and Dick had controversial attributes about them, whereas Jack, nobody had anything bad to say about him. That's not damning him with faint praise; Jack's very smart and very good. Right at that moment in the university's time, Jack had two attributes which were very good: one, he was liked and respected and had broad university experience; second, he was a short termer. So they could look at Jack and say that this is someone who is going to come in, and people will be unafraid. And if we made a mistake, it won't take long.

I think to go outside the norm and appoint a "sport" like me or Frank Sooy, the university would have to be settled down, and you could say, "Okay, let's take a look at a different kind of leadership, who might do something else that we would not normally do. We're doing fine with what we're doing." But I would have been flattered. I don't know if I would have done it, but I would have been flattered. It's a great university.

LaBerge: I can tell in talking to you--

Krevans: My first experience with a public university was when I came here. NYU was private, and Hopkins is private.

LaBerge: Is there anything you'd like to bring up?

Krevans: The labs were a big issue, but a lot of people know more. Frazer knows the most about that.

LaBerge: We talked about that.

Krevans: He's got all the scars.

We do have the name of one of the people who I thought was a great faculty representative, but you put his name down--not me. Neil Smelser.

LaBerge: He was faculty representative to the regents--also Martin Trow?

Krevans: Yes. Neil was terrific. A genuine scholar.

LaBerge: And he's actually on our list to interview also.

Krevans: You should. A very smart man and a very decent person. He's a good friend.

LaBerge: Anything else?

Krevans: I don't think so. What you're looking for is how someone like David fit in on these issues, not what I think about them, and I've tried to keep that in mind. You're also looking--from what I gather--for how a president, whether it's David or anybody else, fit in. That's the hardest part, and that's where I give David very high marks. It's very tough to be the president of this university, because you turn around and--the university is what Chuck Young is running down there in southern California. [laughter]

I enjoyed my relationships with David Gardner very much.

Transcriber: Gary Varney
Final Typist: Caroline Sears

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

University History Series

The University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995

Pedro Noguera

Professor of Education, Student Leader during the Anti-Apartheid Campaign

An Interview Conducted by
Ann Lage
in 1999

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Since 1954 the Regional Oral History Office has been interviewing leading participants in or well-placed witnesses to major events in the development of northern California, the West, and the nation. Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through tape-recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. The tape recording is transcribed, lightly edited for continuity and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewee. The corrected manuscript is indexed, bound with photographs and illustrative materials, and placed in The Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, and in other research collections for scholarly use. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account, offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is reflective, partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable.

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It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows:

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Pedro Noguera, 1997.

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INTERVIEW HISTORY--Pedro Noguera

At the time of this interview Pedro Noguera was an associate professor in the School of Education at UC Berkeley and director of the Institute for Social Change. Thirteen years earlier, during his graduate studies in sociology at Berkeley, he had been president of the Associated Students and part of the council of student body presidents which met with President David Gardner. He was interviewed for the project to provide a student perspective on the Office of the President.

As Professor Noguera indicates in his interview, perhaps the most significant connection with the Office of the President grew out of his leadership on campus to promote university divestment from companies doing business in South Africa. As a leader of United People of Color, he was a key player in Berkeley campus demonstrations, in spring 1985, in favor of divestment. He organized and chaired a forum on campus attended by President Gardner, thirteen regents, and an audience of 7,000. His group confronted the systemwide university with demonstrations at a meeting of the Board of Regents at Lawrence Hall of Science and opposite University Hall in Berkeley, where the Office of the President was then located.

The interview with Pedro Noguera was conducted on May 10, 1999, at the Institute for Social Change, housed in the old Anna Head School building on the fringes of the Berkeley campus. The one-hour interview, interrupted several times with phone calls, includes some brief reflections on his role the previous week in mediating between Chancellor Robert Berdahl and student demonstrators protesting lack of campus support for the ethnic studies program.

In July, Noguera was sent the lightly edited transcript of his oral history for his review; he gave his approval for its release with no changes. The year following this oral history interview, Professor Noguera left Berkeley for an appointment at Harvard.

Ann Lage, Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
September 2001

Regional Oral History Office
Room 486 The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please write clearly. Use black ink.)

Your full name Pedro Noguera

Date of birth 8-7-59 Birthplace N.Y. City

Father's full name Felipe C Noguera

Occupation Police Officer Birthplace Trinidad

Mother's full name Millicent Noguera

Occupation House wife Birthplace Jamaica

Your spouse Patricia Vasthrone

Occupation Administrator Birthplace Lima, Peru

Your children Joaquin, Amanda, Antonio Naima

Where did you grow up? N.Y. City

Present community Berkeley

Education Brentwood N.Y. H.S., Brown U. B.A., MA UC Berkeley PhD

Occupation(s) Professor

Areas of expertise Urban Sociology, Caribbean & Latin American Studies, Sociology of Education

Other interests or activities Soccer, Politics, running

Organizations in which you are active

INTERVIEW WITH PEDRO NOGUERA

STUDENT LEADER DURING THE ANTI-APARTHEID CAMPAIGN

[Date of Interview: May 10, 1999] ##[1]

Family, Education, and the Decision to Come to Berkeley

Lage: Pedro, today is May 10, 1999. We're doing an interview about your perceptions as student body president of the relationship between the students and the president's office. We're also discussing some information about the anti-apartheid demonstrations.

What I'd like to start with is some personal background, though: when you were born, your family.

Noguera: I was born in New York City, 1959. Come from a large family--six of us. Both my parents are immigrants. My mother is Jamaican; father is Trinidadian. Father was a New York City police officer. I went to Brown University as an undergraduate, where I studied sociology and American history and came here in 1981 for graduate school, for a doctorate in sociology.

Lage: Was there a reason that you picked Berkeley?

Noguera: I liked the program and wanted to get out of the East, Northeast.

Lage: Who did you study under in sociology?

Noguera: I worked closely with Professor Franz Schurmann, who was my dissertation chair, and Professor Troy Duster.

Lage: What was your field of study?

Noguera: I was studying political change in the Caribbean. That's what I did my research on.

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[1]## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcripts.

Lage: So all of your activities here were as a graduate student?

Noguera: Yes.

Lage: Did you always have an activist outlook? Had you been involved in political activity in Brown?

Noguera: Yes, I had. Even in high school, I was active politically. It came natural--although when I first came to California in 1981, I didn't get involved on campus. I was teaching in Oakland. My involvement was more in the community. And then what happened is I started to TA, and got involved in the Graduate Assembly and then was elected chair of the Graduate Assembly in 1984, and then I was encouraged to run for president of ASUC [Associated Students of the University of California]. So I became only the second person in recent years to serve as president while a graduate student.

Lage: Right, I thought that was pretty unusual.

Noguera: The last one before me was Dan Siegel, who in 1969 was a Boalt law student while he was student body president.

Lage: That's an interesting correspondence. Another activist.

Noguera: Yes. It is [laughing].

Lage: Had you been in student government at Brown or in high school?

Noguera: No, I wasn't in student government at Brown or at high school. I was active, but not via student government.

Becoming Involved in Berkeley Student Politics

Lage: Who urged you?

Noguera: Nancy Skinner. At the time, she was the administrative coordinator for the Graduate Assembly and got elected to the city council in Berkeley in 1984. She really encouraged me. She said, "Look, ASUC has all the resources. You can really do a lot [laughing]." A $21 million budget.

Lage: And resources that aren't usually put to--

Noguera: That's right, no. That's right. I think a lot of times students do not have the imagination of what they can do.

Lage: You were president-elect during that year of the big demonstrations on campus.

Noguera: Right.

Lage: According to this packet of information which I mentioned to you that's in the Bancroft Library,[2] the student body president was sort of out of the running. Everybody was referring to you as the leader, as president-elect.

Noguera: Right.

Lage: What was the problem there? Do you remember?

Noguera: Well, see, in a lot of ways I had already established myself as a leader on campus, both through student government but also particularly on the anti-apartheid movement. Given that that was the major issue at hand, I already had the credibility--based on the work I had done--to be the kind of official student leader, even though I had not yet been inducted into office.

Lage: Was your idea to bring that apartheid issue into the ASUC? Or were there other things as well?

Noguera: Other things as well, but I certainly wanted to see student government provide active leadership on issues like that that students were concerned about. In the past, you would always have the active students on the outside because of an anti-establishment kind of orientation. My feeling was, always, we should take control over the institutions and use those resources to better serve students. I always characterized the difference--a lot of students wanted to tear down the university, and my view was let's take over the university. And here I am now, a professor! [laughing]

The Student-led Anti-Apartheid and Divestment Campaign

Lage: If you don't mind, let's talk a little bit about the organizations on campus that represented the anti-apartheid movement. There were a lot of them.

Noguera: Yes. One of the major organizations was not even a student organization. It was a group called the Campaign against Apartheid. It was mostly outsiders, some students. But they were the ones who were involved in the sit-in and a lot of the confrontations with the police. They carried on kind of an anarchistic orientation.

Lage: But they weren't necessarily students.

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[2] *Six Weeks in Spring, 1985: Managing Student Protest at Berkeley, 1986* (Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley) 1985. This collection is a series of brief oral history interviews with Berkeley administrators, police officers, and others; transcripts are available only in The Bancroft Library.

Noguera: Mostly non-students, which posed a real problem for the campus because the university had no real means to deal with them because the administration couldn't threaten their student conduct because they weren't students!

And then there was a group called United People of Color, which represented a lot of students of color on campus. And then AGSE [Association of Graduate Student Employees] had just been created. AGSE was involved, which is the union for graduate students. And then various other student groups that were involved. But those are the main ones.

Lage: These are names that were mentioned in these papers at Bancroft: Students for Divestment, UC Divestment Coalition, African Students Association. And United People of Color.

Noguera: Yes.

Lage: Were they all separate?

Noguera: They were all separate, but I would say United People of Color became the umbrella for a lot of the groups.

Lage: Was that a group you were involved in?

Noguera: That was the group I was with also.

Lage: How did they relate to the Campaign against Apartheid?

Noguera: We had a very tenuous working relationship with them. It was tenuous because, while we agreed on the issue of divestment and trying to make that happen, we disagreed about confrontation with the police, for example. We felt the police were not the enemy and that we shouldn't get sidetracked by engaging in confrontations with the police. The Campaign against Apartheid thought that confrontations with the police were all part of it, and they readily encouraged students to do that. So that was one issue of tension.

We also disagreed over issues of how you make decisions. They wanted an open-ended process, where basically anybody who showed up could have a say, which amounted to whoever could stay at the meeting the longest would have the most say [laughing]. We opposed that idea. We said no, we had to have groups who were students --not non-students--who came from established organizations, who would serve on a steering committee where--in a smaller group, make decisions that would then branch out to other groups.

So we wanted much more structure, much more organization. They opposed structure and organization.

Lage: They had this kind of anarchistic tendency.

Noguera: Right.

Lage: Were they tied in with national political--

Noguera: No, not really. They were just kind of radicals from the area. And some who had come from outside the area to be involved.

Lage: That always happens. Wasn't there also the American Committee against Apartheid? [phone rings]

[tape interruption]

Lage: Okay, we're back on. I want to ask you if you had or if your group had any connection with the national organizations that were working against apartheid.

Noguera: We did.

Lage: The American Committee on Africa.

Noguera: The American Committee on Africa in Washington, D.C., and we also were in touch with --there were a lot of networks that got going among students. For example, I spoke at a U.N. [United Nations] conference against apartheid, and there was stuff going on in Washington. So there was a lot going on then.

Lage: So there was communication.

Noguera: Oh, yes. We had days of action and all kinds of stuff.

Lage: How did it get going on this campus? There were some demonstrations down at University Hall, I think.

Noguera: We started in '84. A lot of it was in response to what was happening in South Africa. In '84 was when the United Democratic Front started to challenge the way the South African government was setting up the elections, and there were major protests there, so our protest came on the heels of that.

Lage: I see. It seemed timely.

Noguera: Oh, yes, it was very much in response to what was happening in South Africa.

Lage: And apparently the student regent at the time, Fred Gaines, I believe his name is?

Noguera: Yes. Fred Gaines--I think he started when I started. Our terms coincided.

Lage: He introduced the measure at the Board of Regents.

Noguera: Right.

Lage: Was that resolution something that was worked on by your student networks?

Noguera: Yes, definitely. We were in consultation with each other. We started systemwide organizing on the campuses, using the system--they have a lobby in Sacramento--using their services to help us to organize.

Lage: The students had a lobby?

Noguera: Student lobby, yes.

Lage: An association of student bodies?

Noguera: Right.

Lage: And were all the campuses on board with this?

Noguera: Yes, all were on board. Berkeley was probably the most active and the biggest in terms of activity, but there was stuff going on everywhere, including Riverside, even. It was pretty significant. And what was interesting is it branched out beyond the usual suspects, the students that you'd normally see at these kind of things. It really did get much broader than that. And then we eventually got faculty involved and staff organizations, so it really got broad.

Lage: Was it an interracial concern?

Noguera: It was interracial. It was graduate and undergraduate, it was very diverse in all of those ways.

Lage: It must have been hard to keep people together.

Noguera: The interracial part was not hard at all. It was more the ideological differences with the group that I talked about before. That was the more divisive issue.

Lage: Do you remember how the decisions to sit in and sleep in, the things that led to arrests--how those came about?

Noguera: Well, everything took lots of meetings, lots of debate over strategy and tactics. At times, we worked well together; at times, we didn't--we went apart. The Campaign against Apartheid people always wanted more direct confrontation. We were not against confrontation, but we wanted to keep it nonviolent. We wanted to keep it really focused on the issue.

At one point I even wrote a letter commending the police for how they had maintained their calm during a demonstration. And the Campaign against Apartheid people got mad about that. So we had a lot of differences over issues of strategy and tactics.

Lage: You said before that you knew [Ira] Michael Heyman well.

Noguera: That was how I got to know the chancellor, several of the other people in the administration, the campus police--they all know me now, still, from all those days. Because we communicated a lot. I was very clear that--and I think this is probably what distinguished me from a lot of other students at the time--I was very clear what the issue was. We were focused on trying to get the university to divest, right? But that didn't mean that we had to be nasty and mean to the people like the chancellor, even if he--because in some ways, he agreed with us but he was powerless. He couldn't make the decision about that. That was the regents.

So I didn't see any need for our relations to become negative because of the roles we were playing. And I think that made it possible for us to have good communication throughout. And we did. I remember one day we had California Hall surrounded by hundreds of people who had slept out. That's why I was telling these students, "There's hardly any people here." [laughing]. "This is weak." They had sent in hundreds of police to arrest us.

But throughout, I communicated with the chancellor, I told him we were going to keep it nonviolent, that there will be no resistance, and we stopped the people who wanted to resist. We stopped them so the police wouldn't have to.

Lage: You did your own discipline.

Noguera: We disciplined ourselves.

Lage: How did you do that? What did you do with the people who wanted to resist?

Noguera: We talked to them, isolated them. We had our ways. But it was certainly much more effective than having--because there were occasions on which there was physical violence between the police and some demonstrators. There were people who wanted to do things like throw bottles at the police. We couldn't always control them. But to the extent that we could, we did. And we also made clear who they were so that when the police came in, they would get the people who had done it and not be more indiscriminate in their use of force.

Lage: From reading the other interviews in that "Six Weeks in Spring" project, which were conducted shortly after the protests were all over--the police sounded like they were making a real effort to keep it calm.

Noguera: They did. The problem was that a lot of times they had to bring police from outside the campus because there were so many people. They brought cops from Oakland, from all over the place. They were called the Blue Meanies.

Lage: Right! That came out of the sixties.

Noguera: Right.

Lage: Okay. So you have a sit-in, sleep-in--the arrests. There were demands put.

Noguera: We did a series of arrests at University Hall. This is when we started petitioning directly to the president to put it on the agenda, for him personally to push for divestment, and we started doing a series of arrests. It became celebrity arrests, right there at University Hall. I think that's the reason why the Office of the President moved out of Berkeley.

Lage: People say that, yes. [phone rings] Oh, there's your other call.

[tape interruption]

Lage: I want to keep the times a little straight. There were arrests on campus in '85.

Noguera: Right.

Lage: And then did the focus move down to University Hall?

Noguera: We started at Sproul. [phone rings]

[tape interruption]

Two Important Meetings About Divestment: Harmon Gym and Lawrence Hall of Science, April and May, 1985

Lage: Okay. I was just trying to separate out the two sets of arrests. But let me ask you: Do you remember the forum that was held in Harmon [April 24, 1985]?

Noguera: Oh, yes.

Lage: Tell me about that, from your point of view.

Noguera: That was an incredible event. I've been told that that was the most people ever in Harmon, for anything. We had not only the stands filled with people but the floor filled with people, so about 7,000 people were there, right? It was the most people at Harmon for an event, plus the most regents ever for a meeting that was not a regularly scheduled regents' meeting. We had thirteen members of the regents there, including the president. And I was the chair [laughing]! And just before the event, I believe it was David Gardner said to me--he says, "If this thing falls apart, it's going to be on you." [laughing]

Lage: So how did that make you feel?

Noguera: You know, it was tense, but I had no doubt that we would be able to pull it off. Because *we* were doing it. It served as a teach-in. It wasn't a debate; it was a teach-in.

Lage: It was never supposed to be a debate.

Noguera: Right, it wasn't supposed to be a debate. It went extremely well, it went extremely well.

Lage: Who were the speakers?

Noguera: Oh, we had--[phone rings] Ah, sorry.

[tape interruption]

Noguera: There were student speakers--a guy named [Mecca Azair?], who was a graduate student in political science. He has died since then. He died in a car accident. A guy named [Eric Macanno?], who was a student. He lives in Los Angeles now. He's a planner. Who else?

Lage: Who were active in the movement.

Noguera: Yes. Gay Seidman, who was a doctoral student in sociology with me. She's a professor at Wisconsin now, in sociology. There must have been--I can't think of the faculty now. I'd have to look again.

Lage: Did some of the regents speak? I seem to remember there that there were a couple of regents--

Noguera: Yori Wada said something from the floor. They weren't on the stage. There was seating for them right up front. That was amazing. It went on for about four hours. No disruptions. It just went extremely well. I mean, David Gardner wrote me a letter afterward, praising me for how well it had gone.

Lage: Was it designed to educate?

Noguera: Educate the campus about the issues.

Lage: And educate the regents?

Noguera: Well, yes, yes. And some regents said they wanted to hear. It was a very amazing event.

Lage: Did anyone get up and express an opinion against divestment?

Noguera: There might have been a couple of people from the floor, because we gave a chance for public comment. It might have been a couple of people from the floor who might have said something, but it didn't become a debate or that sort of thing.

It wasn't set up that way.

Lage: Michael Heyman, in his interview about this [in "Six Weeks in Spring"], indicated he thought there wasn't that much discussion and there was quite a bit of noise and stuff, and said you compared it to a football rally.

Noguera: Yes, it was definitely--we were preaching to our supporters, right? And he was so nervous. Heyman was really nervous.

Lage: That something would go wrong?

Noguera: Yes, and that he would look bad. I know we had a meeting with him in his office before the event, and he was just--oh, he was having a hard time [laughing].

Lage: He had to really trust you guys.

Noguera: He did. And that was, I think, the hardest part. The administration had to trust us that we could do it [laughing]. And we did.

Lage: Now, did you worry about this more disruptive group?

Noguera: No, no. I felt that under those circumstances, we definitely could control it because those groups--Campaign Against Apartheid didn't have a lot of broad support; they had very little support, actually. They were most effective when it came to confrontation with the police; that was when they could do their thing. But in a forum like that, they were totally ineffective. It wasn't like they were knowledgeable on issues [laughing].

Lage: They probably didn't have something to contribute about the issues.

Noguera: No.

Lage: Now, what about the regents' meetings? I recall two or maybe three. The regents had a public hearing, then they held a vote at which they voted against divestment, in support of Gardner's position.

Noguera: Right, right. There were a couple.

Lage: A whole year later.

Noguera: Right. Then we had the one at Lawrence Hall of Science [May 17, 1985], where they flew in [Governor George] Deukmejian in a helicopter. That was a big one. We marched several thousand people up the hill to Lawrence Hall of Science from campus.

Lage: First, apparently, you wanted to get it changed to a different location.

Noguera: Right, but that was like a fortress they had, for the meeting. I mean, helicopters, police--oh, it was incredible. I remember I went and presented the case to the regents that day.

Lage: Oh, you did?

Noguera: Yes, I was the one that made the case to them. I remember [Superintendent of Public Instruction] Bill [William] Honig made some statement about--he had concerns about the way we were handling the protest. [Speaker of the Assembly] Willie Brown was there

because he was a regent at the time. There was a lot of tension because they all knew what was going on outside, even though most of our people couldn't get inside. I went in as student body president with a kind of authority that is really uncommon for a student leader, right? It was clear at that point that we had just lots and lots of people, of all kinds, supporting what we were doing. Even if they weren't out there literally, they were out there in the public.

What made it unique was the fact that they had to deal with us. They couldn't just dismiss us. I felt even in the debate on [Proposition] 209 [over affirmative action in hiring and admissions], the students and the faculty never got accorded that kind of respect that we did.

Lage: Do you think it was because supporters of affirmative action didn't get the--

Noguera: I think they didn't do enough to get the numbers. They didn't have the same kind of credibility. They hadn't done the kind of organizing we had done to get broad support. I think that made the big difference. I also think we had moral authority on our side. I mean, we were right morally. And history proved that [laughing] later, ultimately, when South Africa changed.

In the midst of this, Congress voted to uphold sanctions in South Africa and had reversed [President Ronald] Reagan's policy of constructive engagement. So we were clearly on a wave that was changing and challenging what was the national policy on this issue.

Lage: So it made the university stand seem--

Noguera: Right, definitely behind the time.

Lage: But it did take a long time to change.

Noguera: Right. And the weird thing about it is--the reason why we ultimately won had more to do with California politics than anything. Deukmejian was in a race against [Los Angeles Mayor] Tom Bradley for governor, and I think he realized that by coming out in favor of divestment, he could undercut some of Bradley's support. I don't think it was because he necessarily had a lot of conviction about the issue. But he ended up being the one to carry it through [chuckling].

Lage: Right, he got his regents to switch vote for divestment.

Noguera: Right. And Gardner really never switched.

Lage: Did you--you and your people--did you work with Sacramento legislatively?

Noguera: We worked with them. [Assemblyman] John Vasconcellos and I think--who else?

Lage: Did you take part in any of the hearings?

Noguera: A couple.

Lage: Apparently, they gave Gardner a bad time at a couple of the hearings.

Noguera: They did, they did.

Lage: Did you go to those?

Noguera: I think I went to one, where both he and I spoke. He spoke first, and then I spoke after. Some of the Democrats were giving him a very hard time [laughing].

Lage: How about Deukmejian? Did you try to get to Deukmejian?

Noguera: He was at one of the regents' meetings that I spoke at. We never had any direct contact with his office, though. He was maintaining--

Lage: You can't take the credit for Deukmejian's switch, I guess.

Noguera: Not at all, no.

Lage: Did you have anything to do with the organizing for the students to present their causes at the regents' meetings directly?

Noguera: Oh, yes. No, we planned that and orchestrated that with, I guess, the Secretary of the Regents, who handles that process. It was, again, unprecedented--see, I wasn't the student regent. I wasn't supposed to be able to speak at the meeting. I certainly wasn't supposed to speak as long as I did. So all these things were extra, went beyond the normal procedure.

Lage: And they allowed it.

Noguera: They allowed it. They went along.

Reflections on David Gardner's Position on University Divestment

Lage: So what did you think of Gardner's stance? Since we are talking about Gardner here.

Noguera: I thought that he was missing the big point.

The big point was the moral issue about apartheid in South Africa. He was trying to stand on the issue of fiduciary responsibility; that is, that the regents had to do what was best for the university and had to not consider politics in the course of making decisions about how the university invested its funds. That's where I think he was wrong. I think that the moral stance of the university was important. It was not just a symbolic issue.

Ultimately, I think, it made a difference. And it made a difference in South Africa what kinds of stance both the U.S. government but also major corporations took in relation to apartheid in South Africa.

So I think he took a narrow view on the issue; that is, on the issue of fiduciary responsibility when I think what was needed was more of a political and moral reading of the issue. Unfortunately, Gardner never in his public comments addressed that part of it, and I think that led people to see him as uncaring. And I don't think that was true. But that was the kind of public image that came out for him in the process.

Lage: Maybe he felt he shouldn't comment on politics.

Noguera: But he did. He did all the time. In fact, at one point he tried to embrace the Sullivan Principles. The Sullivan Principles were these standards that had created by Leon Sullivan, where corporations doing business in South Africa were encouraged to sign on. Basically, they said they would treat their workers well. So it was kind of rules of conduct for businesses that were operating in South Africa under apartheid.

We said those were bankrupt morally; that is, you couldn't do business ethically in South Africa under apartheid, and that that was a pretense to allow the status quo to continue. But he tried to support those, David Gardner did.

Bishop Desmond Tutu's Visit to Berkeley

Lage: Were you involved in Bishop [Desmond] Tutu's visit [May 13, 1985] at all?

Noguera: Yes, I was the moderator for that one, too [laughing].

Lage: You were? Tell me about that.

Noguera: There's a great picture you can see in the *Daily Cal*, of me and him.

Lage: So you had plenty of exposure.

Noguera: Oh, yes, it was incredible. That was just amazing, amazing. It was packed, the Greek Theater. We had this choir that was created with students and community people that sang, and then we brought out Bishop Tutu, and he just gave this speech, really thanking students for what we had done. At one point, there was a picture of the police attacking one of the shanties that had been erected in front of California Hall, that appeared on the front page of the Johannesburg paper. And so we knew then that what was happening in Berkeley *was* being discussed and being heard in South Africa. Tutu, when he came, let us know that they definitely had heard about wnat we were doing at Berkeley.

When Nelson Mandela came later, after he had been released from prison, he said he had heard about the students at Berkeley while he was in prison, so it was very significant in that way.

Lage: Did Tutu's visit give a shot in the arm to the movement?

Noguera: Oh, it did, it did, it did. Well, it did. It was just a further sign that what we did mattered, that it was having an effect. It was a confirmation that what we were doing was working.

Faculty-Student Relations during Divestment Campaign

Lage: Tell me about faculty. You mentioned faculty, and I want to just talk a little bit more. Did you have connections--

Noguera: We had great connections with the faculty. Faculty, in all honesty, they followed us. They followed our lead. They didn't lead. But they came out in support of students. There was a convocation gathering at the end of the year, where a number of faculty showed up in their gowns but wearing these red arm bands in solidarity with us. It was amazing to see how many of them did, and then they left the convocation gathering to come to Sproul to join us at a rally. It was just incredible to see them in their gowns [laughing].

Lage: It must have been Charter Day, maybe.

Noguera: It was in the spring. Charter Day is in the fall.

Lage: Now, who were the faculty who were--

Noguera: It was a real mix. Percy Hintzen was a person, [Michael Watts?] was another person, Carlos Muñoz, Gerald Berreman in anthropology, Troy Duster, Olly Wilson in music, Meredith Minkler in public heath, whom I just spoke to a minute ago. It was a number of people.

Lage: What about Lawrence Levine? Was he involved?

Noguera: I'm sure [...].

Lage: And the Academic Senate. Did they get involved in the divestment issue?

Noguera: Okay. We had another meeting. This was funny. The faculty have this kind of systemwide body. I'm not sure what it's called.

Lage: Academic Council?

Noguera: Yes, Academic Council. They were meeting one day at the Faculty Club, and we found out about it, and we took a small group over there to their meeting, and we came unannounced. We were right there at the back of the meeting. It was a public meeting, a lot of observers, but we were not on the agenda. They made time on their agenda for us to speak. We made a statement. Asked them to come out in support of divestment. There were a couple of people who had criticized us for being disruptive and carrying on. We left, and they voted in support of it [laughing].

Lage: That's the whole statewide--

Noguera: It was a statewide group. And that I thought was very significant because it was clearly not a group that was known to associate itself with those kind of political causes.

Lage: Do you recall how the decision was made to go to that meeting?

Noguera: Someone had told us. We were not planning on it. Someone had said to us, "This meeting is happening. You all should go. This is important." And we just picked up and went.

Lage: And it wasn't hard to get your troops together?

Noguera: No, not at all. We only had maybe forty, fifty people with us. But they only had about forty people meeting, so it was unexpected.

Lage: I wonder when that would have been?

Noguera: I think it would have been--the big protest started in the spring of '85 and continued throughout that whole year, so it might have been the spring of '86 that that happened.

Lage: After the regents had already voted against divestment.

Noguera: Right. [The regents voted against divestment in June 1985, but reversed their stand in July 1986.]

Lage: Okay, that's interesting. But I don't think the Academic Senate on the campus actually voted. Do you remember that?

Noguera: No, we never really took the issues to them directly. Later, we took other issues to the Academic Senate.

American Cultures Requirement

Lage: I'm intrigued by what you just said, that later you took other issues to the Academic Senate.

Noguera: Yes, because right after the anti-apartheid issue, then we started dealing with the issue of the American cultures requirement.[3]

Lage: Oh, yes.

Noguera: That was our next issue. We won that one, too. But that one did involve a lot of direct action with the Academic Senate.

Lage: Were you happy with the way that turned out with American cultures courses offered in a range of departments?

Noguera: Oh, yes, very much so.

Lage: It seems connected with our current ethnic studies discussions in some way.

Noguera: That's right. Well, originally, we were proposing an ethnic studies requirement. And then in the discussions, what we ended up with was what became known as the American cultures requirement instead.

Lage: Which people can satisfy in a lot of different--.

Noguera: A lot of different departments, right.

Lage: It seems to have made a real difference.

Noguera: Oh, yes. Just look at the number of courses that are being offered. It's incredible.

Lage: Yes. Okay, now, when you say "that was our next thing," it makes it sound like you had a great plan.

Noguera: The anti-apartheid movement lasted over two years, but during the second year, we started saying that it's important to be in solidarity with the struggles of South Africa, but we also have issues here that need to be addressed, and we need, once this is over, to direct some attention on those issues. And that's what we did.

Lage: When you say "we," is that United People of Color?

Noguera: Well, United People of Color in particular, but it was a broad coalition of groups that were involved. And we were thinking about issues of faculty diversity on campus, for one thing. The whole issue of what was happening with ethnic studies. Those are the kind of issues that we turned our attention to afterwards.

---

[3]Since 1991, every UC Berkeley undergraduate must complete one American cultures course as a degree requirement. These courses, which are offered in many departments and are approved by a Berkeley faculty committee, must address issues of race, culture, and ethnicity in the United States.

Lage: Now, the second year of the divestment campaign--at least if I'm correct about it--the first year you were student body president-elect--

Noguera: Right.

Lage: The second year you were student body president [1985-1986].

Noguera: Right.

Lage: Were you bringing ASUC along in support of the divestment campaign?

Noguera: Yes, because what happened is when I got elected, the year I got elected, the party that I was in took all the seats in the ASUC Senate.

Lage: I see. Now, that helps.

Noguera: And we took all the executive offices except for one. Everybody in the ASUC was working together [chuckling]. We had a landslide.

Lage: So what kinds of things did you do within the ASUC itself?

Noguera: Mostly it was use of resources to support the work that we were doing. That was the main thing.

Lage: You could vote some of the money to support the campaign?

Noguera: Yes, just to support everything from xeroxing flyers to making facilities available, things like that.

More Reflections on David Gardner

Lage: Let's move now to talk a little bit about some of the specifics with David Gardner. There was a council of student body presidents. Is that correct?

Noguera: Yes. I don't remember that being very significant.

Lage: One of the things Gardner talks about in terms of relating to students, how the president relates to students, is through this council and the meetings that the president holds with the council. Is that something you recall?

Noguera: I went to something at his house once, but that was, I thought, very uneventful.

Lage: Were there any other ways that he would ask about student opinion? Not just apartheid, but other issues?

Noguera: That I don't know. I think he went through the student regent primarily.

Lage: So that formal mechanism for a president to relate to the student body you don't recall as being very significant?

Noguera: No. I think most of my communication with him happened through informal channels or because we went to him to raise issues, and met with him and discussed it with him, which he was not always comfortable with [laughing].

Lage: Do you remember any of those meetings?

Noguera: Oh, yes, yes, yes. I remember the first time when we had a sit-in out in front of University Hall. We had gotten a chance to meet with him. It was a tense meeting because he didn't like us protesting outside. He didn't like the fact that he was meeting with us when we were not on his schedule. And he didn't like the fact that we were raising all these issues with him. We had an exchange of ideas and views. He was very stubborn about his position. He was not flinching. He was not giving any ground. We made clear that we were going to keep up until there's a change.

The early exchanges with him over the issue--there was not a lot of dialogue. I mean, there were exchanges, but it wasn't like there was much give and take. For example, when we had that thing at Harmon Gym, the big teach-in, we actually started winning his respect then, because he saw that we really were conducting ourselves in a responsible way, and I think he admired that and appreciated that. I think it was out of those experiences that he and I developed a rapport.

Lage: So you can develop rapport with someone who's on the other side.

Noguera: Right, even though we're on opposite sides.

Lage: Did you, as part of your student body presidency, bring up anything in terms of student fees or admissions standards?

Noguera: No, not then. It was all about divestment at the time.

Lage: Is there anything else I should be asking you that I'm totally missing?

Noguera: I'm not sure when his wife passed away, but I remember maybe a year or two later--I can't remember what the occasion was. Maybe it was my graduation or something. I ran into him. I had just heard about it, and we talked, and I could see then he was still very much affected by what had happened. It wasn't long after. We had a very human kind of contact with each other at that point, which was so different from all of our previous conversations [chuckling]. And that was nice, to connect with him on that level.

Lage: Have you had contact with any other presidents--

Noguera: No.

Lage: --when you went on to become a professor. Did you go right from your graduate degree to your appointment as a professor at Berkeley?

Noguera: No, I took two years to work as the deputy to the mayor of Berkeley, Loni Hancock. I did that while I was working on my dissertation. So I took a little reprieve after--

Lage: But still working on your dissertation.

Noguera: Right, I was still working on the dissertation. And when I finished the dissertation, I spent a year--what did I do?--I worked with Dan Boggan, who was the [UC Berkeley] vice chancellor of business, for a year. I did projects for him, more community-oriented projects. And then I got hired as a professor.

Lage: Did you have any connection with Dan Boggan during this period of the anti-apartheid demonstrations?

Noguera: Yes, oh, yes, yes. No, the first day that Dan was on the job as vice chancellor we had a sit-in in front of California Hall. He had to cross our line [chuckling].

Lage: Did you know him?

Noguera: We knew each other before. He had been city manager of Berkeley. He crossed the line. He had his little red ribbon on to show that he was in support, at least. I think it was to show he was in support. So he was a person that I remained friends with throughout, even though we were, by virtue of our roles, on opposite sides.

Lage: You seem like a guy who can understand that people have certain roles to play.

Noguera: That's right. I think part of it comes from the fact--my father was, as I said before, a police officer. I always knew that police were people, even if we might disagree with their role, the role they have to play sometimes, that they're still human beings with families and all those things. And so I think it always came fairly easy for me to relate to people at a human level, even if we were on different sides of an issue, whereas I think for a lot of students, they see that individual as embodying the role and therefore they're the incarnate enemy.

You saw a lot of that just recently with the ethnic studies student protestors reacting to the chancellor. I think that Chancellor Robert Berdahl really showed himself to be very principled in the way he handled that whole incident.

Ethnic Studies Support Protests, Spring 1999

Lage: I'm interested in your reaction to how that played out, the ethnic studies protest.

Noguera: I'll tell you honestly, I think the people who ended up looking the worst in the whole thing were the ethnic studies faculty. If they had exercised more leadership in raising the issues--I think the issues they were raising were legitimate. The department had been allowed to lose faculty and not have them replaced. But the faculty in that program had not been good advocates for their own program. And then the students had become the advocates for the program. And once the students got their protest in motion, even as the chancellor started to be ready to respond with an offer, there was not enough trust between the students and the faculty, so when the faculty said, "Look, what he's offering us is a good deal," the students didn't believe them.

What was happening: I was asked to be in the negotiations on Friday, May 7, 1999. [phone rings]

[tape interruption]

Lage: You said you were in charge--

Noguera: This is where it comes full circle, okay? John Cummins, who was Mike Heyman's assistant--and he was, like, the point person on all the protest stuff [in 1985-86].

Lage: For Heyman.

Noguera: For Heyman. He and I became friends during that. He stayed on. He worked for [Chancellor Chang-Lin] Tien and now he's working for [Chancellor Robert] Berdahl in the same capacity. As things started getting out of hand recently here, he suggested to Berdahl that Berdahl get me involved. First they asked me would I help to mediate this. I said, "Only if the faculty and students say they want me to." [phone rings] Then ethnic studies faculty and students said they did.

[tape interruption]

Noguera: Anyway, the way it comes full circle is John is the one who brought me in. I ended up having more credibility with the students and therefore could interpret the offer that the administration was making to the students and let them know, "Look, this is a good deal."

Lage: Because they trusted you.

Noguera: They could trust me.

Lage: Because apparently the faculty accepted the chancellor's offer earlier in the week.

Noguera: They accepted the first time, but they didn't really work with the students to have the students understand why it was such a good deal.

Lage: Did the chancellor include more in his last offer?

Noguera: He kept offering more. He did offer more by Friday May 7.

Lage: The reports never said what was the stumbling block that was finally resolved.

Noguera: I don't even know if there was a stumbling block. I think it was really a communication block, trust.

Lage: That's very interesting. So you had learned something back in 1985 in your student role.

Noguera: Yes.

Lage: I know you have to go, but just tell me what the Institute for Social Change is.

Noguera: We do research. That's what I was just talking to Meredith Minkler about. We do research, various projects focused on urban areas and problems facing urban areas.

Lage: Has the Institute been here a long time?

Noguera: Over twenty years. Troy Duster used to be the director.

Lage: Are you the director now?

Noguera: Yes, I'm the director.

Lage: It sounds like a good place for you to be.

Noguera: Yes, I like it.

Lage: Okay. We'll close up, unless there's something else. Thank you so much for your time.

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Glenn T. Seaborg

Chancellor, UC Berkeley, 1958-1961

An Interview Conducted by
Germaine La Berge
in 1998

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Chancellor Glenn Seaborg, 1990s.

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INTERVIEW HISTORY--Glenn T. Seaborg

Professor, Nobel Laureate, chancellor, director--all these terms apply to Dr. Glenn Seaborg. Yet it is in his capacity as "mentor" to David Gardner that he was interviewed for this project. Dr. Seaborg carved out forty-five minutes from his full schedule at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory to recount his first meeting with the young David Gardner, an employee of the UCB Alumni Association, in 1958. Later, when David Gardner chaired the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1981-1983), he convinced Glenn Seaborg to be a member. The resulting report, *A Nation at Risk*, is discussed in detail in the interview which follows.

Glenn Seaborg talked about Gardner's excellence as an administrator and his unique ability to articulate with ease.

"David would always get up and give his remarks, and they were just spellbinding....He didn't even need any notes. No. And he would be able to introduce all the important people there, again without any notes....All of them without missing a beat, and saying something relevant about them, that he just retained in his marvelous storage mechanism in his mind."

One tape was recorded at Dr. Seaborg's office at the lab. It was transcribed and edited at the Regional Oral History Office (ROHO) and sent to him for approval. Dr. Seaborg returned it promptly with few changes. Because Dr. Seaborg has for years kept a daily journal, verification of details were assured. The transcript was final typed and indexed at ROHO. We are very grateful that we were able to record his reflections before his last illness and death in February 1999.

Germaine LaBerge, Senior Editor/Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
Janaury 2000

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please write clearly. Use black ink.)

Your full name Glenn Theodore Seaborg

Date of birth April 19, 1912 Birthplace Ishpeming, MI

Father's full name Herman Theodore Seaborg

Occupation Machinist Birthplace Ishpeming, MI

Mother's full name Selma O. Erickson

Occupation Housewife Birthplace Grangesberg, SWEDEN

Your spouse Helen Griggs Seaborg

Occupation Housewife Birthplace Sioux City, IA

Your children Lynne Annette Seaborg Cobb, David Michael Seaborg, Stephen Keith Seaborg, John Eric Seaborg, Diane Karde Seaborg

Where did you grow up? South Gate

Present community ~~Orinda~~ Lafayette

Education A.B., UCLA (1934); Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley (1937) both in Chemistry

Occupation(s) University Professor

Areas of expertise Transuranium elements, nuclear chemistry

Other interests or activities Hiking

Organizations in which you are active American Chemical Society, Eagle Alliance, Cosmos Club, National Academy of Sciences,

INTERVIEW WITH GLENN T. SEABORG

CHANCELLOR EMERITUS AND MENTOR OF DAVID GARDNER

[Date of Interview: April 7, 1998] ##[1]
[Place: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Dr. Seaborg's office]

Alumni Clubs of University of California, Berkeley, 1958-1961

LaBerge: Let's start when you first met David Gardner. Was it when you were chancellor and he was working for the Alumni Association?

Seaborg: Yes. I first met David Gardner while I was chancellor; that is, during the period 1958 to 1961. During this period, or at least part of it, he was a doctoral student in education and the alumni field director.

LaBerge: In his oral history, he talks fondly of going with you on different trips to the alumni clubs, like down to Monterey and Santa Cruz and having wonderful conversations.

Seaborg: Yes. I recall an alumni tour that we had early in February of 1960 in which we visited in public meetings sponsored by alumni groups at Monterey and King City, and Santa Cruz and Hollister and San Jose. We were accompanied by two members of the faculty who, along with me, gave talks at each of these luncheon and dinner meetings. Dick Erickson, the executive manager of the Alumni Association, accompanied us and set up the tour. The faculty members that accompanied us and made talks along with me were Robert Scalapino of the political science department and George Leitman of the engineering science department. At each stop, the three of us would give short talks.

On some of the occasions, I would talk about my specialty, the transuranium elements, and other occasions I would talk about the status of the Berkeley campus of the University of California, recent developments and plans for the future and so forth.

LaBerge: David Gardner's part in all of this was to plan these meetings?

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[1]## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcripts.

Seaborg: David Gardner planned the trip and made all the arrangements of the trip. He would set up the University of California banners, and set the stage, and make the introductory remarks, and so forth.

It was already clear to me at that time that he was unusually articulate. He had a way with the English language that I have rarely seen equalled by anybody.

LaBerge: That's good to get the perspective of someone who knew him so young and saw him "grow up."

Seaborg: Yes.

LaBerge: At that time, he said in his oral history that he would ask people when he was deciding what to do for his next job. Would he call on you and ask for your advice? "Shall I stay here, shall I go down to Santa Barbara?"

Seaborg: Actually, I left here in January of 1961.

LaBerge: That's right, to go to the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission].

Seaborg: To go to serve as chairman of the AEC, until the--well, near the end of 1971. So that by the time I came back, he was--you probably know better than I. Had he served at Santa Barbara by that time?

LaBerge: He was at Santa Barbara and may have been back even as vice president, I'm not sure of that actual--

Seaborg: Yes, you'd have to look that up.[2]

National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1981-1983

LaBerge: So your next contact was maybe the Commission on Excellence in Education?

Seaborg: Yes. Then he went to the University of Utah. My next contact with him that I remember vividly was with the National Commission on Excellence in Education, of which he served as chairman, and Yvonne Larsen, who had been the superintendent of schools in San Diego, served as the vice chairman. It was interesting, I can give you the membership of that commission here. Yvonne Larsen was the immediate past president of the San Diego city school board, and here were the other members of the commission. [hands over paper]

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[2] David Gardner served as assistant to the chancellor at UC Santa Barbara from 1964-1970, and as UC Vice President from 1971-1973.

LaBerge: Okay. And we have a copy of this report [*A Nation At Risk*] in the oral history.

Seaborg: Yes. Well, I might tell you how I happened to become a member of this.

LaBerge: I'd like to hear that story.

Seaborg: I looked this up in my journal, and on Monday, August 17, 1981, I received a phone call from the Secretary of Education, Terrel Bell. He called me and described to me the aims of the National Commission on Excellence in Education and asked whether I would be willing to serve as a member. I listened carefully to his long description and then told him at the end that I was sorry, that due to my heavy schedule, I wouldn't be able to take on this additional responsibility.

Then two days later, on Wednesday, August 19, 1981, calling from his office, I guess, in the University of Utah where he was serving as president, David Gardner came on the line and more or less said, "Glenn, I accepted this chairmanship of the National Commission on Excellence in Education on the assumption that you would be a member of the commission. Now you're letting me down." I said that one of the reasons I had declined membership was that Secretary Bell had indicated that there would be a rather large number of meetings in various parts of the country, and that I wouldn't be able to attend these. He said that he hadn't himself realized there would be a number of meetings, but in any case, he didn't think it would be necessary for me to attend them all. And therefore, I reluctantly accepted membership on the commission.

Then the first meeting was held on October 9, 1981, in Washington, D.C., and at this meeting we met with President Ronald Reagan. He encouraged us to carry on with our assignment. And by the way, President Reagan had indicated a desire to abolish the Department of Education, and Terrel Bell was using this as a means of counteracting that. It turned out to be very successful, because of the positive way in which our report was finally received, and the question of abolishing the Department of Education died as a result of that.

We had meetings in various parts of the country and in Washington, D.C. I remember one meeting at Stanford University, at which time the members of the commission visited the Lawrence Hall of Science of which I have been serving as chairman. This was in March of 1982.

The report was hammered together at these meetings. At first the staff wrote a long, rambling report, running more than 200 pages, and I particularly objected to this. I said that we needed a short, concise report that made specific recommendations as to course content and other issues.

We finally got a draft of a report, and the executive director of the Commission on Excellence in Education, Milton Goldberg, called me on February 15, 1983. I said that I wasn't ready--I wasn't willing to sign the report as it was, it didn't have enough of the specificities that I had requested in there, pointing out the nature of the crisis that faced our country in pre-college science and mathematics education, and the specific remedies

that we wanted to recommend and so forth, and therefore I would sign it, but with an appendix, an additional comment. And I could give you the copy of that comment if you wanted it. It criticized the report and said it didn't have the specific hard-hitting content that I wanted, including an eye-catching introduction that included these phrases that finally got into it.

Later that day or that evening, David Gardner called me at home and talked to me for an hour and a half, saying that he didn't want a report in which I was a dissenter with an appendix. He thought my doing that would have a terrific adverse impact, and he asked me what my conditions would be for signing the report. I went through with him item by item for about an hour and a half, and he met all of my conditions, including the composition of those two hard-hitting first paragraphs, from which you might quote a couple of sentences like, "If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war." And then the other one that I insisted on: "We have in effect been committing an act of unthinking unilateral educational disarmament." And he agreed to placing those in the report.

LaBerge: And those are your additions?

Seaborg: Yes.

LaBerge: We have this, so we will definitely quote that. And if you have a copy of your appendix, that would be wonderful to include that.

Seaborg: Yes. Here it is, right here. [hands over paper] [See appendix]

LaBerge: Oh, this is from your--

Seaborg: My journal.

LaBerge: I can tell by the dates and the specificity you have that your journal was really something.

Seaborg: Yes. I have kept a journal since I was fourteen years old.

LaBerge: It's wonderful.

Seaborg: See, all those books up there on the shelf are my journal. Those colored--yes.

LaBerge: Oh, it's wonderful.

Seaborg: Beginning with January 1, 1927.

LaBerge: My gosh. Can we make a copy of this?

Seaborg: Yes, you can do that.

LaBerge: That would be great to include that. So do you keep a journal both of your personal life and your work life?

Seaborg: Oh, yes. In fact, I've looked up these various other items here, like the comment of my alumni tour and everything. It's all in the journal.

LaBerge: Did your parents encourage you to do that, or how did you happen to start?

Seaborg: No, I just have been asked many times why I did that, and my response is, "My God, doesn't everybody?" It just seemed to me a very useful thing to do, and it's been a tremendous aid to me during my career. I need to look something up--you know, like now--time after time, and I could not have done it without my journal.

LaBerge: Oh, it's just wonderful. Now, did you encourage your children to do the same?

Seaborg: No, but they have.

LaBerge: They probably saw you.

Seaborg: Some of them have to some extent, yes. Although they really didn't have a chance to see me; it was unobtrusive. It was at night after they'd gone to bed, and in more recent years, it was through the use of a recorder like this, which I hand to my secretary every day, and then they transcribe it.

LaBerge: Then I think you were the last person to sign off on this report, is that right?

Seaborg: I was, yes. I was the last person. David Gardner did not want an adverse "additional comment," really an appendix, to the report, because he felt that would attract more attention than the report itself--in my case, with my name.

LaBerge: Right.

Seaborg: So he agreed to my changes. Which, if I may say so, added a lot to the report, because it had a--well, I shouldn't say it had a terrific impact, but it created a lot of attention. It had some impact. I would say that the situation would probably be worse today than it is if we hadn't issued this report. But we're still working to get the adoption of the recommendations in the report. I have been recently appointed by Governor [Pete] Wilson to the Commission on the Establishment of Academic Content and Performance Standards, and have been going to Sacramento. We just came out yesterday with our first draft of our report.

LaBerge: And this is for high school students?

Seaborg: This is for K to 12. In fact, you can get a copy of that if you want, but that's getting a little off the--

LaBerge: I think we'll stick with just the *Nation At Risk* one, but this is wonderful that you're still involved in that.

Seaborg: Yes. That's going to come out, yes.

LaBerge: How was this report received, both by the president and by the public?

Seaborg: Oh, the president--we gave it to the president on April 26, 1983. He received it favorably, but at the same time he, in his remarks, made some comments that really were not relevant to the report. He decried the federal intrusion into the support of education. He called for what he called tuition tax credits, for vouchers so that students could go to private schools, voluntary school prayer, abolition of the Department of Education, none of which were in the report. After the remarks by the president and the ceremony in which we gave him our copy of our report, *A Nation At Risk*, reporters came up to me and asked--they had thumbed through the report and said they saw none of these things that the president had mentioned, like voluntary school prayer and so forth, in the report. I said, "They're not in the report."

As a result, in the press coverage of our meeting with the president to give him the report *A Nation At Risk*, essentially none of the reporters referred to these irrelevant comments of the president, such as voluntary school prayer.

LaBerge: In the schools of the nation, how did they implement this, or how did they react to it?

Seaborg: Well, they haven't implemented it yet. For example, we called for three years of science in high school as a graduation requirement, and only a few states have done that. I'm still working for that in my role as a member--I'm the chairman of the science committee of the Commission on the Establishment of Academic Content and Performance Standards. We're in the process now, like in this case, hammering out a report. And again, I am calling for a concise, hard-hitting report.

LaBerge: What kind of leader was David Gardner in this group?

Seaborg: He was a tremendous leader in this group. He just pulled a group together which had disparate opinions, and just masterfully brought them together, including me at the end.

LaBerge: Because you were the last holdout.

Seaborg: Yes.

LaBerge: I guess that speaks a lot, that he was able to get you along and--

Seaborg: Yes. He deserves a tremendous amount of credit for getting that report out. He had a group of members who had strong views, and many of them conflicting views, and he in his masterful style, as he did later with the Board of Regents here at the University of California, pulled them all together. He was better at that than just about anybody I know.

David Gardner as UC President

LaBerge: Well, let's jump into that, when he was president of the University of California. First of all, were you surprised that he was appointed president?

Seaborg: No. No. Because he had established his reputation, both at the Santa Barbara campus and as vice president of the university, and at the University of Utah. He had brought them up to a much higher level of performance and established a national reputation. It seemed to me very logical that he would be offered the position, which he was offered during the time that he was serving as chairman of the National Commission on Excellence in Education, and he took over as president just two or three months after we gave our report to President Reagan on April 26, 1983. That is, he took over as president in the summer of 1983.

LaBerge: Did you have anything to do with his selection? Were you on any committees or--?

Seaborg: All I recall is that I gave very positive recommendations to the regents.

LaBerge: Would he have called you to ask you your advice on whether he should take it, or what kind of a contract, or--?

Seaborg: Yes. Well, I just saw him during these meetings, and he was talking about it. I encouraged him to take it.

LaBerge: You mentioned how masterful he was with the Board of Regents. So tell me some anecdotes, or what you observed. Because I know you had dealt with the regents as a chancellor, and from then on, have you still gone to visit regents' meetings or gotten involved?

Seaborg: No, I didn't attend regents' meetings very much. [laughs] I had been inoculated by then. I didn't need that much more any more. Oh, it was just that he was so articulate and quick. He dealt with the issues in a masterful way, and swiftly, so that--I don't want to put it this way, that the regents didn't have time to think, but there really wasn't--he did it so swiftly and so adeptly that there wasn't a great deal of time to mull things over. And in such an articulate manner. That's what I want to emphasize over and over again.

I remember I would attend yearly dinners that would be held for the present and past officers of the university, which I would attend in my role as a past chancellor at Berkeley. At these dinners, David would always get up and give his remarks, and they were just spellbinding. That's all I can say.

LaBerge: And often not planned, isn't that right?

Seaborg: That's right. He didn't even need any notes. No. And he would be able to introduce all the important people there, again without any notes, just call here and here and here, past chancellors and presidents, and present chancellors, and other officers. All of them

without missing a beat, and saying something relevant about them, that he just retained in his marvelous storage mechanism in his mind.

LaBerge: Well, one of the issues he faced was the budget. How did you think he handled that?

Seaborg: Well, as soon as he came in in '83, we had a crisis in the budget with Governor [George] Deukmejian, and he got together with him and performed a miracle. Using his same ability and articulate exposition of the case, he was able to convince the governor to restore the funding and put the university on a sound fiscal basis, and he was able to do this year after year, until the very end, when it wasn't so easy, with Governor Wilson.

LaBerge: Right. Well, and then when difficult decisions had to be made, like the VERIPs, or like increasing student fees. At that time, you were on the faculty. Did you as a faculty member have any input or--

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LaBerge: I was asking if you had any input in these decisions as a faculty member?

Seaborg: No, I didn't. I shouldn't admit this, but I was not a regular attendant at Academic Senate meetings, being situated up here on the hill. But I did encourage him in the support of education, pre-college education. I was the chairman of the Lawrence Hall of Science, and I did talk him into taking some of the money--not taking it, but providing some of the money from the fee for the operation of the three laboratories--you know, by the federal government: the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, the Los Alamos laboratory, and the Livermore laboratory--getting money from that fee for the support of the Lawrence Hall of Science.

Lawrence Hall of Science

Seaborg: Actually, the Lawrence Hall of Science was my idea when I was chancellor.

LaBerge: Oh, really?

Seaborg: Yes. Ernest Lawrence died in August of 1958, and I was appointed the chairman of a committee, including regents, to come up with a proposal for a suitable memorial. At the first meeting where there were suggestions of naming a dormitory on the campus after Ernest Lawrence and so forth, I came up with this proposal that the only adequate and reasonable memorial would be a hall of science. And the committee bought that, and actually, with the support of Regent Ed Pauley, they took the entire fee for the operation of the laboratories, $2 million, for three and a half years--that's $7 million--for the building of the Lawrence Hall of Science, and including an endowment fund of $3 million to come out of that. Some funds were also raised by public subscription, industry and so forth.

The idea was that we would continue to get money from this management fee as the needs of the hall grew, but then I left for Washington, and my successors didn't carry that out. Then when I came back, I tried to resurrect that, and I had some success with David Gardner. Not so much with anybody else; well, a little bit with Charles Hitch, too, before him [David Gardner] as president. But no luck at all with [UC Berkeley Chancellor Ira] Michael Heyman. Gardner did help there.

Ideas for David Gardner on Retirement

Seaborg: When he resigned, when he announced his resignation in--oh, I don't know, about November 1991, you could look that up--I spoke with him with all the persuasion that I could muster recommending that he stay with the University of California in some position. One possibility was that he replace me as chairman of the Lawrence Hall of Science. See, that would have suited me fine; I just wanted to be sure it was in good hands. I'm still the chairman, but--

LaBerge: Because there hasn't been another--

Seaborg: But if he had replaced me, I would have been willing to step down. Another possibility, and we'd have to look this up, I don't remember it exactly, but Clark Kerr had an idea for a--or maybe the record would show this, or you could ask him--for a kind of a consortium of departments that would be involved in the education of pre-college science teachers, involving the collaboration of science departments as well as the School of Education, with headquarters at the Lawrence Hall of Science, which David Gardner would head up. That was another possibility.

But then he got this offer to be the head of the Hewlett Foundation. At one time, he considered these other possibilities, but he accepted the position as head of the Hewlett Foundation. He said that however, he would reevaluate that situation in a year or two and possibly take up one of these other possibilities here at the university, but there was no follow-up on that.

The Golden Parachute

Seaborg: And then he had this unfortunate episode where he accepted this golden parachute.

LaBerge: And he talks about that in his oral history, and we'd like to have your assessment of it.

Seaborg: Well, yes. I just think he made a mistake. He shouldn't have done that. It wasn't unethical, but it wasn't consistent with his usual good judgment. It left an unjustified resentment by the faculty. They didn't ever look up--you know, investigate the details and

so forth. But it would have been much better if he didn't do that. Therefore, he didn't go out with a blaze of glory like he should have, but I think in the intervening years, he has more or less reestablished his reputation with the faculty. I have that impression.

LaBerge: Did you advise him during that time, on that issue?

Seaborg: No. No. Not on that issue. No.

LaBerge: He does say what a hard time that was for him, both after his wife died and after the whole controversy erupted, and what a support you were. He named several people who were--who he could turn to for support, to know that you were there for him. Because a lot of people weren't.

Seaborg: Yes. Well, I was trying very hard to get him to stay with the university, and I was trying to work out positions that would be commensurate with his ability and where his leadership would have been very useful, like in this, as I told you, the pre-college education of teachers and so forth. Or the leadership in the Lawrence Hall of Science.

You asked me whether I--he asked me about taking this money. I just don't remember anything like that. I was just intent on reestablishing him with the university.

LaBerge: Right. Well, you mentioned how good he was with Governor Deukmejian and the budget. Do you think it makes a difference for the university's budget who the president is--as far as the relationships with the governor and the legislature?

Seaborg: Yes, I think so. I don't want to criticize any of the presidents, but David's negotiations and relationships with Governor Deukmejian when he first came in as university president were spectacular. I think I'd use that word.

LaBerge: One of the issues that comes up in any president's term is the national lab contracts. Did you get involved in this?

Seaborg: Oh, yes. Oh, I'm glad you brought that up, yes. I urged him to please renew the national lab contracts, even though the faculty was voting against it. And I wouldn't say it was due to me, but he always made the right decision there, in those renewals.

LaBerge: Would you, for instance, go to regents' meetings to speak on that issue?

Seaborg: Yes.

LaBerge: I wondered if he would call you and say, "Could you please come and tell the regents"--

Seaborg: Yes, I did. I went to regents' meetings. Now, I can't quite remember when that was, but I believe it was during Gardner's term, but it might have--

LaBerge: Well, it would be logical that you would be there any time.

Seaborg: Yes.

National Lab Management

LaBerge: Tell me your views of why the university should be managing the labs, as opposed to some other management.

Seaborg: Oh, because it's very important to have this academic contact. The scientists in the laboratory just love their connection with the University of California, and you get better people there and so forth. And furthermore, at least during the time of the Cold War, to have industry operating the laboratory would mean that we wouldn't have the beneficial and mitigating influence of the university over the operation. So I thought it was very important from the standpoint of our national well-being, as well as for the laboratories, and for that matter, for the University of California. It's a good connection. I didn't want to have the--it's absolutely essential that the university operate our laboratory here, the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, and I was afraid that if they changed the contract, that the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory would go along with the other two laboratories to some industrial contractor, and that would be a disaster. All those reasons.

LaBerge: In that, did you have any dealings with the vice presidents who were involved, for instance Vice President [William] Frazer or Vice President [Ron] Brady?

Seaborg: Yes, quite a bit. Frazer--was he from UCLA?

LaBerge: San Diego.

Seaborg: San Diego, yes. I had quite a few dealings with them, yes.

LaBerge: What did you think about David Gardner's team, the people he chose to be his top administrators, and how they worked? Or maybe you didn't have so much involvement in that.

Seaborg: [pause] Yes--no, he kept over--and I'd rather not get into that.

LaBerge: Okay, fine. What about federal government relations that the university has, and I guess the main thing is the lab contracts. But are there others that we need to talk about?

Seaborg: No, I don't think so. The other laboratories, the space sciences laboratory, the mathematics institute and so forth, but I didn't have much to do with them. Although I again was a key member, a key person in getting the space sciences laboratory here when I was chancellor, but that's not very relevant. [tape static]

LaBerge: How about David Gardner's relationship with the faculty? Were you able to see--

Seaborg: Yes, it was okay, until this last--it was good.

LaBerge: Any other issues of that time period that I forgot to bring up? What were your views on those, the move to Oakland?

Seaborg: Oh, I didn't like it, but [laughter] really I wasn't involved in that at all.

LaBerge: Any other issues during his presidency that we haven't covered that you'd like to cover, or to comment on? Did you have anything to do with admissions?

Seaborg: No, I don't think so.

LaBerge: Or admission requirements or anything like that?

Seaborg: No. No, I don't think of anything else.

LaBerge: So what would your assessment be? Your assessment of David Gardner as president.

Seaborg: Oh, I would rate it as a very outstanding presidency and one of the best in the history of the University of California.

LaBerge: Okay. Thank you very much.

Transcribed and Final Typed by Shannon Page

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The University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995

Neil J. Smelser

University Professor, Faculty Representative to the Board of Regents, 1985-1987

An Interview Conducted by
Germaine La Berge
in 1998

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

Dr. Neil J. Smelser, 1994.

Photo by John Sheretz.

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INTERVIEW HISTORY--Neil J. Smelser

Neil Smelser is a longtime University of California faculty member who has served in many roles both on the Berkeley campus and in the statewide university. He came to Berkeley as a professor of sociology in 1958, his first stop after his graduate studies at Harvard. He retired in 1994, after having served as assistant to the Berkeley chancellor, University Professor (teaching at Davis, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Irvine, and San Diego as well as Berkeley), chair of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate, and vice chair and chair of the universitywide Academic Council, in which role he became a non-voting member of the Board of Regents. In 1993, for a year before his retirement he served as special advisor to President Jack Peltason on long-term planning in the University of California.

In 1994, Professor Smelser became director of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, a residential scholarship center at Stanford. On March 10, 1998, in his office at the center, I interviewed him for this oral history project on the University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies. Smelser brought the perspective of a faculty member deeply involved at many levels in university governance whose field of study included the sociology of education and who was a former directer of Berkeley's Center for Studies in Higher Education.

Our interview plan grew out of reflections he had provided me three years before as I was planning the oral history with President Emeritus David Gardner. He had since read the completed oral history and was advising Gardner on using it as the basis for a published memoir. The interview begins with an overview of the role of faculty and the Academic Senate and Academic Council in university governance and then goes on to discuss some of the divisive issues for the faculty during an era characterized largely by smooth relations. These included the national laboratories, divestment in South Africa, the selection of four new chancellors, and the siting of the universitywide Humanities Institute at Irvine, as well as issues such as the southern office of the president, the move of UCOP to Oakland, and faculty reaction to Gardner's retirement package.

Smelser gives an informed perspective on the operations of the Board of Regents, both during the tumultuous Free Speech Movement days when he attended board meetings as assistant to the Berkeley chancellor, and in the mid-1980s, when he was faculty representative on the board. He reflects on David Gardner's effectiveness with the Board of Regents and the evolution of regents' policy on affirmative action. Finally, he discusses the Smelser report on lower division education at UC in 1986 and the complex dealings with a powerful legislator which resulted in publication of an academic study on the importance of self-esteem.

The transcript of the three-hour interview was lightly edited and sent to Professor Smelser for his review. He clarified a few unclear passages but left his words largely unchanged.

Ann Lage, Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
January 2002

Regional Oral History Office
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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please write clearly. Use black ink.)

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INTERVIEW WITH NEIL J. SMELSER

I OVERVIEW: NEIL SMELSER'S ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAREER; THE UC ACADEMIC COUNCIL

[Interview 1: March 10, 1998] ##[1]

Education and UC Professorship

Lage: Why don't we start with a brief personal background of your own: when you came to the university--

Smelser: I grew up in Arizona and I got a scholarship to Harvard as an undergraduate, so I spent my undergraduate years there. Then I went to Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship for two years. I got another B.A. there. I came back to Harvard and did my Ph.D. in sociology and got it in 1958. In 1958 I was hired by the University of California at Berkeley as an assistant professor. I spent my entire academic career there until I retired in 1994. I was in the sociology department, I was deeply involved in the troubles of the university beginning in 1964. That brought me into a larger contact with the university as a whole--the Berkeley campus, and systemwide because of my role. I was in the administrations during the troubled years, in varying capacities.

Lage: In the campus administration?

Smelser: Yes. I was an assistant to Martin Meyerson in the area of student political activities, so my time paralleled David Gardner's when he was in the Santa Barbara office. We had more talk on that than practically any other subject. I was working in this kind of policeman-peacemaker role on the Berkeley campus, and he was in [Vernon] Cheadle's administration on the Santa Barbara campus at the same time. We had a lot to talk about that. Then shortly thereafter I was made a University Professor in 1971 or '72.

Lage: That early on?

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[1]## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcript.

Smelser: Yes. I was very fortunate to attain that position. So for twenty-two years I served in the role of University Professor, which carries with it the understanding that at my initiative I would teach on other campuses while I was at Berkeley, and I would teach what I wanted. During the remaining course of my career I taught on the Davis campus, I taught at San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Irvine, and the San Diego campuses as well as the Berkeley campus. Then in the 1980s I was very active in the Academic Senate. I served as the chair of the Berkeley division for two years and vice chair and chair of the systemwide Academic Senate for two years. That brought me into the regents as a non-voting member. Also, this was a period of most intense interaction with David Gardner.

Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1994

Smelser: Then in 1994 the third of the VERIP [Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program] years became available at the same time as the offer of my position here as director of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I was not intending to retire at that time.

Lage: Even with VERIP?

Smelser: Even with VERIP. I was not ready. And I wanted to stay on longer and extend my career beyond the age of sixty-four. That was 1994. I wasn't tired.

I had been on the board of directors of this center for twelve years. I knew the center well. The search committee found me, and the offer came to me to take up the directorship here in 1994, which was the precise year that the third VERIP became available.

Lage: The third VERIP that Berkeley didn't want.

Smelser: Berkeley didn't want it, and I didn't want it. I was on Chang-Lin Tien's side on that controversy, and I thought they were dipping too deep into the faculty and that they were hurting the institution by removing the senior leadership of the campus too rapidly and too dramatically. My personal opportunities had to be taken into account as well as my feeling about the university. I love this institution, but I agreed to take the VERIP and simply then moved--three months after I retired--into this position where I've been ever since.

Lage: It looks like a wonderful place to be. Just briefly tell what the institution is and what your role is.

Smelser: The center is a residential scholarship center. Each year we have forty-eight scholars mainly from the behavioral and social sciences--nationally and internationally--but also some humanists and some biological researchers--some people who are on the edge of the behavioral and social sciences. They come here for a residential year. They are

completely free to study what they want. We select them through a vast evaluation machinery on the basis of their accomplishments and promise, not their projects, and we then invite each year these forty-eight people who come and live around the center at Stanford in housing that we arrange. We have a few special projects for five to six scholars each year who collaborate together, but the others are completely on their own.

The center has been in existence since 1954; it's been a very successful institution. We're not part of Stanford. We're on Stanford land and the rent is free, but that's basically the only connection. We have our own board of trustees, our own budget and financial independence. I do not miss teaching because of the very high quality of intellectual stimulation that I get from the fellows here. My responsibilities are to supervise the selection and placement, and I ride herd over these independent fellows with a very light administrative hand; I have no need to guide them. And then I have a staff of about twenty-five people that I have to keep in place, and I am responsible for raising on a continuous basis about three and a half million dollars a year on which the Center lives. It's a magnificent institution. The people who come here feel it's the best year of their lives, almost always.

Lage: Are the fellows of varying ages or do you tend to get young scholars?

Smelser: We mix it up: young, old, regionally, by discipline, by age, by sex, by minority. The more diversity the better, and my own initiative has been to increase the number of international fellows here. It's a marvelous institution.

Lage: It sounds wonderful. Had you ever been a fellow yourself?

Smelser: I had been asked on many occasions. I had always thought when I was on sabbatical from Berkeley that it didn't make much sense to move forty miles. So I would always go to London or Europe or New York or someplace else [chuckles]. I was scheduled to be a fellow in 1993-'94, and I had even arranged housing here. But that's when Jack Peltason telephoned me in the spring of '93, begged me to be his special advisor on long-term planning in the University of California. I would come and be kind of a minister without portfolio and I could do what I wanted there and hang around the systemwide office, which I did. I did that in '93-'94, the year before my retirement. I was scheduled to do it another year, but then the offer for the center came up, and I just went and told him that this career was demanding me. He understood very well. I had two good-bye parties at the University of California: one at Berkeley, a marvelous sendoff, and one from the president's office.

Long-term Planning for the Office of the President, 1993-1994

Lage: I'd love to go back to that long-term planning year or else have you just say something quickly about it--which does it deserve?

Smelser: I can say relatively briefly. You see, that was the year in which it became absolutely clear that with the demographic and financial picture of the state--. Think of it in '93: we were in trouble with the recession, the revenues were plummeting, and the best hope we had at that time was to have stable rather than growing revenues from the state. In the meantime we had this great surge of young people in the state of California coming up, and the projections were terrifying as to what this might mean for the university and its capacity to fulfill its historic mission because of the crunch of numbers. If we kept following admission practices according to the Master Plan we weren't going to be able to do it. So this was the context in which he asked me to help: Could the university in some way, by hook or crook, deal with this fundamental institutional contradiction that was looming? I spent my time in analysis, advice, and laying out alternatives to the Board of Regents for this range of problems that were on the horizon.

Lage: Were you thinking the tenth campus or--

Smelser: We were thinking tenth campus and more. We were thinking of various ways to bend instead of break the Master Plan and what the consequences would be if we had to break it. We envisioned all the options. I did not produce a new Master Plan, but I made an effort to find out the best I could about the situation, inform the regents, keep the president's office informed, talk around with different campuses on the problem and so on.

I also did a lot of other things. I wrote a lot of analytic essays as a sociologist on the nature and functioning of the university, the role of systemwide versus the campuses--

Lage: And did you collect these? Are they available or are they private papers?

Smelser: They're in the university files. They're not public or private; they're available. I may put them together. I wrote a hundred-page memo to Walter Massey on my departure from this year, analyzing all kinds of facets, including the planning function, and put it in a private memo to him from me. Dick Atkinson got word of this and asked me if he could see it. I said, "I'd never keep this away from you," so I sent it to him. He has now been urging me to put these things together and publish them in some form. I haven't made a decision on that issue. But they're all there. I was kind of a roving ambassador; I didn't have to push any papers, I did not have to manage any office.

Lage: Not a staff that was responsible to you.

Smelser: No. I went to a lot of committee meetings, but it was kind of at my own design. It was a beautiful year. In a way I miss not having had a second year [laughter]. It was kind of a style that I like most of all because when I was dealing with the troubles and was in the administration in the sixties it also had this free-ranging flexibility. I was an assistant to the chancellor during the first phase. Not a vice chancellor with all the bureaucracy around; I was wandering around. I was at Meyerson's and [Roger] Heyns's bidding, but it was not like a dean or like a fixed member of the administration. That's my style; I like it. That's why I liked being in the Academic Senate; it has a general kind of role. It's helpful <u>in</u> the administration but not <u>of</u> it.

Lage: Had there been anybody doing the same--was there this position under Gardner or was it something Peltason thought up?

Smelser: Peltason created it. And then afterwards he had other people fill it. He had [Elliot] Brownlee from Santa Barbara, he had [Dan] Simmons from Davis, and he now has [Karl] Pister in that budgeted slot. However, they are now given more definite assignments. Pister's now responsible for outreach. So there's a contained mission. None of them have had that beautiful freedom that I did.

Lage: Maybe everyone isn't as good at making use of it [laughter].

Smelser: Well, you're very kind. It became a budgeted slot. It's not a vice president or an assistant vice president or anything. It's a position for a seasoned faculty member who has been involved in the affairs of the university but who then undertakes this kind of assignment. It had become more focused, and that's the reason I wouldn't want it as much again.

Lage: Well, now you're in a good place.

Smelser: This is nice.

Lage: I'm glad that we got that covered--out of order, but that doesn't matter.

The Academic Council and the Office of the President

Lage: Let's start with an overview of the Academic Council, your role, and then how the president's office relates to that Academic Council.

Smelser: The Academic Council, as you know, is a kind of federation of campus councils, the president or the chair of the divisions on each campus, plus major committee members on the systemwide level. They come together as a council. This was created when it became a multicampus system.

Lage: So you serve on that by virtue of being the head of the Berkeley division.

Smelser: That's correct. Or by being head of a major statewide committee. At that time the chairmanship of the Berkeley division was for--well, I was on that council when I was chair of the Berkeley division. I was not chair of it. That was two years. I believe that was '81-'83. Then several years later, the council, which chooses its own chair, invited me to come back to chair the whole council. I was no longer chair of the Berkeley division at that time.

Lage: I see. So they choose their own chair.

Smelser: Yes, they choose and select their own chair, often from past members of the council, which I was. But they invited me to come back and be the chair of the council. I was vice chair for one year and chair for one year. But both of these involved me as the faculty representative to the Board of Regents, and both of these involved me with a consultative relationship with the Office of the President. So the relationship to the presidency is that the president meets with the leadership of the council every month before the council in private meetings for as long as is needed--usually an hour or so for breakfast. And then the president appears along with the vice president for academic affairs--sometimes the vice president for administration, sometimes the budgetary officer, sometimes other officials of the systemwide administration. A good deal of our agenda deals with issues that are facing the university at the systemwide level. So the council itself, during, say, half of its daily meeting, is directed toward issues, crises, problems, and opportunities that the systemwide administration is facing. This is the time for faculty input.

Lage: You make it sound like a very well-run system.

Smelser: It's sort of chaotic in the sense that there are a lot of contradictions that I've actually written about a little bit. You have each of the divisional senates talking mainly to their chancellors. Then the chancellors talk to the president. Then we have the council, which talks mainly to the president. You get two kind of independent and not terribly well-coordinated forms of input into the president's office. And the one through the chancellors is obviously filtered. The chancellors meet with our own academic senates, but they pass on what they want. The other one [the Academic Council] is a completely separate identity. I wrote of it as a nine-legged octopus one time [laughter], referring to all the campuses--which traveled much the same way as an octopus. It was uncoordinated, but the message gets through.

Lage: Does the council see itself as representing faculty opinion, faculty interests?

Smelser: Yes. It sees itself as specifically representing faculty interests, faculty viewpoints, faculty intelligence. On some occasions, and we'll probably touch on those, it comes into opposition with the president's office on their decisions or intents. It never is like a trade union, and there's this co-governance and cooperative culture that really is there almost all the time.

Lage: That's what's so interesting. It's an informal thing, really. It's not in a statute anywhere.

Smelser: The Academic Senate is created, but the culture is not in a statute. You don't make legislation about that. But it happens, and it's a tradition, and it's usually honored. In a way, some of the more independent and anti-administration faculty think that the senate is too much a creature of the administration. It's made up of very senior people who have a lot of experience--

Lage: The senate or the council?

Smelser: The council, which is a manifestation of the senate. And some people feel that the divisions on the campuses are too much a creature of the chancellor, because these people

are ones who have gone in and out of administration: some of them have been former deans. They're good citizens.

Lage: The ones who run the senate divisions.

Smelser: That's right. And in the Free Speech Movement conflict, for example, the leadership on the campus sometimes did not communicate well with the rank and file. To the rank and file it often seemed too close to the administration. That happened in the oath issue as well, and David wrote about that. There are some tensions within it, but its official and informal role is to represent the faculty as they see its interests. It's a very, very good mechanism despite its inefficiencies and too much committee time and all of that.

Lage: You were on the council when David Saxon was president, it sounds like.

Smelser: Yes, I was.

Lage: Would you want to contrast the styles of the two Davids as sort of a background?

Smelser: David Saxon was a person with--I don't want to criticize the man, because I have a lot of admiration for him as well. He was a person who did not have the interpersonal skills and the openness of David Gardner. He tended, not just to the faculty but to a lot of constituencies, to lecture them from time to time about their obligations as faculty members. He gave his goodbye speech, I think it was, to the Academic Council, more or less telling it to get their undergraduate teaching roles in better shape, and this was not appreciated. But he had a more of a directive and somewhat more formalistic relationship to the council. And it wasn't as smooth, really, as David's was. David [Gardner]--I admire the man. He was able to get almost all of his constituencies into his hand, even in troubled times. There were moments which we'll talk about in which there was tension and irritation and disagreement over what he was doing and how he was doing it. But there was never a break. The Academic Senate never censured David Saxon, but it wasn't a warm relationship, really. In the middle of my time in the council in '79, I think, David Saxon brought to it his own scheme about how in budgetary troubled times, would faculty members have tenure within the whole university if some unit were discontinued?

Lage: Some unit of the--

Smelser: Some unit of the campus. Would this person have claim to be shifted or to shift his or her academic position to other campuses? This deeply divided Berkeley and UCLA on one hand from the rest of the campuses. Berkeley and UCLA said no. They didn't want to have this acceptance of all--but the smaller and newer campuses were perfectly happy with the arrangement, because it meant they might place their own faculty members elsewhere in the system and also it would be more equal. It never got resolved, and the faculty divided itself among it, but the way David Saxon handled it was more or less to present it to the faculty without as much articulation or investigation of this very big and sore issue.

The same issue was considered from time to time throughout David Gardner's years, but it was in a somewhat more cooperative mode, and actually the faculty had more responsible input into the matter, I think. That's just an example of the styles. David Gardner was much more effective in dealing with all his constituencies because he had a much better relationship with the legislature, and Saxon had a lot of static because he would go up there and tell them what it was all about--"Leave us alone, we know what we're doing." That kind of thing.

Lage: And he had Jerry Brown to deal with.

Smelser: He had a tougher constituency. The legislature has a lot of its own ideas anyway, no matter who's there. But Brown was not a cooperative person to deal with, as Deukmejian turned out to be.

II DIFFICULT ISSUES DURING THE GARDNER PRESIDENCY

Restoring Faculty Salaries: An Effective Presidency and a Cooperative Academic Council

Lage: Should we talk then more about David Gardner and the things he brought to the council or the council brought to him and talk about some of these sore points?

Smelser: That's fine.

Lage: Or the non-sore points.

Smelser: I think I've given you the general picture. I think talking about specific issues would be better.

Lage: I do too, to get grounded.

Smelser: You get the flavor better from that.

Lage: Do you want to mention what you think are most important to discuss? I have a few on our outline here, but I don't want to dictate--

Smelser: Our outline--since I had brought those up in a communication to you, those are the ones that came basically from me, so we can touch on those either from my earlier--I think you've got them out pretty well.

Lage: One thing I didn't put on there, which was a positive thing, was David Gardner's almost first act to try to restore faculty salaries. That must have had some very positive impact.

Smelser: This was an absolute wonder, the fact that he was able--he was absolutely right in his own memoirs--contrary to advice from most of the chancellors and others who thought he was going to suffer a stinging defeat by asking for too much, he went ahead more or less single-handedly and persuaded the governor to have this whopping and totally unprecedented increase of the university's budget, which included something like an 18 to 20 percent increase in faculty salaries. It was almost a magical, triumphal entry. I can't

imagine a better way ever to extend your own honeymoon in a university setting [chuckles]. During that period I remember his presentations and his descriptions and his dealings with the governor. I had never seen the Academic Council, and I don't think my colleagues ever had seen them, spontaneously and in meeting after meeting break into applause for him. That was the kind of tone it was. The faculty is an independent body, sometimes they--it's not their style. But he had such a winning and effective and almost swashbuckling series of victories at that time. One thing that soured it was--which immediately disappeared when he came--the issue of his salary and his privileges relating to Blake House and housing that he negotiated out before he accepted the presidency. All of this got him in the press, and there was some grousing about it.

Lage: So the faculty is sensitive to those kind of--

Smelser: Very much. And that of course set the tone for the later faculty sensitivities to his retirement package. But it already got into the press and into the books and into the faculty mentality: what does David Gardner want? Is he a greedy, selfish person? Is he demanding too much from the university? Is he demanding a salary that was way out of line with what Saxon has had? Well, the realities are that Saxon took very little interest in money. In fact, he would not accept raises. And he would give money to the physics departments of the different campuses out of his own salary. A thousand dollars a year, I believe, to each of the campuses just voluntarily. So there was a kind of monkish or you might say ascetic quality to Saxon. And he had worked the president's salary down to a place where it was far below other presidents in the country. It was far below what David was getting at Utah. In a way, from David's standpoint, it was perfectly reasonable for him to think in terms of this salary level instead of David Saxon's salary level.

Lage: And that would also set the level for the people he might want to recruit into his senior positions.

Smelser: It had to be. Those things follow. Not immediately all the time, but it sets the whole salary structure. If you get a great discrepancy then they tend to level out over time. So there was a lot of grousing, and people were sensitive to the fact that--"Why does he have to have a second house to live in if there's a real house there?" And he had his own reasons; it had to do with his family mostly, but it looked like a very big package. So there was some dissatisfaction; he did not come in completely untainted.

Lage: And this was before the faculty salaries were restored.

Smelser: Talk about an issue disappearing quickly. That one did, right? It came back at the end of his presidency, but it was quickly forgotten at that time. Almost nobody had anything but positive feelings about David Gardner during his first years. He had a very cooperative Academic Council anyway. I do not remember any facedowns during that time--say, during the first three years of his presidency. That's just an arbitrary figure, but it was a long period of very, very good will.

Lage: A honeymoon.

Smelser: A big honeymoon. And it was just prolonged by this effectiveness that he was able to exercise in dealing with the whole university and faculty.

The National Laboratories: A Divisive Issue for the Faculty

Lage: Let's talk about some of the sore points here. If that's the right term for them--maybe they aren't quite sore points.

Smelser: I'll go down the list of the ones that you listed, and there may be one or--

Lage: And this list came from you.

Smelser: They mostly came from me, yes.

With respect to the national laboratories, I know that one of the competitors in the race for the presidency with David in 1982 was Chancellor [I. Michael] Heyman. He was in the running at that time. One of the issues that gave David Gardner an advantage in this race was that Heyman, as a matter of political conviction, wanted the university to get out of the labs' management. That was contrary to the regents. There was a big majority of regents who wanted it to continue. David had a different opinion. He felt that, along with many regents, the university was providing a level of responsible leadership--

##

Smelser: --almost duty that the university contributed to this aspect of the nation's welfare, even though it included the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Lage: And that was a hot issue then. We almost forget now--

Smelser: It was a hot issue all along. It has died since the lab has sort of got out of the business of nuclear weapons development; that happened around the time of the end of the Cold War. They do not develop new weapons now. They work on updating them and stockpile issues, but not new weapons development. I, by the way, should say that I was a member of the President's Council, Oversight Committee to the national laboratories for nearly eight years.

Lage: Now what time period was that?

Smelser: This would be from 1986 or '87 right up to the present time. I just declined to be reappointed largely because of the pressure on my own time. My last meeting with the labs was about six months ago.

Lage: And is that appointed by the president?

Smelser: The president appoints them. They asked me to continue my service, but I felt I had to decline. I've taken on other assignments that were just too engrossing. It was a very good period of time, so I knew the lab situation intimately.

So here you see that David did not have a controversial relationship with the regents ever about the labs. So in a way that eased his situation enormously, because the regents were the basic approvers of the contracts that get renewed every five years, and David never crossed swords with the regents except a small minority that favored getting out of the lab business.

Lage: Who were the regents that favored getting out?

Smelser: Willie Brown and some of the state people who did not participate too much in the regents.

Lage: Any appointed regents?

Smelser: Maybe--what was his name? The man from Los Angeles. He was a more liberal regent.

Lage: Sheinbaum?

Smelser: Regent [Stanley] Sheinbaum. I believe he was in that camp, and a couple of others voted, who I do not remember. But it was never more than four who voted there. The governor was always on the majority side, and David happened to be.

Lage: How about the faculty? Particularly through the Academic Senate.

Smelser: The Academic Senate never mobilized against the renewal of the labs. During my time, at the mid-eighties contract renewal--well, I guess I can pinpoint it to 1987 or '88, because that was my year as chair of the council. That was a contract time. The Academic Senate --Council--did not come out against the renewal. However, we had a big and deep discussion about this, and I was asked by the council to appoint a committee called the [Malcolm] Jendresen Committee. Jendresen was a council member. The committee was to make a deep inquiry into the relations of the university with the labs. And they did. They worked for two or three years. I appointed onto that committee what I considered a balanced slate of people who were both favorable and unfavorable to the connection. The people who were unfavorable took a very activist role in that committee. I mean, they just did not give up. It was a matter of principle. They managed to get a Jendresen report, a 3-2 divided report, asking the university to sever their ties with the labs. This report was not accepted and not adopted by the president's office. In a way, it died. It was even controversial among the faculty. The faculty itself was very deeply divided on this issue.

Lage: There have been a lot of votes in the Berkeley Academic Senate, and mostly--

Smelser: By narrow margin against the affiliation with the labs. If you go down into the faculty, it's kind of like the affirmative action issue. The activists are on the left with respect to the labs issue, so if you took a vote of the whole faculty all at once it would be totally mixed

on the issue. But the activists, the ones opposing the affiliation with the labs, are the ones who made all the noise. Your scientists and engineers and different people did not mobilize on this issue. So you got these votes, and you got the Jendresen Committee report, and every five years you got a lot of agitation in the academic divisions on the campuses with mostly--

Lage: Every time the lab contract came up.

Smelser: Mostly Berkeley, Santa Cruz, some other campuses, made the most fuss about it. This did not always filter up through the council. The council was really much as my description was--more moderate in this regard and did not take an official stand. Then, of course, in the early nineties the opposition to the labs began to diminish because of the policies of the labs. But when I was appointed a member of the oversight committee of the labs in 1987 I was criticized by some of my faculty colleagues for even taking it.

Lage: For taking the job.

Smelser: Yes. It was quite interesting that one of the criticisms that came out of the left was that the--it was called the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee, SAAC. In 1987 it changed to the President's Council, later on. One of the reasons I was appointed--or the reason I was appointed was that the people from the left said that this was not a supervisory body; this is just a bunch of physicists who go up and talk to a bunch of physicists and they have a club and it doesn't really oversee at all. It's just there; it's meaningless. Bill [William R.] Frazer, and I assume David Gardner, decided to mix the composition of the lab a little bit, so they appointed me to represent something other than the science point of view. I was a totally lost character because most of the reports were technical/scientific accounts of the work going out of the labs and I couldn't understand 10 percent of it.

Lage: Well, you must have asked different questions, though.

Smelser: Many of the issues before the labs were policy issues and reorganizational issues and political issues. I was just as good if not better than the physicists in these issues. So I became a full member, and I think a valued member of the lab, because they really tried to persuade me to take an additional term just now. It was only with a heavy heart that I had to say no.

Lage: Were you able to validate your point of view to those people who questioned your taking that job?

Smelser: I just told them that I didn't share their opinions. It wasn't a matter of convincing them that it was a right thing to do.

Lage: I just wondered if they came to understand or--

Smelser: No, but that was the nature of the conflict. They were not aiming at mutual understanding [chuckles]; they were aiming at political positions.

Lage: I know that David Gardner felt that a lot of the opposition to him at the end was--that there was a holdover from this opposition to the national lab, to his stance on the national lab.

Smelser: That was one of the groups that criticized him at the end on the basis of the package and the settlement and so on. The dissatisfaction with Gardner at that time was much wider than just the issue of the labs. The labs group of course joined in. But not because they just wanted to get him because he was wrong-headed about the labs. So I wouldn't say it was as much a causal factor as he might have indicated.

Lage: Okay, it's important to get your point of view on that.

Smelser: It was a broader reaction. It included that group because they were antagonistic to him anyway on their issue about the labs. But I wouldn't make too close a connection between lab opposition and opposition to the presidential retirement, because that was a more general point of view.

Divestment in South Africa: Gardner and Governor Deukmejian at Odds

Lage: Should we talk about divestment? That was certainly a hot issue. And you were on the regents at that time, I think.

Smelser: Yes, I was on the regents at that time. Here's how I recall the situation. Once again, the council did not take an official position on divestment. There was a lot of division in it, so we did not give formal advice to David on the issue.

Lage: Was it discussed with him though?

Smelser: Yes. And he made the strongest effort to make his viewpoint clear. But it didn't come to the point of being a formal opposition on the part of the faculty. I think it was also divided in its viewpoint. So the Academic Council did not take an official line on the matter.

Lage: Was that itself discussed on the council? Was there some controversy about whether the council should take an opinion?

Smelser: I would remember if it was really hot. I believe we did, but it's not something that sticks out in my mind as one of the really challenging things for me in my leadership of that group. I myself was not for the council to take an official action, so I think I probably influenced my colleagues to keep a distance from the issue. David of course had very strong feelings on the matter. He believed they ought not to have--and his reasons I believe he's given to you, that it's contrary to the idea of a university to enter into these political, partisan issues that were affecting the entire state, and that they were beyond the realm of university involvement. That of course made him in favor of not divesting, de facto.

Lage: Which some would say was a point of view in itself.

Smelser: Well, it is a point of view in itself. But he said, "I don't want to take a stand on that issue. It's a financial issue for the regents to decide. I myself am against it, and I will vote against it." He told the governor he was going to vote against it. He managed to ease himself through the crisis, which was his worst, I think, prior to his retirement. It was the only time he did not really have the regents under his control. He was such an accomplished organizer of debate and decision making that I would have to say that--maybe on minor issues now and then but not earthshaking ones did he ever suffer a defeat. And this was a defeat. That defeat was at the hands of the governor.

Lage: Do you remember that meeting? It must have been pretty dramatic. [Meeting of the Board of Regents, June 1985]

Smelser: Very much. I remember the evening before it because I sat with David for as much as an hour. We knew what was going to happen; we knew the votes.

Lage: Deukmejian had called him and told him, I seem to remember.

Smelser: No, he had put pressure on David. His pressure--it was quite clear what he wanted especially his regents' appointees to do. Anybody on the inside who was capable of counting votes knew what the outcome was going to be. There was still some uncertainty but it was pretty clear that David would not prevail. And I sat with David talking about the whole thing. I have to say it was something of a therapeutic encounter because he was very upset even before the vote. We talked a long time about the thing and even talked in a somewhat personal way about the prospect of a defeat. I was, in a way, a personal support for him on this occasion. I kind of advised him as to ways in which to take this into larger context, rather than treat it as a personal affront on the part of the regents. That was the night before the meeting.

The meeting itself was a hot one and it lasted a long time. Even though the outcome in my mind was kind of foregone, everybody made their speeches, including David--a very eloquent speech opposing it, and he said how he was going to vote. There were some very sharp exchanges. I believe Regent [Jeremiah F.] Hallisey, who was very strong for divestment, spoke especially strongly. [Edward W.] Carter, who was also very strongly against divestment, himself did not speak too strongly but it became evident to me that he had coached the treasurer, [Herbert M.] Gordon. Gordon spoke a lot, and Gordon was against it.

Lage: Now Carter was--

Smelser: He was a regent still. It was about his last meeting.

Lage: I didn't realize he was still a regent.

Smelser: Carter had long been involved in the investment policies of the university. He was the head, I believe, of the investment committee for a long time and maybe was even then. He

had had a lot of influence on the treasurer, Gordon. Gordon defended the anti-divestment position strongly. But if you want my candid opinion it was as though he had been instructed on it. I think he agreed with the instructions. Carter was a little more silent on the issue. He spoke rather more briefly. An outspoken opponent of divestment was Glenn Campbell. You know how the regents lined up. I think the vote was something like 14-9 [in favor of divestment]. You could look up the vote. It was not close. It was a decisive vote. So it happened. As it turned out, divestment lasted a while. It disappeared in the flow of history when they took it back after the fundamental changes in South Africa. The issue died totally. No one sat around trying to watchdog that decision, seeing exactly whether the university was cheating or not cheating and so on.

Meeting with Faculty Proponents of Divestment

Smelser: I'll give you one other incident. A group of really strong, ideologically committed faculty members, mostly from Berkeley, who were almost all in my recollection from the anti-lab contingent, came and requested an audience, a meeting with David right in the heat of the divestment furor before the regents' meeting. David agreed to meet them in University Hall, I think against his better wishes, because he just knew he was going to get beaten up. There wasn't going to be a dialogue; there was going to be a lot of shouting. David asked me as president of the senate to come and sit with him in that meeting, to be present. He didn't instruct me in any position, but he wanted me to be present. And I was present, and I knew all these guys. I had been a faculty member with them for a long time, I had been with them through the FSM, I had been with them through the lab debates--I just knew the whole cast of characters. It was Leon Wofsy, it was Larry Levine, it was Robert Bellah--my colleague in sociology--I remember those faces. Maybe Owen Chamberlain was there. He was in that group.

Lage: He was in the group against the labs and for divestment?

Smelser: He was a spokesman. He was the only Nobel Prize winner, I think, who was. The others spoke out strongly for the continuation of the lab contract, like [Glenn] Seaborg and others who spoke for the connection. Of course, [Edward] Teller would be in that camp as well. So the leading physicists were clearly in favor of the continuation, but Chamberlain was not. I believe Chamberlain was present at that occasion [the divestment meeting]. I could dig it up if I--but these are the ones I remember. It was in fact a kind of shouting contest. In fact, I got kind of angry; I did not express my anger during the meeting. I was sympathizing with David, because he was the one person taking all the heat, and the group was not interested in hearing his opinions.

Lage: Were they just each giving speeches?

Smelser: Yes, they were after him. They wanted him to change his mind and to go along with their side. And he didn't do it, and he defended himself perfectly well, but the thing became a very heavy meeting. The only time I expressed my irritation was at the end when I leaned

over and said to Larry Levine, but in such a way that everybody heard, "I really have to congratulate you guys: you are the world's leading experts on moral blackmail." Levine just totally froze. Later he wrote me a letter saying I should apologize to that group for saying that [chuckles]. I wrote him back later saying that if apologies are due it's from you people. And that was the end of it. David never forgot my comment.

Lage: He liked it, I'll bet.

Smelser: He loved it! He came to me afterwards and said, "You could say that, but I couldn't say that." [laughs] It was a very nice moment in my relationship with him. I did not actually myself, in that whole role--I was completely torn on that issue and neutralized. I was not in David's camp, and I was not in--it was an either-or decision, and I was not in the other camp either.

Lage: You just weren't sure what the right answer was? Or did you have a middle position?

Smelser: Well, I had a middle position in that they ought to have followed the Sullivan rules, which was an intermediate position which was not total divestment; they just would review the policies of the different firms and do it on a partial and selective basis. I guess that was my feeling. But I could not work up a principled stand on the matter. Not that I was indifferent, but I couldn't make up my mind. In a way, I guess that's a pretty good way to feel if you're in the middle of a hot controversy because you can keep your independence and not get as I was with the left: I got cast in a reactionary role because of what I said.

Lage: But you were objecting, it sounds like, to their manner.

Smelser: I was objecting to the way they were treating him. I didn't like it. I got mad at that. I didn't come out and say that I was on his side; I just said they were mistreating him. That of course made me on his side in their eyes. But I didn't come out and argue with them the same way he was arguing with them. And I did not speak at the senate meeting. Naturally, I did not vote because I could not vote. If you asked me how I would have voted, I think down with the crunch I would have probably voted with David because I was persuaded by some of his arguments. But I did not myself go home in a state of great depression that divestment had passed. You see what I mean. It was not such a loaded issue with me that I took it that deeply and that personally.

Lage: Do you think that David Gardner took it so hard because it was a defeat for him or because he felt it was such a wrong course of action?

Smelser: Both. I told him in our conversation the night before, "David, this is the only time you've not been in control of the regents. And that must bother you." I think that was a big component of it, that he had failed in his mode, and that I believe contributed very much to his sense of personal loss. Added to it was that his own convictions had not held sway. Those were the two dimensions of that, and they were both real. And they both contributed to the depth of feeling that he had about losing.

Deukmejian's Partisan Role

Lage: Now what about the role Deukmejian played? Is that a proper role from your viewpoint?

Smelser: No, I don't like the governor intervening that much in the work of the regents. I didn't like Reagan's intervention to get Kerr in 1967. I thought that was improper. It was a partisan, political, ideologically motivated attack. And Deukmejian was in the middle of a campaign against Mayor [Thomas] Bradley for the governorship, and Bradley of course was very strong on the side of divestment. Deukmejian was capturing political ground in the governor's race. I read it entirely in that strategic political move that Deukmejian himself was not committed to divestment, at least strongly, but that in the context of that political campaign he decided he was.

Lage: It wasn't his background as an Armenian, which he brought up?

Smelser: No, not at all. He gave a speech about it, and you can always give speeches. But I don't think he was necessarily very strong for divestment. I read it as a political scene, and for that reason I thought Deukmejian was out of place bringing partisan politics so openly into the Board of Regents.

Lage: It almost has a corollary with the issue we'll get to later--the affirmative action issue.

Smelser: On affirmative action I feel exactly the same way. I think that [Governor Pete] Wilson was improper and wrong to throw his weight in on that issue. So those are the three big moments that I felt that the governor's office behaved badly. Always I had the same opinion in all of them. And my views didn't prevail in any one of them [laughter].

Selection of Four Chancellors

Smelser: We've talked about the lab, we've talked about divestment. I also called your attention to the controversy over the selection of chancellors.

Lage: And that's an interesting issue, I think.

Smelser: Well, I would have to say that the controversy really was focused mainly on Riverside at that time. It was a kind of a double controversy, and it reverberated into future dissatisfaction as well. But at the time no one got particularly concerned about the appointment of Barbara [S.] Uehling. There was some knowledge that she had been the subject of controversy at the University of Missouri, and some people wondered about the appropriateness of her appointment. But it wasn't a matter of focused opposition.

The Selection Process, and Smelser's Offers of Administrative Positions

Lage: Let me just ask you by way of background: is the president the main person to choose the chancellors? I know there's a search committee.

Smelser: There's a search committee, and the president--

Lage: The faculty's involved.

Smelser: The faculty has a lot of influence on this, in that they reduce the numbers down. And they even sometimes will make a specific recommendation. But if there is not an agreement on the part of the president--and the president is the one who presents the committee's point of view to the regents--then it won't go. So it's a complex process, and the president doesn't just say, "I want that person."

Lage: Do you see Barbara Uehling, for instance, as his person?

Smelser: Not really. I believe, if my memory is correct, he had possibly approached a couple of other people before who said they didn't want it. But that's kind of hearsay on my part; I can't remember that for sure. No one really objected to the Santa Cruz chancellor--

Lage: [Robert B.] Stevens?

Smelser: Stevens. I guess I can tell you confidentially, but there's nothing confidential in this, that the regents approached me for that position before they offered it to him. I declined.

Lage: You didn't want to be a chancellor or you didn't want to go to Santa Cruz?

Smelser: I had expressed a lack of interest in the possibility of a chancellorship at other campuses before on maybe one or two occasions. That was because I didn't want to be a chancellor. That reason, plus the fact that I saw the Santa Cruz campus as the most ungovernable of campuses at the time--and I could not make believe that I was such a hero that I would not be badly taxed if not destroyed by going into that setting. It was a matter of personal knowledge of the Santa Cruz campus and an appreciation of how multiple and intractable the conflicts were on that campus that made me uninterested in it. I believe that if I have ever been offered--I was on a short list on a couple of occasions in Berkeley--the chancellorship at Berkeley, I believe that would have been a different matter. Even though Berkeley's not exactly governable either [laughter].

Lage: A different set of problems, maybe.

Smelser: A different set of problems. I was once asked by David Saxon if I were interested in assuming the chancellorship of San Diego. It was at a point in my career when I was not--I probably didn't realize it at the time what an important position it was.

Lage: How San Diego was coming up--

Smelser: What a fantastic position even at the time and its trajectory of growth afterwards. I guess now I would want to reconsider that decision. It was not offered to me, but I was sounded out. I told Saxon that I did not make myself available in that. So I was kind of in the action but never really in it--I was once offered the vice chancellorship of Santa Cruz by Dean McHenry even when I was a very little boy. I was, I think, thirty-five years old. That was when I was in the chancellor's office at Berkeley and beginning to be a visible person even though I was that young. Dean McHenry approached me and asked me to be the vice chancellor under his chancellorship. I said no. I was asked to be the dean of the Letters and Sciences around the same time a couple of years later.

Lage: At Berkeley?

Smelser: At Berkeley. I said no.

Lage: You've turned a lot of things down here.

Smelser: Well, I got presidential offers at places like Oregon and Indiana. I always said no [laughter]. You must keep in mind that I am a dedicated and committed academic to this day, loving the professorial role, loving the academic life, knowing what it would do to you if you gave it up.

Lage: And you do give it up, it sounds like.

Smelser: You do. You can't kid yourself. You give it up.

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Smelser: I've always been wary of those positions. I was never a CEO--beyond being a department chairman on two occasions in my own department--until I took this job. And then I was ready. Five years before I took this job as center director I was in the running with my predecessor. As it turned out I came out second in that race. My reaction at that time was, "Thank the Lord." I was so relieved; I didn't want to face this conflict. I had really been tempted, but I didn't feel I wanted to leave the academic ranks at the time. When it came around the second time in 1994, I was ready.

Lage: The timing was just right.

Smelser: And I wanted it. So I would have been deeply disappointed if it hadn't come the second time. It came and I took it. This is an insight into my particular engagement, and this maintenance of a certain level of independence and always the protection of my academic career.

Lage: And continuing your research.

Smelser: That's right. In this job I can continue some research and writing, and that's a good factor in it. But it's slowed down of course a great deal. This is kind of a full-time job. But nonetheless I've been able to keep things alive.

Lage: You have a good setting for it, that's for sure.

Smelser: Yes, it's very contemplative.

Lage: Okay. We're talking about the four chancellors.

Moving Theodore Hullar to Davis, Appointing Chancellor Schraer at Riverside

Smelser: That is correct. Let me focus on the Riverside problem. I got waylaid and off the track.

What David Gardner did was to persuade [Theodore L.] Hullar to take the Davis chancellorship. He thought his background and skills were better for Davis.

Lage: Just to clarify for the record, he had been chancellor for a brief time at Riverside.

Smelser: He was chancellor for a couple of years, I believe, at Riverside. David basically worked out a transfer deal for him without too much consultation. That was the big issue: consultation.

Lage: Were they happy with him at Riverside?

Smelser: The troubles were brewing there.

Lage: But they did like Hullar at Riverside?

Smelser: Mixed feelings. He was not an overwhelming chancellor. It wasn't his loss that bothered people so much; it was what the faculty and the Academic Council saw as a somewhat swift, unconsultative action.

Lage: I see. Not consulting with Davis and--

Smelser: Not consulting enough with either Davis or Riverside. There wasn't an offensive mounted at Davis against him. They were pleased to have a new chancellor; they were already tired of [James H.] Meyer up there. Plenty tired of Meyer.

Lage: He had been there a long time.

Smelser: Twenty some-odd years. No, maybe eighteen years. But his usefulness to the campus was perceived as over. Subsequently Hullar became very unpopular at Davis. Immediately. They didn't like him once they got him. He came in and made a lot of very aggressive moves and he alienated a lot of faculty quickly. That's another story.

Rosemary Schraer was a person--David was constrained to look for minorities and women at that time. I believe, if I'm not mistaken, the job at Santa Cruz--or maybe it was Santa Barbara--was offered to a minority, a black administrator, and he didn't take it.

Lage: When you say David was under constraint--

Smelser: He saw that as a political issue of the times.

Lage: From the legislature? From the faculty? From his own sense of right?

Smelser: It was kind of a political situation. He was not antagonistic to having non-white males in the position, but at the same time we had nine white male chancellors--with the exception of an earlier Riverside chancellor. It was a political question as well as an ideological question, and I think David would have been very comfortable personally and politically appointing a minority and a woman. So he ended up appointing two women and two men into the chancellor's position, and there was some applause for that.

Rosemary, I think, was not a uniformly respected or liked person on the Riverside campus anyway.

Lage: And she was there at the time, as I recall.

Smelser: She had been on the Riverside campus a long time. And he then said all right, and appointed her. The opposition that came up through the Academic Council and resulted in a vote--a censure? I don't know. It was a disapproval vote. The exact wording--it was during my--

Lage: We should look that up.

Smelser: It was at the very end of the period of my being head of the council. They put the challenge down to David that he had done it wrong.

Lage: The procedures were wrong.

Smelser: They criticized him on the procedures. It did not blow up in the regents. David masterminded the whole thing. I did not cover up the fact that the council had voted against David, but I myself indicated that the criticism was procedural.

Lage: So you were the faculty representing--

Smelser: I spoke at the time of the decision of the regents to appoint the chancellors, and the issue of dissatisfaction on the Riverside campus came up. I guess when the chips were down I kind of defended David, because I didn't stand up and shout that it was the wrong thing to do. In a way I played it kind of cool in that situation. As it turned out, neither Hullar nor Rosemary nor Stevens proved to be good appointments. Nor Uehling. All four got into trouble quickly [laughs]. It was really funny because I always trusted David's judgment, but here was a case where there were four backfires. And Stevens was uncomfortable

from the very minute--he stayed around several years, but he did not make a successful leader on the campus.

Lage: Did he come from Santa Cruz?

Smelser: No. He came from Haverford, I think. A small liberal arts college. I believe it was Haverford where he was president, and it was just a smaller pasture that he was in. He couldn't handle the conflict in the state system. As I say, it was a landmine situation, and he never got on top of it. He was unpopular with the students, he was unpopular with the faculty; he lasted longer than he should have, I suppose, because he was ineffective in that position.

Lage: Did Karl Pister replace him?

Smelser: Let me see. Wasn't Angus Taylor there for a couple of years or was that before?

Lage: I believe Taylor was earlier [after Mark Christensen].

Smelser: Sinsheimer was before Stevens, then came Pister. Pister and Angus Taylor were very effective.

Lage: So somebody tamed Santa Cruz.

Smelser: Finally. They've had a lot of problems. Before Sinsheimer they had a big blowup over Mark Christensen [1976]. He came there and was chancellor for one year. You see why I got my opinion that it was ungovernable [laughter]. I was a close advisor to some Santa Cruz people over the years.

Lage: Well, issues like this must really affect the faculty, I would think--issues like choice of chancellor done improperly. Isn't that something they get their backs up over?

Smelser: There was a big reaction on the Riverside campus, and the Riverside representatives to the council were the ones who really got the council to do something. People were yawning in other parts of the system--"Who cares?" If you're a Berkeley faculty member or a Berkeley person, why get upset? I mean, it's another campus, we don't like Riverside much anyway. Let them get into trouble, it's their problem. So it was not what you'd say was an upwelling of faculty opinion. It was an isolated point of conflict. David was able to absorb it, he was able to ride it through, it did not become a crisis.

Lage: It is one area, as I recall from his oral history, where he feels he handled it poorly.

Smelser: I remember the pages--I don't know. I think he was not proud of that moment.

Lage: Some understanding of why he did it, but--

Smelser: Could have done it better. Yes, I think that would be his opinion in retrospect and even at the time when he may have had some ideas that he had to get this thing through. It was a

dramatic move to bring four chancellors all at once before the regents and introduce them. I remember that meeting, a couple of meetings later in which that happened. It was a kind of happy and triumphal moment. It had its very ragged edges.

III OBSERVATIONS OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL STYLE

Regents' Meetings in the Aftermath of FSM, 1965: A Zoo

Lage: Let's talk a little more--before we go into the retirement package--about your observations of the regents and how they functioned and who were the leaders.

Smelser: When I came into the regents--well, I can speak for two periods. I would go to regents' meetings in 1965 when they were in the aftermath of the Free Speech Movement. It was like a zoo.

Lage: Did you go to the regents' meetings because of your position on the Berkeley campus?

Smelser: Yes. My title was assistant to the chancellor in the area of student political activity. I was on the hot seat all the time, negotiating with the student groups, huddling in strategy meetings with [acting Berkeley Chancellor Martin] Meyerson all the time. We had a lead time of about ten minutes because it was just crisis after crisis after crisis.

Lage: We really should record this someday. This is a separate story.

Smelser: I may write this up maybe. David and I have spoken idly of writing up our respective roles in the Free Speech Movement. We may do something like that yet.

So I went to the meetings in 1965. This was just before Reagan was elected, and I was never in on that--and Governor Brown didn't come to the meetings. But the regents were at one another's throats; they were sharply divided about the Berkeley campus. The right wing of the regents was forever furious that the Berkeley campus wasn't cracking down harder on these students. That included [Edward] Carter, it included Mrs. [Catherine] Hearst, it included [John] Canaday; it included a very sizable number of people, all of whom were later to be on the side that dismissed Clark Kerr--the Reagan camp later on. And then it included people who were really much more loyal to the political leadership at Berkeley and wanted to give them more independence. This was [William] Roth, this was Mrs. [Elinor] Heller, this was Bill Coblentz. They were the most conspicuous people there. Those were the two factions. And there was a lot of screaming. Very hysterical. I

always said these people are behaving just like the Free Speech Movement steering committee; there was no difference in their demeanor [laughs].

Lage: They would interrupt each other and--

Smelser: Oh, yes. It was unstable at times.

Lage: Who was chairman? It would be the chairman's role, I would think, to manage it.

Smelser: It was hard to handle. Who was the chair at that time? I don't remember. That's a matter of the record. But the discussion forever got out of hand, and it was a real hotseat for Meyerson, and I would go with him. I never got really attacked, because I wasn't the man in the leadership. But I was there and I talked, I presented things to the regents on matters of conflict, matters of the university and so on. It was a tough situation. It was very chaotic, and I developed a lot of--I sympathized with the moderates. Those are the ones I really talked to; I didn't have close relations to the right ever. Somehow they were just more comfortable; I liked them more.

The Culture of the Board in the Deukmejian Years

Smelser: Then I went back to the regents in the middle eighties. I did not attend the regents when I was chair of the Berkeley division.

Lage: My notes show your service as faculty rep to the regents as '85-'87, September '85 to August '87.

Smelser: That must have been it. That's right. The Smelser Report came out toward the end of my first year, in 1986.

Lage: How did you find the regents in the mid-eighties?

Smelser: The regents were in a period of transition then. It was the Deukmejian regents who were basically beginning to take over. Those appointments were coming in, and the Brown regents were going off. Deukmejian and later Wilson never reappointed a Democrat. Not once. Deukmejian reappointed [Glenn] Campbell, for example. I didn't think that was a good reappointment; he was too partisan and too uncontrollable a person. [Sheldon] Andelson, for example, was one of the ones that Brown had appointed. The black regent woman who was--

Lage: [Yvonne Brathwaite] Burke?

Smelser: Burke was in there. These people were beginning to go off and go off and go off. And the new regents were coming in, and Deukmejian was gradually stacking the thing with

Republicans. Ultimately it was all Republicans. The regents had no contact with the Democratic side of the legislature.

Lage: That doesn't sound politically a good match.

Smelser: That's the way the governors do it. From the university's standpoint it was bad. From the governor's standpoint they were behaving just like all governors have ever behaved--you know, to appoint people on their side of the political spectrum. The fact that regents' terms became twelve rather than sixteen years increased the turnover, but by virtue of the fact that Deukmejian and Wilson and the Republicans dominated the governorship for so long made it possible for it to become entirely Republican. And it still is. The composition always had this very heavy corporate and legal representation. But Brown's appointments were really in a way kind of far out. They also included [Yori] Wada, who was not a big corporate person; he was basically a worker in the social welfare area. Burke was a lawyer, but she was very much in favor of minority affairs. Sheinbaum was an old kind of liberal type. And Andelson, of course, was a spokesman for the gay community.

Lage: A very different set of appointments.

Smelser: A very different set of political and ideological--

Lage: And who was the anthropologist that Brown appointed--[Gregory] Bateson?

Smelser: He died, didn't he? He wasn't there when I was on it. That was also a very far-out appointment. I knew Bateson. I'm not sure I would have appointed him. It was just a different flavor.

The board was drifting more toward corporate, legal, real estate, influential Republicans in the party and so on. These people really--I'm talking now about the regents--up to the present day really have a more managerial view of how a university should run. Less sympathy with faculty, of culture. They tend to see it as an organization in which efficiency values should play a big role. Impatient with--fundamentally deep down--even though there was a big division on affirmative action, kind of impatient with the issue as taking too much trouble and time of the university. More traditional view of authority. Probably not a really profound understanding of how academic authority differs from corporate authority, and they have an idea that problems should be solved by decision. They're impatient with all the consultation: "Why do you have to talk to all these groups?" It's all muddy and big; they don't quite understand.

Lage: Would this come out at meetings or in private interchange?

Smelser: Both. And there was always a kind of an explanation on the part of Gardner and others as to why these things were not happening and why the outcomes were sometimes not what the regents wanted to see done by decision. But the cultural differences just would persist. It was hard. If people were in the regents for a long period of time, then they would begin to be mellower.

Lage: It seemed like Gardner tried to educate.

Smelser: All presidents have to, because people who come in--with few exceptions--have little experience with or knowledge of the university. If that education didn't take place it would be kind of chaotic. I did not regard the development of the fully Republican regents or the quality of the people appointed to be as high as these really stellar figures that I saw in Coblentz and Roth and to some degree [Donald] McLaughlin, who was right-wing but nonetheless had this more statesman-like approach to the running of the university. He had been a faculty member.

Lage: He knew the culture.

Smelser: He knew the culture.

I guess these are my reflections on the regents. I was always friendly with the regents. I got their respect. I had more trouble with the far right--people like Campbell--maintaining a personal demeanor, but it was a good relationship personally and civilly. I think I spoke in such a way that always commanded their respect. But when I was on the regents I spoke all the time.

Lage: The faculty rep doesn't vote.

Smelser: No, but speaks like any other regent, and really is there all the time, even when they kick the chancellors out in their executive sessions faculty remains and does not ever vote. But never is asked to excuse itself.

Lage: Do they turn to you for the faculty view?

Smelser: Yes. Some people said to me--I remember one incident that just comes to mind in response to your question. One time we were talking about the issue of fringe benefits to the faculty. The issue came up as to the practices of Stanford and other private institutions to give faculty children relief from tuition. Carter turned to me and said, "What is the faculty view on this? Do they care about this issue?" He wanted to know. My response was, "No, they are so inured to being in this public university that the issue sort of never occurs to them that it should be a right." Anyway, I believe I was representing my own view of faculty opinion on the matter. They would turn to us especially with respect to issues of educational policy. I never said a word on budgetary aspects of the medical schools.

Lage: Which were big issues.

Smelser: They were huge issues all the time. They were mainly financial issues. I spoke a lot on the somewhat tiresome issue of the role of clinical professors in medical schools and what their rights should be in the Academic Senate and how they were regarded by faculty and that sort of thing. So no, I felt a full member. I never felt in any way that I was a token or that my words weren't being listened to. I had a nice personal relationship with the

regents. Their views--I've talked about their politics and their quality--were just my general observations.

David Gardner's Effectiveness with the Regents

Lage: What about the way David Gardner--as I've heard the word used--"managed" the regents?

Smelser: He mainly did it by strategic contacting with them before the issues came up. In a way, that was part of David's strategy of managing, or controlling, or working with. He never bossed them around. It was to make certain that they knew the issues as he presented them, to make sure where they stood on them, and sometimes to modify them in light of what regents said to him. But in a way, I believe the outcome of almost all major issues could be known before the meeting. David did not like surprises, so there were not many surprises as to what went through. I mean, I think there might have been some issues that sort of bubbled up in one way, but they were not the crucial ones. That's the mark of an effective leader, where the votes are. In almost all cases he won. [lunch break]

Grumblings over Siting the Humanities Institute at Irvine

Lage: You mentioned that there was some grumbling.

Smelser: The problem was rather specific. David Gardner, during his entire presidency, as all presidents do, faced this internal competition among campuses. They all feel neglected, and they all feel they deserve everything. It's an impossible political situation. A president really has to work out a way of dealing with this incessant and insoluble conflict. I believe David was feeling in the mood at the time of the establishment, when the initiative for a Humanities Institute came up, feeling in his own mind--I believe I can almost quote him from the conversation, that it was time to do something for Irvine. It was a campus that did not have the spectacular successes that San Diego had, it had a lesser capacity to generate outside support, I believe. It did not have a faculty of the distinction that San Diego had developed. But at the same time, it was aspiring to be a major research center--a little more than Santa Cruz in that regard. Not that he decided all this in advance, but he sensed the feeling that it would be nice to get Irvine the place.

By some means or other, a lot of the background applications for this center came to my attention. Was I in the senate? Was I at the Berkeley division? I don't know when. It slips me. But I saw them. There were other campuses interested, but the two giants were Irvine and Berkeley. It was mainly a Berkeley-Irvine competition. Berkeley felt very strongly they had greater strength in the humanities, which they did, that they themselves had kind of a right to this thing, and they were very aggressive. They did not hesitate to express their negative feelings about Irvine in this regard.

Lage: When you say "they"--

Smelser: Berkeley people.

Lage: Just in general, Berkeley people.

Smelser: The Berkeley people who were interested. It was the Berkeley humanists.

Lage: Not the chancellor, necessarily.

Smelser: No, no. The chancellor would have liked it, but to my mind all this fighting went on at the Academic Senate level. David sought the advice of the Academic Senate. That's what I saw. I saw the battle going on. All this was advisory to him, of course, as to where it was set up, and it ultimately went to Irvine. Then the humanists still grumble about that sort of thing; they never forget. Nobody forgets when you lose a big battle. It was never such a thing to cause him any problems with the regents, and it did not cause him a problem with the Academic Senate as a whole. It was one of these brushfires and competitions. Having read his oral history, he made very little of this decision. It was like it just happened. It happened in the middle of a fistfight, and he sort of--I believe I tried a little bit to influence him in the Berkeley direction at that time. I myself was a little partisan in this regard. And I also, I believe, agitated from time to time with him that certainly Berkeley merited a social science initiative of some sort because it really had not fared very well since the really early--since Kerr's presidency--from the standpoint of this kind of an initiative. I didn't have any influence on him in this--

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Smelser: Sometimes you influence him and sometimes not. That's all on the Humanities Institute.

Dissatisfaction with the Southern Office of the President

Smelser: The southern office of the president at Irvine--when I was chair of the Academic Senate flying down to Irvine for a meeting at which David was also going--he was on the plane. We saw each other, and we began talking. In the course of the conversation he said, "Look. Before the meeting I'm going to go over to the site of the new office, the president's office, in Irvine. Would you come with me? You're the chair of the senate." He wasn't trying to influence me to accept it or anything. So I said, "Fine. Let's do it." He took me over there. The rooms were not yet equipped, but I saw the space, and he described the plans.

Lage: Was it on the campus?

Smelser: No, it was in this building cheek by jowl with Dean Witter or some other corporate office. It was a corporate complex, a big plastic corporate complex down there. When I saw the setting I said, "Oh, my God. This is not where it should be."

Lage: You said this out loud?

Smelser: To myself. I never said it to him [laughter]. It was too big and too posh and too out of the academic context.

Lage: Too corporate.

Smelser: Too corporate, right. It turns out that the southern campuses were not all eager to have it--certainly not on their campus. Even, some of them, not too close, because they didn't want the president's office to be intruding too much in their lives. It's this drive for continued independence on the part of the campuses. I don't know whether they told David--well, yes, they did, but they didn't make it an ugly situation, but they said they'd prefer not. And I believe [UCLA Chancellor Charles] Young said he didn't want it around or something like that. Irvine was happy to have it, but they also didn't want to have it plopped in the middle of their own campus. It was the same sensitivity that Berkeley had about University Hall.

Lage: Being right there overlooking the main entrance.

Smelser: The Berkeley campus didn't like it because it looked too much like their campus, and they wanted to dissociate. The other campuses didn't like it because they thought that the university-wide people came down to the Faculty Club at Berkeley and got influenced by Berkeley, and Berkeley had all the power over the senate. That's why it was such a running issue; it was always intercampus competition.

Anyway, it was there. I didn't advise David not to do the--

Lage: Did you react to him at that time about your sense of the milieu?

Smelser: I don't think I made any discouraging noises to him about it. I was always respectful. I don't even know that I--I may have made some jokes. That was about as far as I went. Then it got set up, and it didn't get used much. Then it got this great decor in it of art and sculpture from the UCLA campus and other things like that, and it was very posh. I met in it a few times with faculty committees, and there was always this uneasy joking: "What is this all about? Is this really me?" It doesn't fit with faculty culture and expectations. In that sense, if you wanted to know how it would sit with the average faculty member, it didn't sit very well.

Lage: Those who saw it.

Smelser: Yes. Not that the south wasn't an important part of the university, and not that he didn't have a lot of business down there, and not that it wasn't a good idea. It didn't work, and in the end it didn't work at all; it got discontinued.

Lage: Did it get discontinued under Peltason?

Smelser: Yes. It's not used. I think Jack just didn't want to use it, and Dick Atkinson hasn't made any effort to resuscitate the idea. It went out.

One time David called me in--because we were friends as well as workers together in the university--and he said, "Neil, I'd like you to tell me what the faculty pulse is and what they think about me. What have you heard?"

Lage: When do you think this was?

Smelser: It was in my Academic Senate chairmanship.

Lage: Before there had been much unhappiness.

Smelser: Well before his retirement. I reminded him of the Riverside problem at that time. I had in mind at this point, and I mentioned them to him--his own inauguration on the UCLA campus, which was a very big deal. I was there. I marched at the head of the procession because I was head of the senate, along with Ralph Turner, who was also a sociologist. I said, "This is sociology's finest day. We're walking in front of the governor and the president because we're the Academic Senate." I said, "We'll never see this again." [laughter] I was joking with Turner about this. I even joked with David about it. I said, "People had a mixed reaction to that inauguration, that it was too much pomp and too much a big deal." And I also mentioned that those who had seen and knew about the southern office did not like it too much. I said that the mumbling would have to do with the fact that there was a little dissatisfaction about the possibility of an imperial presidency. Those were the very words I used. He was somewhat shocked. He did not appreciate this level of undertone. It was never public. Then there was his design of the systemwide office.

Lage: The move to Oakland and--

Smelser: The move to Oakland had the same thing, and it had to do with the size of his office, the decor, the doors, and the remoteness, the fanciness--

Lage: The beautiful view.

Smelser: The fanciness, the view, the furniture, the size. There was this kind of feeling, "Who needs this?" It was basically this anti-business, anti-corporate view of faculty. It's not anybody's fault, it's just a basis for not being too happy. I never mentioned the move to Oakland to him; that was a little later.

Lage: Do you think he took note of what you said? Did you get any feedback from him on it?

Smelser: He seemed somewhat stunned and he seemed not to accept it. It was foreign to his ears, even though I was probably braver than I had ever been to say it. I do not believe that it stayed very long with him, and if it did it didn't have an impact on him. This was his style.

He did want a publicly visible presidency, and he took interest in the affairs of its public presentation. He thought that with respect to the southern California office, I think, the main dimension was not the conspicuous consumption. The main dimension was the degree to which he was going to be present as president in the southern part of the state. This also had a little bit to do with the imperial--that is to say, to make it an empire. My word was well chosen. He always listened to me, but this was the least he listened to me, I think [laughs]. It didn't carry much weight.

Lage: That's very interesting. I think that's important to record.

Opposing the Move of the Office of the President to Oakland

Smelser: I opposed the move to Oakland, by the way, to him. And when I spoke to the regents, I said I believed I was not speaking as a Berkeley partisan, but I believed that the president's offices ought to be near a campus.

Lage: Even though there was this tension about the president's office looking over the shoulder.

Smelser: Yes. But my view was that if it were not near a campus, it would be more likely to become like any other big bureaucracy like General Motors or the U.S. Army or something. It shouldn't lose touch with the trenches. That was the basis of my opinion. The regents didn't listen, and David didn't accept that point of view.

Lage: Did you ever discuss that with him back and forth?

Smelser: I discussed it in connection with my discussions with him about his tension with Mike Heyman.

Lage: Do you want to elaborate on that?

Smelser: Yes. Heyman and he were very competitive, generally, and sometimes it got down to matters of ceremony and detail. It showed up in unlikely places like who should be responsible for the invitation of the president of France to the Berkeley campus. It was one of these ceremonial and symbolic things that became an issue. Now they both agreed on the moving of the office away from Berkeley. Mike didn't want it there, and David didn't want it there for different reasons. Mike just wanted to get the president's office out of his hair. They had been competitors in the race for the presidency. You have to believe that there was some aftereffect of that. Issue after issue they just kind of didn't agree on. I think there was a personal dimension. Berkeley and the president's office never are the greatest of friends, but there was an overlay of personal feeling, which I think was more on the shoulders of Mike than it was on David. It was more Mike's problem than David's in my own estimation. I talked to them both about it because I was kind of a neutral friend of both. But in my own private judgment it was more from Mike.

I talked about the UCOP [University of California Office of the President]. I thought the incorporation of the Academic Senate into the Oakland office was a bad idea.

Lage: I didn't even realize that had happened.

Smelser: It happened after David left the office. What the president's office did was to--previously the head of the Academic Senate was from different campuses each year. And the office would move around with him. It wasn't much of an office. It was Pat Thomas, the executive officer of the senate, and a couple of secretaries who would get hired on the spot each year. She would move. I don't know why, but she would move every year. It became centered in the home campus of the chair of the Academic Council. I thought that was a good arrangement.

But then the president's office, at a certain time--I believe it was in Peltason's tenure, might have been at the very end, I don't know--it was offered space in systemwide, and staff was located in systemwide and the head of the Academic Senate and the vice chair of the senate would kind of lead a dual existence back and forth between their campuses, and the meetings began to be held in the president's office. I thought that wasn't so good. I thought that confounded things too much, at least symbolically and possibly really gave more of a domination over the senate than the president's office should have.

It has continued that way and still is not a totally settled way of doing things, but that's the way it's done. In a way, it's eased the Academic Senate's problems. It didn't have to pay for things anymore, didn't have to find space on the chair's own campus for the senate office. But it skewed the relationship a little bit between the president's office and the senate, and I think in the wrong direction.

Lage: I can see that--just as kind of a symbolic--

Smelser: Compromise the independence a little bit.

I think that's it. I guess I can comment on the very last one. It blew up after I left Peltason's office, actually.

Division and Ambivalence on Affirmative Action

Lage: The very last issue on our list is affirmative action.

Smelser: I'll say a few words.

Lage: Which happened way after Gardner's time.

Smelser: And after my time. I kept track.

Lage: You kept track, and maybe there were attitudes you noticed that may not have been expressed while you were more active. That's one of the things I wondered.

Smelser: How do you mean?

Lage: It looked--from minutes and everything you hear--like there was no dissension on affirmative action on the regents, and then all of a sudden it blows up.

Smelser: By "no dissension," the feeling was that [Ward] Connerly had no power. That was generally perceived. I was totally stunned by the fact that his point of view, which I felt to be marginal and either unwelcome or opposed by a lot of regents--the regents said, "Okay, it's there. We don't necessarily like this sort of thing. We're going to live with it. It's publicly necessary. In the best of all worlds we wouldn't have it, but we're not going to resist the power of the institutionalization of that or of the groups that are for it or of the people who don't like it. We're just going to let the thing stay." That was kind of the regental mode.

Lage: When you were active.

Smelser: When I was active, right. It was there. Whenever they got a report on affirmative action there was a lot of tension and snarling.

Lage: This is what I didn't know.

Smelser: But it never became a public division. It just was, "Are you bending over too far backwards or are you taking enough initiative?" The regents were divided. People like Vilma Martinez and other liberal regents were keeping the pushing going, and Sheinbaum when he was around. And Wada. They were keeping that fire alive. The other regents were kind of grudgingly accepting it. The discussions always had this kind of irritated quality about them without ever coming to a head--just because it was under the surface. Like all of affirmative action, it was a subject of continued and unrelenting ambivalence.

Lage: Is that true among the faculty as far as you--

Smelser: Yes. The faculty, however, was more vocal on the left always. The pressure all came from the left. The opposition to affirmative action on the part of the faculty was always to safeguard faculty standards. Affirmative action was a threat to those standards. There wasn't anything anti-minority about it, or if it was it was totally under the surface. But it was, "We have this excellence in the university. We have only one criterion for our faculty, and that's that they're good. If you begin pushing the borders of that you're going to start eroding the quality of faculty. So we'll really welcome the first-rate minorities and women into the faculty, but we don't want second-rate ones." That was the kind of faculty mentality as I'm now summarizing it. Whereas the kind of attitude that the right-wing regents would have was not exactly that. It was kind of this idea that people aren't being rewarded according to their ability; it is vaguely un-American; it goes against equality of opportunity, but not specifically an academic argument.

Lage: How did the academics feel about affirmative action in admissions?

Smelser: You know the polls. They were divided. The polls on the Berkeley campus and I believe on some others showed that they were just about split down the middle. Now the public oratory was not split down the middle; it was all on the left. The opposition was silent and grudging, and people did not want to come out and say they didn't like affirmative action. It created a big problem for faculty members who didn't care for it too much. It was one of the larger and more uneasy points of political correctness. I wrote an article on this once about how the faculty was really troubled because they're politically liberal, but they have these commitments to high standards and if they oppose affirmative action they got themselves moved to the right where they didn't want to be. So they were mainly quiet and would not speak up.

Now everybody was surprised by the regents' action. And everybody came out publicly for affirmative action except the *Daily Californian* [laughter]. It's crazy. The official bodies came out: the senate, the chancellors--they were dealing with their own political situations, and they knew where they had to be in those political contexts even if privately in their own hearts we don't know where they stood. But they knew where they had to be publicly. So it had this enormous division of the regents versus everybody. A very unhealthy political situation in a university to have the board of trustees, the board of governors, be lined up against every publicly--

Lage: The president and every chancellor.

Smelser: And the Academic Senate, the student body social movements that were active on the campuses, and a lot of student opinion. I mean, you've got these lawsuits bubbling up out of students and a few faculty--and this freak *Daily Californian* surprised everybody. It was like hell was freezing over that the *Daily Cal* would have such a stand. And in a way the university was taken off the hook by Proposition 209. Now it was the law of the state and ultimately the law of the nation, and that dissolved or helped reduce intracampus conflict even though it's still there--latent. When the supreme court speaks, it casts an entirely new definition on the situation. And you don't mobilize against the supreme court. So you make peace in other ways. You try outreach programs, you try to achieve some of the same ends without breaking the law. So there's this tension underground, and Connerly knows it. He said we don't want this undermined by bureaucrats. He talks that way. In a way, it eased the university's situation that it finally got worked up through the state and through the courts and up to the supreme court. It's not dead; it'll come up again and again because of this deep public ambivalence about it. But it won't be so dramatic and so sharp and so pointed as we had it in 1995.

Lage: I've heard the opinion that it may result in the university lowering its admission requirements in order to get a more diverse campus legally.

Smelser: The lowering of admissions, I've heard that. I believe it's unlikely, because the motive to protect the Master Plan is so much stronger, that any effort to achieve that end will be by more indirection--by improving or strengthening outreach the way that Pister has been asked to take over that initiative, and seeking harder and competing harder with other

institutions. They can't do it in offering fellowships because that goes against the regents and the state law. Who knows whether it will not be a subtle introduction--not the lowering of standards, but there's this big fight about the SAT now. Who knows whether or not the university and its admissions offices will not begin to redefine and recraft the criteria for admissions--not the level or the--

Lage: Not the obligation to take the top 10 percent or 12 percent of high school graduates.

Smelser: No, and furthermore you do not enter race into these criteria. But there are always these indirect effects, you see. That's how I think it would work out, if it does, to keep up a higher level of minorities and women. The issue has fallen into the background a little bit. It's basically blacks and Hispanics that are the key groups in this. So it will be by indirection.

Lage: Time will tell.

Smelser: We will see. Don't hold your breath.

Okay, now we'll go back.

IV SMELSER REPORT ON LOWER DIVISION EDUCATION AND THE SELF-ESTEEM STUDY

Task Force on Undergraduate Education, 1986

Lage: The Smelser Report?[2] How did that come about?

Smelser: There was a national atmosphere that developed around 1985. It was symbolized by three reports by national bodies. One was the ACE [American Council on Education], there was this commission that William Bennett chaired, and there was a third commission. They all had names. We mentioned those in the interim report of the Smelser Committee, and I do not remember the names. That's a matter of record. This fed into a long-standing legislative concern that the university was becoming a research-centered national prestige-seeking institution that was systematically eroding its commitment to the children of California and their undergraduate education. It spilled over into the excessive use of T.A.'s [teaching assistants], the teaching load, the temporary non-ladder faculty that were hired to teach on the edge. All these issues were latent and smoldering issues in the state before those reports came out. All of those reports were critical of the universities in their dealing with the undergraduate curriculum. All three committees came up with totally different formulas for reform. I mean, Bennett wanted a traditional curriculum, other people wanted to focus on methods of instruction, other people wanted to have more requirements, whatever. There was no agreement whatsoever among the commissions.

David never himself approached me directly to do this. I was newly elected vice chair of the council. I had established myself, if you will excuse the immodesty, as being a reflective, intelligent and cooperative nonpartisan already entering the age of statesmanship on the campus, and I was aware of this. So was David and so was Bill Frazer and so was Calvin Moore, who was Frazer's second-in-command, his associate vice president for academic affairs. Those three people got together, and they decided I would be the best person to chair this. They liked the idea I was a University Professor--a systemwide reference--and they also appreciated me for that reputation I just described.

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[2]Lower Division Education in the University of California: A report from the Task Force on Lower Division Education, Neil Smelser, Chair, 1986.

Lage: And you had done a lot of work with educational reform.

Smelser: My research had been on not so much with--well, I had had the Board of Educational Development behind me. I don't think that was immediately in the people's minds at the time. But I was a good teacher; that was a reputation that I also had, and I would command a lot of attention. It was Cal Moore who called me up and began pleading with me to take over this commission. I knew it would be a big job, and I once again had this horror of getting myself involved in things that take me away from everything else I was doing. I was already vice chair [of the Academic Council]. So it was a big decision that was not too easy to make. I had this feeling and a sense that it was okay to do it. So I said yes. Okay, I'll take this on.

They [Moore and Frazer] went along and did all the work of logistics; they didn't do the work of the committee, but they did all the logistics. It was an unbelievably complicated task force to form because you had to get all the campuses, you had to get the spokespeople from the different disciplines, you had to get people who were advocates for undergraduate students, you had to get those people who were still big in the research commitments of the university and graduate training and so on. There was an issue of ethnic representation and there was an issue of women on the task force--you name it. So they did all the leaning. I didn't call people up and ask them to be on this. It was Moore and Frazer who did all the leaning and put it all together. That eased the amount of work. To meet, these people came from all over the state, it was a big group, it got above the limits of the numbers that you like to handle when you're chairing anything.

Achieving Consensus, Political Issues

Lage: How many members of the task force were there?

Smelser: Twenty-five. The people were so diverse on that; it was a very tough group to handle. I once wrote a book called *Effective Committee Service*,[3] and I described the work of the task force a lot as a case study of committees I had chaired. Interestingly, I developed an early and I have to believe--using the word you did before--I became a kind of David Gardner [laughter] with this committee.

Lage: What word did I use before?

Smelser: Managerial. That was the one I wanted to avoid [laughter], so I went over to the milder way of saying it. Cal Moore, after the first meeting, took me aside and said, "They are in your hand, Neil." Because I had outlined the agenda, I outlined the major issues of concern that I thought were there, and I had no opposition whatsoever. People kind of liked to hear it. I said, "Look, we're going to have a few recommendations--not one of

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[3]*Effective Committee Service*, Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1993.

these fifty-five recommendations; it won't happen. I think these are the following areas we ought to address."

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Smelser: --I think they saw the problem, they kind of identified with me, there were only a couple of people on the task force that were insistent, you might say. One was Kenneth Jowitt on the Berkeley campus. He had an idea that we ought to get a curriculum like the old Columbia University "Western Civ" curriculum. "We ought to require it, this is going to do the job for the undergraduates," and he really pushed it. He would argue; he wouldn't easily be talked out of it at the meeting. Fortunately I had a personal relationship with Jowitt, who is on the Berkeley campus. So I would take him aside and say, "You know this is not going to happen. Why don't you just go with the flow and don't give me this trouble?" Then I'd joke with him. I'd say, "Look. We both had kids in the CPS [College Preparatory School] school. Let's just get this whole committee work over with, and in the end you and I will say that we ought to adopt the CPS curriculum and that'll be the undergraduate--." [laughter] So he liked all this. It was a personal intervention and a potentially tough scene. He could have become a little militant focus of opposition. He did not have too many supporters, but he didn't give up. He just pushed.

And we had some other points of potential division; they didn't really get there. We got carried away on the engineering curriculum one time because we had an engineer on the committee. We did have kind of an affirmative action side, and we had some real issues before us as to whether or not the university was going to develop a common lower-division curriculum with the community colleges and the state university system. The Academic Senate didn't like that idea, and some campuses hated it even more; there was a lot of opposition to this on the Berkeley campus. So there were a lot of issues here and not all of them were resolved readily. We met five or six times in different parts of the state and so on. I just kept negotiating with different subgroups of that committee on what they cared about, and I made a point of saying that I would like to draft the whole thing myself and bring it back and talk to them. They were happy to have this done; it cut down their work, and enough confidence had been established in my working with the committee for that to be done. It blew the mind of the staff of the systemwide, who did a lot of this writing themselves, that I would actually write it. I disappeared one weekend up in the mountains and I wrote the fifty-page thing.

Lage: Incorporating--?

Smelser: Well, the results of all my conversations. I wasn't being authoritarian in all this, pushing any views on my part on it, and it was something that I had gotten general consensus on the substance of the recommendations and analysis. And I wrote it paying enormous attention to style and mode of presentation and language. It basically sailed through the committee. It was a nice experience on my part as a leader in uncertain and perilous waters. I do not want to underspeak on the amount of underlying tensions and disagreements and where the priorities were.

Lage: There was a lot of tension.

Smelser: There was. And that's what I almost spent all my energy dealing with: forming the language and the compromises on issues like T.A.'s--the substance where we had a lot to do with the freshman and sophomore seminars, we had a lot to do with the teaching loads of senior faculty members, the teaching responsibilities for lower division--

Lage: To reaffirm--

Smelser: For campuses to increase the employment of senior prestige people in teaching the larger lower-division courses. We had a lot on training of T.A.'s, on the language preparation of T.A.'s, on the proper role of T.A.'s in classes. We had several points on the common core curriculum. We addressed very sore political issues at the time with respect to transfer.

Lage: From the community colleges?

Smelser: Yes. And that was in the context of--because the transfer rates were going down, and there was a lot of criticism of the university from that standpoint because it wasn't serving its purpose as a conduit for excellence to rise all the time. Racial minorities didn't like the decline of transfer rates because the community colleges seemed to be getting more ghettoized and they wanted access to the universities. So we made a few suggestions about transfer, including the core curriculum: make it easy! Don't throw up bureaucratic obstacles for transfer students. You ought to make more efforts. In fact, after that the transfer rates began to go up and they began to take a number of reforms in this matter, and that addressed this sore issue: was the university getting too elitist?

That's a fair illustration of the kind of topics that we covered--not totally exhaustive, but that was the range. It was a political document in the middle of a political situation, taking into account the political context.

Reception of the Report

Smelser: I submitted this report a little bit before a regents' meeting. Bill Frazer came up to me and said, "I read your report last night. It's a knockout." I said, "How do you know?" I really wasn't that certain. He just came up and said, "That does it." I don't know how he could tell it, but he was absolutely unequivocal in his reaction to the report. David Gardner was equally enthusiastic about it. Gardner began now talking about it publicly, identifying the work of it and embraced our findings. Obviously it was doing something for him, getting him off the hook from this legislative and other criticism, and it was sensible and definitely attentive to undergraduate and lower-division needs. So you might call it a knockout for the purposes for which it was written. I got some criticism: spotted, never public, only colleagues mainly on the Berkeley campus coming to me saying, "Why did you do this? This is going to mess up our way of life."

Lage: Were these senior faculty who didn't want to teach the lower-division classes?

Smelser: It wasn't quite that parochial. It was just the people who were committed to the idea that--"This is going to eat in on the research excellence of this campus." That was the kind of thing. They weren't making it personal; they would say things like that. I would say that this was not truly significant; maybe a half a dozen people. Then of course the advocates for undergraduate education on the campus all flocked around. There is a subgroup on all the campuses for this, so I was kind of a folk hero of that group. I went around to many campuses, I spoke on this thing a lot. I sort of had a little circuit on it. Then David and the administration organized two whole regents' meetings on this. He pulled out other national figures, Ernest Boyer and others, to talk about the import of this.

I had a big debate with [Bill] Honig, who had an idea that we should directly teach values to these kids. I represented a liberal education viewpoint, and it was a long and quite memorable dialogue because the chairman of the Board of Regents let it go on. It wasn't just that he said something and then I said something and then it went on to something else; we got into it. And it lasted twenty minutes or more, and these two positions just got articulated. It was quite a beautiful occasion, actually, for this to happen. It doesn't happen at regents' meetings. Normally they just go point to point to point and it's kind of boring. This was a genuine intellectual and philosophical exchange.

Lage: Did that get wound up by anybody? Commented on?

Smelser: Oh, the regents started talking about it and continued the discussion. It was not an action item, so we didn't have a big fight over "ought we to do this."

Implementation of the Smelser Report: Freshman Seminars, Common Curriculum, T.A. Training, J.C. Transfers

Smelser: I'll say two more things about the Smelser Report. Some of its purposes were really effectively implemented, which I was gratified by. The freshman/sophomore seminar got in there right away and has become a feature of most campuses in the UC system. It continues more or less successfully, and it's regarded as a positive feature in the system. The teaching habits of the faculty are virtually unchanged.

Lage: It's institutionalized somehow.

Smelser: Hit a brick wall. We got through the common curriculum the following year. It was very fortunate, because I moved from vice chair to chair at the Academic Council. I myself was in a position to engineer these reforms through, and that was very fortunate.

Lage: That is a very good placement--

Smelser: Because I came from vice chair to chair, and I said to all my colleagues, "Look, this stuff is going to be designed for us if we don't do it..." I exercised a lot of influence over the Academic Council and basically got the package that we recommended in place within a

year, and we secured the agreement of the community college segment and the state university segment. It was in place by the time I left the council.

And the language and training of T.A.'s--the university enacted a ruling that T.A.'s should have to pass the oral language requirement and not just the written language requirement, which meant teachers would have somewhat less difficulty with spoken English. The training programs for T.A.'s began to develop from campus to campus, from place to place, when they would have retreats, and there would be more built into the evaluation of T.A.'s and in the training of T.A.'s. I don't know how successful that was, but it got a response. And then the university began, basically for political reasons, to try to improve the transfer from junior college. And over the next few years it began to swing in a way that they wanted it to swing.

Tangling with Tom Hayden

Smelser: The last thing I'll say about the report is that the legislators liked it a lot. David Gardner had me meet with selected legislators, including [Assemblyman] Tom Hayden, who was the big trasher of the university in this regard. I did, with David.

Lage: Was Hayden receptive?

Smelser: Hayden was very receptive but he kind of turned his back on us. He began playing a role in the legislature, saying, "Why isn't the university doing what's in that report?"

Lage: Embraced the report and then continued to be critical?

Smelser: Yes, and then began whipping the university. I never got in his target, his line of fire, but the university did. And he said, "Your very faculty is calling for you to do this. Why aren't you doing it?" He used it for his own partisan purposes. He was bashing the university. I didn't like that, and I had some tangles with Hayden in subsequent meetings. There were a lot of meetings that came up after the report over the next three years or so, also on issues of undergraduate education. Hayden was there at a number of them, and I would always fight Hayden in these meetings because he was always just wanting to bash the university.

Lage: Not very well thought-out positions, do you think?

Smelser: It was his political agenda. He was a populist. He was using it about, "You don't pay enough attention to these undergraduates. Why are you doing so much research? The Smelser Report said this, why don't you do it?" I thought it was somewhat mischievous to have this used in that way from the outside. He was a one-person irritant to me; it wasn't anything really big. I kind of went down after that point as the darling of the president's office because I had done this successful and popular and widely accepted report. It gets

called all the time the Smelser Report. It didn't generate one tenth of the opposition that the Pister Report on faculty rewards did a couple of years later.

Lage: That hit a sore point.

Smelser: The faculty was really mad about that. And the senate yelled about it, and they really said that that was undermining the university's mission. They got a lot of opposition in the Academic Senate on that. Pister and I used to kid each other about these two reports. He said, "How did you get away with it?" [laughs]

Lage: Did you agree with his recommendations?

Smelser: I thought they went too far, and they were couched in a rhetoric that was bound to inflame because it was a little bit "lectury." And you know how faculty resents being lectured. Like Saxon--they didn't like it when he lectured them, and they didn't like it when Pister's committee lectured them about--

Lage: They should call you in as a consultant on writing these reports.

Smelser: [laughs] I don't know. I didn't have anything to do with that report. But I saw why it was inflammatory.

So at that point now, I had been sort of on demand for the university for a long time, but at that point I became a sitting target for doing work for the president's office because I was this reliable character. It was surely as a result of Frazer's affection for me and his esteem that he got me into the labs picture. He was the one who initiated my appointment to the labs. He was the one who initiated the [John] Vasconcellos business.

Asssemblyman John Vasconcellos and the Commission on Self-Esteem

Lage: Tell me about Vasconcellos. That got in the newspaper a lot.

Smelser: Yes, it sure did. Vasconcellos. That'll be the last topic, I think.

Lage: And then the retirement package. I don't want to wear you out, but we have to do that.

Smelser: Yes, we have to do that. Okay, I'll be as brief as I can and we'll keep an eye on the tapes.

Vasconcellos got this one-person campaign going on how if the self-esteem of California's population were more a subject of public attention and could be brought up, this would be a very effective way of attacking major social problems in the society.

Lage: Where did he get this idea?

Smelser: He got it out of his own personal background, because he was a psychologically unhappy man. He had gotten a lot of treatment from a lot of therapists and groups, and he got a great commitment going for the work of Carl Rogers and related therapy movements, and that all focused on self-esteem and self-regard. He himself underwent something of a personal conversion in therapy to this whole idea. It was a personal cause. It was a mission, and it was both personal and public ingredients in this. And he managed to get the governor to support the idea of a commission on self-esteem. And Andy [Andrew] Mecca was the head of it.

He came to David Gardner and said, "Isn't there something the university could do about the self-esteem initiative?" I'm sure David didn't welcome this at all, because he passed it on to Bill Frazer, a physicist who was totally floored and didn't understand anything about what was going on. He didn't like the idea, I think. He passed it on to Cal Moore, who knew even less--a mathematician [laughter]. These guys were totally at a loss. Moore calls me up and said, "Neil, what can we do about this?" I said, "Okay, I'll think about this." I saw that it was kind of a mission impossible, and they were under the gun. Vasconcellos was the head of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee.

Lage: Yes, that's what needs to go on the record here [laughs].

Smelser: They couldn't really resist. He was a sharp critic of the university in many respects during all that time. Not like Hayden exactly, but he came from the populist side. He was a spokesman, he had a lot of ideas. He was sort of a hippie, and he had the idea that if you only develop the right feelings and the right sentiment and the right outlook and the right culture and so on, it would help.

Organizing an Academic Study: *The Social Importance of Self-Esteem*

Smelser: I thought about it, and I told Moore I'd be back to him. I called back and said, "We ought to do what the university can do best. What we ought to do is to establish a group of people who have done research in these areas of the relationship between self-esteem to these social problems." The problems were teenage dropouts, alcoholism, crime, violence, drugs, welfare. I'll show you a copy of the book, and ultimately it was published. We organized it around those topics. I said, "That's the way to do it. Get the university--"

Lage: *The Social Importance of Self-Esteem.* [UC Press, 1989]

Smelser: "Let's get the university to get its experts together and say what social and behavioral science research can say about these issues." This won Moore over. He said, "You do it." [laughter]

Lage: That'll teach you.

Smelser: So I said okay. In this case they didn't do it for me; I mobilized the experts on all the different campuses.

Lage: Because there was a lot of writing on it.

Smelser: A lot of research and a lot of good people. I got the right committee together, and I got them to come together and meet with the Commission on Self-Esteem, and I went back to the Commission on Self-Esteem myself on a number of occasions, and I got these people to write these basically scholarly chapters on the research that's been done. I wrote a long introduction to this, all about where we thought we knew something, where there wasn't any connection between self-esteem and social behavior and problematic issues, and where there were some answers. I came out with the main conclusion to be drawn from this extended discussion--that the social-psychological variable of self-esteem is simultaneously one of the most central and one of the most elusive factors. There was a lot of skepticism about how important this single variable was. I kept talking about the murkiness of the results and the inconsequentiality of a lot of it, but on the other hand I said this is the kind of research we really need in order to find out about it. No one criticized me for this. Then for reasons of state, I agreed with my administrative people that we ought to involve Mecca and Vasconcellos.

Lage: Mecca was his staff person?

Smelser: Mecca was the head of the Commission on Self-Esteem. These were the two people I thought should be there, so I approached them and said, "Won't you co-edit this volume with me?" I was doing it, and they didn't do any editing.

Lage: Just get their names on it.

Smelser: Have them in. They loved it. And I said, "You also should write something by way of a preface or something in this book. Wouldn't you, Mecca, write about the work of the commission? And wouldn't you, John, write about the politics and the formation and your own vision about the commission?" Fine. A few pages. Preface, introduction. Mecca sent me back this totally impossible article [laughter]. Can I say it? It was all about the history of the idea of self-esteem beginning with Plato and moving down through Western history, culminating in the Commission on Self-Esteem. It was totally unacceptable [chuckles].

Lage: That made it a tricky issue.

Smelser: Vasconcellos wrote an article which was basically autobiographical and totally out of fit with the tone of the volume. I called up Frazer, I believe. I said, "We have a problem." He said, "You have a problem." [laughter] We got the book reviewed by the--

Lage: Did you put the introductions in?

Smelser: I worked with them. I went back to them. I said to Mecca, "We got the book reviewed. The reviewers pointed out these articles and said that they shouldn't be there." I went right to Mecca and said, "The reviewers say this book should be published, but if your article's in it, it shouldn't be published. You've got to do something about this. You've got to go

back and write us a brief introduction on the Commission on Self-Esteem." Mecca said, "Fine, I'll do it." He wrote a decent preface.

I went to John, and it was much tougher, because here's this assemblyman. At the same time, when I approached him he began treating me like a professor, like he was a student. Here was a professor saying, "This is not going to work; you've got to work on it."

Lage: It's not good for his self-esteem [laughter].

Smelser: And he said, "Okay." I told him what needed to be done. I said, "It doesn't fit. You've got to take out this personal stuff. You've got to take out this and that." He said, "Fine, I'll do it." The second draft came back. Almost no changes. So I had to go back to him. I said, "John, you didn't do it. Do it again." The third draft comes back. Very little change [laughs]. I was going crazy. Finally I put it in the hands of an editor. I said, "Please chop this out." So I got an editor who was commissioned with me. The systemwide paid for it so I could get an editor to work on this thing. She did it. I said, "Spare no mercy." She cut it down to length and got in the material about what the politics were of this, what the history of the organization was, and so on. I believe John was really offended by this, but he went along with it. I had had a long relationship with John. We didn't agree with one another very much but I just kept working on him to do it. And it came out okay in the end. A huge effort on my part.

Results, Reception, "Doonesbury" Roast

Lage: And it didn't leave bad feelings, I hope.

Smelser: I would never know. On my side I felt a triumph. I don't know about how he felt. Next year when the book came out I was in New York on a fellowship with the Russell Sage Foundation. Vasconcellos had a press conference up in Sacramento. He said, "This confirms my opinion on the importance of self-esteem." The reporters started ringing me up in New York and said, "Is this really so?" [laughter] Because it was very modest and sometimes critical of things. So I really had to do a lot of dodging in this press conference. I tried to be as nice as I could to John, and at the same time I said the empirical results are mixed and so forth. Well, the press conference came and went.

Gary Trudeau [creator of Doonesbury comic strip] picked it up. Trudeau was roasting Vasconcellos all through this. He picked this thing up, and he had one cartoon strip that showed Vasconcellos lecturing to the audience. One of the people in the audience got up and said, "This report by professors says the following--" and he quoted this sentence about inconsequential results. The figure for Vasconcellos said, "Get this guy out of here," or something like that. My name was never mentioned--thank God. It was only "the professors' report." So that's the end of that story. It's a really funny one, isn't it?

Lage: It's a great story, really.

V DAVID GARDNER'S RETIREMENT AND AFTERMATH

The Outburst against Gardner's Retirement Package

Smelser: Let's go on to the retirement package.

Lage: How did you feel that controversy played out particularly from the faculty point of view?

Smelser: The faculty point of view? I'll concentrate on that. There were so many facets to that sort of thing, and it was also a personal tragedy for David. I always felt for him the whole time. I never joined this chorus against him, which was like an almost hysterical outburst. I always maintained this complicated view toward the whole thing.

From the standpoint of its genesis and who was behind it, I don't know the answer to that. I know the stories that have gone around about the role of [Ron] Brady, about the role of Gardner.

Lage: You mean in the design of the retirement package?

Smelser: Yes. And the initiation of the impulse to it. As it was, it was kind of an unholy thing in the sense that there were a lot of people affected in the higher administration, including chancellors.

Lage: Twenty-two top officials.

Smelser: This, of course, was not going to yield much opposition among them because it was a very generous thing, and most of them probably thought that this was a deserved reward for the service that they'd given to the university and were largely either unaware or did not predict the public reaction that would come.

It occurred at the wrong moment. Student fees were going up rapidly. The faculty had just been asked to take a one-year freeze and a five-year cut that was then restored. The faculty was not feeling good about this. Gardner's honeymoon was not over. There were not these groups out there. We've mentioned the oppositions; they did not form permanent

bases of opposition to Gardner. I think most people thought that Gardner was a very, very successful president--perhaps the most successful since Kerr.

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Smelser: My opinion is that David Gardner was in fact the most successful president of the University of California since Clark Kerr. I would put those two in a special category, leaving Sproul in history. That's always been my opinion about his presidency--the effectiveness, leadership, all the dimensions. This retirement issue, of course, was the big flaw, and it blew up all at once. The regents probably had a role in it; in two senses they went along with it innocently, and also not all of them knew about it.

Lage: The more recent ones, you mean.

Smelser: Well, the ones who were there at the time.

Lage: Didn't realize what they were voting for at the time?

Smelser: Not all the details. And they certainly were like a lot of others: unaware that it would blow up in the way it did.

Lage: And it was designed when the budget was doing very well.

Smelser: Sure. So out it came, the press played a big role. It was absolute meat for the press, and they pounced on it and played it up, including this very unseemly bit about his wife and insurance. Everything got in there. Everybody blew up at once. Some regents--they never became too public, because they voted for it--who wanted to get off the hook, certainly faculty leadership, and faculty rank and file--you just couldn't see a more dramatic turn of opinion all at once. A lot of it was focused on him. A great deal was focused on Brady. Brady was a villain in this piece.

Lage: We haven't talked about Brady, really. Had he rubbed people the wrong way?

Smelser: Brady was looked upon as an extremely effective, accomplished, slightly ruthless and opportunistic person. He was an object of considerable suspicion. So in a way the faculty was kind of set up to not like him, or to blame him. The fact that Gardner kept him and that Gardner let him do it and didn't block it or didn't change it meant that Gardner was an equal object of attack. It wasn't all on Brady. Gardner did not escape, of course, as you know. He was an equal object of attack. It was relentless, it didn't quit. In a way it ended his presidency. He certainly lost that magic.

Lage: It came out after he had offered his resignation.

Smelser: Yes, but the reputation was sullied. It lost his presidency for a while. Administrators or future administrators have been embarrassed to include him back in the family in the way that he fully deserves. It's beginning to thaw now.

Lage: What about Chancellor Tien? Did he take that same--

Smelser: Tien was quiet. Tien was completely quiet. Tien owed his position to David. He was always a supporter. He never entered into these fights. He was polite all the way along. He was even polite during the affirmative action thing; even though his position was known he did not get irrational and he did not become principled. He said he was a team player, even though he let his position be known. He never joined the chorus about David. Nor did any of the chancellors. There was not an assault on the president by the chancellors--none of them, though a lot of them had ambivalence about David. Did the faculty ever take a formal action?

Lage: I don't think so.

Smelser: The faculty never had any censure.

Lage: There was no Academic Council action or anything.

Smelser: No, but there was tons of talk. Tons of opposition. David was extremely wounded by this. I don't have to tell you that; he told you that. And he was to some degree perplexed and, I would have to say, a little bit betrayed.

Lage: Feeling betrayed or actually betrayed?

Smelser: Feeling betrayed. Well, also being betrayed. This became such a mountainous issue.

Lage: Now tell me your understanding of it. You know the faculty so well, aside from your professional expertise as a sociologist--how do you understand it?

Smelser: They're only human. They are as subject to dramatic sways in opinion and sentiment as anybody. I went through several ups and downs of the university's fortunes--mostly budgetary and in relation to the state. These six-year cycles. A pot of gold followed by hardship and back up again and down again. The faculty's mood would swing absolutely with these cycles. They would forget everything when it was good, and they would get mad when it was bad.

Lage: So the timing--

Smelser: It came at the bottom of a down, and this I think accounts for the passion that went into it. Plus the mood of corporate responsibility, the mood of moral and political leaders, of foundation leaders, of business and so on. And the suspicion of institutions, the suspicion of people, the new high morality that we're now still living through--all was unfolding at the time, and all fed into what I regard as an exaggerated swing of opinion, but nonetheless real from the psychological point of view. There was nothing to do about it. Anything you said wouldn't carry an ounce of weight in the face of this reaction. A very extreme and not especially rational reaction to him and to the presidency of the university.

Institutional Consequences of the Retirement Controversy and Gardner's Strong Governance

Lage: So it had institutional consequences [inaudible].

Smelser: I'll give you only one example of what happened afterwards. It seemed to me that, because David was so effective with his chancellors and in running the university and sort of had his way during the entire time of his presidency, and then because of the diminution of the esteem toward him personally and toward the Office of the President during that bad episode of the retirement package, there was an aftermath that made life really difficult for Jack Peltason. The regents became testy because they had been basically run by David Gardner. The chancellors became testy, because they had basically been not silenced but managed. He was the one who ran the show. They became testy. And Jack's life was made difficult by these circumstances.

There was a kind of internal faculty and regental rebellion after the fact that he inherited but didn't cause--and Jack's political, managerial, administrative style was one of "let's hear all the viewpoints, let's have a consensus position worked out, let's come to a proper compromise." But that wasn't the politics the chancellors were playing. They were pouting and they were playing hardball, and they were not manageable. He did his best to manage this great flare-up over VERIP in which Tien threatened to resign. I played a role in that, by the way.

Chancellor Tien's Threat to Resign over VERIP III

Lage: Tell me about that if you're not too tired. I don't want to push you, but I think this is important.

Smelser: I played a role in that. I--

Lage: This is the third VERIP.

Smelser: Yes. It's where Tien--I got together with Clark Kerr, Budd [Earl] Cheit, and Frederick Balderston. We went to Tien, and we went to Jack, and we said this can't happen.

Lage: Was this after Tien had threatened to resign?

Smelser: It was between the point of the threat and the resolution. We were in the middle. We mostly talked to Tien by phone, because he was traveling. We met in Kerr's house, and we tried our best to think of ways of compromise and ways of keeping the situation calm, ways of keeping Tien from resigning.

Lage: Were you meeting with Jack Peltason or was this the three of you?

Smelser: No. The four of us were there and we were basically phoning from Kerr's house to try to ease and make peace and avoid what we thought would be an institutional catastrophe if Tien resigned. So we were intermediaries in this whole thing. You see, what had happened was that Peltason put forth this package which was very, very permissive as far as the lowering of the age was concerned, and Tien got mad and said he was going to lose his faculty. People are going to do what Smelser and Levine subsequently did; they're young enough so that I'm going to lose my faculty and they're going to take jobs elsewhere. Why wouldn't they leave? They're attractive on the market and other universities will hire them and they'll take their fat retirement package and they'll go take another job. This was the big argument. Faculty quality is going to go down.

Lage: And it affected Berkeley differently from the other campuses, I understand.

Smelser: The other campuses did not have the age problem. Their faculties were not as attractive--if you'll pardon me for saying that about Berkeley--their faculties were not as much a national market. San Diego should have been worried about that, and to some degree UCLA should have been worried about that. But all the other campuses had gone ahead and filled their VERIP positions that had been emptied out in the first two VERIPs. They went headlong. Berkeley went with more prudence; they said, "We don't want to jam up this whole thing with a headlong rush of new appointees; we're going to draw it out and restrengthen our faculty gradually." That was their policy. So they had a lot of empty positions. This means they weren't under quite such budgetary pressure as these other campuses who had been filling. And if these other campuses had to take the budget knocks that were rife from 1990-1995, they were going to have to ask questions about tenured faculty--especially junior faculty. "Are we going to have to knock out assistant professors in order to be able to go with this?" So they were either going to get lower and lower until they'd lose faculty--they didn't care; this was the least of evils.

Lage: For the other campuses.

Smelser: Yes. It was a big evil for Berkeley because it had open places, and also it knew it was going to suffer. They felt they were going to suffer a big exodus of faculty down to the age of fifty-five. Peltason called all the chancellors, got them all to agree to a change, to lift the age up to fifty-seven. Peltason said, "Let's get a vote on it and let's settle it that way." Tien said, "That's not good enough. I won't go for that." Chancellors were enraged with Tien, as I think maybe Jack was for not playing team. So it went on again, and finally that's when the exception for Berkeley--one year only--it got Tien sort of what he wanted. At least to claim a symbolic victory. It only affected about eighteen faculty members.

Lage: So a one-year exception--which I guess is unusual, to have an exception in a policy like this.

Smelser: They gave it, and that's what made Tien finally drop the resignation threat and settle into an acceptable solution for the chancellors. It was a rare--and you know the other campuses didn't like Berkeley at all for that. They didn't appreciate Tien. It increased the competition between Tien and Young in particular. That was already a big tension from

the time Jack came in. One time another chancellor complained to me, "This is a virus. It spreads out through the whole system." This kind of mutuality and integration that David had fashioned caved.

Restiveness among the Regents and Chancellors

Lage: It seems like there was a lot operating besides the retirement package in terms of the lack of collegiality.

Smelser: Of course. There's nothing like a reaction after a period of subordination. They were subordinated to David's effectiveness.

Lage: So even if this retirement package hadn't occurred, do you think there might have been a backlash against David Gardner's strong leadership?

Smelser: There was restiveness among the regents even before David left. There was restiveness, and people like this big contractor--

Lage: Not Howard Leach--he's not a contractor.

Smelser: No, it was this other guy who made all his money in lumber and contracting. It'll come to me. He had argued about the president taking all the initiative and the regents not being--

Lage: Brophy?

Smelser: Roy Brophy was the one. He was among the grousers that David was running the show too much, and the regents were passive. The regents kind of calmed him down. They said, "Stop it." The regents did this; David didn't tell him to be quiet. The regents kind of closed ranks because they still were going with David. But there was a kind of muffled feeling.

Lage: And maybe the same would have occurred with the chancellors.

Smelser: It could have. The chancellors had a muffled feeling, and in a way there was this new burst of freedom. It was open-fire time. My own view--it's only my interpretation; I didn't ask these regents or the chancellors how they felt. It was my own view as a student of organizations and politics that after a long period of quiet and of strong governance, let's put it that way, you will get this restiveness. And it will often appear when the popular leader goes. This was what happened with [President John F.] Kennedy and [President Lyndon B.] Johnson--when a popular and largely beloved but ambivalently regarded leader passes from the scene, the negative bubbles up. I believe that happened to Jack. It was beyond his control. It would happen to anybody. And the retirement package fed into that and reinforced that reaction. You would have gotten it anyway.

This just provided a focus for the whole thing. So this was kind of a rebellion which had been settled by the time I joined Jack in '93-'94.

Lage: Well, this will give me a lot to discuss with Jack Peltason too.

Smelser: Yes, I'd be very interested to see what he says.

Transcribed by Gary Varney
Final Typed by Shannon Page

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

University History Series

The University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995

Martin Trow

Professor of Public Policy, Faculty Representative to the Board of Regents, 1990-1992

An Interview Conducted by
Ann Lage
in 1999

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INTERVIEW HISTORY--Martin Trow

Professor Martin Trow, after first training as an engineer, studied sociology at Columbia University with Paul Merton and Seymour Lipset, taught for four years at Bennington College in Vermont, and then came to Berkeley as a professor of sociology in 1957. In 1969, disenchanted with a contentious Department of Sociology, he joined Aaron Wildavsky as a founding member of the Graduate School of Public Policy at Berkeley. As a sociologist with a focus on comparative and historical studies of higher education, he was active in faculty governance, serving on almost every committee of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate, an activity which he treated as a form of field work. From 1977 to 1989 he was director of the Center for Studies in Higher Education, and in 1991 he was asked to be vice chair and then chair of the Academic Council.

In this capacity, he was faculty representative on the Board of Regents from September 1990 to August 1992, years of budget crisis, the transition from the Gardner to the Peltason presidencies, and the controversy on the Board of Regents and in the public arena over the Gardner retirement controversy. He brings to this interview his years of study of higher education, as well as his observations from his personal experiences.

Professor Trow spoke freely and in detail during our interview session, held on June 24, 1999, in his office at the School of Public Policy. When the lightly edited transcript was returned to him for his review, he did additional research and consulted with other participants to be sure of his facts, and on several topics he elaborated on his answers to give a more detailed recounting. He did not soften his remarks or remove the tone of immediacy and involvement that the interview transcript reflected.

He took particular care to present a full picture of two events in which he participated and which he felt had not been accurately documented previously: the closed session of the regents where Gardner's retirement package was approved, with full disclosure and without dissent; and the selection of Jack Peltason as president. He also gives a full account of the perspective of the Academic Council on VERIP, the voluntary early retirement incentive plan which allowed the university to weather the budget cuts of the 1990s but had profound effects on the professoriate. And he reflects on the shifting balance of power toward the campuses and away from the Office of the President following David Gardner's retirement.

Ann Lage, Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
January 2002

Regional Oral History Office
Room 486 The Bancroft Library

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please write clearly. Use black ink.)

Your full name MARTIN AARON TROW

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Father's full name George TROW

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Birthplace New York, N.Y.

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Occupation housewife
Birthplace New York, N.Y.

Your spouse Katherine Bernhardi TROW

Occupation Psychotherapist and author
Birthplace Cleveland, Ohio

Your children Paul Benjamin Trow; Sarah Louise Eydam; Peter Jacob Trow

Where did you grow up? New York City

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Education M.E. (Mechanical Engineer), Stevens Institute of Technology, 1947; Ph.D. (Sociology), Columbia University. (1956)

Occupation(s) University teacher; researcher; author, consultant

Areas of expertise comparative higher education

Other interests or activities chair, international advisory committee to Swedish governmental agency; also member of international advisory comm to Linköping University; Sma

Organizations in which you are active California Assoc. of Scholars; Kensington Empowerment Club, Center for Studies in H.E., UC Berkeley

SIGNATURE Martin A. Trow DATE: 3/21/02

P.S for further information, see my biographical note on my website, linked to the home pages of both the CSHE and also of the Goldman School of Public Policy.

INTERVIEW WITH MARTIN TROW

FACULTY REPRESENTATIVE TO THE BOARD OF REGENTS, 1990-1992

Education and the Decision to Come to UC Berkeley

[Date of Interview: June 24, 1999] ##[1]

Lage: Today is June 24, 1999. I'm interviewing Martin Trow about David Gardner's and Jack Peltason's presidencies of the University of California. In the course of this project, we did an interview with Jack Peltason, a long one, and it seemed proper to enlarge the project to include the administrations of both David Gardner and Jack Peltason.

Trow: Good.

Lage: We want to start by getting a sense of where you come from.

Trow: Well, I've been at Berkeley since 1957. I was trained and educated as an engineer back East at Stevens Institute of Technology in New Jersey. I volunteered for the navy the day I turned seventeen in June 1943, and served for three years in the navy, was commissioned at the Naval Academy, and then was trained for the invasion of Japan as a fighter director on a picket destroyer, an invasion which happily didn't come off. I served for over a year on a battleship, and was discharged in July 1946. Anyway, after the war I finished my degree at Stevens on the G.I. Bill, and then I worked briefly as an engineer, including a stint for a firm of consulting engineers working on plans for the UN [United Nations] buildings in New York, then being designed.

Lage: Oh, you did.

Trow: Yes, but at same time I also went to the New School for Social Research at night. And then in 1948 I took a year's leave from engineering, which somehow extended itself to the rest of my life, went to Columbia University, took my Ph.D. in sociology there, influenced mainly by Robert Merton, but also by Paul Lazarsfeld, Wright Mills and S.M. Lipset. I would say that I learned most from Merton and Lipset.

Lage: What made you go from engineering to sociology?

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[1]## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcript.

Trow: Well, I was bored as an engineer. That wasn't my field. I was okay at it, but it wouldn't have been very enjoyable, and I was really--I had become an engineer to go into my father's construction business. And that was okay too, but not really what I wanted to do. I became intensely interested in social science at the New School, where by chance I took a course, my very first, in sociology with Carl Mayer. I was going there just at night, after work. Then I took a year, as I imagined, to just enjoy myself by going off to study sociology at Columbia, which accepted me without my having ever had any social science at all besides the one course at the New School, conditions being what they then were for veterans. I had earned years of G.I. Bill time, so my tuition was paid as well as a small living allowance. So I found myself drawn deeply into sociology within six months of starting at Columbia, began to work on a study which became a book, *Union Democracy*,[2] which I coauthored with Martin Lipset, the senior author, himself only a young assistant professor, and the late James Coleman, a graduate student with an engineering and navy background like myself.

And that launched my career in sociology. I went on and took my doctorate at Columbia. They didn't bother with the master's degree in those days. I then spent four years at Bennington College in Vermont, teaching and doing more research, and wrote another book, about Senator Joe McCarthy's popular support, called *Right-Wing Radicalism*,[3] another piece of political sociology and then was invited to come to Berkeley, as well as to the University of Chicago and some other places. Jobs were not difficult to get in those days. Anyway, I came to Berkeley--

Lage: And what year was that?

Trow: I came in '57. I taught and did research at Bennington between '53 and '57.

Lage: And did you come to the sociology department?

Trow: Sociology department. I had a kind of a joint appointment with the School of Education, which didn't work out very well. I left my part appointment with Education after a few years, and moved over into the Sociology Department full time. That was fine until it became highly politicized after the FSM [Free Speech Movement] polarized the campus, when that department blew up and almost everybody left.

Lage: Was this in the sixties?

Trow: In the sixties, in the five years after the FSM, roughly between 1965 and 1970. I left in 1968. Life in the department became intolerable, so that every single leading person in the

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[2]Seymour M. Lipset, Martin Trow, and James S. Coleman. *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union* (New York: Free Press, 1956).

[3]Martin Trow. *Right-wing Radicalism and Political Intolerance: A Study of Support for McCarthy in a New England Town* [Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1957] (New York: Arno Press, 1980).

department left within that period of four years or five years. I mean fifteen or twenty members of the department. Neil Smelser was the only distinguished sociologist who stayed, and he became a University Professor.

In 1968 I was invited to go to MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] to start a research center in education there, and would have done so. I liked MIT, I'd been a consultant there, knew many people, and of course I had been trained as an engineer, and liked them, though I did not want to be one. But Aaron Wildavsky, who was the founder of this school [UC Berkeley Graduate School of Public Policy, later the Goldman School of Public Policy] in '69, just as I was leaving sociology, invited me to join him as one of the founding fathers of this place.

I had already accepted to go to MIT for a trial year, but I knew that if I went I would not come back to the Sociology Department. We were preparing to move. On the other hand, I liked Berkeley very much, and I also knew and liked Wildavsky, and when he gave me a chance to stay at Berkeley and join him in building a new interdisciplinary professional school, one which would allow me to continue my own research even if it were not directly linked to the professional curriculum, I accepted instantly.

Wildavsky was a very powerful, impressive, very attractive man, one of the most distinguished political scientists of the postwar era, immensely erudite and a prolific writer. He had been chairman of the Political Science Department, and was a natural institution builder. He started the Graduate School of Public Policy from scratch, in this wonderful old building, which I loved. Five of us joined him to get it started, some from Berkeley, some from other universities, and I stayed with it for the rest of my career until I retired, so to speak, in '93.

During these years since my formal retirement I have continued my comparative and historical studies of higher education in advanced industrial societies, focusing on Britain, Sweden, and Japan in addition to the United States, though I have also visited and lectured all over Europe and included their development in my work. My work has been translated into every European language, as well as Chinese and Japanese, where two books of my essays have been published in translation. My family and I have lived abroad for varying extended periods while I was working on comparative issues. An abbreviated professional biographical note and a list of my publications can be found on my website.

Since my formal retirement I have remained very much involved in a whole variety of academic activities, writing and consulting, and I've never really retired. I have continued my research, free of committee work and that kind of thing. I'm no longer doing much teaching, partly because the higher education unit in the School of Education has been closed down, and currently very few graduate students write dissertations on issues of higher education. Formerly I served on the dissertation committees of students going through the doctoral program in the School of Education, and occasionally taught a course there. I still help students in the U.S. and abroad who are interested in pursuing themes I have written about.

I continue to work a lot in Europe; for example, we spent the whole of the summer of 1998 in Japan, and we get back to Britain and Sweden a couple of times a year. I served as chief consultant to the chancellor of the Swedish universities for some years, and currently am chairman of the international advisory committee to the National Agency for Higher Education in Sweden, and also am a member of the advisory committees to other Swedish universities.

And I continue my interests in British higher education, on which I have published a great deal. My current interests, in addition to those continuing interests overseas, focus mainly on the impact of the new information technologies, which draws on my background as an engineer too. I have published a number of papers in this area as well.

Lage: Oh, yes. I know you've written about higher education. Is that your main field?

Trow: Well, it is, but it has a wide range. I've written on governance and finance and organization, on student cultures, on accountability and accreditation, on just about every aspect of the life of colleges and universities, always in a comparative and historical perspective. In 1972 I wrote an essay for the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] on the movement from elite to mass higher education, and then on to universal access, which was widely cited and reprinted, and which I find is still a useful conceptual system for understanding the current rapidly changing scene in higher education. Trying to understand European and American structures of higher education, and the broad movement of these systems and their links to other institutions in society--well, that is enough on my plate. I've never found myself bored with the subject. And I've gotten to work with people like [UC President Emeritus] Clark Kerr very closely. I directed the big national surveys for Kerr in '69 and '75, and have been a friend and admirer of his ever since. But the greater part of my research has been in England and Sweden, as well as in this country.

Work in Faculty Governance, Chair of Academic Council and Faculty Representative

Lage: And you must have been very active in faculty governance.

Trow: Well, I have been. I was a member of just about every senate committee on the Berkeley campus, and was also chair of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate in 1981-82. But I have served on all the senate committees, was elected to the Committee on Committees, and so forth. I saw it all as field work really. With my interest in higher education, I was able through my work for the senate to see the inside workings of the university. So I really rather enjoyed it, looking at it with a different eye than most of the others who served on these committees. I never saw it as a sacrifice or giving something back, which is the usual way senate service is put. But it was, for me, always field work, and I kept my eyes open, and listened, and saw a lot.

Then, in 1990 I was delighted to be invited, out of the clear blue sky, to be the vice chair of the Academic Council, serving as vice chair in 1990-1991, and then as chair of the council between 1991 and 1992. I hadn't served on the council for ten years since I had been chair of the Berkeley Division. In the interim I wasn't very active in the Academic Senate since I had been director of the Center for Studies in Higher Education between 1977 and 1989. But then, to my total surprise, they called me.

Lage: I see. I had thought somehow that the Academic Council was made up only of representatives of the various divisions.

Trow: Yes, except for the chair and vice chair. The rest of the council is made up of the chairs of the senates on each of the nine campuses, plus the chairs of the six leading senate statewide committees. But those people can then elect any member of the senate as the vice chair. The council elects the vice chair for the following year, who need not be any current member of the council--he or she can be any member of the senate in the university, except for administrative officers. And the vice chair, without any exception, has always become the chair the following year. So you serve a year as vice chair and then a year as chair. The two usually work as a team, and the vice chair sits alongside the chair at meetings of the regents--to learn the job among other things. As I say, I wasn't on the council at the time I was elected.

The link of the council to the campuses is through their divisional chairs, plus the chairs of the campus committees. These latter become members of the statewide committees, and those statewide committees, or at least the most important six of them, then elect a chair of their own who also then sits on the council. So there is a connection that way. I jumped over that system directly onto the council as vice chair. I think some people on the council knew that I was a student of higher education, and therefore they thought it might be of some use to have somebody with that experience. I can't say for sure how it happened since I did not have any close friends on the council who might have told me about it. But I know I enjoyed my time on the council, and as its chair, and it was a tremendously useful experience for me to see the inside of the governance of the university.

Lage: And we do have dates for that. September '90 to August '92, vice chair and chair.

Trow: That's right. And then I retired from the university on the first of January '93, so I only had another four months of regular service to the university after I left the council.

Lage: And you served as faculty rep to the regents as part of this office?

Trow: Well, that is the job. The faculty representative to the regents goes along with being the vice chair or chair. So there are two faculty representatives to the regents. You may not know that the regents have, a number of times in the past, invited the chair and vice chair, the faculty reps, to become voting members of the regents. And always we've respectfully declined.

Lage: On what grounds?

Trow: Well, the grounds are that when you become a member of the regents, you have a broad responsibility for the university, which is a very good thing, but you stop being a representative of the faculty. And if we had done that, then the faculty would have had to find another way to be represented to the regents. So while of course we had the general interests of the university at heart, we always were aware that we had a special responsibility to look after the interests of the faculty. And we would have surrendered that if we had accepted the invitation to be members of the regents itself.

On the other hand, the regents treated us as if we were members of the regents. We didn't have the vote, we didn't want the vote. And also at that time very few issues came up for a vote, or at least a contested vote. Very, very few. When they did, it was a rare, special occasion. Matters were usually settled through discussion and compromise before the votes on the Board of Regents. If a consensus or near consensus could not be found, the matter was put off till it came. You get a vote on such hotly contested issues as affirmative action, where people are unable to compromise principled positions.

Different Types of Regents' Meetings

Trow: Apart from our not having the vote, in all other respects we two faculty reps were treated as full members of the board--for example, we were present at all the [regents-only] meetings, when no one who is not a regent is present, even the senior vice presidents. No one aside from the regents and the two faculty reps is present. That is highly relevant to the present story, since it was in meetings of that kind that the president's retirement package was discussed and decided.

There were, and I believe are, three kinds of meetings, as you probably know: regents-only meetings, which are highly confidential--

Lage: Is the president present at these meetings?

Trow: The president is a member of the regents, and so he is always there, except when they talk about personnel matters in which he is directly involved. We were there, vice chair and chairman of the council, for those meetings. And then there is the second kind of meeting where in addition to the regents, attendance is restricted to the chancellors and vice presidents, and other members of the president's staff who will come to report to the regents without the public present. And then there are public meetings.

Lage: Now, those restricted meetings, are they on personnel matters also?

Trow: Oh, no. They can be about anything.

Lage: I'm surprised that the law for public access hasn't opened those up.

Trow: You might ask the university [general] counsel about that. It never was clear to me what was legal to discuss in regents-only meetings, and what wasn't. I understand that matters have changed since I served. And then also, it has to do partly with what the regents want to discuss among themselves, as well as what they will accept.

Lage: Will accept?

Trow: To discuss in the closed meetings. Indeed, part of the story here is that the central fact of David Gardner's retirement problems or embarrassment was that one or two of the regents did not respect the confidentiality of the regents-only meetings. It was just understood, certainly by myself--I would never have revealed what went on in those meetings--that we were there on the same terms as the regents were, and that those meetings were completely closed and confidential. But in relation to the Gardner retirement, several regents did not respect that. And that really blew everything up. But that is getting ahead of the story.

Lage: Yes, we'll come to that. And then there are the committee meetings where, I understand, a good deal of the work takes place.

Trow: Well, yes. Those regents' committees meet the day before and those were ordinarily not open. So a lot of the basic decisions, really, are made at the committee meetings.

Lage: Did you take part in those committees, or do faculty reps ordinarily take part?

Trow: We were always present when the committees reported. We did not sit on the committees themselves. But we had a right to talk about any issue, especially issues that had some bearing on faculty matters. I'm not at all a shy person, nor am I intimidated by regents, and often have a lot to say about a lot of things, often not very popular things. But I didn't talk very much during regents' meetings during my tenure there because I found that our views had been so thoroughly canvassed by the president, or one of his vice presidents whom we dealt with, that our views were almost uniformly built into whatever recommendations the president was making.

Assessment of David Gardner's Leadership Qualities

Lage: I see. Let's talk about that, under the rubric of the president's relationship with the Academic Council during those years.

Trow: I'd like to start, if I can, with a statement about David Gardner, because that is what we're really talking about. Let me say that I've had a fair amount of experience in public life and on committees. I was chair of the Advisory Committee to the U.S. Secretary of Education dealing with the recognition of the accreditation bodies for postsecondary education. I have served on advisory and review committees in Sweden and the U.K., committees of the National Research Council, and all the senate committees on the Berkeley campus, including chair of the division. And I have been a trustee of Carleton College for twenty

years. But I've never seen anybody manage a body as effectively as Gardner did the Board of Regents. And that was made possible by his personal qualities, one of which is that he is almost always simply smarter than anybody else in the room.

But I've been around a lot of smart people, so that is not enough. Gardner is extremely smart, but he is also very, very keenly analytical, which isn't quite the same thing. He can take a problem and break it down into its component parts, which already suggests a solution--his solution.

Third, he is very articulate. He can perceive and define a problem, get a notion of how he wants it handled, and package it in a way that is extremely clear. He can take a complicated issue and make it very clear.

Fourth, he has no hesitation about expressing his views very directly; he is not at all hesitant about making his views known. At meetings he tends to wait for everybody else to speak and then sum up what has been said or else make reference to it in his response. In this summing up it is clear that he has been listening, and his summaries are very fair to what has been said, including those who hold opinions differing from his own. But then he also has no hesitation about dealing very sharply with people who are criticizing something that he or one of his staff people have done, simply by producing a body of evidence and facts and packaging them in a way that overwhelms the critic. And the critics are usually somewhat embarrassed and humiliated. And they retreat. So what he made clear to the Board of Regents very firmly was that if anybody criticized his staff, in particular, it was very likely that they would be sorry they did.

Lage: Can you think of an instance, what kind of a critique he would--

Trow: Well, he did this so effectively that the occasions for his responding to such criticism of his staff were very few during my time.

Lage: You came on, after all, after he'd been there for a number of years--he had them trained.

Trow: That is exactly right. Trained is the word. The metaphor that came to my mind again and again as I watched him was that he was like a lion tamer that I remember from the circus when I was a lad. Frank Buck would come into this cage full of lions and tigers armed with a whip and a chair. And around the ring there were these little stools, and these big cats got up on the stools. Frank Buck was physically less powerful, but he overpowered them by his force of will. And he made them jump through hoops, and sit up on their little stools.

Gardner had that group of powerful, rich, contentious, some of them egomaniacal people sit up there on their little stools and behave themselves. There was one occasion during my time when he was away for one of the meetings. He went to North Korea with some semi-governmental group and that meeting was chaired by one of his vice presidents. And the big cats got down off their stools and clawed one another.

Lage: One another, not necessarily the president or his people.

Trow: No, the president wasn't there. In his absence they clawed anybody whom they felt like clawing. It was like little boys let out of school, pummeling this one, pummeling that. The meeting had a completely different tone. I don't want to exaggerate, it wasn't out of control. But there was a degree of contentiousness in the room, and it wasn't being managed. Now, it wasn't that the other person sitting in for David wasn't able. He hadn't, of course, been there long enough to dominate the way David had. But what was very clear was the difference between David's presence and David's absence.

In his interview for this series, David Gardner describes his first meeting with the board. Inside of ten minutes he made it clear to them what he would stand for and what he wouldn't stand. He always reminded them that there were other things he could do. It was clear to him that if he ever wanted that job too much, he would be too anxious about offending somebody and then lose all of his leverage. Now that kind of force of will wasn't necessary most of the time. Most of the time I think he simply persuaded people that he had thought the matter through, he had a lot of facts and information and that he had a better solution than everybody else. In addition to which, if anything important came up, he had talked it through with every member of the board on the telephone beforehand.

Lage: So he listened to them individually.

Trow: Yes, but he also told them what was on his mind so there were no surprises. No surprises. They knew where he stood, and he knew where they stood. And if there were any difficulties, real difficulties, the item wouldn't appear on the agenda; it would be held over. So the items that were on the agenda were already, for the most part, settled by the time the board met. There would be some discussion and so forth, but on the whole, by the time they got to the meeting they were settled matters. Gardner certainly did not like decisions being made de novo by the regents, that is, by a bunch of amateurs tackling really important and often complicated questions. He always had to take their views into account, but he'd take them into account, on the whole, before the meetings.

Lage: Did he show respect for them, or did he feel respect for them?

Trow: Well, it depended on who it was. For some regents he had high regard and respect. For some he had very little respect; it was respect that they had to earn. And some were, simply, difficult. He treated them all, of course, very respectfully, but as equals. But also, in a way, as when you have a really good physician, even though he treats you with respect, there is no doubt who is the professional in that relationship.

Lage: Some people have indicated in these interviews that the difficulties after Gardner left were sort of a reaction against this very tight ship that he ran. I mean, do you think that the regents were kind of restless underneath?

Trow: I don't think so. I think that what came out after he left was the ordinary cantankerousness of people who, in their other lives, are used to having their own way. Regents are people who usually run things. Under the leadership of David Gardner, the board members weren't running things. They were mastered. I mean, in the wild the tigers and lions aren't anybody's--they don't obey anybody. So for them this was a very unusual circumstance.

When he left and their behavior changed I don't think it was a reaction, no. What happened was that the regents began to discover that they could do things that they hadn't previously done. We haven't gotten around to that, but many things changed with the change in the presidency, and that is, you might say, a structural issue. But if you want to talk about my reading of the retirement package, that might be worth discussing now.

Martin Trow's Assessment of Gardner's Retirement Package

Lage: Okay.

Trow: Because we're still talking about David Gardner.

Lage: Right, and there are other--

Trow: Many other things.

Lage: The order doesn't really matter. I think you should take them up as you see fit.

Trow: Well, I believed that he had a very bad rap on this retirement issue, very bad indeed.

Lage: Media-generated, do you think?

Trow: Well, in part media-generated, but also generated by some of his enemies on the board. I was present at a couple of meetings--and these were regents-only meetings--in which first there was a review of the conditions for these supplementary commitments by the regents to the retirement package. These supplements to the retirement pension had a name, deferred compensation. They were a commitment by the board for certain additional sums that would come to the president on his retirement. As I recall, they were voted over a period of years, and added to the sum he would be given on his retirement. At one of the meetings I attended during my first year on the board, well before Gardner's resignation, the board was voting yet another annual supplement to the total of deferred compensation that would supplement the university service pension to be awarded on the president's retirement.

Lage: The president and others.

Trow: And others, including a couple of vice presidents and all the chancellors. But in order to get this award they had to have been serving for a certain number of years. These additional deferred compensations were not introduced, I believe, at the initiative of the president. I heard, by rumor, that this was originally an idea of Ron Brady's. But so many things were loaded onto Ron Brady that I can't be sure. It may have been at the initiation of one or more regents. What I heard and saw at firsthand was not the initiation but the ratification and continued funding of the idea.

While I was a faculty rep with the regents the then chancellor at Santa Cruz, Robert Stevens, resigned to take up a job in the U.K., and the question came up then whether he would be eligible to be a recipient of the delayed compensation allocated for chancellors. Incidentally, the money for all these delayed compensations for senior university administrators came out of private funds that the regents controlled, so they never saw any basis for public knowledge or reaction to these sums they were committing.

And the general consensus on the board regarding Stevens was no, that he was leaving on his own terms, he hadn't served terribly long and he wasn't meeting the conditions of this extra bonus, which under the rules was conditional on a service over a longer period of time. I suppose ordinarily that it would be granted when one of the people in the defined category would retire from the university after long service. Stevens was going to another good job in a London law firm. I know Stevens, by the way; he is now Master of Pembroke College, Oxford. I have been in touch with him about English university issues in which we both have an interest, and in fact I gave a seminar at his college which he chaired. We discussed this matter, and to my knowledge he had no resentment at not being awarded this addition to his retirement package; my sense is that he did not expect it.

During the regents' discussions of this policy of deferred compensation for senior university administrators, I saw that the regents were very proud of the university and they believed that the existing normative constraints in California on the president's salary were inappropriate. They understood that there was a political constraint on his formal public salary, given the fact that it would be seen to be inappropriate for him to earn more than the governor, and things of that kind. But the conversation among the regents was, "Look, there is no other job in the world like this. There is no other university in the world with 150,000 students and 150,000 employees. In magnitude it is more like Chrysler Corporation than like the University of Wisconsin or Stanford. You can't just do what you do with the faculty, which was to tie the president of UC to the comparative presidents' salaries around the country. There is something special in this job here."

The regents had decided that they wanted to commit additional funds to the salary of the president as a recognition of the size and complexity of the job, as a statement of the unique character of the University of California, and also as a way of ensuring that they would be able to attract the best candidates for the job in the future. And then, justified along the same lines, were the spin-offs for chancellors and some senior vice presidents. Otherwise the relation between the compensation for the president and for his senior staff would have been out of balance. I think the regents saw this as similar to what big companies do for their CEOs and senior staff, though at much lower levels of compensation than in the private sector.

Lage: It was also the era of big compensation.

Trow: That's right. And as I listened to what was happening in that meeting, I had no problems with it, because the compensation, in my view, wasn't all that big, and furthermore came from private funds in the grace and favor of the regents. If that is the way they wanted to spend their money, I had no problems with that. Moreover I was not hearing the proposal

as an initiative, but merely as an existing policy being reconfirmed. So I never said a word during that meeting.

When the matter came up again at another meeting the following year, specifically in connection with David's retirement, he was absent. And the thrust of that meeting was consensually that the regents should take advantage of an exception clause in the rules governing these supplementary delayed compensations, which had to be worked out with the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] and other federal agencies. And those agencies, and the contract that the university had written, allowed exceptions to be made so that these delayed compensations could be part of the retirement package, despite the fact that the president hadn't quite served the full term ordinarily required to be awarded these supplementary sums. Moreover, the president wasn't leaving under ordinary circumstances.

The argument was, "We are not going to penalize this man because he is unable to continue to serve as a result of the death of his wife." There was nobody in the room who would or did say, "Well, his wife died and he is not very happy and he can't carry on; that is too bad, but that means that he forfeits this additional compensation which has been designed for him and put away for him year by year." Nobody said that. There was apparently unanimous agreement that the money had been committed and should be paid to him. He had served, then, seven or eight years as president, not counting years of earlier service to the university. He was extremely popular, in a personal way, with the regents, much more than one would have guessed from the later behavior of some of them. Much more.

And there was no debate at the meeting; if any regents had any reservations about the decision to invoke the exceptional clause for Gardner, they did not say so at that meeting. That is worth stressing; those regents who complained later did not object during this crucial meeting when the decision was made to make the exception and give the additional compensation to the president on his resignation and retirement from the university. You must remember that the regents were making this decision in the firm belief that it would not be made public--and the views of some of them changed when it did become public.

Lage: As he told it, and as others have told it, it was a long meeting. He was outside and kind of wondering what was going on, and then was surprised to learn that they gave him only a three-month administrative leave.

Trow: First of all, as I said, I don't remember any controversy. The fact that it was a long meeting just means that regents, when they don't have Gardner to keep them in check, loved to talk. You had a lot of people who had an interest in this policy, and all of them had to have their say. I don't recall that the issue of "administrative leave" was much discussed. The real issue was the granting of the additional compensation. In fact, I don't recall any discussion of the issue of administrative leave.

Lage: But there was nobody who was saying, "Let's not give him the full package"?

Trow: No, not one that I can recall. The minutes of those meetings should bear me out.

Lage: Of course, the budget had already started to go bad.

Trow: But this had nothing to do with the budget.

Lage: I know, but I wondered if people--

Trow: No, no, no. Not at all. No one made any connection between the decision about the president's package and California's budget. I don't think the length of the meeting had anything to do with any disputation. I mean, I would remember that. The vice chair at the time, Elliot Brownlee, was also there, so you might check with him. Now, I'm surprised by the three-month administrative leave. I had the strong sense that he had a full year of paid leave. He doesn't remember it that way?

Lage: No, and I think I have a document right here that--. This is a document, getting ready for the April meeting, the public meeting, and it outlines what they gave him.

Trow: I think the issue here was whether he would be getting a full year of administrative leave at a link to his salary as president, or a shorter period of administrative leave and a longer period as professorial leave earned separately by ordinary service at his professorial salary. As it ended up, he had a combination of the two, but in the event only used the three months of administrative leave he was awarded before he went on to head the Hewlett Foundation.

Lage: Oh, I see.

Trow: I don't recall how that decision was arrived at. I don't recall much discussion of his leave at the meeting which discussed his retirement package. As a matter of fact, none of these things would have been discussed if it hadn't been for Regent [Jeremiah] Hallisey and some other people, who were whistle-blowers to the press.

Lage: But was Hallisey a dissenter during that meeting, do you recall?

Trow: No, he was not. He was not. He did not say a word in opposition. He didn't have the courage to actually express his reservation to the apparently unanimous agreement to the package. So Hallisey and I think another regent expressed their reservations to the policy by simply leaking it to the press. As for the unanimous support for the deferred compensation on the board, several arguments were made, all of them supporting their waiving the length of service requirement.

With respect to the leave, it is very possible that Gardner had another kind of leave that he had earned, or a sabbatical or something. My memory now is that this three months was merely to get him from April to July, and that very likely, or at least it was believed, that some additional paid leave kicked in for the president. Maybe the regents were wrong in their assumptions, but I am pretty sure that is what was assumed about his leave situation. But I am not absolutely sure about that.

Lage: It might have had something to do with the amount of time he had to have worked before he was granted these deferred benefits.

Trow: No, I think that was covered by the exception clause--no further concern about his term of service was involved. That was not an issue for the regents--they were not counting his months or years of service, but merely invoked the exception clause. So I wouldn't assume that he didn't have additional paid leave time. I'd want to look at that. As some of the board members argued, the additional compensation was crucial for recruiting: for them to be able to get the right people and reward them for this job. And after all, David had presided over the extraordinary [Governor George] Deukmejian years, for which everyone was grateful. Moreover, the pinch on the university's budget hadn't yet really hit.

Lage: It was coming.

Trow: It was coming, and Gardner saw it more clearly than most people. But I don't think that made much of a difference because the commitments the regents were making from private funds were not going to be affected by the state budget at all. I mean, the only reason you would have any reservation about doing this is if you felt you had to defend it in public. If this hadn't been leaked to the press, nobody would have known about it. He simply would have resigned, and the details of his pension arrangements, you know, would have passed unremarked. It was not a financial issue, it was a public relations issue.

Lage: The media wouldn't even have noticed.

Trow: Absolutely.

Lage: I think he says in his interview that he did have an announcement to the press, in a very low key way.

Trow: Yes. Probably. But my sense is that the press under ordinary circumstances would probably not go into the details of his finances. Ordinarily the press doesn't get involved deeply in those things.

Lage: How do you explain the controversy?

Trow: Oh, I believe that Hallisey and one or two other people on the board really hated Gardner, and wanted to embarrass him. Once the information was released in a very tendentious way, then you got the kind of feeding frenzy out in the press. I mean there is the usual populist tone of California anyway, but on top of that you had the [San Francisco] *Examiner* and its treatment of the story, with little concern for the facts, and much hostile distortion. What is juicier than to be publishing documents from a closed session that seem to be unmasking an admired and powerful public figure? That changed the climate in the state regarding confidential meetings by the board, so there I understand that there is much less that goes on in closed session.

Impact of the Retirement Controversy on University Governance

Trow: As a result of the political and media generated scandal, the regents I believe became less important in the development of the university. It is more of a confederal university than it used to be.

Lage: You mean just since Gardner?

Trow: Yes. His successors did not inherit the same university that David Gardner governed as president, a federal university with a strong president and a strong Board of Regents. Just as the strength of the Academic Council depends on the strength of the president, so also does the power of the Board of the Regents depend on the power of the Office of the President. The regents have very little direct influence on the chancellors. The chancellors must be the most fortunate, the most autonomous presidents of universities in the country. They are buffered from the state legislature by the Office of the President, and from the regents by a president who now has little direct power over the chancellors. My sense is that the campuses of the University of California are more autonomous than any other public university in the country, and maybe in the world, and even more autonomous than many of the elite private research universities.

Lage: When you say federal, what do you mean?

Trow: The contrast is with a confederation. Under the current confederation of campuses far more power lies with the chancellors and on the campuses now than during Gardner's administration.

I think that the loss of the power of the regents and the president has also affected negatively the authority of the Academic Council. The Academic Council exercises its power primarily through the president, its advice and consultative relation to the president. And if you have a strong president, then the council is important and effective. If you have relatively weaker presidents, the Academic Council is less significant.

Lage: So it diminishes the power of the faculty?

Trow: Not the faculty, the Academic Council. How the power and influence of the Academic Senates vary on the campuses is another matter.

Regent Jeremiah Hallisey's Role

Lage: Well, let's explore this retirement, because there is a lot more than the retirement. You say Hallisey hated Gardner. What do you mean?

Trow: Hated is pretty strong; I think disliked intensely is better. Well, among other things, Hallisey was very unhappy on the board. He was, among other things, one of the few Democrats on the board, maybe the only Democrat at that time. He was more liberal than the other regents in the ordinary political sense. He was a San Francisco lawyer, but my impression is that he was not highly respected by the other lawyers on the board. On the whole, the other members of the board simply treated him as a non-person. And he was understandably very resentful of that. I don't know what his personal relationship with David was. My guess is that he felt--and I'm sure that others on the board also felt, though they might not have behaved in the same way--that there was an in-group on the board, and an out-group and that the in-group made all the important decisions. And he was certainly in the out-group. It may be that nobody bothered to consult him when they made decisions and so, when he had a chance to express his resentment, he did. I suspect that the other regents came very close to treating him disrespectfully. I also suspect that Gardner simply ignored him as a person of no consequence.

He also may have had feelings about the size of David's retirement package, and the arrangements behind the settlement, the retirement arrangements, which he never had really expressed in the meetings. And he wouldn't have expressed them because he would have assumed that they wouldn't have had any effect; the way to have effect was to tell the press. He wasn't the only one, and David knows those people much better than I, but I saw up close how this worked.

Hallisey was also not very fond of the faculty or the Academic Council. There is one funny story about Hallisey and [UCLA Chancellor] Chuck Young. Hallisey had made a very critical remark about the faculty at one board meeting, maybe something about UCLA. When they had a break, Chuck, who was a very abrasive guy, saw Hallisey in the corridor outside, and he says to Hallisey, "Well, let me tell you how glad I'll be when your term is up in July." Hallisey replied, "You're off by a year." [laughter] I heard that exchange in the corridor. Chuck had no hesitancy about telling Hallisey exactly how he felt, but he should have calculated his tenure a little better. Indeed, it was in Hallisey's last year that so much of the trouble arose over the president's retirement package.

Faculty Responses to Gardner's Retirement Package

Lage: Now how did the statewide Academic Council respond, and the faculty here at Berkeley, to Gardner's retirement package?

Trow: Well, those are two different things. The council, on the whole, were on this issue naturally influenced by myself and Elliot Brownlee who actually had been there for all the discussions and agreements when the regents had made its decision about Gardner's package. And we didn't talk directly about those matters. For one thing, the council wasn't really involved; this was really between the regents and the president--and I certainly was not going to reveal to the Academic Council or anybody else what I had heard in these highly confidential regents-only meetings. When the matter blew up in the press, I gave the

council my sense that this was a bad rap on Gardner without going into details. But I didn't have to do any arguing or go into details because the council was, on the whole, quite pro-Gardner. We had some arguments with vice presidents on certain issues. But those were, you might say, the usual conflicts between administrative officers and an academic senate. And we won our fair share.

A big issue for the council was how to manage our advisory role when the budget cuts came, and when the VERIPs came up we were deeply involved in that, at least in the policies if not in the implementation. We had a big problem with Vice President Brady (and I can go into that at another time). But basically, David Gardner managed his relation with us as effectively as he did his relation with the regents.

Lage: Was it in the same way?

Trow: No, because we weren't as important to him. I mean, the regents could give him bigger problems. We could give him problems too, but not of the same order. Moreover, I think he found dealing with the council relatively easy. For one thing, the council, during my term, had few internal divisions. We really got along very well together on a personal basis. And we had very, very few really contentious issues to divide us. We talked things through, almost always to a consensual outcome; we very rarely had to take a vote, or did so purely for the record and to confirm some decision or action. And we weren't wealthy, powerful, 800-pound gorillas, like the regents mostly were. The council members are academics, and Gardner had an easy way with people, especially academics who could appreciate his capacity for analysis and explanation, and who did not have much of a political agenda themselves. So he was able to talk to us.

Lage: Did he listen and change his views based on the faculty input, or was he more like this lion tamer?

Trow: Well, he didn't deal with us as he did the regents. For one thing, we did not have the power with relation to the president that the regents have: we didn't hire him and couldn't fire him. The genius of "shared governance" is that it forces a president to deal with a group of faculty whom he did not appoint. We didn't appoint him, but on the other hand he didn't appoint us. Our meetings had to be on the basis of voluntary conversation and mutual trust, because, in fact, that is what "shared governance" amounts to. A president who ignores the council or pays no attention to its recommendations in the areas of its special concerns will become very unpopular with the faculty, and over time that could make his life difficult. But that was never the case with David Gardner, who certainly cultivated his relation with the senate. And while he never gave up any effective power beyond what the regents had granted us many years before, he certainly paid attention to our concerns and advice. And that was really all we wanted.

The council's meetings with the president were very different from his meetings with the regents. They were our meetings on our turf, and we invited him in. That was true also of the occasional meetings of the Academic Assembly, two or three times a year, which he also almost always attended. The other forum of our relationship with the administration was the meetings of the chair and vice chair of the council with the president in his office--

a monthly consultative session. And we had similar regular meetings with [Senior Vice President William] Frazer and with [Associate Vice President and Director of the Budget Lawrence] Hershman. Our relations with Hershman were especially close during this time because we were having to work out ways of coping with the big budget cuts, and working out the VERIP business was very complicated and difficult. It wasn't so difficult with the president and Hershman. It was very difficult in relation to Ron Brady.

Martin Trow's Reflections on Ron Brady

Lage: Let's talk more about Ron Brady.

Trow: I'll talk about Brady just briefly. Of all the people I've ever really dealt with in the university over forty years, the only person I came out disliking intensely was Ron Brady, because he, among other things, simply didn't tell us the truth. Other people would differ with us, and I got used to that--if you are dealing with difficult university issues, you get used to people not agreeing with you, and some of them disagreeing very sharply. But I usually could count on good will, civility and truth-telling.

Lage: In what instances was he not truthful?

Trow: I'll give you one example. Brady didn't like academics, and he didn't like the senate because in his view it wasn't very efficient, it spent too much time talking issues through, and it was slow and wordy. It wasn't businesslike. He made clear to us that in his view faculty members were mostly incompetent people who were academics because we couldn't do a real job of work in the world. He didn't hide that contempt very much. If you really were very good, you would be making money somewhere, or at the very least you'd be a university administrator, maybe even a college president or a vice president. So you are basically just employees, not even middle managers. He had to deal with us because he had to, but he didn't like to. And he had an assistant by the name of [Carole] Swartz, who had come from the private sector, who held similar views but made even less effort to hide them.

Brady saw his relations with the senate in terms of the university's labor relations, basically the same way he saw his relations with all the other staff people, both white and blue collar, whom the university employed. He had no sense of an academic relationship with the members of the Academic Senate. And there were many more staff people than there were academics. He wanted always to merge us for his administrative purposes with the staff people, and to develop the same policies for us that he had worked out with the staff people. One difference was that the staff people are by and large represented by unions, while the academics were and are not. Brady knew how to deal with unions, but he had no idea of how to deal with the senate. The unions were forthrightly fighting for their members' compensation and working conditions. He was comfortable with that.

But the senate didn't play that way; we continually thought of ourselves as the heart of the university, and talked about defending the best interests of the university, not just our own. We certainly were concerned about the working conditions of the faculty--but an important difference was and is that compensation for faculty is determined by a treaty with the state government which ties our salaries to average salaries at each rank at eight other named universities, four public and four private, thus taking the salary issue almost completely out of the realm of dispute and negotiation. And that is one of the reasons that the academic staff at UC is not unionized to this day. But that basic agreement doesn't cover fringe benefits, nor the special retirement packages called VERIP being put together as an emergency way of dealing with the sudden very deep budget cuts during California's recession in the early nineties.

Lage: Like retirement packages?

Trow: That's right. So, for example, Brady had worked out VERIPs for the staff, and he told us forthrightly that there was no way in which he could write a different set of VERIP criteria for the faculty than he could for the non-faculty staff. He couldn't do that because the IRS, or some other federal agency, had issued certain regulations governing this kind of early retirement package, and they did not permit discrimination between different classes of staff. And he made very clear that he thought that was very good idea, that there shouldn't be any such differences. From his point of view, of course, the same plan for both faculty and staff would be convenient because it would avoid criticism from the staff unions, and also would be easier to administer.

But when we made the case to him in the appropriate senate-administrative committees that the faculty is different from other employees in being recruited nationally and internationally, as well as in having intrinsic interest in their work, many planning to continue their scholarship after formal retirement, and therefore that the VERIP conditions might be written somewhat differently to reflect their situation, he said that his hands were tied by the federal regulations, and therefore there was no point in taking this to the president. It was a settled matter, because of the federal regulations.

Since the assurance was so categorical, we on the council were inclined to accept the situation as Brady described it. But somewhat by accident I actually talked to a distinguished professor of law in the university who was knowledgeable about this issue. And this man said, "No, that's not true." That in fact this issue had been discussed in Washington. The agencies in Washington had told the university that, yes, as a broad matter of policy they planned to write that kind of regulation, but were not planning to implement it for some years. But they had not in fact introduced that regulation; the idea of not permitting different arrangements for different classes of employees was in abeyance for three to five years. It would not be affecting the existing retirement packages being developed by organizations all over the country. So Brady was not constrained from developing a package specifically for the senate. I believe that he knew that.

Lage: He is a smart man.

Trow: Oh, he is very, very smart. That is partly why he was so valuable to the presidents who employed him. He was the kind of man who could get a lot done, and everybody praised the way he negotiated the terms of the contracts for the energy labs. He was very, very competent in that kind of high level bureaucratic negotiation, in dealing with various interest groups.

But we were, for Brady, merely one interest group among many in the university, a rather small one with pretensions beyond our station, governed like other groups mainly by self-interest. His general pattern was to deal with us as employees in an adversarial way. And very often we would ask for information, but it wouldn't come. He would sit in a meeting without saying anything, or simply not come to the meeting. He would simply stonewall us, his general attitude being that his real business was to get this VERIP thing going, and not spend a lot of time listening to self-interested amateurs who knew nothing about large-scale administration. In some respects, of course, this assessment of the senate was true--but only partly true. But he surely did not want advice on how to shape the VERIPs from us. Useful advice from us would have required that we have full and accurate and timely information. And by the time we knew anything about plans it was usually too late.

A common administrative reply to the senate--this was true even under David Gardner--when we wanted to influence or shape some policy that the administrators took to be their prerogative, was to say to us, "Well, that is a very good idea but things have gone along too far to make any changes. Unfortunately, the decisions on this matter have already been made and for various reasons cannot be changed." Or, "We'd like to do what you suggest, but we're not able to because of some rules or regulations set by authorities outside the university." Or, "We can't do that because there are political constraints"--usually unspecified. These were among the standard answers for why something the senate wanted couldn't happen, and it was hard to challenge them because they often rested on information to which we had no independent access. The council had no analytical staff of its own; all our information about university policy and plans had to be provided by the people in the President's Office, and that is still a problem.

One example of where we successfully challenged an administrative decision had to do with the privacy of academic records, especially letters of recommendations used in connection with academic appointments and promotions. The procedures and criteria for academic appointments and promotions are found in the Faculty Manual, an official document written by the senate. The council was told at one point early in my term as vice chair that the senate had to rewrite our procedures because the courts had already decided that our rules about the confidentiality of the documents in these actions were no longer legally defensible.

We were told that we had to come into compliance with the recent decisions in this area because the university did not want to lose the lawsuits that were bound to be brought challenging our rules. The council was very unhappy about that message, since we believed it would reduce the candor and truthfulness of letters of recommendation, and would profoundly affect the quality of faculty appointments and promotions which depend in good part on the quality of the letters we get, and that requires that they and our own

recommendations remain confidential. We almost bought the administrative position, until Carlton Bovell, then chair of the council, said, "Well, that would amount to preemptive capitulation."

Anyway, we did something which wasn't anticipated. We talked to a number of leading constitutional lawyers around the university; they looked into the matter and then gave us their views. They all said that the way the university saw these matters was not necessarily the way the law was written or being interpreted. And so instead of having to change our faculty personnel document from one week to another, we had a year or more to review the whole question and to come up with a change in policy that had been discussed on the campuses, was acceptable to us and didn't go nearly as far as the original demand made by the Office of the President toward compromising the confidentiality of these personnel files.

The administration's position on this issue was largely driven by bureaucratic convenience. As in other cases, we were being told we had to do something by next Tuesday, and there is not enough time for us to discuss the issue fully. Sometimes the argument was: "We are constrained by political or legal or financial considerations. The university does not have the freedom to do what you want us to do." And sometimes we had to say, "No, that isn't the case; we need to discuss this matter with the relevant senate committees." That was a nuisance to the administrators, but we often could slow down the process and be able to influence the outcome. We had misunderstandings and misinterpretations from other senior administrators, but we didn't get falsehoods or the systematic withholding of information from other administrators. Brady was very angry with me for challenging him, especially in connection with the VERIPs.

Lage: For calling him on things?

Trow: Yes, on VERIP, though in that case not very successfully.

Crafting the Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program [VERIP]

Trow: I recall one of the few times I really spoke up in a meeting of the regents. We on the Academic Council were quite unhappy about the quality of information we were getting on the design of the VERIP contracts, and the degree to which Brady and his office, which was preparing the VERIP [Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program] criteria, were listening to our concerns. We kept pressing and pressing Brady and his assistants for information and input without success. And finally we complained about it to the president, to David Gardner. This was a measure of our confidence in David, who finally gave us to understand that he had certain constraints on him, that Brady really owned the complex details of the VERIP, and so on. So at the meeting when the regents had to pass on this--

Lage: On VERIP?

Trow: On VERIP. The biggest concern the council had was whether there would be some provision for faculty who were taking VERIP to come back if they wished, and be employed in some way, so that we wouldn't lose this very substantial body of senior academics in such a rapid way. We were really concerned that some of these senior people would be there to help socialize the next generation of academics. We did not want VERIP to decapitate the university overnight. It wasn't a question of money. It was a question of whether the university would make it clear that it would like to keep retirees who wanted to be academically active and involved in some way. We didn't have any sense that we had that assurance from Brady, who tended to discourage ideas of returning.

But we also knew that the state and the university budgets were both very tight, and that the VERIPs were crucial to the university's meeting the forthcoming cuts. And so when the regents asked my views before their vote on the VERIPs, since it was so close to the senate's interests, I was very uncomfortable. I told them that I understood that the president and his people had worked very hard on this matter, and that there were really very pressing financial and time pressures. And therefore I would not make a formal statement of objection to the proposal. The council--and of course I had cleared this with them--is not going to come out and urge you to not pass this. I went on to say, however, that we do not feel that we have been adequately consulted in relation to this matter. That is all I could say.

Well, some of the regents expressed their sympathy; our problems with Brady would have been no surprise to them. But they went ahead and passed the relevant motions.

I doubt if a stronger statement by the council would have defeated the proposal, and I don't know what effects that would have had. I have thought about this often since that day. We could not write the contracts ourselves; what we wanted was the consultation with Brady that constitutes "shared governance." But we didn't get it from him.

Lage: Was this because of your loyalty to Gardner, that you didn't want to oppose the VERIP?

Trow: Well, it was partly loyalty to Gardner, or rather confidence in his judgment, and partly loyalty to the university. I thought that the university was in very deep trouble financially. It needed the VERIPs to meet its considerable financial problems. VERIP was one part of a general package of how to deal with the deficits at the time, which were really quite serious.

It would have been a very, very serious act to say to the regents: "Despite the president's recommendation to you, we urge that you not do it." First of all, I didn't think they would take our recommendation over Gardner's, though it might have affected the vote of a few regents. So it would have been a kind of empty symbolic statement and would have seriously affected our relations with the president. I mean, he would not expect that we would oppose him in that way and at that time without warning. His policy for regents' meetings, from them as from us, was: "No surprises." We had been making unhappy noises about VERIP, but we hadn't had enough detailed information to make the kind of serious arguments that would have been necessary for our intervention to be anything more than symbolic.

Besides which, he had a million other things on his mind at that time and I'm not sure that the details of the forms of retirement were going to be the kind of things on which he would have backed us. He tended to say, "That is Brady's business." It was a whole package, you see. And also, Brady may well have told him that there were legal constraints that I spoke of earlier. I think Brady may have lied to him as well as to us, because I raised this matter with David after the fact. I said, "He lied to us about several things." And David conveyed to me that he did not know the facts either.

So to make our case we would have had to go into a long statement to the regents, and formally accuse Brady on the floor there of lying to us, or of withholding relevant information. And the Catch-22 was that we needed the information he withheld to credibly charge him with withholding information. Well, unless you're very well prepared to make those charges, you better not do it. And after all that, it probably would not have reversed the regents' decision. We might have asked them to postpone their decision for a month, but matters would still have remained in Brady's hands. And there really were time constraints. I must say, I got on Brady's nerves enough so that at one point in the meeting, he came by and whispered a fiercely hostile few phrases in my ear.

All this showed me that "shared governance" depended on the administration's willingness to consult with the council. Where administrators did not want to do that and withheld information we were essentially powerless. In this case "shared governance" didn't work.

Relationship of the Academic Council to the Administration

Trow: Ron Brady was not at all happy with what I had done. I didn't care about that. But the Academic Council was in an awkward position. Essentially we said to the regents, "We're not going to support this, but we're not going to oppose it either." I'm sure we looked like wimps, and in a sense we were, in not taking on a senior administrator out of control. But as I said to the regents in my swan song when I left office, "The regents and the faculty are very similar in that we are part-time, unpaid members of the governance system here. We leaders of the senate, like the regents, are amateurs dealing with full-time professionals, and we are, therefore, dependent on them for a lot of things, especially information. The general lesson is that a group of part-time academics without a staff were and are no match for full-time well-staffed professionals on issues like VERIP involving not just academic principles but issues of law, politics and university and state finances. On such matters we know what the administration chooses to tell us, and for Brady that wasn't very much. The lesson is that we have to understand the sharp limits to the senate's capacity to get anything done without the administration's readiness to support us and listen to us."

For my understanding of all this I drew on my reading in the history of universities. Universities originated as guilds of craftsmen, and for centuries developed that way. Internally they were neither hierarchical nor bureaucratic. They were essentially groups of equals who got together and named a part-time chairman to lead and represent them, not to

employ them. And I was a chair of a committee of academics, the Academic Council, just as I would have been in a guild of shoemakers in the fourteenth century. And so were the regents. They were much the same kind of guild that you can see in Rembrandt's pictures of the militia bands, which were roughly military guilds, a group of twenty-five or thirty men in their ceremonial uniforms who just loved clubbing together from time to time.

And it was that same kind of clubbing together that we see in the Academic Council --also a small group of amateurs. There are of course enormous differences between the regents and the Academic Senate, in power and responsibilities, but in relation to the Office of the President there are remarkable similarities.

Lage: What was your message to the regents in this? What were you trying to get across? Did you foresee some problems or reforms?

Trow: No, I didn't foresee problems in that way. I was just trying to clarify the nature of our relationship with the administration--the fact that we were highly vulnerable to what we were told by the pros. I was particularly concerned then about the role of the university's general counsel. The university general counsel--Jim Holst--reported both to the regents and to the president, and there was a sense on the part of the president that there was a conflict of interest. Our sense was that, in so far as the counsel reported both to the president and the Board of Regents, we could call on the counsel's assistance if we had difficulties with the president or somebody in the president's office. Our view was that the university counsel was responsible to the regents who were responsible for the whole university. And that included the faculty.

And during this difficult period Holst gave me some help in trying to dig out the truth about the legal context of VERIP. If he were reporting solely to the president, I could not assume he would provide the Academic Council any help in any argument we might have with one of the senior university administrators. So the change in the organization which happened after I left that office, making the university counsel reporting to the president and to the board, was in a way a loss to the Academic Council.

On the other hand, even then the counsel was very disinclined to have a fight with Brady. And if you were a member of anyone on the president's staff, you would be very disinclined to have a fight with Brady because he was a very rough customer. And the presidents were terribly dependent on him, and in a fight would be more likely to back him rather than any opponent.

More on Ron Brady--His Strengths

Lage: Both Peltason and Gardner spoke so glowingly of Ron Brady and his abilities--

Trow: Exactly. He was very able, and very helpful to the presidents. It was just everybody else who disliked him. It was known that regents disliked him because he lied to and misled

them too. Their view, expressed by some, was, "Well, maybe he is a bastard. But he is our bastard." I went in to complain about Brady to Jack, speaking for the council, after Jack came on. One of the earliest things I said to Jack was, "You know, you've got a guy here who is strongly disliked, not just by me, but throughout this building." I may have exaggerated out of my own feelings, but my impression was that everybody in that thousand-member Office of the President who had to deal with him, disliked Brady because he treated them like vermin. He treated them, really, much like he treated us, except that they were employees, you see. He tried to treat us as if we were employees, and we never really accepted that. But Jack said to me, "You know, I came in here and found a lot of problems. And I rang my bell to find somebody who'd help me with the problems, and he was the only person who came in." Metaphorically speaking. "If I had a difficult problem he would come in and help me."

Jack and he had a relationship going back to Illinois, so they were friends from way back and I always chalked his loyalty to Brady partly up to that. But the presidents didn't have the problems that everybody else in the university had with Ron.

Lage: Right, Brady was seen from a different perspective.

Trow: That is right. To the presidents he was somebody who could grasp the essence of a bureaucratic problem and actually get something done, who could come up with creative solutions and bull his way through the morass and delays of amateur clubs like the Academic Senate. He could also deal in a tough and effective way with unions, and with government bureaucracies--be a tough operator and actually accomplish things. One of his big assignments was to negotiate the contract and then deal with the Department of Energy in relation to the university's oversight of the energy labs. In that arena he was a tough bureaucratic infighter. And given his effectiveness, both Gardner and Peltason were prepared to live with the degree of discontent that Brady generated in the regents, in the rest of the central administration, and in the council--though I'm not sure they knew how widespread that hostility to Brady was. I suspect that not many people complained about him to the presidents.

Anyway, I was glad to know that I bothered his group so much that his chief assistant once e-mailed another vice president with the message: "Look, Trow is public enemy number one around here. Don't give him the time of day"--that is to say, don't give me any information that I might be seeking. That was in the days when people still thought that e-mails were private documents. But this other vice president disliked Swartz as much as I did, and gave me a copy of the e-mail. And I showed it to the president. And he laughed.

Lage: Was this Peltason or Gardner?

Trow: This was Gardner. And he just laughed. Because what is he going to do, fire Brady because his assistant called me public enemy number one? Anyway, I wore that accolade as a mark of distinction.

Lage: How did you like the other people in the president's office? William Frazer or Baker?

Trow: I had very little to do with [Bill] Baker. The council had to do mainly with Frazer and [Lawrence] Hershman. I liked Larry Hershman. We saw a lot of him, especially in connection with the necessity to make sudden and deep budget cuts during the recession the state was going through. Larry actually told us a good deal about what was going on in the relations of the university to the state, and what the implications of those negotiations were having on the university's budget. Without that information the council could not develop any views or positions; we would be blind.

Larry seemed to really enjoy his job and liked to talk about it. For example, he liked to come up with solutions to problems and then explain them to other people and have other people admire them. And that was a very familiar matter to the academics on the council -- that is what academics do all the time. Now Brady, by contrast, was a pure bureaucrat. He didn't give a damn what we thought of him so long as somebody above him thought well of him. He was concerned with how the president thought of him, not with how the faculty thought of him. Hershman, by contrast, was always ready to talk and try to lay the budget situation out for us, and explain the nature of problems and reasons for decisions.

Lage: And he worked on the budget and--

Trow: Well, the budget, of course, was central. And he owned it so far as coming up with solutions to its problems, so far as I could see. We assumed he spoke with the voice of the president. So we could negotiate with him, and what we agreed would actually happen.

The Budget Crisis and Negotiation of the VERIP

Trow: During the budget crisis we had regular meetings with Larry and maybe one or two of his assistants. And during that critical time of having to decide how to meet these shortfalls, only myself, the vice chair, Elliot Brownlee and maybe one of the relevant committee members would meet with him to actually thrash out an agreement on how the cuts should be achieved. The president's formula was that everybody in the university should suffer in this crisis in some roughly equivalent way. And Hershman could come up with the kind of solution that seemed plausible, fair and reasonable. I have no reason yet to think it wasn't.

The idea was that in some rough and ready way, a third of the required cut in the budget should come from university administration, a third from the faculty, and a third from the students by way of increases in tuition. And on the backs of envelopes, we wrote figures representing millions and tens of millions of dollars. We would figure out what level of cut would be required to close the gap: how big a tuition increase, how big a cut in administrative staff, and what to do about salaries and VERIPs. And the faculty's relationship of trust in that administration was such that in the worst year for the university budget the senate accepted a salary cut.

Lage: A cut?

Trow: A cut.

Lage: Not just a cut in the rate of increase?

Trow: No. A cut in absolute salaries. However, what happened was that some of this was made up from the university's retirement system which was heavily in excess of actuarial requirements when the budget was contracting. The retirement system had been so well managed that it could easily cover the big increase in the number of pensioners arising out of the VERIPs without danger to its integrity. Most of the retirees could get pretty good golden handshakes at this time, and they got to be more golden from VERIP I to II and from VERIP II to III. But also, the active faculty, the non-retirees, were able to accept a cut of 2 or 2.5 percent from their salaries, while by administrative sleight of hand something very nearly equivalent to that cut was added to their retirement funds. So while the faculty appeared to lose some money from their pay in the short run--when the university needed the saving--they had it back eventually. The compensation sum was invested in each person's own retirement account with the rest of the pension funds--a kind of forced savings.

It turns out that the faculty who took that cut eventually got more money because their retirement fund was so well invested. Nonetheless, it was a cut from their take-home salaries, and helped with that year's university budget. But not everyone saw or understood the compensating addition to their retirement fund.

If the university had been dealing with an academic union rather than the Academic Senate, a union probably couldn't have accepted that salary cut. Union officials would have been under terrific pressure to reject it. Under those conditions the council would also have been under pressure to reject the cut. But without having to look over our shoulder at a faculty union, as members of the council we were persuaded that a salary cut and an offsetting retirement investment under those circumstances made sense, and we could accept it without serious criticism in the senate. And basically that is because while we represented the faculty, we did so while defending the interests of the university as a whole; we were not just a special interest.

We in the council were concerned particularly about the effect of this cut on the newest assistant professors, for whom the loss of 2 percent of their take-home might make a difference. I can't recall the details, but on our insistence some provision was made for them so that their cut was smaller or maybe voided altogether. There weren't many of them and it didn't amount to a lot of money. Hershman was very good at being able to say, "Well, there are this many assistant professors in their first three years, and that cut from their salaries would amount to such a sum." He was able to pull these broad figures out, and present them in the context of the overall budgetary crisis.

So again, on the back of envelopes we were able to come to agreements. Then we would present those provisional agreements to the Academic Council as a whole. During my time on the council we did not have any serious disagreement about any major issues of this kind. If that sounds implausible, remember that we were in a grave crisis, involving deep budget cuts and specific and constant negotiations with the governor and legislative

committees. These were areas managed almost wholly by the president and his senior staff. We could not dispute the fundamental issue of how large the cuts would be; that was taken as given. All we could do was express our views on how the cuts should be distributed with least damage to the university. The council could accept the plans that came out of our conversations with Gardner and Hershman because its members trusted their leadership, they trusted Gardner and Hershman, and the arrangements that we worked out with them were accepted without serious controversy. It helped that we did not have factions, and that we had overcome what had existed previously--and I gather has reemerged since: the new campus versus old campus cleavage. We didn't have any differences on that score at all.

Lage: On those issues [of inter-campus rivalry].

Trow: No.

Lage: Ordinarily that is a strong line of cleavage.

Trow: Well, that had been the case, but it wasn't during the time I was there, and it's not clear to me why it was not.

Lage: So you sold VERIP to the Academic Council. Then did the Academic Council members sell it to their respective campuses?

Trow: Well, we have to distinguish between accepting a one time across the board salary cut, and "selling" VERIP. The salary cut was accepted because it was well received in Sacramento, as evidence of the faculty accepting some of the pain of the cuts. As I have said, the actual loss to each faculty member was more than made up by the "forced saving" of a roughly similar sum as an addition to each senate member's pension account, which while not trumpeted, became quickly understood throughout the university.

VERIP was a different matter. For one thing, VERIP involved a voluntary act by individual faculty, while the salary cut affected everybody and was not voluntary. VERIP was the major instrument the university had for dealing with the budget cuts, substantially reducing the costs of instruction by encouraging and rewarding the accelerated early retirements through the use of the overflowing pension funds. It continued, as you know, for three years, each plan with slightly different and improving conditions and effects. We could see that there really was no practical alternative to the VERIPs, at least the first two, and so the council focussed on the relation of the new cadres of emeriti to the university, some of them quite young for retirees. We were concerned, of course, with the details of the buy-out for early retirement, which finally were quite generous on the whole, but where we had the most difficulty getting information from V.P. Brady and our views through to him.

On the other hand, we were also concerned about the impact of the sudden loss of so many distinguished scholars and scientists from the university, many of them still highly creative and productive, and a source of the university's high standing in the universe of higher education around the world. The council therefore tried to develop procedures and

policies that would allow those emeriti who wanted to remain active in teaching and research to continue to do so. Broadly that was also the policy of the president's office. But on the whole we failed in that. The relation of individual faculty members to the university was really retained strongly by their departments and schools, who wanted no interference from O.P. or the council. So each campus and each department developed its own policies ad hoc for each faculty member, without constraint by any overall university policy. And that may have been better than what we were trying to do.

As for how the council "sold" VERIP to the campuses: half its members were chairs of their divisions, and the other half were chairs of various leading campus senate committees, so they surely brought the news back to their own campuses, and then their reactions back to us. When it was clear that the VERIPs were going ahead, my concern was how much and what its main provisions would be. That took a lot of time in these early breakfast meetings with Hershman. He might have one assistant with him, and I and one or two others, always including Elliot Brownlee, from the council would go over the figures and try to figure out what was right and what was fair, and what the effects on the university would be.

Lage: And it was a good relationship.

Trow: Well, it was very good. The crucial thing was that the council had a basic trust in Gardner. We felt that, on the whole, he was looking out for our interests.

Lage: Did Gardner appear, at this time, to participate in the VERIP negotiations?

Trow: No, he didn't get involved with us in the details of the way to handle the deficit, though what he did in his private meetings with his own staff of course I do not know. My sense is that Gardner's role here would be to say to the regents: We will meet the deficit on the principle of "equal pain." Equal pain to be felt by the three branches of the university: administration, faculty, and students. And he sold the same idea to the regents, and I guess to his own staff, and to the students, as well as to the senate. But he did not go into defining "equal" in terms of dollars or proportions of the deficit to be closed. There again only the president and his staff customarily saw the university as a whole; the senate, part-timers and amateurs as we were, could not challenge their figures, which accounted for the importance of trust.

Always, the key issue in the relation of the senate to the president is the degree of trust on both sides. The senate has to accept much of its understanding of the problems facing the university, and the facts surrounding university policy, from the president and staff--it does not have the time or the resources to do its own staff work. So trust is crucial. David had ours, and that meant a great deal in our relationship.

Perhaps because of this, the council had been very comfortable with the president, despite the published attacks on his retirement package, partly because they understood that the details of the "scandal" weren't quite as they had been reported. At one of our very last meetings, David came to say good-bye to us on his retirement from the university. We had known he was coming, and I was authorized by the council to propose a vote of confidence

and general thanks to David for his work with the council. It is on the record somewhere, but also everybody on the council chipped in and we got him a print of Berkeley and the university site from the University Archives. Berkeley is close to his heart, and the print is a photograph taken in 1873 from the hills toward the Bay, showing South Hall but North Hall was not there yet. It is a beautiful print. We had it mounted properly, and gave it to him. So that is a measure of our feeling. It was a very warm meeting; various members of the council made short statements of gratitude and support to David--mind you, this at the height of the controversy and attacks on the president.

David Gardner Proposes a New Campus in the Midst of a Budget Crisis

Lage: Were there other issues, like new campuses, that came up on the Academic Council?

Trow: Well, yes. There was the question of the tenth campus which at that time nobody believed in, except Gardner.

Lage: He wanted three new campuses.

Trow: He did, looking at the demographics of the state, and the second tidal wave of students ahead. But here you were in a deep recession, cutting budgets, with no prospect of getting the billions of dollars needed for one new campus. On the other hand, there were political as well as demographic factors involved. The Valley was increasingly influential in the legislature, and the only part of the state with a sizeable population that did not have a UC campus. And that was a powerful motivation to show some movement in that direction, even if the money were not immediately forthcoming. Therefore, in the middle of this recession a search committee for a site was appointed to make recommendations to the president. I was a member of that committee by virtue of chairing the Academic Council.

It was one of the most enjoyable parts of my time on the council because I actually got to see parts of California that otherwise I'd never have seen, off the main roads, back into parts of California that had not yet been developed. We did tours of three sites that had already been winnowed down from the large number with which they had started. The teams were largely made up of O.P. planners, just as if we were ready to start building, which seemed to be a perfectly reasonable thing to do. Nobody was jumping ahead, committing money we didn't have, but it seemed prudent to at least find and acquire a site for when and if a tenth campus became feasible.

Lage: It wasn't divisive on the council?

Trow: Not at all. No, the council saw no real issue; no one raised the question of where the money would come from, or whether it would be at the expense of the existing campuses, which might have been reasonable questions for the senate to have raised. The whole question of a tenth campus seemed rather abstract to us, a long way off. We weren't going to even have

to pay for the land, remember; the university assumed that the owners of whatever site we chose would cheerfully give it to the university.

Lage: You mean, that one site that was chosen?

Trow: Oh no, we expected that of any of the sites that we chose. I think that the university doesn't, as a matter of principle, buy the land on which it sites new campuses. The financial and other gains that accompany a new UC campus to nearby landowners and communities are so great as to make owners and communities compete fiercely for the privilege of giving the university the two or three thousand acres it requires for a new campus. And this one certainly was fiercely competed for. The three sites were all going to be contributed. But this plan foundered on the problems of acquiring the most highly favored site, Table Mountain, toward Fresno. The problem there was that there were too many owners, so you couldn't get agreement among them for a gift of the whole site.

Lage: Did you agree with the final selection of the site, or were you involved when the actual selection was made?

Trow: On the site which we eventually recommended, the site near Merced where we are now going ahead, my views were the same as the staff people's. It is a good site, with great potential. But we first tried to get Table Mountain. We spent time there, talked to the various owners, looked at the maps and saw the difficulties on the ground. And so, failing that, my preference and the staff people's were identical in the ultimate recommendation for the site. One could raise many questions about whether we ought to expand on traditional campuses, or not, but that is another issue, a fundamentally political issue on which the council was not consulted.[4]

The President and the Chancellors; Jack Peltason's Appointment to the Presidency

Lage: One thing you had mentioned was the balance of power between the Office of the President and the chancellors' offices. Do you want to comment on that?

Trow: Well, the two successors to David Gardner were both chancellors before becoming president. Both [Jack Peltason and Richard Atkinson] saw the world through chancellorian glasses. After Gardner, under both successors, there was a major transfer of power and authority out of the president's office to the chancellors, a transfer which took many forms. To my mind the event which symbolizes this is that under David Gardner the Council of Chancellors was advisory. He would never permit them to meet until he called them together.

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[4]The three sites considered were Table Mountain in Madera County (near Fresno), Lake Yosemite (near Merced), and Fresno County, east of Clovis.

Lage: They couldn't meet as a group unless--

Trow: Without Gardner calling them together. And when he called them together, he never asked them to vote. He and I have talked about this. He would tell them what was going on, the issues facing the university, and then get their input. I never sat in on those meetings, but he told me about them. By contrast, it is my understanding that when Jack Peltason met with the chancellors on an issue early in his presidency, he asked for a show of hands and indicated that he was bound by that. And that instantly changed the relationship between the president and the chancellors.

Lage: Now, how did you hear about this? Because you weren't involved at that point either.

Trow: I did overlap in office some months into Jack's presidency. Maybe Jack told me that. But I have spoken with people who know about how the relations between presidents and the chancellors have changed over time. I should add, by the way, that this is no criticism of Jack's way of serving in the presidency, but just to note that it was different from David's, and has changed the relation between the Office of the President and the campuses. It may not be necessary to say that I know, respect and very much like Jack, and believe he served the university well in every office he held.

There was one thing that I was going to talk to you a little about, which was the election of Jack to the presidency of the university. And this is the only time when the issue of confidentiality of our conversation comes up. I wouldn't care who read what I have said so far. But I was involved deeply in the appointment of Jack Peltason in a process that was confidential. And considering the false rumors that still float around that appointment, it has remained confidential. Indeed, it is clear that even the regents did not know the process that lay behind our recommendation to them of Jack Peltason. The truth should be on record somewhere.

I believe that the ground rules for the appointment of a president to succeed David had been established in connection with the appointment of David Gardner to the presidency, but possibly earlier, when David Saxon was appointed. What happened on Gardner's resignation was that the Academic Council was asked--I was asked--to appoint a screening committee to do the heavy lifting in the search for Gardner's successor. The senate's screening committee, as defined in the earlier search, was to consist of twelve members, one member from each campus, plus the chair and vice chair of the council, plus one more. For this last I named Carlton Bovell, my immediate predecessor as chair of the council. All were to be members of the senate, but no one with an administrative appointment was eligible. The ten members other than the chair and vice chair were to be appointed by the chair of the council.

The senate committee actually did the search, collected all the names of candidates, however nominated, then screened them, doing the necessary research on each. Of course, as the numbers narrowed down the research on each surviving candidate became much more intensive--we went beyond paper qualifications to the formal and informal recommendations of people who knew the candidate--in many cases involving one or more of the search and screening committee in phone calls to people they knew who also knew

the candidate and could speak frankly and from direct experience about him or her. The regents also appointed a special subcommittee which would get the senate's recommendation and then would make its own recommendation to the full Board of Regents.

Lage: So the work of your screening committee came first?

Trow: That's right. Well, of course, several things happened. In the conversations with David, and informally with some regents, we were given to understand that there was a strong disposition, under these difficult circumstances, to find somebody from inside the university. There was not a lot of time to make an appointment; moreover the issue of David's retirement package was blowing up. What we needed was somebody to restore a good relationship with Sacramento, a relationship which had been severely strained.

Lage: I think I'm correct about the sequence, Jack Peltason was appointed before all the retirement stuff was disclosed.

Trow: Well, of course it was all known inside the board and to myself and Elliot. And I think the main outlines of the problem may have been known by the council and the senate screening committee. I know that when the council met with David before he left office and gave him a vote of confidence, the scandal had already blown up.

Lage: Oh, I know that, but I'm thinking that Peltason had been selected earlier.[5]

Trow: Well, let me tell you how Peltason was selected. Regarding the selection of the members of the senate's screening committee: We looked primarily for someone from each campus who had good sense, experience, and respect of the members of the senate members on his/ her own campus. Beyond that, within this group of nine, we tried to have various perspectives represented. We made sure to have scientists, professional people, humanists and social scientists, both men and women, and some minority members. But the main criterion was their good judgment in the opinion of the people who nominated them. Some were members of the Academic Council, most were not.

The committee turned out to be an excellent one. Asking Elliot Brownlee to chair it was a very good idea because he is an able chair of a committee, and he is very well organized; for example, he came to the meetings with his early laptop, and kept records of the discussions and of candidates and how far they had been investigated right on the computer. That meant that it was instantly available when anybody wanted to know what we had been saying, and what we knew about each of the candidates. The management of our search, the list of candidates, their paper qualifications, what people said about them, and our own discussions and decisions about them, were all in that laptop, and it greatly improved our work, as well as speeding it up.

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[5]Jack Peltason's selection was announced on April 4th, 1992; the details of the retirement package (agreed to in March) were made public a few days later. --A.L.

We met with the assumption that we would produce a short list of three or four names to send to the regents' committee. And we met, and considered all kinds of people who were nominated, and self nominated, and regentially nominated. But we weren't bound by those nominations; we could go out and ask people to allow themselves to be considered.

So we spent several months, meeting frequently as small groups and larger groups, assigning clusters of names of candidates to different members of the committee for research about them, finding out who knew somebody--the candidates themselves or people in their university campuses or other people who would know them, accumulating information beyond their paper qualifications. So a lot of phoning was done, in a very informal way, to get leads, to get information about these people. For example, we wanted to find out how effective they seemed to be on their own campuses in the opinions of who had to work with them; what their strengths and weaknesses were, et cetera. Reports were made back to our whole screening committee. We had initially three or four hundred names to work through this way, though of course many were clearly unqualified at a glance.

Lage: And were you concentrating on the university?

Trow: No, we were not. We were absolutely resolved to include some outside names. Well, we kept boiling it down. And in the course of time the question came up of internal candidates. Now there has been a widespread rumor. I've heard it from any number of people but I've never bothered to correct them, that the leading candidates were Chuck Young and Dick Atkinson, that they both had very strong support but in a way that cancelled each other out, and that Jack was a kind of compromise candidate. Nothing could be further from the truth. Neither Chuck Young nor Dick were ever serious candidates for inclusion on our short list. Each had one or two supporters in this senate screening committee, but even that support did not last long in the face of the clear lack of support in the committee as a whole. For quite different reasons they were not seen as viable. Jack Peltason was, in a sense, the only viable internal candidate from the very beginning. But he didn't know that. In fact, Jack Peltason was the leader of the Chuck Young lobby, and helped organize support around the country for his candidacy.

Lage: So was he the only Chuck Young supporter?

Trow: Well, he wasn't on our committee, of course.

Lage: I know.

Trow: Young had supporters on his own campus, one or two on our committee, and also a vigorous nationwide lobby. But frankly the committee didn't like the idea of a lobby. A president shouldn't solicit that job, he ought to be asked to take it. So we had some letters of support for Young from outside the university. But I don't think the lobby would have affected us one way or another if we liked the candidate. Charles Young was never a serious candidate.

Lage: Why was he not a serious candidate?

Trow: Well, he had made a lot of enemies. And as we learned later, though we did not know it during our deliberations, he was never a serious candidate for the Board of Regents. The regents had scratched him off. We had our own reasons for not choosing him. We felt that he was very difficult and arrogant, an awkward person to have to deal with. With a violent temper, and the occasional readiness to shoot from the hip, as in his remark to Regent Hallisey, "Thank God you're finished in July." There were concerns about how he would deal with the legislature.

Among the regents, I gathered, some of them didn't like him because there had been some very big problems with the medical school down there at UCLA, and other problems with his administration as well. Other regents wondered why UCLA never was able to create a Silicon Valley South. They thought that UCLA had been very slow in connecting with the new high tech industries, and that Young hadn't taken the necessary initiative, and so on. I have no idea whether those charges were true or not. I had no views on his competence down there. I know that he was rather popular with his own faculty. But with anyone else who knew him, he wasn't really a viable candidate. And he was certainly not a healer. So that was an issue.

I recall a spirited defense of Young from the UCLA representative, which had little or no resonance in the rest of the committee. As soon as it was clear that Young would not have a significant number of votes, it was only a matter of giving his supporter the courtesy of a full hearing and a chance to bring people over to his views. That did not happen, and in fact we gave him enough time to irritate people who were not supporting Young. I personally did not like Young, and may even have spoken against him, though I cannot remember that.

Lage: Do you think UCLA Chancellor Young's furious reaction to Peltason's being appointed affected Peltason's style as president?

Trow: No, I don't think Young had any effect on Jack's performance as president. The irony of course is that Jack had nothing to do with Young not becoming president; in fact, he continued to be Young's strongest supporter right to the end, and no one could have been more surprised than Jack when he was selected. After the appointment I just saw in Young a bitterly disappointed man who believed passionately that he deserved the appointment, and no one else did. After Peltason's appointment they threw Young a bone, they made him chairman of a transition committee. I was also appointed to that transition committee and we sat around chatting about the future, knowing perfectly well that those decisions were going to be made by the new president. But Chuck never really forgave Jack, I think, for becoming president.

Lage: I just wondered if that appointment affected the balance of power in the council?

Trow: No, I don't think so. Not within the council--in my time there wasn't much competition for power in the council, or anything you could identify as a balance of power there. But

Gardner's leaving I think did affect the power of the council in the university, as I mentioned above. By and large, the council's power is a reflection of the president's power.

Dick Atkinson was not on our list for other reasons. He had the strong support of the senate committee member from San Diego. But while there was no real opposition to Dick, there was still concern then about some old scandals in his life. I had no feelings against Atkinson, and would have cheerfully accepted his name for our recommendation if he had had the support on the committee. But he did not have that. We did not dwell on his candidacy, partly because of a mildly bad conscience at allowing this old scandal to affect our decision in the absence of any real feeling on our part that it should be a criterion in our choice. The past scandal lost Atkinson support, not because anybody thought it would make him a bad president but because we were all leery of what the newspapers would make of it when his appointment inevitably revived the memory. Remember how sensitive we were at the time about press reactions to the UC presidency. So that was an issue. It may not even have been an issue at that time--only three years later no one brought it up when Atkinson was finally named president. But getting back to our recommendation regarding the successor to Gardner, it turned out finally that on our short list there was only one internal candidate.

Lage: And that was Jack Peltason?

Trow: Yes. And two outside people, both of whom quickly made clear they weren't going to take the job. I am sure that some regents were surprised at the absence of Young and Atkinson from our list of recommended candidates, and spoke privately to some of the senate screening committee members about them. But in the end the regents took our recommendation and quickly acted on it.

Lage: In effect, were you saying, "This is who we want, Jack Peltason"?

Trow: We did, with a very strong recommendation. We were told not to rank them, but we did rank them. Jack was that committee's recommendation, a very strong recommendation. This is the first time I've ever told this to anybody. But it is at odds with what is generally believed.

The regents' committee accepted our recommendation because I don't think the other candidates were viable to them. So if you really were looking for an internal person, Jack was it. The best evidence for the link between our recommendations and the regents' views was how quickly Peltason was elected after our recommendation went to the regents' committee. The speed with which they acted surprised everybody, including then-President Gardner, as he notes in his own oral history; the news caught up with him while he was away on a trip to China and Korea.

Lage: Now, would the regents have to accept the committee's recommendation?

Trow: No, no. They could have said, "No, we don't like these people. Go back and give us some other names." They could have thrown the recommendation back to us for other names, but they wouldn't have appointed somebody without running it through us.

Lage: They wouldn't have gone and said, "You didn't put Chuck Young on the short list"?

Trow: They could have done. They could have said, "Reconsider." But I think that, by the understanding at the time, we had a veto. They would not appoint somebody whom we didn't recommend, or at least was on our short list. If they had said, "Reconsider," I'm still not sure that we would have reconsidered Young. But if they said, "We want Chuck very much," I don't know, we might have. I mean he wasn't absolutely precluded. But if they had said they didn't like any of our candidates, we certainly would have gone back to others on our expanded list of candidates.

Lage: But from what you tell me, they weren't going to say that.

Trow: No, that's right. That is exactly right.

Lage: What was it about Jack Peltason that you felt--

Trow: Well, he had been successful at Irvine. He didn't have an enemy in the world. If you know Jack, he's not a person who makes enemies. He's intelligent, able, capable. He was getting on in age. I made the point that we have to re-examine our criteria about competence and age. We didn't know if he'd take the job, but we certainly thought that he'd be a great guy. Various people said, "We're talking three years. A transition. We just need a healer right now." He's a well-known political scientist--half or three quarters of the political scientists in this country were weaned on his book. He wrote one of the most popular political science textbooks in the country, and a lot of people who knew his writings were up in Sacramento. He never had any enemies up there. There were a lot of things going for him. He knew the UC system.

I have the greatest regard for Jack and I don't think we made a mistake, although, from my own point of view, I thought he went a bit too far in weakening the president's office, and I deeply disagreed with his affirmative action policies. But those are absolutely open and forthright disagreements. And we remain good friends.

David Gardner's Handling of the Affirmative Action Issue

Trow: The issue of race preferences or affirmative action illustrates Gardner's style, as well as the limits of regental power when it is resisted by the president and all the chancellors, as it was on this issue under Peltason. During Gardner's tenure in office the discrepancy between the university's policy based on the then governing Supreme Court decision, the *Bakke* case, and the actual practice on the campuses, was not generally known. It only surfaced during Peltason's presidency, and led through the leadership of Regent Ward Connerly to SP1 and SP2 and eventually to Proposition 209. The president and chancellors fiercely opposed the changes in university policy, despite the evidence that they had been out of compliance with the previous *Bakke* policies. And they continued to criticize the

new policies, publicly and privately, after they were passed by the regents, as did the large affirmative action communities on all the campuses.

The chancellors were behaving quite inappropriately on those occasions. But they were not censured by the regents, because chancellors and the president were unanimous in their opposition to the regents' actions, at least publicly. The regents I believe were shocked by the fierce reaction of administrators to the ending of race preferences, and disinclined to press matters with their senior administrators. Thus the chancellors were able to respond to the sentiments and pressures of their own staff members and the affirmative action communities on their own campuses rather than the now toothless regents. On that issue, at least until Prop. 209 was passed and got the regents off the hook, the regents were simply not making university policy on affirmative action. Indeed, they never did recover their authority on that issue, or ever tried to enforce SP 1 and 2 on their campuses, but left it to 209 and the courts.

On an ideological issue like affirmative action, the real power in the university lies with the administrators and staff people, and the activist communities who can cause a chancellor a lot more trouble on a day-to-day basis than the regents can.

David Gardner once captured the affirmative action issue in a classic way. He was being badgered again by Willie.

Lage: [Speaker of the House] Willie Brown?

Trow: Yes. With whom he had a warm personal relationship.

But to get back to the affirmative action story, when Willie was badgering Gardner about the numbers of minority people enrolled at the university, David produced a piece of paper in which he showed the numbers of new places in the university every year, the master plan requirement that the university accept the top one out of eight of graduates from California public high schools, the top 12.5 percent. And then he produced the numbers of black and Hispanic students in the state who met the admissions criteria, as compared with the numbers of students from other groups. And he passed the paper over to Willie and he said, "You make up the admissions proportions meeting these constraints."

Lage: What was Willie Brown's reaction?

Trow: He looked at the papers showing the numbers of people that the university admits, the number of blacks who qualify for the 12.5 percent, and he shoved the paper back. And David said Willie never raised this matter with him again. That was a kind of classic Gardner-ish thing to do. Instead of arguing high principle, he supplied the context of hard facts and let his hearer work out the implications. He said to Willie, "You do it." His mantra on this race/ethnicity issue was, "If you think you have a solution, you don't understand the problem." And this is exactly what he meant.

David and Willie were then both caught between the same rock and hard place, so to speak. David was saying to Willie: If you want the top 12.5 percent on meritocratic

grounds, then you couldn't do very much about the absolute numbers of blacks and Hispanics in the university.

Lage: And he also always tied his remarks on the numbers of minority students to the related issue: "We have to have new campuses, because if we have to take fewer than 12.5 percent, we will have even fewer minority students."

Trow: That is absolutely right. So you have to keep expanding the university as the state grows, because you can't cut back the 12.5 percent who are eligible. The other reason was that if you cut back, you'd lose your political support. This was also Clark Kerr's position on that issue.

Lage: Did Gardner keep the issue better managed than Jack Peltason was able to?

Trow: Well, in a way. Although things were coming to a head, anyway. If you want the story of affirmative action in UC you have to talk with Ward Connerly. I have said publicly that what you've read about the events at UC in connection with this issue is mostly not true. And what's true, you haven't read. Because the story about affirmative action at the university was developed by the administrators and public relations people who were almost all opposed to the regents' action.

Faculty Teaching Loads, Rank and Promotion

Trow: Let me go back to the issue of VERIP and the relations of the university to the legislature--this involved the issue of faculty workloads. Some important legislators were pressuring the university to save money during this recession by increasing faculty workloads, thus enabling it to get by with fewer academic personnel. VERIP I and II were put in place at the same time as the council and administrators were talking about faculty workload. In the early nineties faculty workloads on some UC campuses--though not at Berkeley--were declining, despite the cuts in the state's support for our budget.

Lage: Other UC campuses?

Trow: Yes, and that was really a scandal because here we were running up against this budget crunch and various groups around the university were using every opportunity to reduce their workload. The awful pattern was that a department or a school is considered prestigious in relation to how light a teaching workload it can demonstrate. And so, while there was some justification perhaps for some of the sciences to have light workloads since so much of their work is done in labs and graduate work, this habit began to creep over to the social sciences and humanities, for which there is generally no such justification. We were seeing rather shocking things, and we were doing what we could within the Academic Senate. But it also was somewhat embarrassing to the president's office when they were hearing these critical stories about faculty workload up in Sacramento. It was remarkable

that under David Gardner the president's office avoided, almost at all costs, from pressing us in the Academic Senate to discipline our own people.

The president's office was very protective of faculty. Senior administrators would go up to Sacramento and take a lot of flak about this, but they wouldn't come back to us and say, "Why are you senate members making life so difficult for the university?" Which they could certainly have done, and justifiably. What we were seeing then was a fundamental problem in the university; it really was a problem for the local chancellors to manage in cooperation with their senates. It couldn't be done effectively from the president's office. It was part of that delicate relationship between the president and the chancellors. A problem might arise on a campus; the president might hear about it in Sacramento, but he could not do much directly to deal with it.

Lage: Could it be done from the Academic Council?

Trow: Well, I don't think so. We expressed our concerns, but we had little influence directly on any campus except through the divisional chair who was a member of the council. The council dealt with systemwide issues, and not with the problems unique to a specific campus or group of campuses. On the issue of faculty workloads, the council could not do much more than express our concern. And there was universal agreement that it wasn't a good idea to cut workloads during a recession. It was, at the very least, embarrassing to the university. I made some very strong statements about that in the council, and other people did as well.

But the Academic Council had no direct authority relation over the campus divisions. The whole system is a guild without, really, any central or top-down authority. You couldn't ever tell anybody what to do, you had to sort of persuade them. In a few areas did we have a clear measure of authority speaking as the executive body systemwide. One of these was through the wording of the Faculty Handbook which governed the procedures for appointments and promotions on every campus. Even there much depended on how campuses and departments interpreted the rules.

President Gardner made it clear that however much he and his people, including V.P. Frazer, would like to change the terms of the Faculty Handbook, which actually defines all sorts of aspects governing faculty life, they would never do this over our heads. In fact, they would suggest some initiatives and then make clear to us that they hoped that we would concur and maybe implement the suggested change.

For example, there was a strong initiative during my term on the part of Frazer, and some of his assistants--partly for public relations reasons but partly for other reasons--to try to increase the weight of teaching in the process of promotion. Could we rewrite the criteria that the senate appointment committees would have in their hands while making these promotion decisions? That was one of the most carefully worked out, though contentious, issues during my term in office. Several council committees were given this proposal, they took it back to the campuses where they got input. We had several meetings at which this issue was high on the agenda. And this was one of the few cases where there were real votes; most of the issues we dealt with were talked through to a rough consensus.

One of the big issues in this case was that Step 6 of the professorial rank was a high hurdle in the professorial career in UC. As you know, the professorial rank is divided into a number of steps up which academics are promoted over time, in response to their academic productivity and reputations. If a professor was good but not nationally or internationally known, he would hang up at Step 6 and stay there. Step 6 would be a ceiling to his career.

Lage: They would stay at Step 6?

Trow: That is right. It would take something special to get promoted above Step 6; it was formally required that they have national or international reputations in their fields. At that time there were a lot of people who had bumped their heads up against Step 6--over a thousand people were sitting there at Step 6 beyond the ordinary three-year period, leading them to assume that this might be a kind of terminal appointment if they did not gain broader recognition through their scholarship or science. Now, I may say that they weren't exactly poor. We don't have to be very, very sorry for them at Step 6, which at the time carried a salary roughly equal to the very top professorial salaries in the CSU. But nonetheless it blocked further advancement in rank and salary, though of course not the usual range of adjustments for inflation.

Also the precise step of a person's appointment was not public knowledge, they were professors like everybody else; there was no public humiliation, nobody was able to say that they did not have those wider reputations in their fields. But nonetheless for them it was a ceiling. And the question was, would we do away with that Step 6 ceiling altogether, or would we push it up to Step 9 or further? There were a whole series of other possibilities.

But the other question was, would we also rewrite the faculty manual so that promotion wouldn't be based primarily on just research productivity, quality and amount of research, but would also take into account in some way excellence in teaching. A lot of it had to do with the language in the handbook. The administration, responding to what they perceived as pressure from the legislature, and also from other critics, wanted us to change the wording so that teaching would gain equal weight with research and publication. A lot of discussion centered on the question "How could you tell about the quality of the teaching, whereas the quality and quantity of research is easier to assess?"

After a lot of discussion, on the campuses and in the council and its committees, the changes we made were quite modest. We didn't change the Step 6 hurdle. Moreover, it was understood that if teaching was also included as a criterion for promotion beyond Step 6, it would require that a professor's reputation as a teacher be on a national and international basis, the same basis as research, and that almost never happens. If somebody were a great teacher and were known widely as such, (and we could name a few), in their case that would carry a lot of weight, as much as their research. But it's very uncommon for a teacher to be known so widely for his or her teaching, and so teaching remained for most professors a supplementary factor in their promotions.

Now, I think that the way teaching was taken into account varied a lot by field and by faculty and by campus. But fundamentally, the council was very wary of undermining

the basis of the university's international distinction, even for politically correct reasons, if I may put it that way.

Lage: By de-emphasizing research over teaching?

Trow: Yes. The danger would be that you might have a better teaching institution but you wouldn't have a faculty with the kind of international reputation that's based on research. Anyway, I mentioned this to point out that it was, on the whole, a thoroughly civil discussion. People were really divided on it and the matter was discussed on all the campuses. But what was important was that the president's office made it clear that, while they had initiatives and ideas, we owned the words--the words that we produced actually ended up in the Faculty Handbook which is the official guidebook to the procedures and criteria governing appointment and promotion committees. So that illustrates the kind of relationship we had with the administration, and on that basis, you don't want to undermine a president who honors that relationship if you can help it.

Lage: The president's office was recognizing the appropriate separation of spheres.

Trow: That's right, and the president's office was acknowledging that there were certain spheres of university life that were thoroughly the faculty's responsibility. These powers had in fact been granted to the senate in the twenties directly by the regents, but these powers have to be recognized and affirmed by each president. In addition to this really crucial evidence for the principle of shared governance, the president's office gave us continual verbal support when the faculty were the object of intense criticism, some of it even justified. The vice presidents would come in and tell us how important we were, and all that sort of stuff. That certainly helped at the time. That verbal support would not have been helpful if it were not also backed up by clear evidence of the administration's recognition of the nature of shared governance and the separation of powers. By contrast, I cannot recall that Brady ever came and talked with us. He sent an underling, but he never came himself.

The Effect of VERIP on the Faculty

Lage: On VERIP, I hadn't realized that the faculty had been so wary of it from the beginning. I knew VERIP III was a big one.

Trow: Oh, we were very wary of VERIP all along, and especially of VERIP III. And Gardner never approved VERIP III; it was ultimately approved by Peltason after Gardner had left office. Nobody liked it, except perhaps those getting ready to take VERIP, and some of the people struggling with the budget in O.P. Since it was even more favorable than the two earlier ones, it led to the sudden and premature loss of many more distinguished and productive scholars and scientists, many of these on the younger side of retirement age. Of course we were wary.

Lage: Because of the thought of losing Berkeley's senior faculty?

Trow: Absolutely. The effects were felt throughout the university, but especially at Berkeley, whose faculty was on average older anyway.

But if we had to save a lot of money, VERIP was one of the few ways to do it. So in the university there was very little resistance to VERIP. We got more concerned as VERIP went along. But VERIP was a pretty sensible way to save a lot of money in the face of the deep cuts that the university was facing. And some of us believed that many faculty who took VERIP would remain active--we may have imagined this number to be higher than it actually came to be. For them it would be a way of shifting some of their salary on to the pension, which was a clever thing to do. VERIP enabled people in the senate who were themselves very active scholars or scientists to remain active even after their retirement. They really didn't care about where the money came from, so long as you had roughly the same kind of income as you had before. And VERIP, to some important extent, retired people--if they had long service in the university--on roughly the same salary as they were getting while employed.

Lage: And then they could go back and work, at the university or elsewhere.

Trow: That is right. Some of us didn't think of making a second salary; some people did. It depended partly on age and many other things. But we were concerned, really, with the extent to which the university would have in place a series of policies to encourage people to come back, even on a part-time basis after they took VERIP. Our interest was in policies that would not result in a sudden total loss of so many able and distinguished faculty from the university. It turned out that Brady had no such interest. I mean, his view was very simple: employees, when they retire, they retire. He simply never understood the nature of academic life, nor had any interest in understanding it.

When we put this matter to him, Brady talked as if we were out of our minds. "What are you talking about, coming back? You know you can't come back for six months, that's the rules," he said. "If you think you're going to get another salary--." He always thought of this in terms of people trying to get another salary or trying to maneuver to get more money. He just never understood the possibility that scholars are not drawn to it initially for money anyway. They just love it, many people do, and they just love to continue to do their work. He just never understood that, nor that some scholars and scientists are literally irreplaceable. In his view, some old highly paid employees were going to be replaced with younger cheaper employees.

So we never could get a really good policy on recalling newly retired faculty to part-time teaching. We promulgated policies but, without the support of the president's office and the chancellors, they largely went by the board. For example, the council proposed a range of salaries for recalled retired faculty who might continue to teach, but they were mostly ignored on the campus. So despite support from the O.P., policies varied a lot from one campus to another, or didn't exist at all. Once the faculty retired, most of them were gone, and stopped being a source of guidance and wisdom for the younger faculty.

The people who remained in the university didn't have that much of an interest in the VERIP people. Our generation--the older retiring generation--were concerned with what

the loss to the university would be. The younger generation, I think, wondered "How do we best replace them?" So finally, no real policy on "recall" ever came out of the president's office; decisions were made on an individual basis by the individual departments. And maybe that was for the best. It does show how real power on academic personnel is widely distributed in the university, often right down to the department.

I personally have no complaints about how I was treated. We're sitting here in an office which this department is not required to provide me. I know of other retirees who were very much encouraged to stay on, other people less so. The sciences were self-correcting. If a retiree still wrote proposals and got money, he kept the lab. If not, not. But if you couldn't get your research supported, then you wouldn't want to stay active anyway.

A Changing University Community: Adjustments in the Balance of Power

Lage: Do you think it's changed the tenor of the university?

Trow: Oh, the VERIP? Oh, I think it did. I think this university has changed in significant ways. It would all have happened anyway, but it might have changed somewhat more slowly because my generation who took VERIP was still very, very much devoted to the university. What has happened? Well, the expansion of knowledge has meant that science and scholarship has become terribly highly specialized. When I started, I could imagine myself having a broad knowledge of the field of sociology. So even if I had a specialty, I could read any of the work produced by my colleagues and take an interest in it. That is not possible anymore in any subject. We all write for and speak to people in our subdisciplines around the world rather than to our colleagues in other specialties in our departments.

Our links to our professional colleagues are largely through email and international meetings; our linked specialists are called "invisible colleges" made up of people working in fine sub-specialties. That means that your ties to your own university change--they become looser and weaker. One symptom is that people don't use the Faculty Club for lunch with departmental colleagues as much as they did. Formerly it was crowded at lunch time. It's not any more. That change is very, very important for the university.

I don't think that you get the same kind of commitment and devotion to the Academic Senate. This troubles Clark Kerr very much, because he is from an even earlier generation in which the role of the faculty and senate in shared governance was very, very important. I think it just has changed. The university has become so big that it has become highly bureaucratic and managerial, not because the chancellors and president are necessarily more bureaucratic and managerial, but because it takes a big staff to raise and spend large sums, and administer an increasingly big and complex operation. Berkeley raises some $200 million a year in private giving. That started as recently as the middle seventies. Before that, Berkeley didn't raise any private money.

Lage: The chancellor didn't really have a fundraising function.

Trow: He didn't have any--partly because of a gentleman's agreement with Stanford. They lived on private money, we lived on public money. And so if we started to poach on the sources of private money, it would be at their expense. That turned out not to be the case. It turned out that the more we raised, the more Stanford raised. This started under Heyman.

Lage: [Chancellor Ira Michael] Heyman?

Trow: Yes. Heyman started local fundraising in a big way to raise money for the transformation of the biological sciences at Berkeley. Heyman needed to raise money to build some big and expensive biology buildings, and the fundraising from private sources that he initiated continued thereafter. But large sums of private contributions give the chancellors a lot of discretionary money that doesn't go through either the president's office or the budget committee. So the chancellors can make personal commitments to people and departments, just as Chancellor Robert Berdahl made commitments to Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley without going through the Budget Committee at all. The chancellor gets a degree of discretionary power that comes through this fundraising function.

The campus has changed also as a result of its becoming more autonomous, freer from the constraints set by the president's office. And this has weakened the Academic Council. Fundamentally, the council's power was through its role as advisory to the president and the regents. Weakening the Office of the President means weakening the Academic Council, in ways that they probably don't even notice.

Lage: And the changes that you mentioned as a result of Peltason and Atkinson being not as strong as presidents--how much was it them and their mode of operation, and how much were these a result of other changes in the academy worldwide?

Trow: I think in both their cases that they accelerated a trend of power moving toward the campuses. Perhaps that is in part due to a weakening of threats from outside the university--no real threat of interference by the regents, nor of deep budget cuts or of serious attacks from the legislature or governor. Those threats from outside strengthen the Office of the President, as the only body able to defend the university as a whole. During David Gardner's time the threat--or maybe better, the challenge--was to bring the university back financially to where it was before the difficult Reagan and Brown years. Moreover, of course, he had never been a chancellor, but had served his apprenticeship as a university president in Utah. In any event, I think that both Peltason and Atkinson continued to see the world through the eyes of a chancellor after they became president. Peltason didn't have to turn the Council of Chancellors into, essentially, a voting body, but he did.

The other thing is that Dick Atkinson decided that the money coming from the state, which used to be in the president's hands for allocation to the campuses, would now be allocated to the campuses on a formula basis. So the president's office became a flow-through for state funds to the campuses. That reduces his capacity to reward and punish. Why should any chancellor care what the president thinks if the president can't have this degree of budgetary control? So Peltason and Atkinson have to a certain extent disarmed themselves, I'm sure out of a strong sense of the rightness of the policy of decentralization of power and authority.

I don't have any monopoly on wisdom on this issue of what is the right balance between the president's office and the campuses, I don't think there is any final or inherently right answer to that. I have a feeling that the shift has gone too far in one way rather than the other, but it is a question of balance, and the people who did this had very good reasons to do as they did. This devolution of power to the chancellors was very popular on the campuses, and among the many of our colleagues who never understood what the president's office was about, or could see what its functions were. Even some members of the council never understood what the president's office was about, or that a strong council requires a strong president. Most academics have very little interaction with the president's office, and don't see why it employs so many people or interferes in their lives at all.

Lage: And what was the view on the campuses? Do you think that the faculty really don't think much about the president?

Trow: No, they do not. Insofar as they think about it at all, they mostly see the Office of the President as draining money off from where the real work is done, on the campuses, or introducing bureaucratic complications, and so forth. For many or maybe most academics, the president is pretty remote. I admired David Gardner's management style very much because I saw it up close.

But even David could not have done what he did if he didn't have the powers that were then attached to the presidency. He could only do what he did, really, if he had at least a whip and a chair to take into the arena. And so, by virtue of his mastery of events, he drew more power to himself. If you had another person like that, then he too might be able to draw back some power to the president's office, because that office owns the relationship of the university to Sacramento. This might be a cyclical thing rather than a secular shift of power to the campuses. But I'm not sure about that.

Martin Trow's Personal Relationship with David Gardner, Election to the Academic Council

Lage: I can see, it is intriguing. Anything else you think we should say? We didn't talk about your personal relationship with David Gardner.

Trow: Well, I didn't have a very close personal relationship with him. I had known him many, many years. He took his degree in the School of Education and he claims, though I can't recall it, that I taught him. We certainly overlapped, and Professor Fritz Lilge, who was important to him, was also a close and valued colleague of mine at about the same time--by far the most distinguished and scholarly member of the School of Education. Maybe what David means is that when he was starting up he was reading things by me, so he thinks of me as a teacher in that sense. In addition, our paths crossed a number of times, always in a rather friendly way. I was the chair of the Commission on Isla Vista, UC Santa Barbara, appointed by President [Charles J.] Hitch after a mob burned down the Bank of America

there. Hitch appointed that commission essentially because he didn't know what to do. The joke is that when you don't know what to do you appoint a committee. And if you really don't know what to do, you appoint a commission.

The difference between a committee and a commission is that our commission had an open-ended budget. We could spend whatever we needed, so we hired some very able people as staff, headed by an outstanding young lawyer from one of the top San Francisco law firms, who did this on a pro bono basis.

Lage: To investigate what happened.

Trow: The commission was appointed to investigate and write a report--a very open-ended charge. The effort was to try to understand what the sources of the riots and disturbances were, and what to do about them in the future. The only other faculty member on the commission was Mike Heyman. No other academics--Hitch wanted this commission and its report to have credibility, and not be seen as an internal whitewash. So all the rest of the members were people from around the state who were mayors, county supervisors, political people or civil servants, so that we wouldn't be slanting it in our way. That is another long story, which it might be worth telling some time, because the report is still referred to when problems arise at Santa Barbara. Of course it is available here at the library.

At that time, David was already an administrator and eventually a vice chancellor down there at UCSB. I didn't have very much to do with him; our commission dealt mostly with the chancellor at that time, and in a way kept our distance from the university administrators in order to do our own investigation and come up with our own findings. We also did not want to interfere, or even be thought to interfere, in a local crisis. It was hard enough for the campus administration to cope with the events there; they did not need a commission of outsiders to be giving them advice or otherwise interfering in a difficult situation. Instead we wrote a report that we presented to the regents which resulted in the regents allocating some $350,000 a year or so for about ten years to supplement the public services in Isla Vista that neither the university nor the county of Santa Barbara were providing at that time. That was one source, but only one, of the riots and disturbances at Santa Barbara--many of the sources were out of our or the university's control, but were part of the broader national problems of the late sixties and early seventies.

Then David became a vice president of the university, and at about the same time I became chairman of the Berkeley Division [of the Academic Senate]. Among other responsibilities, he was given the job of exploring the possibilities of the university offering some degree credit courses off campus. David was way ahead of his time in thinking it would be a good idea to have such an outreach program--what we would now call distance learning, but as a clear part of the credit granting course work of the university, and not just some courses offered by Extension. I also thought it would be a very good idea to have credit courses offered off campus, for example, to provide regular courses in San Francisco to mature students. So we agreed on that.

But the faculty at Berkeley had no interest in such forms of outreach, since in their view that is what community colleges are for. Berkeley has never been enthusiastic about

providing credit courses off campus; even now, in the year 2001, it allows Extension to offer a few, but very few. But I think the university is slowly coming around to David's view of university degree credit courses offered off campus.

David was often ahead of the wave. So we came to know one another in connection with that initiative in a very friendly way. Then when he was chairman of the national commission that produced *A Nation at Risk*,[6] he asked me to come and talk to it in Washington, as a kind of consultant. We had that kind of occasional professional interaction, until we got to know each other a lot better when I became vice chair and then chair of the Academic Council. He couldn't have had anything to do with my appointment to that job, because the faculty wouldn't have thought very highly of any administrative intervention in appointments to senate committees. The whole point of the Academic Senate is that it makes chancellors and presidents deal with people that they haven't appointed. That is the heart of it. And it certainly does not allow any administrative intervention in the election of its leadership.

Lage: So, just to clarify, you mean your election as vice chairman of the council?

Trow: Yes, initially as, vice chairman. Which more or less automatically leads to election as chairman the following year.

Final Thoughts on David Gardner's Retirement Controversy, and Other Loose Ends

Lage: What about the reaction on the Berkeley campus to Gardner's retirement package?

Trow: Well, there was a lot of confusion. And I ran into colleagues who were complaining and bad-mouthing David, mostly on the basis of what they had read in the local newspapers. And every time I could, I would try to correct them on a one-to-one basis, but also constrained by what I had learned in confidence. I think that the council was rather disinclined to get involved publicly in the retirement issue. It wasn't really our issue and there was a lot of confusion about it. I think that the senate and council kept a low profile on this. But in the midst of the fierce controversy over Gardner's retirement, the council had a small ceremony for the president in our meeting room in the spring of 1992, thanking him for his service to the university, with special appreciation for his support of the senate and the council and for shared governance. And we gave him the gift to which I referred earlier, to which every member of the council had contributed.

So that is a pretty clear statement of where the council stood. We were the only group in the university apart from the regents who knew anything like the real story, and that only because Elliot Brownlee and I had been present at the meetings of the regents

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[6]See report in David Gardner's oral history.

where the decisions had been made about his retirement package. And those had been made in regents-only meetings.

I was tempted at the time to make a personal statement in support of David. But to go beyond what the council did would require me to talk about what I had seen and heard at regents-only meetings. I felt that even if other people, notably some regents, had talked about the events in those regents' meetings where they had discussed David's retirement, I still felt constrained by my sense of the confidentiality of what I had heard. This is the first time I've ever spoken about those events. I'm trying to explain why I didn't say more about what I had learned at the regents' meetings at that time, when the controversy was at its height. But constrained as I felt I was, on my motion the council gave him this vote of confidence which was public, and we gave him a present: what more could we do?

Lage: Well, I see that we have run out of time, and really need to end here. Thank you so much for your time. I'm sure that this interview will be a valuable addition to our series.

Transcribed by Rex Adams
Final Typed by Shannon Page

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

University History Series

The University of California Office of the President and Its Constituencies, 1983-1995

Charles E. Young

Chancellor at UCLA, 1969-1997

An Interview Conducted by
Ann Lage
in 1999

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INTERVIEW HISTORY--Charles E. Young

Charles E. Young was the longest serving chancellor in the University of California system, retiring in 1997 after nearly twenty-nine years at the helm at UCLA. Young received his B.A. from UC Riverside in 1953 and his Ph.D. in political science from UCLA in 1960. As a member of UC President Clark Kerr's staff, he participated in formulating California's Master Plan for Higher Education in 1959 and then joined the new administration of Chancellor Franklin Murphy at UCLA in 1961. In 1968, when Murphy resigned, then Executive Vice Chancellor Young was appointed chancellor at the age of thirty-six.

As the senior chancellor in the UC system and head of one of the two oldest, largest, and most prestigious campuses, Charles Young brings an important perspective to this project on the university during the presidencies of David Gardner and Jack Peltason. Known for his strong opinions, candidly expressed, he was characteristically forthright on a range of issues during the three-hour interview held in his office on Wilshire Boulevard just south of the UCLA campus, in May 1999. He discusses his strong disagreement with the decision to add additional campuses to the University of California system, his opposition to the siting of the tenth campus at Merced, and his views on the impact of the retirement package controversy. He characterizes the voluntary early retirement plan (VERIP) of the 1990s as "a stroke of genius" and discusses how he managed the years of budgetary crisis at UCLA.

Young speaks candidly about his aspirations to the presidency after David Gardner's retirement and critically of the administration of the man the regents selected as Gardner's successor, Jack Peltason. He assails the regents' action in ending affirmative action in admissions and employment in 1995 and gives an impassioned defense of the value of affirmative action to the mission of the university.

The interview was transcribed and lightly edited and sent to Chancellor Young shortly before his appointment as president of the University of Florida in fall of 1999. He reviewed the transcript, providing a few clarifications and corrections but no substantive changes. A full oral history with Charles Young, covering in depth his chancellorship at UCLA, is in process under the auspices of the Oral History Program at UCLA.

Ann Lage, Interviewer
Regional Oral History Office

Berkeley, California
January 2002

Charles E. Young
(1969 - 1997)

- About Chancellor Young
- The Young Years at UCLA
- The Chancellor Speaks On...
- 1996-97 Speeches

Charles E. Young took office as chancellor of UCLA on Sept. 1, 1968, and was formally inaugurated on May 23, 1969 -- the 50th anniversary of the university's founding. His inaugural pledge was to advance UCLA "from the second level of good universities to the first rank of excellent universities." Today, UCLA is in the distinguished company of the finest universities in the nation and the world.

When he became chancellor at the age of 36, Dr. Young was the youngest person at the helm of any major American university. After nearly 29 years in office, he was the senior chief executive by tenure among his fellow chancellors and presidents nationwide. His signature appears on two-thirds of all the diplomas issued in the history of UCLA -- including those held by 75 percent of UCLA's 285,000 living graduates. Chancellor Young has announced that he will retire on June 30, 1997.

Dr. Young presided over a complex organization that is one of the largest employers in Southern California and has an operating budget approaching $2 billion. He directed the rapid growth of UCLA -- which educates more students than any other California college, public or private -- toward its present distinction as one of the country's most comprehensive and dynamic university campuses.

UCLA is widely recognized to be among the top 10 research universities in the nation; established in 1919, it is also the youngest of this select group. Few institutions can match UCLA's comprehensiveness. In 1995, the National Research Council ranked 31 UCLA Ph.D. programs among the top 20 in their respective fields -- third-best in the nation.

In the first months of Dr. Young's chancellorship, UCLA had only one endowed professorship, library holdings of fewer than three million volumes, an ethnic minority enrollment of less than 23 percent, and an operating budget of $170 million. The campus today boasts more than 120 endowed faculty chairs, 6.7 million volumes in the UCLA Library, an ethnic minority enrollment of nearly 60 percent, and operating expenses approaching $2 billion. Extramural funding for the research program has skyrocketed during Chancellor Young's tenure, from $66.4 million in 1968-'69 to a campus-record $406 million in 1995-'96. The private fund-raising program has likewise flourished, from $6.1 million raised in 1968-'69 to $190.8 million in 1995-'96 -- a University of California record. UCLA's endowment, which had a market value of $19 million on June 30, 1969, is presently valued at $752 million. By each of these measures, UCLA ranks among America's premier universities.

Dr. Young's association with the University of California dates to 1953, when he enrolled as a transfer student at UC Riverside. There, he served as the new campus's first student body president. After graduating with honors in 1955, he pursued doctoral studies in political science at UCLA, earning his M.A. in 1957 and Ph.D. in 1960. In 1959, as a member of UC President Clark

Kerr's staff, he participated in the creation of the Master Plan for Higher Education in California and the University Growth Plan.

Dr. Young returned to UCLA in 1960 to serve in a series of executive posts in the administration of Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy: assistant to the chancellor (1960-62), assistant chancellor (1962-63), and vice chancellor for administration (1963-68). He also became a full professor in the political science department, an appointment he still holds. Following Chancellor Murphy's resignation, Dr. Young was named his successor by the UC Regents on July 12, 1968.

Chancellor Young was recognized nationally and internationally for his leadership in higher education. He was chairman of the Association of American Universities. He served on numerous task forces and commissions of the American Council on Education, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, and the Business-Higher Education Forum.

Committed to making internationalism and inclusiveness hallmarks of UCLA, Chancellor Young was an ardent spokesman on behalf of educational opportunity, inclusiveness and the value of ethnic and cultural diversity to the university experience. He served on the administrative board of the International Association of Universities and the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Inc., and chaired the board of governors of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. In 1985, he received the Award for Inter-American University Cooperation from the Inter-American Organization for Higher Education. The chancellor and his wife, Sue K. Young, were jointly awarded the UCLA International Student Center's 1987 Neil H. Jacoby International Award for their outstanding contributions to international education. In January 1997, the Coalition for International Education honored Dr. Young with its first International Education Leadership Award, in recognition of his contributions to the development of international studies at UCLA and other American universities.

Chancellor Young made UCLA an integral part of, and partner with, the Los Angeles region, reinforcing the importance of the university's mission in service to the community. His commitment to public service was reflected in his leadership role in California Campus Compact, an organization he co-chaired that is part of a national coalition of colleges and universities striving to encourage student involvement in community and public service. Dr. Young also was active in efforts to improve elementary and secondary education; he serves on the Council of Trustees of LEARN (Los Angeles Educational Alliance for Restructuring Now), a coalition of leaders working to reform K-12 education.

A longtime member of the NCAA Presidents Commission, Chancellor Young often drew the national spotlight as a leading proponent of intercollegiate athletics reform. He was active in the movement to raise academic eligibility standards for student-athletes and curb recruiting abuses.

Chancellor Young is a respected adviser to numerous enterprises in the realms of business, education, the arts, and science and technology. He has served on a number of corporate boards in the finance, technology, and health-care industries and is currently a director of Intel Corp. and Nicholas-Applegate Capital Management. He is a member of the board of directors of the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences Foundation, the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, and Town Hall of California. He participates in several organizations that examine the role of science and technology in society, and the research agenda for universities. These include the Carnegie Commission Task Force on Science and Technology and the States, the National Academy of Sciences' Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable, and the Board of Governors of the Foundation for International Exchange of Scientific and Cultural Information by Telecommunications.

Chancellor Young has been honored many times for his contributions to academe and community endeavors. He was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1994, cited for his "outstanding and recognized accomplishments in educational and scientific administration." In May 1996 he was among a select group of leaders in education, community affairs, the arts and culture, and communications recognized by the Central City Association as a "Treasure of Los Angeles." The Hugh O'Brien Youth Foundation bestowed its prestigious Albert Schweitzer Leadership Award upon him in December 1996.

Dr. Young has received several tributes from the UCLA Alumni Association, including its highest honor, the Edward A. Dickson Alumnus of the Year Award, which was presented in May 1994 in

recognition of his 25th anniversary as chancellor. The UC Riverside Alumni Association gave him its 1996 Distinguished Service Award, honoring his contributions to higher education and his tenure as UCLA chancellor. Also in 1996, Chancellor Charles and Sue Young were named Honorary Fellows of UCLA's College of Letters and Science.

In April 1997, Chancellor Young received the American Council on Education's Distinguished Service Award for Lifetime Achievement. Occidental College awarded him an honorary degree, Doctor of Humane Letters, at its May 1997 Commencement.

Chancellor Young was born on Dec. 30, 1931, in San Bernardino, Calif. He and his wife have two children and seven grandchildren. Working side by side to strengthen and advance the campus, Charles and Sue Young have made UCLA an integral part of their lives for four decades.

Back to Past Leaders Page

INTERVIEW WITH CHARLES E. YOUNG

I A CHANCELLOR'S VIEW OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND DAVID GARDNER'S PRESIDENCY

[Date of Interview: May 24, 1999] ##[1]

Education and Early Work in University of California Governance

Lage: Today is May 24, 1999, and I am Ann Lage, interviewing Charles Young, UCLA chancellor emeritus, for the project on the Gardner and Peltason presidencies. I thought we'd start with just very brief background, even briefer than it might have been if we'd had more time. I've found on the [World Wide] Web the story of your personal and academic background [see page 270]. Give me in twenty-five words or less how you got to be chancellor, what happened up to that point?

Young: After high school I went to a community college for a year, or a year and a half, and then left, got married, went into the service during the Korean War. Returned to school and finished up at the community college. I had done horribly before; afterward I did nothing but straight A's, I think. And then I went on to the University of California, Riverside. I was in the first class there, was there for a year and a half. I was the first student body president. After I graduated from Riverside, I came to UCLA, did my graduate work in political science through the Ph.D. During the last year and a half of my degree I was doing a dissertation in Washington [D.C.] for a year on an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellowship. And then I was in Berkeley and Davis for a year. I was an assistant professor at Davis--acting assistant professor to start--while I was finishing my degree, and working in Clark Kerr's office when he was president, working primarily with Dean McHenry, most of the time on the Master Plan for Higher Education.

Lage: How did you make that connection?

Young: Dean McHenry had been a professor of mine at UCLA, and he had then gone to Berkeley as an assistant to the president, and really headed up the work of the university on the Master Plan. And so I worked with him and then did other things for a few months. Then I was

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[1]## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcript.

called one day in the late summer of 1961 by [UCLA Chancellor] Franklin Murphy, who had just come to UCLA from the University of Kansas, who was looking for someone to be assistant to the chancellor. I came to Los Angeles and spent a day here and we decided that would be a good thing to do.

Lage: You had a meeting of the minds?

Young: Yes, meeting of the minds. So I became an assistant professor and assistant to the chancellor, and was here in that capacity for about three or four years. Then I became assistant chancellor, and then vice chancellor, and then administrative vice chancellor. Then when Franklin left in 1968 to go to the Los Angeles Times Mirror Corporation as a chief executive officer, the search committee recommended me to be chancellor and [Charles J.] Charlie Hitch, who was then the president, accepted that. He recommended me to the regents, and that was it. I've been here ever since.

Lage: You're the youngest chancellor to be appointed ever in the system, and also the longest serving?

Young: Yes.

Lage: So your overview, or experience, with the president's office goes back to Clark Kerr.

Young: Yes. I've seen it from there [in the Office of the President] and from here [UCLA].

Assessment of President Charles Hitch and President David Saxon

Lage: Just by way of providing a little context, would you have anything to say about Presidents Hitch and Saxon? You served as chancellor under both of them. And hadn't Saxon also been an assistant to you?

Young: Yes. Charlie Hitch was one of my great friends and idols. I admired Charlie immensely. We got along very, very well. I know Charlie felt pretty much the same about me. I enjoyed working with him very much. He was an extremely effective president, not president for too long, really only from January of 1968 until 1975.

Lage: Just about the same time you stepped into the chancellorship.

Young: Yes, I think he went in about six months earlier. Clark left in about February or March of '67. Harry Wellman was acting president, or was president for a year. And then Charlie came in, I think, in January of '68.

Lage: And Hitch was known as quite a good manager. I think of you as being known as a good manager.

Young: Yes. Yes, he was. Of course he'd been very effective as a faculty member and as a research scholar at Oxford, before the war. And from that time on he was an economist at Rand and then with the Department of Defense.

Lage: And David Saxon, was he your assistant?

Young: David Saxon was a professor of physics here at UCLA, and became dean of physical sciences during Franklin Murphy's administration. And then when I became chancellor, I asked David to take the position of academic vice chancellor, which he held for about five years, I guess, from '68 until about '72 or '73. Then he left and went to the Office of the President in, I think, a new job called "provost" for a year. And then went from that job to being president.

Lage: Anything to say about his management style or how the system functioned under Saxon?

Young: David Saxon's presidency was a difficult one. David came in as president in 1975, with [Governor Edmund G., Jr.] Jerry Brown. As a matter of fact, the first meeting David had with the chancellors was in Tiburon (I think Tiburon), and that would have been right after the election. And we had a meeting with Jerry Brown. So he [David Saxon] was really president from what, '75 until '83.

Lage: 1983. Just about the same as Jerry Brown's governorship.

Young: That span of time, really, was Jerry Brown's period. Jerry took office, I guess, '75. The election was in '74. So it was difficult from that point of view, because of all the governors I've known, I think Jerry Brown was the worst governor for the university. And so that made things difficult. He was difficult. There was constant turmoil of one kind or another. Difficulties in the state governance. David was in kind of a constant struggle with the board [of Regents], things were never settled. David, with whom I had worked very, very well, he was a very good friend--became very testy. He did not get along well with the chancellors in the Council of Chancellors. There was always turmoil of one kind or another.

Lage: So, things were not smooth. (We have to try and fully describe your gestures, which this tape recorder is missing.)

Young: Things were not smooth. In my opinion, he was not well served by those he had as his key associates. They were weak, not good administrators. David was not a strong administrator, and although he should have been able to do better, he did not operate well in what should have been a decentralized mode, but could not be because of the weakness of his staff.

Lage: Coming from UCLA you'd think he would have favored decentralization of the university.

Young: Yes. We would have thought. He did while he was here, and then kind of became anti-decentralization.

Lage: While he was in the president's office?

Young: Yes. But he did not have good people. His vice presidents were weak. The Office of the President became very bureaucratic. Far too much authority came to reside in the president's office. He was not strong enough to manage the regents. And there's a clear-cut place of real balance in that regard, and David [Saxon] was not strong enough.

Lage: Martin Trow compared David Gardner to a lion tamer. David Saxon wasn't a lion tamer?

Young: No. David Gardner was a lion tamer, but he was a little too strong a lion tamer.

The Selection of David Gardner for the Presidency

Lage: Well, let's move into that, because I think you've given a good context. I think Gardner himself said that both you and Michael Heyman were interested, perhaps, or were being considered for the presidency at the same time he was being considered for the job, in 1983.

Young: I was not interested--I was not, myself, actively interested in it. I may have been considered, but I was not aware of it. There were others--Bill Gerberding, who was then the president of the University of Washington, I was pushing as president. I mean, when I got down to the end and you knew who was there, Bill was the person I was supporting. Bill had been my vice chancellor.

Lage: You've trained a lot of people, I bet, over the years. Well, how did you react to Gardner's appointment? You'd known him somewhat.

Young: I'd known him when he was at Berkeley as the director of alumni, or in alumni relations. I'd known him when he was at Santa Barbara as a vice chancellor. And I had also known him and been involved with him to some extent when we'd served on a commission together when he was at the University of Utah. So I knew him, not well, but I knew him. I was initially disappointed in the appointment. I think that was kind of a general feeling on the part of the chancellors, not much disappointment, but I think disappointment. And I think the chancellors had a meeting with the regents or the selection committee, or whatever, and told them we were all disappointed.

Lage: It must be a very delicate matter.

Young: Yes. But my views changed dramatically on that.

Changing Impressions of David Gardner

Lage: Well, tell me about how you saw him as president. Let's start with the initial couple of years.

Young: He turned my view around, and I think that of any others who had negative fears about him, very quickly.

Lage: How?

Young: Well, how? In a lot of ways. Number one, just as David Saxon might have been about as good a person to deal with Jerry Brown as you could have had, in some respects, David Gardner was an excellent person to deal with Governor [George] Deukmejian. David Gardner was a superb person to assume the presidency right at the start of the Deukmejian administration. Their views were pretty much the same. David Gardner was, in my view, a moderate conservative on many issues, and a fairly strong conservative on some issues, and pretty much mirrored Deukmejian in that regard, I think.

Lage: In what ways did he mirror the governor on issues? What sorts of issues?

Young: On political, social, economic issues, he was sort of liberal to moderate. And on philosophical and family values issues, he was very conservative. Very much like Deukmejian. Very much like Deukmejian in style. So that's one thing. Another thing is he knew he had to have good people, and he picked good people to work with him.

Lage: You liked his vice presidents, you mean?

Young: I liked the people that he brought in, especially Ron Brady, and others.

Lage: Ron Brady became the most controversial.

Young: Yes, because of what happened at the end. His role in whatever Gardner was supposed to have done that he shouldn't have done. But Ron Brady was very effective, a very, very effective person. He worked well with the chancellors, and with other people around him by and large, I think, but especially he worked well with the chancellors.

Lage: Did he come with a stance of helping the chancellors?

Young: Yes. And David Gardner did as well. Things were decentralized. There was a feeling, under David [Gardner], that administration was a good thing, not a bad thing. Under David Saxon, administration was a bad thing you had to put up with, and you can't run a multi-billion dollar operation like the University of California feeling that administration is a bad thing and do as little of it as you can, because what you do is require a lot more to be done than would otherwise have been done. So Gardner was a good manager. He got along well with, and worked well with, the regents. I think Gardner overcontrolled the regents and, to some extent, that's what happened toward the end. And I think there was some bridling against that overcontrol that was below the surface for a long time and then bubbled up when things went sour.

Lage: When you say "overcontrolled," can you describe how he exercised control of the regents?

Young: He ran the board meetings. He dictated what was being done, when it was being done. Spoke very firmly about what ought to be done. Brought people along with him. Which is all very good, but you can--sometimes it just got a little--

Lage: If you had been a regent you might--

Young: If I had been a regent--. Although, if I were a regent I'd want the president to run the university. I wouldn't want to run it myself. I might have been a little upset, on occasion.

Lage: Did you sense that at the time, or is this in retrospect?

Young: Yes, no. I don't want to overemphasize that. It's a 95/5 situation.

David Gardner's Relationship with the Council of Chancellors and the Campuses

Lage: You mentioned Gardner did some decentralization. What kinds of things would have been decentralized?

Young: Well, for the most part, of things that had been in the president's office, I mean, in selecting and appointing deans, and selecting and appointing other staff.

Lage: So some of that had primarily to come up through the president's office.

Young: Yes, yes. A whole range of issues. People [in the president's office] were trying to be able to say "Yes" rather than trying to say "No." Much more cooperative. Much more real discussion with the chancellors, with the discussion having an impact. It was clear that on 99 percent of the issues it was his decision and he could make whatever decision he wanted, but we weren't just sitting there going through the motions. We were sitting there having an impact. And when we didn't agree with the action he took, we said, "Look, we said we wanted this, why are you not doing what we want?" We could have those kinds of discussions.

Lage: So it was an open exchange?

Young: Open, yes. Very much open--

Lage: Now tell me, this is in the Council of Chancellors?

Young: Yes.

Lage: Give me a description of how those meetings went under Gardner.

Young: I think there was a lot of time and attention paid to the agenda.

Lage: What kind of things came up?

Young: A variety of things. A lot of things that required action. Any substantial issue that was open, that had to be decided, we would discuss. There were a lot of detail things ranging from the budget recommendations to how to deal with same-sex partners. All of those things were dealt with. We'd usually have twelve, fifteen, or twenty items, most of which were of real consequence. Under Gardner there was more focus. The issues we did deal with were more clear. We dealt with the issues which were important to a better extent than we had, let's say, with David Saxon. And, as I said before, we had a feeling that there would be a thorough discussion and the chancellors would have an impact. They would know what the decision was going to be. And if the decision he made was something that wasn't supported by the chancellery, we'd know why the decision was made.

Lage: That sounds very much less frustrating.

Young: Yes. It was very much less frustrating. By and large, the meetings were things you looked forward to. They were congenial. I think the chancellors during that period, by and large, enjoyed the involvement, enjoyed the other people that were in those roles, appreciated their value.

Lage: Was allocation of resources between the campuses one of the issues?

Young: Oh, the principles on which resources should be allocated were discussed. We'd never discuss dollars and cents and that sort of thing. But the principles were. And what changes might be made, should be made, should be considered, and so forth and so on.

Lage: Did Gardner run those meetings anything like he ran the regents' meetings?

Young: Well, yes and no. Not with as firm a hand, in a way, more firmly in control in another. The Board of Regents, obviously, made decisions. The things that were before the board were the board's to decide. So David was having to move them to do what he wanted done. He didn't have to move the chancellors to get what he wanted done because he could make the decision in any event. So, in a way, we were stronger and in a way not as strong, or not as potentially rankling, if I may put it that way.

Lage: Aside from the Council of Chancellors, how did the president and the president's office relate to the campuses?

Young: Well, a very good relationship. Most of us, I think, dealt with either David or Ron. The leadership on the academic side of the president's office has always been weaker. Or not always, but more often than not, been weaker. Ron was really the key glue for the whole thing. Whatever the issue was, you could talk to Ron and he would get the problem resolved, no matter who else in the OP [Office of the President] might be involved. He was clearly David's key associate. So you could always talk to David, you could always talk to Ron. They both were very helpful. They both, I think, tried to respond positively to requests and proposals that came from the campus. They both worked well with people who might, themselves, be strong and opinionated, such as me. And David Saxon did not.

David Saxon and I parted ways, because he didn't like my stating my views forcefully and clearly, and just saying sometimes I didn't agree with him about some things. That was never a problem with David Gardner.

The University and the Governors: Contrasting the Jerry Brown and Deukmejian Administrations

Lage: He wasn't fearful of other strong leaders.

Young: No, David Gardner surely was not. I think David [Gardner] was a very effective president. Not only were there two governors between the two Davids, but the economic condition in the state was very different.

Lage: I think that's an interesting thing to take up.

Young: Times were difficult under Jerry Brown; things were much better under Deukmejian. Jerry Brown was a populist, non-elitist, not likely to be supportive of the university, and he wasn't. He would be more supportive of the state colleges than the university. He was more supportive of community colleges than the state colleges. He would be more concerned with social welfare issues.

Lage: And he had some bad budgets.

Young: And he had bad budget situations. Deukmejian, on the other hand, was an elitist. He was dedicated to the university--it's very clear throughout his term. The first priority to George Deukmejian was the University of California. So the university fared very well in terms of budget, very well in terms of general support. The state's financial condition was good, so there was a lot of improvement in the financial quality of the university, a lot of money for construction. Now, David Saxon gets saddled with the first and David Gardner rides along on the second.

Lage: Apparently David Gardner had something to do with persuading Deukmejian to continue supporting the university.

Young: Yes, he did, there's no question about that. I think he did. And I think the governor had very great faith and trust in David Gardner. So Deukmejian's natural predispositions were reinforced by his associations with people in the university. I think he got along well with all the people within the university. Jerry Brown spent most of the time talking and Deukmejian spent most of the time listening. So they were very different people.

Lage: Did Gardner call on you to do any work in Sacramento?

Young: Yes, he did.

Lage: What kind of situations--

Young: Oh, whenever he thought there was something that would have been helpful. David was very good at working Sacramento. David also was effective in Washington; he'd had a lot of experience in Washington. He tried to involve, and did involve, the chancellors in discussions with legislators and administrative people, both in Washington and in Sacramento. When there was a situation in which he thought one campus, or the relationship between one campus and a key person was critical, or the relationship between an individual chancellor and a key person involved was critical, he would involve that chancellor, or that campus through its chancellor.

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Young: I think that being called upon to play those roles makes the people involved feel very good, very useful. So I think Gardner kept the support of his colleagues very well.

Saxon's and Gardner's Different Views on Professional Compensation

Young: David Saxon, during his period as president, some of us used to say, wore a hair shirt. David [Saxon] didn't want administrators to get increases. He didn't think people ought to be paid well. So the administrative structure all the way down was held down in a variety of ways.

David Gardner had a very different view. People felt they were getting rewarded appropriately financially for what they were doing under David. That started at the top. I mean, David Gardner was, himself, seeking to be rewarded and so that kind of pulled everyone else along.

David Saxon felt that you don't--you shouldn't--expect to get paid well. And David himself, didn't, for whatever reason. He then went to MIT and felt very differently about things.

Lage: Oh really? But he did keep the whole pay structure lower.

Young: Yes. For a very long, very long time.

Lage: Do you think that was to the detriment of the ability to hire competitive candidates?

Young: Yes, I think there's no question about it. I think it had to be changed, and it was largely changed under David Gardner. I think it's still a problem. Not across the board, but there are still areas in which benefits and salary and other things have been held down a little too long. And that works its way down through the whole enterprise. But it's much better than it used to be.

The Issue of New Campus Development

Lage: Let's look at just a few of the things that happened. One of the things that David Gardner did was try to plan ahead for new campuses. Also, didn't he have each campus prepare its own plan and fit that into a larger plan for future development?

Young: Yes. We all had to do a long-range development plan. And then he was planning for the--what are they calling it now, the second wave of enrollment pressure. Then he came up with the plan which set limits on the growth of the several existing campuses, and we went through the process to get agreement for what growth was provided for. In addition to that, then he came up with the plan for the establishment of three new campuses.

Lage: Would this have been something that was discussed rigorously at the Council of Chancellors? What the limits of growth would be, and--

Young: Yes, it was. And there was great disagreement among the chancellors.

Lage: Along what lines?

Young: Well, disagreement and difficulty. The administration at Riverside and, I think, generally speaking, the faculty at Riverside and the community at Riverside, wanted growth. And there was no problem with growth. They wanted much more growth, faster, than David provided for in his plan. Santa Cruz and Santa Barbara would have liked more growth but were severely restricted by the community reactions to growth. At that point in time--we're talking traditional enrollment--it was felt that Berkeley and UCLA would not be able to grow beyond where they were, and should not grow. I had some different views regarding internal adjustments for UCLA.

Lage: What do you mean, "internal adjustments"?

Young: I believed, and still do, that UCLA could take more undergraduates, but it should take nontraditional kinds. We ought to be able to take--not evening classes, not extension classes--people that could come in as we do with the executive MBA program and the fully employed MBA program, and so forth. Take people whose schedules are different.

Lage: As undergraduates?

Young: Undergraduates, yes. There are a lot of undergraduates who are perfectly capable and qualified, who would love to come and get a degree if they could come one night and one morning--

Lage: Less than full time.

Young: Yes. Less than full time. Or sometimes full time but in different patterns. But not just mix those in with traditional undergraduates, but have a separate program for them. With very little agreement from the other chancellors on this, I feel very strongly that probably on

every campus there are some programs in which we have far too many graduate students, and that we are taking--because we are taking so many--graduate students who are not as qualified as they ought to be and for whom there are no discernible careers. We ought to cut back on graduate enrollment. Take some more undergraduates.

Lage: That's a hard thing to put across to the faculty.

Young: We have a strong history department at UCLA. All our social sciences are very, very strong. But we must have 250 graduate students in the history department. Now you don't need 250 graduate students to have a good graduate department. The best graduate departments, for the most part, have far fewer students. You need to have a critical mass, but once you get beyond a critical mass you don't need more. And we're turning away alpha plus undergraduates and taking beta minus graduate students. That doesn't seem to me to make much sense. So that's a feeling I've had going back to that period of time but--

Lage: So you would want to reallocate some of the resources?

Young: Furthermore, at about that time the state got into a situation where they pay us on a per-student basis. They don't pay us more for graduate students than for undergraduate students. So take a few less graduate students, and you get enough money because you're actually getting more money [per student] than the cost for undergraduate students. It gives you more money to put back into the graduate program, with fewer graduate students, and, therefore, you are able to do a much better job.

Lage: Now, would the decentralized nature of the system allow you to do that at UCLA?

Young: Well, yes. At some point in time that could be done. I mean, that's not something that the campus can decide on its own, but that's something that could work its way through and get approval.

Assessment of UC Merced Choice

Young: The major controversial thing, I think, in David's proposal, was the notion that we needed three new campuses. And I don't think that anyone, any of the chancellors, believed that was the case. Or that we could, as was proposed at that time, build three new campuses by--I forget the precise date, but one opening in 1998, one in 2000, and one in 2002, or something of that nature.

In the first place, they were not needed. In the second place, the time schedule was impossible. And, in the third place, this would, undoubtedly, drain resources from the existing campuses. And I spoke against it at a regents' meeting. I told David that I thought--

Lage: Oh, at a regents' meeting, not just within--

Young: No, with the regents. I said, "Look, I've only twice now, in my chancellorship, spoken against a presidential proposal, but this is one I feel is wrong."

Lage: And is that okay? Weren't you supposed to be a "good soldier"?

Young: Well, I think David would have preferred that I not do it. I think our relationship, which had always been good and stayed good, was not as good after that as it had been before. I don't remember the precise date on that, but that was not too long before he left. He left when, in '91?

Lage: He gave notice in '91. However, the budget crashed and the idea for the three campuses was abandoned.

Young: The budget crashed really in '92. Well, yes, but also the enrollments that were predicted didn't come along as rapidly. They never have. I mean, they've always overestimated the enrollments. The existing campuses were able to take more students than was proposed.

And, as I said, there are two or three issues now, that being one of them. "Oh yes, it'll be additional money we put into University of California at Merced." But it's not additional money! If the state had additional money, it would be restoring some of the cuts it made in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996. It hasn't. The budget was cut 20 percent. The student-faculty ratio was increased dramatically. The staff was cut severely. The funding for maintenance for the physical plant was drastically cut.

None of those cuts have been restored. Now they're going to take that money and put it into a new campus? Well, that's not new money. That's money that ought to be put back into the university. So it is draining resources.

Lage: Did your fellow chancellors feel the same way?

Young: Yes.

Lage: So that was something where the president--

Young: Well, yes, they felt it later when we got to talking about Merced. The chancellors all opposed, at the time, moving ahead on Merced the way we did. And that was probably, for the most part, in Peltason's period.

The decision was made to put it in the wrong place. It's in the wrong place. It was at least the third best choice of the sites that we looked at in the Central Valley.

Lage: Why do you feel so strongly about the choice of location? Were you in favor of the Fresno site?

Young: I was in favor of the Table Mountain site.

Lage: Near Fresno.

Young: Near Fresno.

Lage: The one without water.

Young: No, it had water.

Lage: One of them had no water.

Young: Well, the one they put it in [Lake Yosemite, Merced County] had no water. Table Mountain was a much more beautiful site. It was a site that could be developed into a much more attractive campus. It is close to the metropolitan area. There's going to be growth around it in the reasonably foreseeable future. The members of the committee who were on the committee throughout the period favored Table Mountain. The two regents on the committee favored the site that was chosen. And the only reason ever given was that it was free.

I kept saying, "Look, you're going to be spending, on this campus, over the next ten or fifteen years, half a billion dollars. Whether it costs you three or five million dollars, or nothing, to buy the land, that's in the noise. It doesn't even come out. Choosing Merced is going to end up costing you $150 million, for a variety of reasons, more than Table Mountain would." "But the other one's free. It's free. They're going to give it to us."

Lage: You think there was more to it than that?

Young: Yes. But that's as far as I can go. I never did sit around and try to figure it out. It wouldn't have done any good to figure it out anyway.

Lage: You had other things to do.

Young: I had other things to do.

Lage: This is the kind of thing I wanted to discuss, something where you disagreed and how you went about trying to effect change. Did you speak up at the regents' meeting on that? Or were you on the site selection committee?

Young: I was on the committee.

Lage: And they actually put forth, I thought, two sites and let the regents vote.

Young: Yes. That's what Jack Peltason decided. Which we objected to, or I objected strongly.

Lage: Because you thought you should come forth--

Young: Come forth with a proposal.

Lage: But would it have been the proposal you wanted? Would your committee have voted for Table Mountain?

Young: Yes.

Divestment and the Issue of Investments in South Africa

Lage: Divestment in South Africa was one of the controversial political items. Do you want to talk about how that went and how David Gardner managed that? What your opinion was?

Young: Well, David Gardner was opposed to any restrictions on investment in South Africa. And he appointed a committee and I chaired it. Did I chair that?

Lage: You chaired the committee after the regents voted against divestment. You chaired a committee to monitor investments after the earlier vote to monitor investments according to the Sullivan Principles.

Young: Yes, to monitor it. We talked with people. We had a very good committee and finally came to the conclusion that we should be working to try to bring about change, and that we should work with all of the companies that were investing, try to get them to insist upon certain kinds of things, and we were working along in that way. And then Governor Deukmejian, for whatever reason, clearly, morally, made up his mind that the regents should resolve to discontinue investment. He had just appointed three new members of the board, all of whom would have opposed disinvestment but were clearly told they were going to vote for disinvestment. And there was a meeting at which that issue came to the board, and David Gardner opposed it. I think it's probably the only time which he opposed anything that the board--he made a statement that he thought it was the wrong thing to do.

Lage: It must have been sort of dramatic, with the governor appearing.

Young: Yes, it was. It was a very dramatic--. It was at Santa Cruz, as a matter of fact [1986]. And we had had several stormy meetings, including one at UCLA, a few months before.

Lage: With protesters.

Young: With protesters, they'd storm the place, and we'd had to have them removed and shut things down.

Lage: Did you have protests on your campus aside from that meeting?

Young: Oh, yes. Yes. But that protest at the regents' meeting was the most difficult one. It was very physical. They broke some doors, and some people were hurt.

Lage: How does that make you react, as chancellor, to the issue? Does it change your view at all?

Young: No. I made up--I remember, it must have been about 1970 or '71, when we were having sit-ins and one thing or another. And I said something to the effect--and I said it to a group of

people, and everybody kept reminding me of it, and I reminded myself of it--you should never do anything that you don't think is right because someone demands that you do it. And you should never fail to do something that you should do because someone demands that you don't do it. You know, you like or you dislike what is done, or you wish you could get things done without some of the problems that you have, but you go ahead and do what you think is right. [tape interruption]

The Budget Downturn and VERIP, a Stroke of Genius

Lage: Okay. We're back on after lunch and we're still in the Gardner era. What else do you think is important to discuss in the Gardner era? What stands out in your mind, aside from the final benefits controversy, which we'll get to?

Young: Let's go on with that and then we'll see where that leads. And if there's anything else that I can think of, I'll come back.

Lage: Okay. That sounds good. Should we talk first about when the budget started to decline? There started to be difficulties with the state budget. And VERIP I [Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program] was under the Gardner regime.

Young: Were all of the VERIPs under Gardner?

Lage: VERIP III was definitely under Peltason. And I think VERIP II was in the in-between time. The first one was '91-'92 and the last one was '93-'94. Did you think that the budget downturn was adequately dealt with? Forecast? The severity of it realized? And was it handled the way you would have handled it?

Young: I think the university handled the budget reductions about as well as they could be handled. I think that there were differences in the way it was handled from campus to campus, but in general, I think--and that was allowed for, and I think that [flexibility] was useful.

Lage: The campuses were allowed to take cuts as they saw fit?

Young: Within reason, to each treat things a little differently. I think UCLA was the most aggressive in the use of the VERIPs. I think it was the most protective in keeping cuts away from the academic core. But the differences were gradations.

Lage: And were they due to the chancellors' proclivities?

Young: Well, they were due to different views, in part, of the chancellors. But they were also due, in part, to the degree to which the chancellors had the ability on their own campuses to get done what they wanted to get done. And I, for a variety of reasons, was able to keep more control over what was done than, I think, any of the other chancellors.

Lage: I would ask you about that if I didn't know that you would--maybe it's already begun--complete an oral history with your program here at UCLA.

Young: Oh, I'm thirty or forty tapes into it, I think.

Lage: Good, I'm glad that's under way. We don't want to repeat that.

Young: You mentioned earlier that I was viewed as a manager-administrator. I was probably much more heavily into budgetary control than any of the other chancellors, and also, I think, I had a working relationship with the Academic Senate and with the rest of the administration that was more cooperative and more easily managed. Now, you know, that cooperation was tested very clearly during that period. And we did some other things at UCLA, for instance, like the Professional School Restructuring Initiative, which, you may have heard, was a way of making dramatic changes and had huge consequences. We eliminated a school, added schools, put schools together.

Lage: Did you do some things that you'd wanted to do before the budget crisis?

Young: Yes, some things that made sense, that you could do under budget exigencies that you could not do otherwise. But that ability to maintain control, to keep all of the elements together, was severely tested during the crisis. I'm not certain to what extent I would have been able to continue doing that indefinitely after that.

Lage: Too much unhappiness, and too many changes?

Young: Well, yes, I think there were--. Earlier we'd gone through a splitting up of the College of the Arts into two schools, and made some changes there. We were very aggressive in trying to bring about some changes.

I think that VERIP was just a stroke of genius. I think everyone involved, the chancellors and everyone, would say that it was good we had it. There would be a spectrum. I'd be at one end, and there would be other people at the other end, but they'd all say VERIP was good. I say stroke of genius, some would say a necessary evil.

Lage: Was it useful on your campus?

Young: Oh, absolutely. It worked out excellently here [at UCLA]. I don't know how many people--faculty for instance, let's just talk faculty--went through VERIP, but let's say 125 or 150. As best I can determine, we only lost two people that we'd <u>really</u> wanted to keep. And I think we kept a lot of people that we otherwise wouldn't have been able to--it was a fabulous thing.

People were able to retire, under extremely advantageous circumstances. If you needed them, recall them. Their combined income was greater than before. And the cost to the university budget was one third of what it was before. You were able to go out and hire someone to replace them. You had a new faculty member and the old faculty member both working at less salary than the one had cost before, and you were making the necessary

savings. You've got to be able to look at those things analytically and come to a conclusion --and it worked well.

We always put a positive face on it, always pushed it positively. If you start out kind of talking negatively about it, then everybody gets the viewpoint that it's negative, and they don't want to be involved with it, and it's bad for them. And if they quit, if they do it, they're bad people. Our best people who could take advantage of it, took advantage of it and stayed. And it was wonderful. They're still teaching, and we've been able to bring somebody new in. So it worked out very well. Between the faculty and the staff cuts that were made that way, we were able to do it in ways which prevented us, with very, very rare exceptions, of having to lay anybody off. The only place we laid anybody off was in the hospital, and that was a handful of people.

Lage: That is pretty amazing.

Young: Those were budget cuts that amounted, in the aggregate, to 25 percent. And to get through that, without in any way, in my view, hampering the quality of the program in the short range--. Now, as I said earlier, we should have gotten credit for that. We should have gotten support from the legislature and the governor.

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Young: As you said, you can't do a VERIP every year, and you reach a point when it really begins to hurt because those people are gone, you've brought in a lot of new people. You need to begin to fill back in at the higher levels where you have now lost some people. But all it really did was advance retirements, the retirement of people who would otherwise be retiring, by one, two, or three years. So the losses weren't losses you wouldn't suffer anyway, they just came a little more quickly. And Ron Brady and David Gardner, with the support of the chancellors, I think, especially me, managed to get that through. But that was something they came up with, especially Ron, that I think was the salvation of the university.

Lage: That's a strong statement, but those were pretty dire times.

Young: Absolutely, I mean that's--until then, until, what was it, '91 or '92, we hadn't had cuts. We'd gotten less money than we would have gotten. The University of Washington, University of Illinois, University of Wisconsin, University of Minnesota, had all suffered cuts. We'd never had any cuts, but we had, over a period of four years, cuts that amounted to 25 percent, and that's a tremendous amount.

David Gardner's Retirement

Lage: Let's talk now about the Gardner retirement and all the controversy that came after that. And maybe that's tied in with this budget business too. If you think so, tie it in. Give me your take on it.

Young: Well, you know, none of us knew really anything about it as it was happening. And later on when I learned about it, I realized there were some regents' meetings when David wasn't present and Ron was, and something was going on and we didn't know what, and that's what was being dealt with. And, gosh, I don't even know if I remember the details of it now.

Lage: Just to step back a little, were you surprised when David Gardner retired?

Young: No. I was not. He announced his retirement in about November of '91, and that had been kicking around since February or March of that year, I guess. In the press daily, almost. He faced hassles at regents' meetings, fights about what to do, what not to do. What had been a very successful administration got bogged down. People were spending more time worrying about what the *San Francisco Chronicle* said or didn't say.

Lage: I thought that most of that came after he actually retired, after he announced his retirement.

Young: No, that was all--that precipitated the retirement. I think two things precipitated the retirement. One was Libby's death, and the other was the battle over the retirement package. Most of that was in the period leading up to the retirement, wasn't it? Maybe you're right.

Lage: My memory is that he retired, we'd had some bad budgets--and then the generous retirement package was announced.

Young: You're right. You're right. It's from the November [1991] through the end of his term--then the question as to how to deal with the benefits--should he give it back, should he not give it back? Should he not take it? Should he take it? Was it secret and underhanded? Did the regents really know what they were doing, et cetera, et cetera.

Lage: And then they brought up a lot of other things, like--

Young: The housing arrangement.

Lage: The southern office of the president.

Young: Yes, and how his house was handled, and all those other things.

Lage: How do you understand what happened, the negative media? I understand that down here it wasn't as bad, in the newspapers, as it was in northern California.

Young: No, no. The attacks were mostly in the [San Francisco] *Chronicle*, I think.

Lage: The *San Francisco Examiner.*

Young: *Examiner* and the *Chronicle* both. The *Sacramento Bee*, to some extent, and the *Oakland Tribune*, to some extent. Mostly, I think, the *Chronicle* and the *Examiner*. But it was, you know, it was fully played out here. Well, number one, it was wrong. I think you've got to start with that. I think it was in principle wrong--

Lage: Now, what was wrong?

Young: It was too--I don't even remember the details any more--

Lage: Too rich a package?

Young: It was too rich a package. And there were clearly some procedural problems with the way in which it was done.

Lage: I think they allowed him to vest a little sooner, because he retired a year before the vesting date.

Young: Yes, but there were several aspects of it. Some of it made sense, some of it didn't make sense.

Lage: And some of it was the same retirement, the same kind of deferred package that all the top people, the chancellors, the vice presidents, were given.

Young: Yes. But then it got back into some of the earlier things. So I think there were some things about it that should not have been done. There were some procedural issues which made it easy to shoot at what was done, even if it had been all right. And the budget situation probably exacerbated it substantially. Here, in the face of all the problems that the university was facing, the president was leaving and getting this golden parachute.

And I think, going back to our earliest conversation, there were some regents who had begun to chafe under the Gardner reign who, consciously or subconsciously, saw this as a way to get back at him. One regent who, a year before, was telling me about how he and Ed Carter had really chosen Gardner and talked him into coming, and so forth, now thought he was the worst thing in the world. So, you know, there's some of that element. It was a combination of those things. Then, I think one of the problems was that they overreacted.

Lage: The university?

Young: The university overreacted to it. I kept saying, "Forget about it!"

Lage: Ignore it?

Young: Yes. That's all anybody in University Hall could think about, or in Oakland, up there in the Kaiser Building [where the Office of the President was situated]. That's all they could think

about. You go to meetings, that's all they talked about. "Oh, we understand this is coming out tomorrow morning. We don't know--Who's the leak? Where's the leak?"

Who cares where the leak is? You know, if there's anything there to leak then you don't worry about whether there's a leak. There's something to leak. But forget about it. It'll get over, it'll be gone in three months, or thirty days, or sixty days. You people are making too much of it. And all you're doing is making it worse, because everybody says, "Wait a minute, if they're that defensive about everything there must be even more there." So it just got to be untenable.

II THE UNIVERSITY DURING JACK PELTASON'S PRESIDENCY AND REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT ISSUES

Charles Young: A Willing Candidate for the Presidency

Lage: The retirement benefits controversy was kind of the context for the turning of the regime, the new regime. Let's talk about Jack Peltason's coming on as president. I've been told that there was some unhappiness there, and that you had been interested. Give me your point of view about that whole business.

Young: Well, I don't know. As I said, you asked me earlier if I had been a candidate or if I had been involved or interested in the presidency when David Gardner was appointed. Then the answer was no, not in any substantial way. And I wasn't initially interested when David announced his resignation. We were meeting at the Kerr campus there [in Berkeley]. Then, at that meeting, several people, including Jack Peltason, told me there was only one choice. It was me.

I began thinking about it and thinking about it, and other people began talking to me. And people around the country began talking to me. I finally reached the conclusion that they were right. And I think Peltason was right. Dozens of colleagues around the country said, "Well, why are they going through all this? Obviously they ought to ask you to take it."

And so I became a willing candidate, and indeed talked to people about writing letters of support. People came to ask me about it, I told them, yes, I think I would like to do it. Jack Peltason swore to everyone that I was his candidate, that he had no interest in the job. Dick Atkinson kept telling me that I was his candidate, but Dick clearly meant if he didn't get it, I was his candidate.

Lage: Did he tell you that, or you knew it?

Young: No, I could tell. People sent me copies of letters they wrote, and there were so many people writing letters that everybody thought I was out on a campaign getting people to write letters. I talked to maybe three or four people that I initiated. I said, "Gee, it would be nice if you'd write a letter. I'm being considered." A lot of people came to me and said, "I'd like

to write a letter, is it okay?" But dozens never told me they wanted to write a letter. They just sent letters without my knowing about it.

When they did the interviewing, it was down clearly to Jack Peltason, Dick Atkinson, and me. Jack said he told them he wasn't going to come because if he came he was just going to tell them why they should choose me. My understanding (you didn't ask this but I might as well get it in), but my understanding is that they came to a situation where there was--I don't know how many people were on there, nine people, or something of that nature?

Lage: On the search committee?

Young: Yes. I had the plurality, but not a majority. There were five for me and three for Atkinson, and two for Peltason, or something like that. And then they fiddled around--it was clearly the governor [Pete Wilson] who did not want me to be the president.

Lage: Oh. How do you learn that?

Young: Well, from people who were on the thing. At least, regents who were on the committee reported that the governor didn't want me. I don't know whether that's true.

Lage: Had you offended him in any particular way?

Young: I thought we got along very well. In retrospect, there was an incident that occurred some time before that, two or three years before that, where he was asked to speak at the inauguration of a new part of the law school at UCLA. It was during the period when he'd made some anti-gay statements at Stanford and there had been some howling, and there was an anti-Wilson demonstration. I tried my best to get his people, through the people who were working on it, not to hold it where they did because I knew there was going to be a problem.

And then when it came up, I got up when he was speaking (and he was being heckled), I took the microphone away and told the people that they were acting like jackasses and that he was the Governor of the State of California, and he was here to help celebrate the dedication of a great facility for our law school and he deserved to be treated decently, whatever their views were--and all they were doing was hurting their cause by their actions. But I've been told by a couple of people that his wife took great umbrage at that and blamed me for it, that I was responsible for it.

I don't know whether that is true or not, who knows? I've heard that. I don't know whether it is true, I don't know whether it is not true. And I really have no view about it, other than that's what I've been told by some people.

The Selection of Jack Peltason and the Report of the Transition Team

Young: Meredith Khachigian called me at the meeting of the selection committee, and said the regents had decided to ask Jack Peltason to do the job, but Jack would not take it unless I asked him to do so. I said, "Well, have Jack call me." And we had a conversation. I told him what I thought needed to be done. I told him that I was very concerned about some things in the university that I thought needed to be taken care of, and I was also concerned about my having a reasonable role in all that, one of being able to be helpful in a different way than just another chancellor. And he said, "That's wonderful. That would be great." I said, "Then Jack, I will ask you to take the job." And he did. But he didn't do what he said he was going to--

Lage: He didn't use you in the way that you thought he should.

Young: No.

Lage: Yet he did appoint you as head of the transition team.

Young: Yes.

Lage: Then tell me about that.

Young: Well, I think that was--. [He and I] discussed that, and we put that together. And I think it was a great experience. I think we got a lot done. I think the report of the transition team, the recommendations and the report, the several, in effect, books that followed from it, were remarkable. I think the group of people all worked together well. We came up with a lot of very good recommendations.

Lage: And they focus on management?

Young: They focused on management, organization, on tactics, on a whole range of issues. I did a report, then, a year later I think, on what had been done. And, to a very large extent, the recommendations were implemented. Some weren't. But I think it's very clear that a lot was accomplished as a result of the transition team, and I was very pleased to have participated in it. Took a lot of time and effort, but we had a good group. The team and the various task forces were, I thought, well chosen.

Lage: From all the campuses.

Young: From all the campuses and from, you know, all the constituencies.

Lage: That must be quite an effort.

Young: It was. It was a very, very substantial effort. The body of work that's involved in it was very great.

Lage: It was more than just transition, it was future planning?

Young: Yes. It grapples with questions like what changes ought to be made in the university to allow it to fully realize its potential.

A Frank Assessment of Jack Peltason's Leadership

Lage: Now, where did Peltason fall down in using your skills in the way you thought he should? Had you envisioned going up to the UCOP?

Young: No, no, no. I had not envisaged not continuing to be chancellor of UCLA. But what we had talked about, and what he and Ron Brady--as Jack's representative--and I talked about was a supplemental kind of role. One of the things that Ron was pushing was the possibility of there being, in effect, a chairman of the Council of Chancellors. A number of things like that, a kind of an additional position as special assistant, or advisor, or something that recognized a special role, so that there was a recognition that I was not just being pushy, which I have been and was, but that I was doing so with some cachet.

Lage: How did Jack Peltason's management style--

Young: Disaster.

Lage: Tell me about it.

Young: In a word, disaster.

Lage: In what respect?

Young: You name it. If you take all of the good things about David Gardner and turn them around, you've got Jack Peltason.

Lage: Was he like David Saxon?

Young: Well, [long pause] he was overly deferential to the regents. In my view he did not comprehend the difference between governance and management. We had discussions in which I would say, "But Jack, you're letting the regents run the university." And he said, "That's what they're supposed to do." And I said, "No, they're not, Jack; the president's supposed to run the university. The regents are supposed to govern the university, and there's a difference."

Lage: I see. That's what I wanted to ask you next, what is the difference between governance and management?

Young: Yes, policy versus--. Governance entails responding to an agenda that's established by the president. Providing an overview for what the president and the administration do. Giving the benefit of doubt to the recommendations of the president. Seeing the president as the chief executive officer who they have selected to run the place.

It does not mean being the president--as many regents would have liked him to be, especially some of the newer regents, or taking the position, in which Jack acquiesced--that the president and the administration are just another one of the constituencies that the Board of Regents deals with, as if they were members of the Public Utilities Commission and they listen to this group, and that group, and another group, and then they decide which of those ideas is the best. Jack lost Ron Brady early on, and he brought in a very good person in Wayne Kennedy, but other than that, there were really no substantial members of his management team.

Lage: Was [Walter] Massey a good man?

Young: Yes. Excuse me, that's unfair. Yes, Massey was a good man, and I think was doing a good job. He was somewhat frustrated, but he was doing a good job. But then he left fairly early. So you lost Brady and you lost Massey. And Wayne Kennedy was the only one around.

Lage: How much would you attribute to Jack Peltason and how much to the restlessness of the regents that you've described?

Young: A mixture. You can't blame this totally on Jack. I'm being unfair to blame it totally on Jack. But he was the wrong man to get into that situation at that point in time. It couldn't have been worse. You needed someone with strength who was going to pull things back together, who was going to try to get people back rowing together to get things done. Jack tended to be laissez-faire. He made some recommendations to try to be responsive to the concerns the regents had, which were negative, and most of the chancellors told him that they were negative, and some of the regents told him they were negative, not the right things to do.

Lage: Now, what would these have been?

Young: Oh, having to do with cuts that were made, new rules and regulations in regard to travel, new rules and regulations in regard to entertainment. A change in what had been a very strongly fought for and approved position for the spouses of the chancellors that recognized their role. Jack took that away. A whole range of things. But it isn't so much what finally got done, it's the way it happened: "Well, what do you think? What do you think? What do you think? What do you think?" "Well, I don't know. I don't know. Maybe this, maybe--." Very, kind of, rudderless.

Lage: Are you describing the Council of Chancellors meetings?

Young: Yes, and other meetings. Jack just did not have the strength to deal with the situation at the time in which he became president. At other times Jack may have been a very superb president. But it was just not the right time for him.

Lage: Time and people. Both are important factors.

Young: Time and people, yes. And then he did some things which just so infuriated me. Arrangements which clearly had been made with regard to [UC Santa Barbara Chancellor] Barbara Uehling and her retirement, had been made by David Gardner and she had taken on full faith and credit, he failed to live up to. He eventually got overridden on that by the regents. The regents finally realized that she could take them to court and win. I mean, there was just no question. A number of things like that.

I continued--this was during the period of working up to the regents' action against affirmative action--and I, consistent with what I'd always done, took very strong positions and was very vocal. And Jack didn't like that.

Lage: He didn't like your--

Young: Didn't like my speaking out.

Lage: And [UC Berkeley Chancellor Chang-Lin] Tien? Did he come down on Tien for speaking out?

Young: Yes. I gave some interviews about things I thought needed to be changed in the university and Jack thought I was being disloyal. I said, "This is not about individuals involved at the moment, these are structural changes. The university needs reform of its organizational structure." I went back and talked about things that happened under Clark Kerr, and things that worked forward, and where we'd gotten, but there was still more that needed to be done. And he told me that if I didn't rescind that and come back and write a letter of apology, I'd be fired.

Lage: It doesn't sound like there were very friendly feelings.

Young: No, there is no friendship, and we went in the best of friends.

Affirmative Action and the Mission of the University

Lage: Tell me how you see the affirmative action issue. How do you see the way that occurred? Was that a case of the president not being strong enough? Or of a particular regent being too strong? Or was it the times?

Young: Well, it [rescinding affirmative action] clearly was the wrong thing to do. Unnecessary. It was a political interference in the internal affairs of the university. I don't care what anybody says, it was instigated because Pete Wilson, who had been a supporter of affirmative action, decided this was a good issue on which to run for the presidency [of the United States]. And that's the reason that Ward [Regent Ward Connerly], in my view,

introduced it. I think it could have been stopped early on by stronger presidential action. But that's hindsight, and it's also biased.

Lage: Just to go back a minute, for background, how did David Gardner measure up on affirmative action, and why weren't the regents challenging it earlier on?

Young: It had been established policy for twenty-five years.

Lage: But were they rumbling about it? That's what I get when I talk to regents. They say, well nobody really liked it--

Young: There was some rumbling. But only from two or three regents. And it clearly would have not passed had the governor not made it an issue; it's kind of similar to the Deukmejian situation on divestment. Had Governor Wilson not made it an absolute test of loyalty, and himself taken a very strong role in it, SP1 and SP2 [the two regential special policies, passed in July 1995, ending affirmative action in admissions and in employment] would not have passed.

Lage: So you think he was directing his regents to come out against affirmative action?

Young: Oh, absolutely. It was not an issue. It never became an issue until--well, the thing that allowed it to become an issue was the activity of a father and son, both of whom, I think, had been turned down for admission to the medical school at San Diego. They did some studies. One of them was a statistician, the father. And they did some studies which showed the university was discriminating, and a variety of things. And that provided the ammunition--

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Young: I believe Jack Peltason was a strong supporter of affirmative action, and David Gardner was not. I'm sure that if David were running David Gardner University, there would have been no affirmative action.

Lage: But he did support it all those years.

Young: He supported it. But there was always, "Well, what happens when we get to this, and that, and the other, when we get down to so-and-so and we have to start turning away white males for this and that, and on and on." When we get there, David, let's talk about it. We're not there yet.

And then those of us who worked very hard within the university, especially Tien and I, to oppose Proposition 209[2]--you know, if we'd had one-tenth the money the pro-Proposition 209 people had, we would have defeated it.

Lage: How actively were you involved in working against it?

Young: Very.

Lage: On what different levels?

Young: Speaking. Writing. Financial contributions.

Lage: Did you connect with any organizations?

Young: Oh yes, I was involved with the coalition from the outset, trying to help put the coalition together, and then trying to raise money for it. I spoke at a number of occasions. And Tien and I both wrote, held joint press conferences.

On that issue, let me just say that the regents' items, SP1 and SP2, should be rescinded. And I know everybody says, "No, let's not bother." They ought to be rescinded. I don't care if it doesn't change anything, Proposition 209's there, they ought to be rescinded. It's a black mark on the University of California.

Lage: That's Regent [William T.] Bagley's crusade.

Young: Yes. And he's absolutely right. The governor [Gray Davis] says, "I don't care."

Lage: You must get discouraged, and you don't even have to go to the meetings any more.

Young: Yes. I haven't set foot in a regents' meeting.

Lage: What is it like when the chancellors speak out on a number of issues against the regents' stand?

Young: Well, you make some enemies. I have a few.

Lage: But it's allowed within the structure, or not? You just said you got reprimanded for--

Young: Well, yes. You've got to do it carefully. I sometimes wasn't too careful. I made some disparaging remarks about Ward Connerly in an article that got me in a pot full of trouble. And I went overboard on that. I don't think I did on the other matters. I've always said,

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[2] Proposition 209, The California Civil Rights Initiative, was passed by voters in November, 1996. The key provision states: "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting."

when you believe in something, I think you ought to try to do something about it, and I believe you ought to try to do something about it in the appropriate forum. And then when you lose it, you lose it. I don't think you ought to run around pretending you don't care or fighting something halfheartedly. If you don't think it's too important, then don't do anything. If you think it's a little important, then do a little about it. If you think it's very important, then you ought to get in there and do everything you can to make it go the way you want it to go.

Lage: Now, tell me why is affirmative action so important to you? Do you see it as important for the system, or for UCLA in particular? Or for the people?

Young: Oh, I think it's important for the people. It's an understanding about what the university is and what the university's trying to do. In the fight against Prop. 209, as I listened to others, the people I was debating in one place or another, on television or at meetings, I finally came to the conclusion that they had a different view about the university's role than I do, and what I think is the proper role.

For instance, they see admission as something the university is engaged in to reward people for doing a good job. It's like being the official at the finish line of a race. They say: "You went over all the hurdles, you didn't knock any down. You stayed in your lane and you came out first. You're in. You came out second, you're in. You came out third, you're in."

My view is that the university is a social institution, and it's supposed to do something for society. And, for the most part, a university like this one, which is a very selective, research-based university, can select the people it thinks ought to be its students on the basis of who won the hurdle race. But it doesn't have to.

It can select them because it thinks it has a responsibility to provide for a better society, and to educate people who are going to be filling the roles in that society that need to be filled in the future. And that's a very different matter. And furthermore, you need to provide an educational experience for people that is going to prepare all of the students, no matter how they were selected, with the best education possible. And that's one of the things people--.

You ask the students at UCLA and the students at Berkeley, what are things about this university that make it a great university and are allowing it to give you the kind of education it's giving you? And very high on that list will be, "It is a diverse university that provides a student body from whom I can learn a lot."

Lage: And also professors that want to teach a diverse student body.

Young: And also professors that want to teach them. I mean, if you look at UCLA twenty years ago and UCLA now--I don't care whether you look at medicine or law or education, or where you look--the people that graduate from UCLA today are better prepared to go out and serve this society than they were twenty years ago, in part because they're getting educated in an environment that's like the one they're going to be working in. And furthermore, we're in a

situation where, you know, within the next few years the Caucasian population of California is going to be in a minority.

And we don't have to worry about the Asian Americans in that regard, but the majority, very quickly, is going to be Chicano/Latino. And with a majority population Chicano/ Latino, and when only 5 percent of the teachers, and 5 percent of the doctors are Chicano/ Latino, something structurally is not going to work. Our children and our grandchildren are going to pay the consequences of that failure. There is no surrogate for race in this matter. All these things that they're out there trying to do now [to compensate for the absence of affirmative action] are going to make little, minor adjustments around the edges, but they're not going to resolve the problem.

Lage: And I think the university knows that because they've done studies.

Young: And they're spending millions and millions and millions of dollars trying to do things, and they're not going to have any impact at all. Well, I'm preaching.

Lage: I wanted to get that.

Decentralization, Privatization, and the Chancellors' Relations with the Board of Regents and State Government

Lage: Now, let's see where we are. Affirmative action is a key issue of those three years of the Peltason presidency, I wanted to ask you also about another issue: I read a newspaper article saying that you'd made a proposal that UCLA should secede from the statewide university.

Young: Oh, no. I've never said that.

Lage: Was this a false report?

Young: There was an article--that's one thing that Jack Peltason thought I was doing. I said, "No, I was never proposing that." There are a couple of things I've done. One is, I've said that there ought to be much more decentralization than there has been.

Lage: So you think it should go further?

Young: Further, further decentralization.

Lage: In what respects? What's next?

Young: Allow substantially more change among the universities than there is at the present time.

Lage: In the way they handle their money?

Young: In the way they handle their money. The way they handle a lot of things that are important, but not the heart of the university, not the basic quality. Quality ought to be a commonality. Structurally there ought to be changes.

I think, for instance, that the chancellors ought to be treated differently with regard to the regents. I think the chancellors ought to directly make recommendations to the regents with the president's approval, rather than these all being presidential approvals that come in, and the president's office screws them up. I mean, you put together very complicated things to go to the regents, and somebody in the president's office who doesn't understand it screws it all up and goes in and then presents something that the regents don't understand. Then we, the chancellors, have to explain.

Lage: Would you suggest that the chancellors present proposals just for their own campus to the regents?

Young: A lot of the things that go in are universitywide things. A lot of them are in the budget and things of that nature. But if there's a proposal to build a new building on campus "X," it is presented to the regents by OP: "The president recommends this and that..." and the chancellor sits back here and answers questions if he's asked.

The chancellor ought to recommend it, the chancellor with the approval of the president. For instance, "Chancellor X recommends..." And then we're the ones who--. And we put together the proposal. And they can comment on it, but it's our proposal. And the president can say, "I don't agree." I don't know whether you could go in to the regents without the president's approval, or you go in with the president saying, "The chancellor's recommending this. I don't agree."

Lage: But would this create an awful lot of fighting for resources?

Young: I don't think so. No, no, no, not resources. Resources you don't--

Lage: Well, for a new building.

Young: Well, a new building that doesn't require--. Not, "I want to build a new building and I want you to give me some money for it."

Lage: Oh, this is a building you--

Young: A building, yes, privately funded, or whatever. You know. Architectural decisions, and things of that nature.

Lage: That makes sense.

Young: I finally decided that I made a mistake early on in talking about privatization. See, I said that the university ought to become privatized. And that conjures up in people's minds something different from what I mean by it, although it's used pretty broadly. And very clearly the University of Indiana, the University of Michigan, and other state universities

have moved very heavily in the direction of privatization. So has the University of California, up to a point. UCLA, perhaps, a little more--UCLA has moved to a maximum extent that's allowable within the system. Others have not.

Lage: Of the balance between private fundraising and the state budget?

Young: Well, it's a concept. One of the things that causes problems in the university is that we're treated as a state entity. And the state approves our budget and appropriates funds. What I would like--and this has happened at Indiana, it's happened at Michigan--in effect, to come to a situation where it's more like this at least--the university and the state legislative and executive branches agree that the state wants the university to provide this level of education for this number of students, to admit "Y" percentage of the population, whatever. And the university and the state negotiate, and the state says, "We'll pay $3.5 billion for that and you have to provide what we've told you for that $3.5 billion, and we're going to examine it carefully. And if you don't, you've abrogated the agreement."

Lage: But every budget item isn't hashed out in legislature?

Young: No. And then it's our money. We've got to provide what we said we'd provide, but it's not, "This money is for this purpose and that money is for this purpose, and this money is for some other purpose, and you can't use it." We're in the situation here--. You're cutting back on staff and you're maybe reducing salaries, and you're building a new building. And they say, "Why are you building that new building?"

Well, in the first place, that new building costs $5 million, and if you want to annualize that--but secondly, I've got money to build a building and I don't have money to do the other. We ought to be able to make those kinds of choices. And if we can go out and get more overhead funds from federal contracting grants, we ought to be able to get it and we ought to be able to use it. So it's a matter of how it's run. We ought to be able to run it more like a private university is run, with a contract with the state.

Lage: That's an interesting concept.

Young: Well, you know, it's moved somewhat in that direction, but I think we ought to move a great deal more.

Lage: If you had become president do you think you would have--this is in the realm of what-if--would you have worked on more decentralization that you supported so strongly from the chancellor's position?

Young: Yes.

Lage: Because sometimes the perspective shifts when you get into the central system.

Young: I mean if you, going back to the privatization--and we've done studies--I'm convinced it costs us a premium of at least 20 percent to build a building, over what could be done in the

private sector. Also, we do it more slowly, and we don't get as good a building. So the real premium is not 20 percent, it's probably 25-30 percent.

Lage: Is this because of the state requirements?

Young: Yes. All the requirements. You have to select an architect in this way. You have to go out to bid on everything. When you go out to bid, the architect and the builder can't talk to each other. That isn't the way anybody in his right mind builds a building. As it now stands, you've got to start in with, "We'll give you some money to do preliminary planning. Then next year we'll give you some money to do design work. Then the next year we'll give you some money to do detail planning. Then we'll give you some money for construction, then we'll give you some money for equipment." The things are all stretched out. You can't count on anything.

For years the legislature wanted us to have differential student fees for the professional schools, and the university fought it. The university shouldn't have fought it, it was a good idea. But we finally came to the conclusion, that's a good idea. We went in, and we said, "Yes, we'll do it. And we'll do it in a rational manner. We'll start with law and medicine and dentistry and management." We worked out a careful plan. You start with the people coming in, you don't tack it onto people--if somebody comes into law school and it's $5,000 in their first year, it's $5,000 in their second year and their third year. But the next people coming in, it may be $6,000. Worked it all out, how you use the money. Worked the whole thing out, the policy adopted. Now, the legislature and the governor then come along and say, "Oh, we don't want that." And they put restrictions on our doing it.

And now, the big thing--. Here there's extra money in the state coffer. Here's the university that hasn't had any restoration of the cuts that had been made over the period that we talked about earlier. For the last three years they've been reducing the student fee. The student fees in this university are the lowest--it's the greatest educational bargain in the world. What people really need isn't lower tuition, they need more and better financial aid. So you can give more and better financial aid to the people who really need it. At present, 80 percent of the students who come to UCLA are no different from the students who go to Stanford University.

Lage: In terms of their financial abilities?

Young: Right. Why should the state be subsidizing all those students? It's ridiculous. And they're cutting fees when prices are going up. Because we don't get any more fee money, we have no more money to distribute in financial aid, so in effect the university is getting less affordable rather than more affordable. But you can't get that kind of a notion across.

Lage: Did you work with legislators on issues like this?

Young: Yes.

Lage: Would you do this because the president asked you to, or do it on your own?

Young: Oh, both.

Lage: That was something you and Jack Peltason agreed about, it seems to me.

Young: Yes, yes.

Lage: That is a role of a chancellor, to go up to Sacramento or to talk to your local people?

Young: Both. You shouldn't do Sacramento without the approval of the president, because each chancellor can't be up there fighting for his campus to the detriment of the rest of the university.

Lage: Or for his particular views.

Young: Or for his particular views, to the detriment of the rest.

Lage: Now, how about with individual regents? Did you have regents that were kind of "your regents"?

Young: No. No, and I was the only chancellor that didn't.

Lage: Oh, others do?

Young: Others do. Dick Atkinson used to say, "My regent," when he was at San Diego. And I said, "I don't have any regents, Dick. Why do you have regents?"

Lage: Why didn't you have regents?

Young: I didn't think it was right. And I didn't realize, until really kind of later on, how much other chancellors were doing with regard to regents. I never went to talk to a regent about something without telling the president I was going to talk to him, and usually not without being asked to go do it. Occasionally I'd say, "Look, this is a problem we've got. Is it all right with you if I go talk to Regent So-and-so about that?" "Yes, fine. Go do it." But I never--

Lage: I always thought Regent [Edwin W.] Pauley was a UCLA--

Young: Yes, but that's back a long time ago. Ed Carter was. [Dorothy B.] Buff Chandler was. But those go back a long time. There really aren't--until recently there haven't been many Los Angeles regents. And the Los Angeles regents don't--Los Angeles is so big--.

The Riverside regents clearly associate with Riverside. The San Diego regents are associated--and they would talk to Dick, "Well, what do you think about this, and what do you think about that, and what do you think about something?" The San Francisco regents are very Berkeley and San Francisco-oriented. The people from Sacramento have always been very tied to Davis.

But for the last twenty-five or thirty years, there haven't been any, kind of, Los Angeles regents who feel UCLA is their--except a lot of them are UCLA alumni. Harold Williams was maybe a little more like that. Yvonne Brathwaite Burke was a little like that. But not like the others.

Changes in the Regents and Regents' Meetings

Lage: How do you see change in the regents over the time we're talking about here? Ron Brady had some ideas about that when I spoke with him. He felt they changed quite a bit.

Young: They have. The regents, as an institution, has gone downhill, in terms of their being able to be successful regents. For a variety of reasons which are, in a way, similar to some of the things I fight for elsewhere, there are no Ed Pauleys, there are no Ed Carters. There are no people who run large organizations, who know how a large organization runs. They are lawyers, and they tend to be from small law firms. CPAs from small accounting firms. People who run small businesses. So they don't have the background or the attitude of people who are members of a board, working with a chief executive--

Lage: Which you must get on your other boards that you work with, like Intel.

Young: I don't try to tell Andy Grove how to run Intel. I listen and if there's anything I believe which is being done that's contrary to the best interests of the shareholders, or if I think they're making a serious mistake, I speak up. But, you know, I go on the assumption that Gordon Moore and Andy Grove have been pretty successful in running that organization, made it one of the largest corporations in the world, they must have a pretty good idea of what they're doing. So that they're probably right, unless I see some good reason to doubt the conclusions that they come to. There are people like that around.

And another thing, the open meeting laws have been a bad thing for running organizations. The press interest that developed and that continues is bad. Maybe not for other reasons, for getting more information to the public, or whatever. But it changes the character of the Board of Regents' meetings.

We used to meet in the regents' room at UCLA when I was first chancellor. There was a table for twenty-four people, and some chairs sitting around the back for the chancellors and the vice presidents, and five or six chairs down at the end for the press. Now, you're sitting in an auditorium with a crowd of 150 or 200 people--

Lage: Just for normal meetings?

Young: Yes. And thirty or forty reporters of one kind or another. People are talking to the press, and they're talking to the cameras. It's just different. And it's not a good difference, it's a bad difference.

Lage: For the governance--

Young: Yes, it affects the governance. I think it's had a negative effect on--I think Congress and the legislative process is not as effective today. I think it's, in large measure, for those reasons. I mean people aren't sitting down, getting the business of the university done. They're making speeches.

Lage: Are there other regents who have, sort of, political interest?

Young: Well, the other thing--I think there's been a politicization of the board. I think governors have come--and it goes back quite a while, I mean maybe it started with Ronald Reagan--and have used the university for political purposes, Republicans and Democrats alike.

Lage: Reagan and the firing of Clark Kerr?

Young: Yes, well Reagan didn't fire Clark Kerr. He would have been fired whether Reagan had been there or not. He had lost the confidence of the board. The myth is that he was fired by Reagan, and it's probably a good myth.

The governors used to appoint regents, and I think they appointed regents who had strong university backgrounds and affiliations, and they didn't have to be confirmed by the senate. Now they have to be confirmed by the senate and the governors--some governors at least, the last governor [Pete Wilson] did it and this governor [Gray Davis] is doing it--says, "I'll appoint you, but you've got to agree to do x, y and z."

You ought to say, "I'll appoint you because I think you're the best person involved. You know my views, but once you're appointed your responsibility is to do what you think is best for the university." They don't say that.

They say: "You've got to vote against student fees. You've got to vote against this, against that, against everything. Or for this, or for that, or for something else." And then you go to the senate for a confirmation hearing, and they ask, "What are your views on this, and what are your views on that?" They turned down a very good Asian American appointee because they didn't like his views on student fees and appointed a very bad Asian American because he would agree with him. I mean, approved the appointment.

Lage: I noticed when Gray Davis came in, he pushed the idea of this 4 percent admissions policy [admitting the top 4 percent of the graduating class in every high school]. Is that unusual, for a governor to insert himself into developing the admissions policy?

Young: I think he inserted himself too quickly, and I think that's wrong. I mean, that's bad policy. It's not so bad I wanted to go fight it. He's doing the same thing on student fees, reduction in student fees, which is a bad idea. They're doing it on year-round operation, which is a horrible idea. Horrible! It won't do what they want it to do.

We're doing what they want to do now and not costing the state any money, through summer sessions and institutes, and the Berkeley campus and UCLA campus, at least, are as

busy during the summer as they are during any other time of the year. We're doing things that are important, that need to be done and won't get done if we're on year-round operation.

Lage: And we tried it years ago, and it didn't work.

Young: And we tried it and it didn't work. Absolutely. I'm writing an op-ed piece on that right now.

The Technology Transfer Initiative

Lage: What have we missed now? We haven't discussed tech transfer. Is that something you got involved in, the technology transfer issue which came to a head during Peltason's presidency?

Young: Well, yes. That was a mistake.

Lage: Developing it? That was Ron Brady's baby.

Young: I know it was Ron Brady's, and Ron Brady made a mistake.

Lage: Okay.

Young: That was one which I tried to tell Ron was never going fly, it wouldn't work. They hadn't consulted the appropriate people. They didn't start out in the right place. They were trying to claim too much for it at the beginning, suggesting it would attain goals which could never be realized. They also had failed to consult with those who would have to be involved to make it work--

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Young: --and, therefore, who never bought into the plan. I told him, it's not going to do what you want.

Lage: It was also a response to the budget problems, in part.

Young: Yes, but then they got this--right on the heels of the Gardner thing, getting involved with this high flyer, whatever his name was.

Lage: Ron Cowan.

Young: Ron Cowan. Bad. Again, I tried to tell Ron [Brady] to stay out of that, not get involved with that. In my view, Ron made very few mistakes in his role as vice president, but that was one in which he and Jack Peltason together made a serious mistake.

Lage: Was your faculty in opposition to the idea?

Young: Not to the idea, but to the way it was done. You don't start in announcing publicly you're going to do something like this and create this thing to do it; in the university, you've got to start by consultation. The faculty don't like to hear announcements about what they are going to do. They take umbrage to that.

Lage: You should know, after all these years.

Young: Yes.

Lage: I think we've covered most everything I had planned to.

Young: I've about run out of gas.

Lage: Okay, then I think it's time to stop. And if you think of something later we can add it. Thank you so much for your time. Your interview will be a valuable addition to this project.

Transcribed by Rex Adams
Final Typed by Shannon Page

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APPENDIX

Excerpt from Glenn T. Seaborg's Journal
April 15, 1983

talk at the Bill Honig dinner last night and the forthcoming report of the NCEE and some of its content.)

I rode back to LBL with Jackie Mehlhop arriving about 3:10 p.m.

Upon my return I found Al Ghiorso in the office area having just returned via Lufthansa today from his stay (with Wilma) at Gesellschaft fur Schwerionenforschung mbH (GSI). He told me that the results on S.H.E. were negative in all the experiments --SHIP and chemical.

I received a final draft of our NCEE report at 3:20 p.m. I read it and found it disappointing. It is too wordy and fails to include some of my key recommendations.

Helen and I had dinner in the playroom.

Later I called Gerald Holton to discuss the NCEE report; he is ready to accept it although he, too, is not very satisfied with it. I wrote a draft of a sort of dissent, or actually "an additional comment."

Friday, April 15, 1983--Berkeley

At 8:50 a.m. I telephoned Milton Goldberg (NCEE) and told him that although I will agree to sign the Commission's report, I wish to attach "An Additional Comment" emphasizing the particularly critical need for improvement in math and science education. He put his secretary Alisa Longworth on the line and I dictated the following statement to her:

An Additional Comment

This Open Letter to the American People, with its call for educational reform and an improvement in our national attitude toward education, includes many well worded and potentially useful recommendations.

I have, therefore, joined my fellow Commissioners in signing the report even though, in my opinion, it falls short in its not very concise nor explicit description of the crisis in pre-college education that faces our nation and in its recommendations for the alleviation of that crisis. The deficiencies in that educational process and the uninformed attitude of our American people toward it have led to a critical shortage of engineers, to high school graduates who know too little to function effectively in an increasingly scientific and technological society and to prospects for a future citizenry incapable of participating knowledgeably in matters of public policy involving science and technology.

We must improve our national competence in science and engineering in order to restore our competitive position in the industrial world of increasing high technology and to reverse the continuing decline in our economy. Our nation's present course of indifference toward such needed educational reform has been very aptly characterized as "Unilateral economic Disarmament".

I believe that the report does not focus sufficiently on this crucial problem of pre-college education in science and mathematics. It is in just these subjects that our nation has a critical and crippling shortage of competent teachers. I would emphasize more unorthodox methods for augmenting immediately the supply of science and mathematics teachers. I would emphasize the need for appropriate instruction in science and mathematics, and the use of computers, for all students throughout the elementary, middle and high school. And although we certainly should not fault the large majority of beleaguered elementary, middle and high school teachers, who are under-appreciated, underpaid and lacking in the needed support tools, more effective methods for the termination of incompetent or mediocre teachers should be developed.

I believe that we should make a special appeal for help in implementing our recommendations, for science and mathematics, to organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, Science Service, the National Science Foundation, and, for other subjects, to organizations such as the Social Science Research Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Endowments for the Humanities and Arts.

Glenn T. Seaborg

At 9:45 a.m. I went to Building 70 and had a long talk with Al Ghiorso and Diana Lee (in the presence of Kjell Aleklett) about their stay at GSI. At present GSI is well equipped with physical apparatus, but some of its chemical glassware is antiquated. They said that Kenton Moody will return today. He will arrive in San Francisco tonight.

I returned an earlier call from D. A. E. Bennett at 10:15 a.m. He asked me to speak at the Berkeley Rotary Club on June 10th about the nuclear freeze. I declined, mentioning the very heavy speaking schedule I have that prohibits accepting other engagements.

John Rasmussen called me at 10:40 a.m. to tell me that he is working on a memorandum to Brad Moore regarding Darleane Hoffman. He asked me to pick up

April 2002

INTERVIEWS ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Documenting the history of the University of California has been a responsibility of the Regional Oral History Office since the Office was established in 1954. Oral history memoirs with University-related persons are listed below. They have been underwritten by the UC Berkeley Foundation, the Chancellor's Office, University departments, or by extramural funding for special projects. The oral histories, both tapes and transcripts, are open to scholarly use in The Bancroft Library. Bound, indexed copies of the transcripts are available at cost to manuscript libraries.

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Centennial History Project, 1954-1960. 329 pp.
Includes interviews with George P. Adams, Anson Stiles Blake, Walter C. Blasdale, Joel H. Hildebrand, Samuel J. Holmes, Alfred L. Kroeber, Ivan M. Linforth, George D. Louderback, Agnes Fay Morgan, and William Popper. (Bancroft Library use only.)

Thomas D. Church, Landscape Architect. Two volumes, 1978, 803 pp.
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Julia Morgan Architectural History Project. Two volumes, 1976, 621 pp.
Volume I: *The Work of Walter Steilberg and Julia Morgan, and the Department of Architecture, UCB, 1904-1954.* Includes interviews with Walter T. Steilberg, Robert Ratcliff, Evelyn Paine Ratcliff, Norman L. Jensen, John E. Wagstaff, George C. Hodges, Edward B. Hussey, and Warren Charles Perry.
Volume II: *Julia Morgan, Her Office, and a House.* Includes interviews with Mary Grace Barron, Kirk O. Rowlands, Norma Willer, Quintilla Williams, Catherine Freeman Nimitz, Polly Lawrence McNaught, Hettie Belle Marcus, Bjarne Dahl, Bjarne Dahl, Jr., Morgan North, Dorothy Wormser Coblentz, and Flora d'Ille North.

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Volume I: 1901-1920, 1970, 307 pp.
Volume II: 1921-1930, 1977, 313 pp.
Volume III: 1931-1935, 1990, 343 pp.

Six Weeks in Spring, 1985: Managing Student Protest at UC Berkeley. 887 pp.
Transcripts of sixteen interviews conducted during July-August 1985 documenting events on the UC Berkeley campus in April-May 1985 and administration response to student activities protesting university policy on investments in South Africa. Interviews with: Ira Michael Heyman, chancellor; Watson Laetsch, vice chancellor; Roderic Park, vice chancellor; Ronald Wright, vice chancellor; Richard Hafner, public affairs officer; John Cummins and Michael R. Smith, chancellor's staff; Patrick Hayashi and B. Thomas Travers, undergraduate affairs; Mary Jacobs, Hal Reynolds, and Michelle Woods, student affairs; Derry Bowles, William Foley, Joseph Johnson, and Ellen Stetson, campus police. (Bancroft Library use only.)

Robert Gordon Sproul Oral History Project. Two volumes, 1986, 904 pp.
Includes interviews with thirty-five persons who knew him well: Horace M. Albright, Stuart LeRoy Anderson, Katherine Connick Bradley, Franklin M. "Dyke" Brown, Ernest H. Burness, Natalie Cohen, Paul A. Dodd, May Dornin, Richard E. Erickson, Walter S. Frederick, David P. Gardner, Marion Sproul Goodin, Vernon L. Goodin, Louis H. Heilbron, Robert S. Johnson, Clark Kerr, Adrian A. Kragen, Mary Blumer Lawrence, Stanley E. McCaffrey, Dean McHenry, Donald H. McLaughlin, Kendric Morrish, Marion Morrish, William Penn Mott, Jr., Herman Phleger, John B. deC. M. Saunders, Carl W. Sharsmith, John A. Sproul, Robert Gordon Sproul, Jr., Wallace Sterling, Wakefield Taylor, Robert M. Underhill, Eleanor L. Van Horn, Garff B. Wilson, and Pete L. Yzaguirre.

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